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Home My WebLink Aboutb2electioncampaignreg FROM: Anthony J. Mejia, City Clerk J. Christine Dietrick, City Attorney SUBJECT: AMENDMENTS TO THE CITY’S ELECTION CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS RECOMMENDATION As recommended by the Election Campaign Regulations Committee, direct staff to prepare an ordinance with the following components: 1. Amend Chapter 2.40 of the Municipal Code to eliminate the City Supplemental Campaign Statement. 2. Amend Sections 2.40.040(A) and (B) to increase contributions by persons to candidates and/or controlled committees and acceptance of said contributions to not exceed the sum of three hundred ($300) dollars. 3. Delete Sections 2.40.050(C) and (D) of the Municipal Code related to the closing of campaign accounts and disbursement of unexpended campaign funds. 4. Clarify Section 2.40.060(D) of the Municipal Code to indicate that the City Clerk will cause publication of one display ad, informing the public how, when, and where to access campaign statements, at the time mail ballots are distributed for said election. DISCUSSION The City's Election Campaign Regulations were first adopted in 1974. These regulations were intended to place realistic and enforceable limits on campaign contributions and expenditures, to ensure fairness and full disclosure, and to provide an opportunity for all citizens to become candidates for public office unhindered by exorbitant campaign costs and the reality or perception of undue influence over elected officials. The regulations specifically call for a periodic review of such regulations in order to ensure they are consistent with the original intent and with state and federal law. The last review was conducted in 2009 and revised Election Campaign Regulations were adopted by the Council on January 19, 2010. Section 2.40.160 of the Municipal Code provides that at least nine months prior to the expiration of Chapter 2.40 the Council shall appoint a committee of at least five citizens to study the efficacy of the City's Election Campaign Regulations and report its deliberations to the City Council. On August 20, 2013 the City Council appointed a citizens committee consisting of the following: Ty Griffin (Chairperson), Allen Settle (Vice Chair), Jerri Carroll, Andrea Devitt, Wilda Rosene, and Bob Shanbrom. This committee met on October 3, October 24, and concluded its business on November 7, 2013 and said meeting minutes are Attachment 1. Meeting Date Item Number 02/04/2014 B2 - 1 Election Campaign Regulations Committee Recommendations Page 2 Summary of the Meeting of October 3, 2013 Prior to their initial meeting, members of the committee were provided with a Facts/History Sheet related to past committees (Attachment 2). In addition, Kevin Rice submitted correspondence, dated October 3, 2013, to the committee for its consideration (Attachment 3). The committee provided direction to staff related to items for future consideration and established its meeting schedule. Summary of the Meeting of October 24, 2013 At the meeting of October 24, 2013, the committee received a report from City Attorney Dietrick summarizing her memo, dated October 23, 2013, and the implications of the McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission case on the future of campaign finance regulations (Attachment 4). Committee discussion ensued relative to the City’s ability to establish campaign limits on Independent Expenditure Committees and Political Action Committees (PACs). City Attorney Dietrick advised that the City is precluded from establishing such limits and the committee agreed no further discussion was necessary. The committee then discussed specific elements of Mr. Rice’s letter including the mandatory closure of campaign bank accounts and the City Supplemental Statement requirements. The committee discussion focused on the possible rationale for enacting regulations which require the closure of campaign accounts and it was agreed that it should be eliminated due to its inconsistency with Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) regulations and its negative impacts on treasurers, candidates, and staff. The committee questioned the purpose of the City Supplemental Statement and whether it furthers the intent of the campaign regulations. The majority of the committee agreed that the supplemental statement should be eliminated, but Committee Member Shanbrom requested that the matter be further discussed at the next meeting. Committee discussion then ensued relative to contribution limits on candidate controlled committees with focus on the City’s inability to regulate PACs, whether such limits impede a candidate’s campaign, and whether limits should be reduced, increased, eliminated, or remain unchanged. Following straw poll votes, the committee tentatively agreed that contribution limits should be raised to $300, but at Committee Member Shanbrom’s request the committee agreed to table the matter to the next meeting. It was noted that Committee Member Devitt strongly felt that contribution limits should be eliminated and Committee Member Shanbrom felt that limits should remain unchanged at $200. It should also be noted that considerable discussion was given as to whether the Council would approve an increase above $300, but ultimately it was the consensus of the committee that if Council desired to increase the limits that it may do so regardless of the committee’s recommendation. The committee agreed that Section 2.40.060(D) of the Municipal Code should be clarified that the City Clerk will cause publication of one display ad of a notice advising citizens how to obtain campaign disclosure information. The committee also discussed whether the City should use public funds for campaigns financing, but the committee agreed to not move forward with such a proposal. B2 - 2 Election Campaign Regulations Committee Recommendations Page 3 Summary of the Meeting of November 7, 2013 At the meeting of November 7, 2013, at the City Attorney’s request, the committee discussed the City Attorney’s role as prosecutor of campaign regulations violations and the potential for the public to perceive a conflict of interest when required to enforce regulations against incumbent Council Members. City Attorney Dietrick advised that because the City and the Council as a whole, and not any individual Council member, is her client she does not feel any tension between her role as City Attorney appointed by the Council and City Prosecutor representing the People in this context. Moreover, she advised that if any actual conflicts did arise, she would seek independent outside counsel in accordance with her state bar ethical obligations. The committee recommended no changes to the ordinance related to the City Attorney’s prosecutorial role related to election campaign regulation violations. Committee Member Shanbrom was unable to attend the majority of the meeting and sent a correspondence to the committee (Attachment 5). The committee discussed Mr. Shanbrom’s recommendation to amend the purpose and intent statement (Code Section 2.40.02) to include the term “transparency”. The majority of the committee felt that the statement already expressed the sentiment of transparency and that it was unnecessary to revise. The committee further discussed the value of disclosing contributions between $50 and $99 pointing out with the raise of inflation the impact of these contributions are lessened. By unanimous consensus of the members present determined that the City Supplemental Statement should be eliminated, with Committee Member Shanbrom absent. The committee had an in depth discussion related to contribution limits and the discussion focused on the following: 1) whether contribution limits should be eliminated, 2) whether contribution limits should remain at $200, 3) whether contribution limits should be increased to $300 or $400. The committee had earlier discussed a correspondence from Stew Jenkins which indicated that individual contribution limits are effectively not going to withstand constitutional scrutiny over time and should be rescinded (Attachment 6). Committee Member Devitt expressed “grave concern” that the committee appeared to be moving forward with retaining contribution limits despite the risk of litigation by Mr. Jenkins. Following its discussion, the committee recommended that contribution limits be raised to $300, with Committee Member Devitt opposed and Committee Member Shanbrom absent. Chair Griffin requested that it be pointed out that the committee read and reviewed the letter from Mr. Jenkins and still recommends retention of contribution limits. Attached to this report is an article published on SCOTUS Blog, by a very well respected constitutional scholar, Erwin Chemerinsky, discussing the distinction between expenditure and contribution limits and providing further analysis of the issues staff believes Mr. Jenkins to be raising. B2 - 3 Election Campaign Regulations Committee Recommendations Page 4 FISCAL IMPACT Costs to codify the amendments were already anticipated in the City Clerk Records/Administration budget. Therefore, introduction and final adoption of the ordinance will not result in a significant financial impact. ALTERNATIVES The Council may reject the recommendations of the Election Campaign Regulations Committee or modify as appropriate. ATTACHMENTS 1. Election Campaign Regulation Committee Minutes of 10/03/13, 10/24/13, and 11/07/13 2. Facts/History of the Election Campaign Review Committee 3. Correspondence from Kevin Rice, dated October 3, 2013 4. Memo from City Attorney Dietrick, dated October 23, 2013 5. Correspondence from Bob Shanbrom, dated November 6, 2013 6. Correspondence from Stew Jenkins, dated November 5, 2013 7. Article from Erwin Chermerinsky 8. Regulations from Other Cities (Council Reading File) T:\Council Agenda Reports\2014\2014-02-04\Election Campaign Reg Report (Mejia)\CAR ECRC Recommendations.docx B2 - 4 CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO ELECTION CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS COMMITTEE Minutes OCTOBER 3, 2013 4:30 PM COUNCILHEARING ROOM 990 PALM STREET - SAN LUIS OBISPO 1. CALL TO ORDER The meetingwas called to order at 4:30 p.m. 2. ROLL CALL: Jeri Carroll, Andrea Devitt, Ty Griffin, WildaRosene, Allen Settle, Bob Shanbrom. STAFF PRESENT: Sheryll Schroeder, Interim City Clerk, and Heather Goodwin, Deputy City Clerk 3. OATHS OF OFFICE Interim City Clerk Schroederadministered the Oath of Office to all Committee Members. 4. SELECTION OF CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR The Committee agreed to appointTy Griffin as Chair and Allen Settle as ViceChair. 5. DISCUSSION - PLAN OF ACTION FOR REVIEW During the discussion, the Committee agreed to the following discussions: o City Attorney to review Supreme Courtcase. o Discuss independentexpenditure committee / Political Action Committee PAC", and lobbyists do not have the same regulations as a local candidate. o Review the language of existingordinancewhere two sections were not 702 -05 B2 - 5 removed fromamended ordinance in 2009. o Consider the contribution limit or eliminate all together. o Discuss mandatoryclosure of campaign accounts. o Discuss removing the CityCampaign Statementsrequirement. o Filelocal campaign ordinance toFPPC. o Discussthe City requirements for publishing election and candidates information on the website and local newspaper o Use of public funds to finance a campaign. 6. PUBLIC COMMENT None. KevinRice sent comments to the Interim City Clerk to address points to consider. 7. SELECTION OF NEXTMEETING DATE The followingmeetings have been set withthe location. October 17, 2013 at 4:30 p.m. — FIT Conference Room November 7, 2013 at 4:30 p.m. — Council HearingRoom November 21, 2013 at 4:30 p.m. - FIT Conference Room 8. ADJOURNMENT The meetingadjourned at approximately 5:26 p.m. Heather Goodwin, Deputy City Clerk Approved: XX/XX/XX 702 -05 B2 - 6 CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO ELECTION CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS COMMITTEE MINUTES Thursday, October 24, 2013 Finance and IT Conference Room, 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, California CALL TO ORDER A meeting of theElection Campaign Regulation Committeewas called to order on Thursday, October 24, 2013, at 4:35 p.m. in theFinance and IT Conference Room, located at 990 Palm Street, San Luis Obispo, California, by Chair Griffin. ROLL CALL Committee Members Present: Andrea Devitt, Wilda Rosene, Allen Settle, Bob Shanbrom, Vice Chair AllenSettle *, Chair Ty Griffin Vice Chair Settle arrived at 4:36 p.m. Committee Member Absent: Jeri Carrol Staff Present: Christine Dietrick, City Attorney, Anthony J. Mejia, City Clerk, and Heather Goodwin, DeputyCityClerk 1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES By unanimousconsent, thecommitteeapproved ofthe minutes of the Election Campaign Regulation Committee Meeting of October 3, 2013. 2. PUBLIC COMMENT No members of the public were present. B2 - 7 Minutes - Election Campaign RegulationCommittee 3. DISCUSSION - PLAN OF ACTION FOR REVIEW 702 -05 Page 2 City AttorneyReview of Supreme Court Case _(McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission) City Attorney Dietrickreviewedthe contents of her memo regarding the Supreme Court Case McCutcheon v. FederalElection Commission and responded to Committee inquiries. A hard copy of Ms. Dietrick's memo, dated October 23, 2013, is on file with the City Clerk. Inde1nendent Expenditure Committees /Political Action Committee City Attorney Dietrickexplained that theCity is precluded from establishing campaign limits againstindependent expenditurecommittees and political action committees; advised that the City's campaignregulations only apply to candidates and /or controlled committees; responded to Committee inquiries. During the courseofdiscussion, the Committee reviewed the City's existing contribution limits, reporting requirements for independent expenditurecommittees and politicalaction committees, and the distinctions between independent versus candidate controlled committees and campaign limits versus expenditure limits. It was agreed that the City is precluded from regulating independentexpenditure committees and politicalaction committees and no further discussion is necessary. Mandatory Closure of Campaign Accounts versus Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) Requirements Chair Griffin noted that thecommittee received correspondence from Kevin Rice concerning items for the Committee's consideration; pointed out that Mr. Rice recommends rescinding the mandate to close bank accounts. A hard copyof Mr. Rice's letter, dated October 3, 2013, is on file withthe City Clerk. Committee discussion ensued relative to therationale for requiring the closure of campaign accounts, current Fair Political Practices Commission regulations related to campaign accounts, and impacts on treasurers, candidates, and City staff. By unanimousconsent, thecommitteerecommended the deletionof Municipal Code Section 2.40.050(C) and (D) relating to the closure of campaign accounts. City SupplementalStatement Requirement Chair Griffin advised that Kevin Rice's correspondence further recommends rescinding the supplemental city campaign statementrequirement. B2 - 8 Minutes - Election Campaign Regulation Committee 702 -05 Page 3 During the courseofdiscussion, the Committee discussedthe purpose of the supplemental statement and questioned whether it furthers purpose and intent of the campaignregulations. Individual members of the committeeagreed that the supplementalstatement requirement should be eliminated, with theexceptionofCommittee Member Shanbrom. CommitteeMember Shanbrom requested, and it was agreed, that the committee will table the matter to the next meeting forfurther discussion. Contribution Limits Chair Griffin reviewed the memo from Interim City Clerk Schroeder regarding the City's history of contribution limits. A hard copy of Ms. Schroeder's memo, dated October 1, 2013, is on filewith the City Clerk. TheCommitteediscussed the impacts of independent expenditure committees on local elections; whether the regulations hinder a candidate's ability to launch an effectivecampaign; whether thecontribution limit should be eliminated, increased or remain at $200. Followingdiscussion, the Committee tentatively agreed that thecontribution limit should be increased to $300, with the exception of Committee Member Shanbrom who preferred that the limit remain at $200. The Committee determined to table the matter to thenext meeting for further discussion. Requirement for Publishing Candidate Information on the Website andLocal Newspaper City Clerk Mejia advised that Ms. Schroeder's memo points out a discrepancy betweenthepreviouscommittee's recommendation and theadopted ordinance relating to the publication of candidateinformation in the local newspaper. By unanimousconsent, the Committee recommended modifying Municipal Code Section 2.40.060(D) to requirethatthe City Clerk cause one publication of a notice in a newspaper of general circulationadvising citizens how to obtain information relatedto campaign disclosures. Use of Public Funds to Finance Campaigns CommitteeMember Shanbrom discussed whether consideration should be given to the use of public funds for campaignfinancing. B2 - 9 Minutes - Election CampaignRegulation Committee Page 4 City Clerk Mejiaadvised that the Cityof Los Angeles does providepublic funding forcandidatecampaigns, noting that the process is highly regulated and has dedicated staff to oversee the program. City Attorney Dietrick pointed out that the use of publicfunds for campaigns financing wouldimpact theCity's limited financial and human resources. The Committee determined to not moveforward with utilizing public funds to finance campaigns. ReviewLan ua e of Existin Ordinance Re ardin Sections Not Removed from the 2009 Amendment The Committee noted that thematters identified in thememo from Interim City Clerk Schroeder were addressed earlier in the meeting and that no further discussion is necessary. Items for Future Consideration City Attorney Dietrick requested theCommittee reviewthe role of the City Attorney in the enforcementof the existing ordinance. Chair Griffin noted that contribution limits, the City Attorney's role ofenforcing the ordinance, and the City's supplemental statement requirement will be agendized for the next meeting. 4. ADJOURNMENT The meeting adjourned at 6:01p.m. The nextElection CampaignRegulation Committee meeting will be held on Thursday, November 7, 2013 at 4:30 p.m. in theCouncil HearingRoom, located at 990 Palm Street, San Luis Obispo, California. Heather Goodwin Deputy City Clerk Approved: XX/XX/XX 702 -05 B2 - 10 CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO ELECTION CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS COMMITTEE MINUTES Thursday, November 7, 2013 Finance and IT Conference Room, 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, California CALL TOORDER A meetingof the ElectionCampaignRegulationCommittee wascalled to order on Thursday, November 7, 2013, at 4:30 p.m. inthe Financeand IT ConferenceRoom, located at 990 PalmStreet, SanLuis Obispo, California, by Chair Griffin. ROLL CALL Committee Members Present: JeriCarrol, Andrea Devitt, Wilda Rosene, Bob Shanbrom*, Vice Chair AllenSettle, Chair Ty Griffin CommitteeMemberBob Shanbrom arrived at 5:12 p.m. Committee Member Absent: None Staff Present: ChristineDietrick, CityAttorney, Anthony J. Mejia, CityClerk, and HeatherGoodwin, DeputyCityClerk 1. APPROVAL OFMINUTES Byunanimousconsensus, theCommitteeapprovedof the minutes of the Election Campaign RegulationCommittee Meeting of October24, 2013. 2. PUBLIC COMMENT Therewere no membersofthepublicdesiring to speak. B2 - 11 Minutes - Election Campaign Regulation Committee Page2 3. ACTION PLAN FORDISCUSSION Correspondence fromStewJenkins concerning Election CampaignRegulations dated November 5, 2013 Inresponse to Committeeinquiry, CityAttorney Dietricksummarized the allegations and potential implicationsraised in the correspondence received from Mr. Jenkins; noted that Mr. Jenkinsletterindicatesthatindividual contribution limits are effectively not going to withstandconstitutionalscrutiny overtimeand recommends that the regulations be allowed to expiretoavoid a legalchallenge in the future. Byunanimous consensus (withCommittee Member Shanbrom absent), it was recommended thattheElectionCampaignRegulations be extended for an additional four year period. Following discussion, it wasagreed thatthe committee will reconsiderMr. Jenkinsletterafter considering other agendaitems. Review the Role of the City Attorney in the Enforcement of the Existing Ordinance CityAttorney Dietrickadvised that there is potential that the public may perceive a conflict ofinterestwhenshe is required to enforce ElectionCampaign Regulationsagainst incumbentCouncil Members. In response to Committee inquiry, Ms. Dietrickexplained that her state bar ethicalobligations require that if she wasunable toindependentlypursue her role thatshe would seek an independentoutsideprosecutor. Following discussion and by unanimousconsensus (with CommitteeMember Shanbrom absent), it was recommended that Code Section 2.40.100 Civil Actions remainunchanged and theCity Attorney retain herrole as prosecutor in relationtoElection Campaign Regulations. Correspondence fromBob Shanbrom concerningElection Campaign Regulationsdated November 6, 2013 Chair Griffin pointedoutthatCommitteeMember Shanbrom has recommend ed theinclusion of theterm “transparency” to Code Section 2.40.020(A)(1). The Committee agreedthat the purposeandintent statement alreadyembodiesthe sentiment of transparencyand it isnot necessarytorevisethe code. B2 - 12 Minutes - Election Campaign Regulation Committee Page3 SupplementalCity Statement Committeediscussion ensued relative to the impacts of requiringdisclosure of contributions greaterthan $50, but less than $100, on the supplemental city campaign statement. By unanimous consensus (withCommitteeMember Shanbrom absent), it is recommended that the supplemental city campaign statement be eliminated. Contribution Limits During the courseof deliberations, individual CommitteeMember(s) offered commentary as follows. Thebelowpointsdonotnecessarilyreflect Committee consensus: People do notgetpower and influencefrommaking campaign contributions. Otherlocalraces such as County Supervisor andSchoolBoardMembers do not have contribution limits. It is not appropriate to retain contributionlimits just because it’s the way thingshave been done. There is a perception that moneybuysaccessanddrivespublic policy. Iflarge sums of moneyarecontributed, how does anelectedportray themself as impartialrepresentativeofthe community? Whenmoneygets out ofcontrol, you don’t have a representative government or democracy. IfPoliticalActionCommitteesinjected large contributions into a local election it would be headlinenews. It is a political issueto remove contributionlimitsandthatshouldbea decisionoftheCouncil. It is highlyunlikelythat a developer’s contributions to a Council Member wouldimpact the outcome of a projectbeforeCouncil. Contribution limitsshouldbe raised to $400 because it is difficult to keep books with odd numbers. IftheCommitteedesires to raisethe contribution limits, therewouldbe a higher rate ofsuccess if $300 is recommended. TheCommitteeshouldmakepolicyrecommendationsbased on our opinionsand noton whatCouncil will approve. Byconsensus (with CommitteeMemberDevittopposedandCommitteeMember Shanbrom absent), it is recommendedthat contribution limits be raised to $300. City AttorneyDietrickadvised that the Council AgendaReport will includean evaluationofthelegal factors addressed in the correspondence by StewJenkins; notedthat if litigation is filled by Mr. Jenkins the Council willdecide if defending theprinciples of contribution limits isinthe bestinterest of theCity. B2 - 13 Minutes - Election Campaign Regulation Committee Page4 Committee Member Shanbromarrived at 5:12 p.m. CommitteeMemberDevitt expressedgraveconcern thatthe committee is movingforward with retainingcontributionlimitsdespitethe risk oflitigation by StewJenkins. Chair Griffinnoted for therecord that the Committee read and discussedthe correspondence from Mr. Jenkins and it is recommending that contribution limits beretained Representative to Present Recommendations to Council Bystraw poll vote, thecommittee selected Ty Griffintopresent its recommendations to Council. 4. ADJOURNMENT The Committee agreedthat it has concluded its business and nofurther meetings are necessary. The meeting adjourned at 5:30 p.m. Anthony J. Mejia CityClerk B2 - 14 r r - f 4 w mcmoRAnbum city of san Luis ompo, office of the city desk DATE: October 1, 2013 TO: Election Campaign Regulations Committee FROM: Sheryll Schroeder, InterimCity Clerk SUBJECT: FACTS /HISTORY FOR THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW COMMITTEE hope this additional information will be a helpful review as webegin discussions on Thursday, October 3, 2013. 1 look forward to working with you. The original regulations were first adopted in 1974, contribution limit was $100. In 1991, the citizen committeethought it should be increased to $250; Councildenied this recommendation by a 4to 1 vote. In 1994, a new citizens committeerecommended raising the contribution limit to $120; recommendation was voteddown 5 to 0 vote. In 1998, the contribution limit was $100 (Ord. 1333) In Nov. of 2005 it was increased to the current $200 (Ord. 1483) Currently no anonymouscontributions are allowed in excessof $50. In 1974, none were permitted. In 1976, they were allowed up to $10. In 1981 the amount was raised to $25 and currently the amount is $50. City Supplemental CampaignContribution Statement is due the sametime campaign statements are filed as required by the provisions of the Government Code. For 2014 election cycle, candidates file Form 460 on July 31 st as their Semi - Annual Statement; September 25th as their first Pre - election Statement *, October 23rd as their second Pre - election Statement *. January 31 st, Semi - AnnualStatement. * At the sametime these reports are due, the City's Supplemental Report is also due. Per Section 2.40.060 B, The City Supplemental Reportcontains name, address and amount of contribution for eachperson who contributesgreater than $50, but less than 100 and totalexpenditure made by each committee. The 2010 Supplemental Report B2 - 15 City Clerk Council Memorandum Page 2 contained a box wheretotal expenditures were reported. At the November 5, 2009 Election Campaign Regulations Committee meeting the members agreed to eliminate that requirement butthe subsequent ordinance still contained the requirement. This is one possible issue to discuss. 2.40.060 D: "Upon receipt of each campaign statement and supplemental citycampaign statement, the city clerk shall timely cause to be published a display ad in a newspaper of general circulation advising the public how and where to accesscopies of the filed campaign statements and supplemental city campaign statements on the City of San Luis Obispowebsite ". Theminutes of theNovember 5, 2009 Committee meetings, members agreed to one publication of a display ad when the County issues the ballots, notifying the public how, when and where they can access the information. Again, the subsequent ordinance contained the older language. This is another possible revision to the ordinance that mayclarify thisissue. 2.40.070 Campaign signs. Staff has asked the Police, Fire and Public Works Department for their comments on the currentregulations. To date there hadbeen no response. 2.40.050 C: requires the candidates to close their campaign accounts 90 days after the election. State regulations, Chapter 8 of the State Manual, says that thelawdoes not require any local candidate or committee to terminate the committee. A new Form 501 and 410, plus a filing fee of $50 are required. The City's regulations, Section 2.40.050 C requires the treasurer to closethe campaign account no later than 90 days following theelection. The City Attorney can explain the difference between state regulation and the City's and thismay be another areathe Committee could discussclarifying. TheCity's contribution limits do not apply to ballot measurecommittees. Average spent on local elections: 2013 Special all mail ballot election 2012 Regular Municipalelection 2010 Regular Municipalelection 16,000 (5 candidates) Supplemental 15,000 (7 candidates) Supplemental 12,000 (6 candidates) Supplemental 5,243 reported on 6,367 reported on 1,564 reported on Comments from current CouncilMembers regarding the regulations: Independent ExpenditureCommittees are not regulated by the City's campaign limits. Raise the limit at least to $300. Consider raising the limit or eliminate it completely. Your finalreport is due to City Council by January 31, 2014 B2 - 16 Kevin P. Rice 2013 October 3 Election Campaign Regulations Review Committee San Luis Obispo CA Via: Electronic Mail through City Clerk SUBJECT: ITEMS FOR COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION Dear Committee Members: Thank you for representing our city on this committee. Following my experience and participation as a council candidate, I wish to bring several items to your attention pertaining toChapter 2.40 of the San LuisObispo Municipal Code (SLOMC). For some items, I offer a recommendation; others, I will leave for you to debate. I. Contribution limitations ( SLOMC 2.40.040) Question: Should the current $200 contribution limit be raised or rescinded? Background: Presently, contributions to candidates from any one source are generally limited to two hundred dollars, whether monetaryor non - monetary. Many feel this limit prevents undue influence from largemoney sourcesand allows all candidates to compete on a more even playing field. However, during thecampaign period for the recent June 18 special municipal election, a large $4,159.64 contribution from the SLO CountyDemocraticParty ( SLOCDP) occurred benefitting a single candidate. (See Exh. A.) Because the SLOCDP is a state committee and political party, it cannot be regulatedby our local campaign limit ordinance.' 1 See Government Code §§ 85312, 85703, 81009.5(b) (Political Reform Act); also FPPC opinion, In re Olson (2001), 15 FPPC Ops. 13, 0 -01 -112 (http: / /www.fppc.ca.sov /opinions /olsonfinal.pdf). The interpretation of this issue is complex; I would be pleased to provide further information on this topic, upon request, or you may wish to contact the FPPC directly. B2 - 17 Items for Committee Consideration (Kevin Rice) Election Campaign RegulationsReview Committee Discussion: Contributions from state committees, not subject to our local ordinance, will certainly play a role in future city elections. Such contributions effectively defeat the purpose ofour local ordinance. As a result, the contribution limit causes disparity for candidates not backed by an exempt organization, but who might otherwise be fully capable of soliciting and receiving comparable donations locally. II. Mandated closure of campaign bank account (SLOMC 2.40.050(C)) Recommendation: Rescind this mandate. Require candidatesto be able to show all campaign were properly expended or disposed instead. Background: SLOW 2.40.050(C) requires a campaign treasurer to close election campaign accounts no later than ninety days following theelection. Compare this with state law, which requiresonly that all campaign funds must be spent for the purpose theywere contributed —on the present election. Discussion: It is an unreasonable hardship to require candidates to close a bank account which they are otherwiselegally entitled by state law to reuse for future campaigns. State law requires excess campaign funds must be expended, donated to charity, returned to donors, or disposed of via other particular means. It is also a hardship on bankers to close an account, only to re -open a new account. A candidate must then amend FPPC filings simply to change an account number, then reorder checks and bank cards. Presently, it is my understanding that the City Attorney has interpreted our ordinance mandate in a waythat allows candidates to simply "zero" their account balance. The ordinance should be amended to require candidates to be able to demonstrate all campaign funds were properly disposed. The mandate toactually close bank accounts should be removed. III. Supplemental city campaign statements (SLOMC 2.40.060) Recommendation: Rescind the supplemental city campaign statements requirement. Background: SLOW 2.40.060(A)(2) and (B) requires campaign treasurers to file supplemental city campaign statements" disclosing contributions "greater than fifty 2- B2 - 18 Items for Committee Consideration (Kevin Rice) Election Campaign Regulations Review Committee dollars, but less than one hundreddollars ". State law otherwise requires disclosure of cumulative contributionstotaling one hundred dollars or more. (Gov. Code § 84211(c).) Hence, the "gap" filled by the supplemental city statements mandates disclosure of contributions totaling between $50.01 and $99.99. Greater amounts are already required to be reported by the Political Reform Act. Discussion: There are a number of reasons to eliminate the requirement for supplemental city campaign statements: Whenthe supplemental city form was created, I believethecampaign contribution limit was $100 (please check me on this one). Thus, it was imperative to have a supplemental form to get any reporting at all. That is no longer the case, and most donors are in the $100 -$200 category reportableunder state law. The supplemental cityform creates extra hassle for city staff. The supplemental city form creates extra hassle for candidates. The "gap" ($50.01- $99.99) filled bythe supplemental statements is small. In looking at recent city candidates, the number of donors in this category is also fairly small; thus, the value of disclosing this information offers little. The vast majority of donations of interest are over $100. The value of the dollar has decreased over time. Due to all of the above, I believethe public disclosure provided bythe supplemental city form has substantially decreased in value and necessity. I would like to see this extra nuisance" filing eliminated from our ordinance. IV. Disclosure of local campaign ordinance to FPPC (Gov. Code § 81009.5) Recommendation: Ensure copy of SLOMC 2.40 is filed with FPPC. Background: The Political Reform Act requires "[a]ny local government agency which has enacted, enacts, amends, or repeals an ordinance or other provision of law affecting campaign contributions and expenditures shall file a copy of the action with the commission." (Gov. Code § 81009.5(a).) Sincerely, Kevin Rice 3- B2 - 19 MEMORANDUM From the Office of the City Attorney October 23, 2013 TO: Election Regulations Committee Anthony Mejia, City Clerk FROM: J. Christine Dietrick, City Attorney The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission on October 8, 2013 and a decision is pending, butnot expected for several months. Links to the FEC's brief background summary of the case and all party and amicibriefs filed are at: http: / /www.fec.jzov/ law /litigation /McCutcheon.shtmi The issues before the Court have been presented as follows: Issue: (1) Whether the biennial limit on contributions to non - candidate committees, 2 U.S.C. 44 1 a(a)(3)(B), is unconstitutional for lacking a constitutionally cognizable interest as applied to contributions to national party committees; and (2) Whether the biennial limits on contributions to non - candidate committees, 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)(B), are unconstitutional faciallyfor lacking a constitutionally cognizable interest; and (3) Whether the biennial limits on contributions to non - candidate committees are unconstitutionally too low, as applied and facially; and (4) Whether the biennial limit on contributionsto candidate committees, 2 U.S.C. 44la(a)(3)(A), is unconstitutional for lacking a constitutionally cognizable interest. The current limits restrict people from donating more than $123,200 tofederal candidates, parties and political action committees. No more than $74,600 may be donated to parties and PACs, while no morethan $48,600 may be given to candidates. This case is essentially the follow up to the Citizens United case and a June 2012, SCOTUS decision that overturned the decision of that State's Supreme Court and invalidated a 100 -year old Montanalaw that prohibited corporatespending in the state's election based on the application of Citizen's United. The central holding of Citizens United was that states and the federalgovernment may restrict the amount of money corporations may contribute to an individual political candidate, theymay not limit the amount of money a corporation spendson its own — independent of any candidate — to express political ideas in advertisements or other forms of political expression. There, the Court declared, "We now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption... The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy." Following on that sentiment, McCutcheon seeks to B2 - 20 Page 2 extend the holding to invalidate the aggregate limits on contributions to party committees and candidate committees. The Supreme Court is reviewing the U.S. Court of Appealsdecision, which upheld the limits after D.C. Circuit Courts dismissed the case. A succinct summary and videowrap up of the issues to be decided in McCutcheon can be found at: 1ittp: / /www.washingtonpost.com /blogs /the- lix /wp/2013/1 0/08 /supreme- court - takes -up -the- sequel -to- citizens - united /. Despite the Court's recent activity to limit campaign finance regulation, limits on individual candidate contributions currently remain permissible. B2 - 21 1 Mejia, Anthony From: Sent:Wednesday, November 06, 2013 7:45 AM To:Goodwin, Heather; Dietrick, Christine; Mejia, Anthony; Subject:Shanbrom absence I'm sorry toinform the committee that I will not be able to makethe meetingtomorrow, Nov. 7. I mistakenly double- booked thedatesome weeksagoandcannot getout of my other commitment. Here are my commentsfrom last meeting that I wishedtopresentattomorrow's meeting: 1) While the contribution limit of $100 established in 1974represents $475 in 2013dollars, the contribution limit of $200 established in2005 represents only $240 in 2013 dollars whenchecked against the CPI. However, neither this calculation noranyother calculation is particularlyrelevant tothe issues/questions at hand, "Is there a compelling reason to raise the limit?" "Isthelimit sufficient to allow candidates to gettheir message out?" "Dowe wish to 'disenfranchise' middle-income contributors by placing the contribution limits onlywithin reach of the wealthy?" Toillustrate thelast point, currently a family of fouradults (thereexistsuch cases) might contribute up to $2400to influence the outcome ofa city election, 3 seats. If thelimitwere raised to $300that amountwould rise to $3600. Only a relativelyfewfamilies, ostensiblythose with strongfinancialinterests inthe outcome, can afford that amount. Forthose committeememberswho are concerned withan inordinate influence of money inour democratic, not plutocratic, society, I would ask, "Whypush our city electionsfurther in thatdirection?" I maintain my preference for a $200 limiton individualcontributions. 2) While thetotal amount of supplemental money in 2012, $6,400, accountedforonlyabout 6% of thetotal money contributed, foronecandidate the amountrepresented about15% of the contributions. So while the averageamount is low, thereare nowandmay beinthefuturespecific cases wherethe supplementalcontributions are/could be significant. I believevotershave an interest in having this info available. Anotheraspect of this issue is that voters have a legitimate interest in knowingwhethercandidates are supported by "the people" with lowand mid-rangecontributions. Reviewing theforms requiredforsupplementalreporting I donotsee a majorburden in this sort of reporting. And it would seem that in thisthe age of computers such a reportcould be generated with a couple clicks ofa mouse if the campaigntreasurer usestheright software when intaking the contributions. But if it is somewhattroublesome I thinkthe amount of money in playhere is significantenoughtowarrant theextraeffort to report and record it. 3) I wish to agendize for discussion theaddition of the modernword, "transparency," as below inthe regulations. "Transparency" is a word whichhas come into common usage in approximately thelast 15 years orso, the age of the Internet, to describe a process in whichthe truth is notjust forthright and forthcoming, but is alsoeasily accessible and visible. Transparency is the means by which the statedgoalsof "integrity, honestyand fairness" arebest assured. Proposedrevisionto 2.40.020A.1.: To promote integrity, honesty, fairnessand <transparency> in municipalelection campaigns. 4) In terms of the cityattorneybeingplaced inthe uncomfortableposition of having to enforce campaignregulations violationsagainstelected officials, perhaps the responsibilityformaking a recommendation to pursueenforcement could be made by anotheragency, perhaps the CRRCsince it is reasonably armslengthfromthe outcome and is up tospeed on the regulations. TheCity Councilcould makethe final decision, with a tie vote or better obligating actiononthepart of the city attorney. In the rare occasion that a city attorney mightnot wish to act, the CC could hire a privateattorney. Respectfully, Bob Shanbrom OriginalMessage----- From: Goodwin, Heather <hgoodwin@slocity.org> B2 - 22 2 To: Allen Settle <AndreaDevitt <Bob Shanbrom Dietrick, Christine <cdietrick@slocity.org>; DominicPerello <Goodwin, Heather <hgoodwin@slocity.org>; Jeri Carroll <Mejia, Anthony <amejia@slocity.org>; Ty Griffin WildaRosene < Sent: Tue, Nov 5, 2013 4:43 pm Subject: FW: Study Committee & City Council re: SLUM Chapter 2.40 - Comments Good Afternoon Committee Members, Attached are two documents from Stew Jenkins for your review. Thank you, Heather Goodwin | Deputy City Clerk City of San Luis Obispo 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 tel | 805.781.7103 web | www.slocity.org/cityclerk Bcc: Council ALL Original Message----- From: Mejia, Anthony Sent: Tuesday, November 05, 2013 12:04 PM To: Goodwin, Heather Subject: FW: Study Committee & City Council re: SLOMC Chapter 2.40 - Comments Please forward to Council and the Committee Anthony J. Mejia | City Clerk City of San Luis Obispo 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 tel | 805.781.7102 Original Message----- From: StewartJenkins [mailto: Sent: Tuesday, November 05, 2013 11:55 AM To: Mejia, Anthony Cc: John Ashbaugh Subject: Study Committee & City Council re: SLOMC Chapter 2.40 - Comments Good Morning Mr. Mejia, I am forwarding a letter and a US Supreme Court case, as suggested, to you digitally so that they may be provided to the study committee that I understand meets this Thursday, and to the City Council Members, as they consider whether to extend, amend, or let sunset Chapter 2.40 of the San Luis Obispo City Municipal Code - Campaign Finance. A hard copy will be dropped off to your office, as City Clerk, for your official records. Thank you, Stew Jenkins Law Office of Stew Jenkins San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Phone: ( Web: www.stewjenkins.com B2 - 23 STEW JENKINS ATTORNEY C tfa/714 < 6aly- C J to Pi it C4 /L/Zf /L November 5, 2013 CEJVED Anthony Mejia, City Clerk 990 palm Street NOV 0 5 202 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 (", 17Y CLERK Re: SLO City Municipal Code, Chapter 2.40, ELECTION CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS; Council Study Committee Dear Mr. Mejia: I hope that you will pass this note and the accompanying U.S. Supreme Court opinion on to the study committee and the members of the City Council as they consider campaign finance ordinances now in place, and any consider replacement ordinances. As required by SLOMC 2.40.140 a committee is studying whatprovisions should be recommended for preservation, amendment or lapse as set out in Chapter 2.40 of the Municipal Code limiting campaign contributions and expenditures in City elections. As I mentioned to at least one of my friends on the City Councilduring the lastthree elections cycles, the terms of the current City campaign finance ordinances are strikingly similar to a Vermont statute held to be unconstitutionalin 2006 on five separate grounds as violative of individual rights of free speech and free assembly. Those rights are amplified by stronger provisions in Article I, Sections 1 -3 of the California Constitution. Specifically the case of Randall v. Sorrell (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479 held that restriction of donors to contributing $200 -$450to a candidate, and restrictions on campaign expenditures, so impaired these important inalienablerights that they hadtobe struck down. With the current contribution limit in the City at $200 per donor, similar to the Vermont statute, the City's ordinance constitutes an imporper incumbent protection program and would be struck down by any court that examined it. A copy of the full U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Randall v. Sorrell is attached. After reviewing that case, it is clear that any personseeking to support or oppose a candidate, or any candidateseeking support, in a San Luis Obispo City election would be in a good position to bring a legalaction to preventenforcement of SLOMC Chapter 2.40. But, with Chapter 2.40 sunsetting and going out of existence effective June 30, 2014, the study committee and the City Council has an opportunity to correctthisbefore some citizen, orgroup of citizens, seek judicial correction. I want to suggest that thegoal of encouraging fair elections free from corrupting influences, while removing provisions which impair individual and collective individual rights is laudable; but the current state of the law in this area is in such significant flux that readopting Chapter 2.40 of the www.stewjenkins.com B2 - 24 Municipal Code would be fool hearty. Doing so now poses significantrisk for drawing the City into violations of individual and collectiverights toexercise free speech, free press, and free assembly. Until the U.S. Supreme Court resolvesthe legal landscape, caution is adviseable and the chapter should be permitted to sunset. Oncethe High Court has defined what regulations to ensure fair elections free from corrupting influence can be enacted without trammelling individual and collective political rights, consideration of newmoreappropriate ordinances can and should be addressed at that time. As all of the Council and the study committee members know the nation's highest court has been recently very active in reviewing and strking down campaign finance limits. Comments made by a majority of theJustices in the back to back opinions of Citizens United and American Tradition Partnership, Inc., vs Steve Bullock, Attorney General ofMontana haveprefaced what appears to be a sea change in whether limits on contributions and expenditures to support or oppose candidates or ballot measures can beenacted and enforced in any form. On October 8, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission which examines whether placing a limit on contributions to non - candidate and to candidate committees can be imposed at all by statute (or by extension by an ordinance). The argument is available on line from the Supreme Court's website, and any listener will recognize that comments and questions of theJustices suggests an outcome at odds with placing limits on contributions and expenditures is likely. While a reading of Randall v. Sorrell might suggest that setting higher limits on contributions to City Council candidates that matched those imposedon state assembly andstatesenate candidates might pass muster, clearly a decision in McCutcheon may well make those higher limitsunlawfully restrictive. Waiting to craftlocal ordinances to replaceChapter 2.40 until after theSupreme Court issues its opinion in McCutcheon would be the City's most prudent action. Si Stew J www.stewienkins.com 2 B2 - 25 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... Justice Souter filed dissenting opinion in which Justice 126 S.Ct. 2479 Ginsburg joined and Justice Stevens joinedin part. Supreme Court of the United States Neil RANDALL et al., Petitioners, West Headnotes (4) v. William H. SORRELL et al. Vermont Republican State Committee, Et Al., Petitioners, V. William H. Sorrell et al. William H. Sorrell, et al., Petitioners, V. Neil Randall et al. Nos. 04 -1528, 04 -1530, 04 -1697. 1 Argued Feb. 28, 2oo6. I Decided June 26, 2oo6. Synopsis Background: Voters, candidates, and organizations brought actionchallenging constitutionality of various provisions of Vermont CampaignFinance Reform Act. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont, William K. Sessions, III, Chief Judge, 118 F.Supp.2d 459, enjoined the enforcement of Act's limitations on expenditures, gifts by non - resident contributors, and contributions by political parties to candidates, and upheld all of the Act's other contribution limitations, and parties cross - appealed. TheUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 382 F.3d 91, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, and certiorari was granted. Holdings: The Supreme Court, Justice Breyer, held that: Ill Vermont campaign finance statute's expenditure limits on amounts candidates for state office could spend on their campaigns violated First Amendment free speech protections, and 2] statute's contribution limits onamounts individuals, organizations, and political parties could contribute to campaigns of candidates for state office violated First Amendment free speech protections. Reversed and remanded. Justice Alito filed opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Kennedy filedopinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed opinion concurring in the judgment inwhich Justice Scalia joined. Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion. Constitutional Law Limitations on amounts Election Law Limitations on amount of expenditures Vermont campaign finance statute's expenditure limits on amountscandidates for state office could spend on their campaigns violated First Amendment free speech protections. (Per opinion of Justice Breyer, with two justices concurring and three justices concurring in the result.) U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; 17 V.S.A. § 2801 et seq. 30 Cases that cite this headnote 21 ConstitutionalLaw Limitations onamounts Election Law Limitations on amount of contributions Vermont campaign finance statute's contribution limits onamounts individuals, organizations, and political parties could contribute to campaigns of candidates for state office violated First Amendment free speech protections; statute's substantial restrictions on the ability of candidates to raise funds necessary to run a competitive election, on ability of political parties to help their candidates get elected, and on ability of individual citizens to volunteer their time to campaigns showed that it was not closely drawn to meet its objectives. Per opinion of Justice Breyer, with two justices concurring and three justicesconcurring in the result.) U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; 17 V.S.A. § 2801et seq. 73 Cases thatcite this headnote 131 Election Law In general; power to regulate campaign finance Where there is strong indication in a particular case, i.e., danger signs, that risks to the democratic electoral process exist, both present in kind and likely serious in degree, courts, including appellate courts, must review the recordindependently and carefully with an eye 4' estla,,.,vNest' © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. B2 - 26 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 55-03.—.. toward assessing campaign contribution statute's "tailoring," that is, toward assessing the proportionality of the restrictions. (Per opinion of Justice Breyer, with two justicesconcurring and three justices concurring in the result.) U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. 17 Cases that citethis headnote 41 Statutes Elections, voting, and political rights Unconstitutional campaign contribution limits in Vermont's campaign finance law were not severable from contribution limits that might have remained fully operative. (Per opinion of Justice Breyer, with two justicesconcurring and three justicesconcurring in the result.) U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; 17 V.S.A. § 2801 et seq. 43 Cases that cite this headnote West Codenotes Held Unconstitutional 17 V.S.A. § 280117 V.S.A. § 280517 V.S.A. § 2805a17 V.S.A. § 280617 V.S.A. § 2809 2480 *230 Syllabus" Vermont's Act 64 stringently limits both the amounts that candidates for state * *2481 office may spend on their campaigns and the amounts that individuals, organizations, and political parties maycontribute to those campaigns. Soon after Act 64 became law, the petitioners — individuals who have run for state office, citizenswho vote in state elections and contribute to campaigns, and political parties and committees participating in state politics— brought this suit against the respondents, state officials charged with enforcing the Act. The District Courtheld that Act 64's expenditure limits violate the First Amendment, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, and that the Act's limits on political parties' contributions to candidates were unconstitutional, but found the other contribution limits constitutional. The Second Circuit held that all of the Act's contribution limits are constitutional, ruled that the expenditure limits may be constitutional because they are supported bycompelling interests in preventing corruption orits appearance and inlimiting the time state officials must spend raising campaign funds, and remanded for the District Court to determine whether the expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to those interests. Held: The judgment isreversed, and the cases are remanded. 382 F.3d 91, reversed and remanded. Justice BREYER, joined byTHE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice ALITO, concluded in Parts I, II —B -3, III, and IV that both of Act 64's sets of limitations are inconsistent with the First Amendment. Pp. 2487 — 2489, 2490 — 2500. 1. The expenditure limits violate the First Amendment's free speechguarantees underBuckley. Pp. 2487 — 2489, 2490 —2491. a) In Buckley, the Court held, inter alia, that the Government's asserted interest in preventing "corruption and the appearance of corruption," 424 U.S., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612, provided sufficient justification for the contributionlimitations imposed on campaigns for federal office by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, id., at 23 -38, 96 S.Ct. 612, but that FECA's expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment, id., at 39 -59, 96 S.Ct. 612. *231 The Court explained that the difference between the two kinds of limitations is that expenditure limits "impose significantly more severe restrictions onprotected freedoms of political expression and association than" do contribution limits. Id., at 23, 96 S.Ct. 612. Contribution limits, though a "marginal restriction," nevertheless leave the contributor "fre[e] to discuss candidates and issues." Id., at 20 -21, 96 S.Ct. 612. Expenditure limits, by contrast, impose "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication," id., at 19, 96 S.Ct. 612, and therebynecessarily "reduc[e] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached," ibid. For over 30 years, in considering the constitutionality of a host of campaign finance statutes, this Court has adhered to Buckley's constraints, including those on expenditure limits. See, e.g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 134, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491. Pp. 2487 — 2489. b) The respondentsargue unpersuasivelythat Buckley should be distinguished from the present cases on a ground they say Buckley did not consider: that expenditure limits help to protect candidates from spending toomuch timeraising money rather than devoting that time to campaigning among ordinary voters. There is no significant basis for that distinction. * *2482 Act 64's expenditure limits are notsubstantially different from those at issue in Buckley. Nor is Vermont's primary justification for imposing its expenditure limits significantly different from Congress' rationale for the Buckley limits: preventing corruption and its appearance. The respondents say unpersuasively that, hadthe Buckley Court considered the timeprotection rationale for expenditure limits, the Court would have upheld those stlawNext © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. GovernmentWorks. B2 - 27 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... limits in the FECA. The Buckley Court, however, was aware of the connection between expenditure limits and a reduction in fundraising time. And, in any event, the connection seems perfectly obvious. Under these circumstances, the respondents' argument amounts to no morethan an invitation so to limit Buckley's holding as effectively to overrule it. That invitation is declined. Pp. 2490 -2491. 2. Act 64's contribution limits violate the First Amendment because those limits, in their specific details, burden protected interests in a manner disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance. Pp. 2491 -2500. a) In upholding the $1,000 contribution limit before it, the Buckley Court recognized, inter alia, that such limits, unlike expenditure limits, "involv[e] little direct restraint on" the contributor's speech, 424 U.S., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612, and are permissible as long as the government demonstrates that they are "closely drawn" to match a sufficiently important interest," id., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. It found that the interest thereadvanced, "prevent[ing] corruption" and its "appearance," was "sufficiently important" to justify the contribution limits, id., at 25 -26, 96 S.Ct. 612, and that those limits were "closely *232 drawn." Although recognizing that, in determining whether a particularcontribution limit was "closely drawn," theamount, or level, of that limit could make a difference, see id., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612, the Court added that such "distinctions in degree become significant only when they ... amount to differences in kind," id., at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. Pointing out that it had "no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as 1,000," ibid., the Court found "no indication" that FECA's contribution limitationswould have "any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns," id., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. Since Buckley, the Court has consistently upheld contribution limitsin other statutes, but has recognized that such limits might sometimes work more harm to protected First Amendment interests than their anticorruption objectives could justify, see, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395 -397, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886. Pp. 2491 - 2492. b) Although the Court has "no scalpel to probe," 424 U.S., at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612, with exactitude whether particular contribution limits are too low and normally defers to the legislature in that regard, it must nevertheless recognize the existence of some lower bound, as Buckley acknowledges. While the interests served by contribution limits, preventing corruption and its appearance, "directly implicate the integrity of ourelectoral process," McConnell, supra, at 136, 124 S.Ct. 619, that does not simply mean the lower the limit, the better. Contribution limits that are too low also can harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaignsagainst incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability. Where there is strong indication in a particular case, i.e., danger signs, that such risksexist (both present in kind and likely serious in degree), courts, including appellate courts, must review the record independently and carefully with aneye toward assessing the statute's "tailoring," i.e., toward assessing the restrictions' * *2483 proportionality. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502. Danger signs that Act 64's contribution limits may fall outside tolerable First Amendment limits are present here. They are substantially lower than both the limits the Court has previously upheld and the comparable limits in force in other States. Consequently, the record must be examined to determine whether Act 64's contribution limits are closely drawn" to match the State's interests. Pp. 2492 - 2494. c) The record demonstrates that, from a constitutional perspective, Act 64's contribution limits are too restrictive. Five sets of factors, taken together, lead to the conclusion that those limits are not narrowly tailored. First, the record suggests, though it does not conclusively prove, that Act 64's contribution limits will significantly restrict the amount of funding available for challengers to run competitive campaigns. Second, Act 64's insistence that a political party and all of its *233 affiliates together abide by exactly the same low $200 to $400 contribution limits that apply to individual contributors threatens harm to a particularly important political right, the right to associate in a political party. See, e.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574, 120 S.Ct. 2402, 147 L.Ed.2d 502. Although the Court upheld federal limits on political parties' contributions to candidates in Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461, the limits there at issue were far less problematic, for they were significantly higher than Act 64's limits, see, e.g., id., at 438 -439, and n. 3, 121 S.Ct. 2351, and they were much higher than the federal limits on contributions from individuals to candidates, see id., at 453, 121 S.Ct. 2351. Third, Act 64's treatment of volunteer services aggravates the problem. Although the Act excludes uncompensated volunteer services from its "contribution" definition, it does not exclude the expenses volunteers incur, e.g., travel expenses, in the course of campaign activities. The combination of very low contribution limits andthe absence of an exception excluding volunteer expenses W' ..tla, vvNext' © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 B2 - 28 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503.., may well impede a campaign's ability effectively to use volunteers, thereby making it more difficult for individuals to associate in this way. Cf. Buckley, supra, at 22, 96 S.Ct. 612. Fourth, unlike the contribution limits upheld in Shrink, Act 64's limits are not adjusted for inflation, but decline in real value each year. A failure to index limits means that limits already suspiciously low will almost inevitably become too low over time. Fifth, nowhere in the record is there any special justification for Act 64's low and restrictive contribution limits. Rather, the basic justifications the State has advanced in support of such limits are those present in Buckley. Indeed, other things being equal, one might reasonablybelievethat a contribution of, say, $250 (or $450) to a candidate's campaign was less likely to prove a corruptive force than the far larger contributions at issue in the other campaign finance cases the Court has considered. Pp. 2494 — 2500. d) It is not possible to sever some of the Act's contribution limit provisions from others that might remain fully operative. Doing so would require the Court to write words into the statute (inflation indexing), to leave gaping loopholes (no limits on party contributions), or to foresee which of many different possible ways the Vermont Legislature might respond to the constitutional objections to Act 64. In these circumstances, the legislature likely would not have intended the Court to set asidethe statute's contribution limits. The legislature is free to rewrite those provisions * *2484 to address the constitutional difficulties here identified. P. 2500. Justice BREYER, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE in Parts II —B -1 and II —B -2, rejected the respondents' argument that Buckley should, in effect, be overruled because subsequent experience has shown that contribution *234 limits alone cannot effectively deter corruption or its appearance. Stare decisis, the basic legal principle commanding judicial respect for a court's earlier decisions and their rules of law, prevents the overruling of Buckley. Adherence to precedent is the norm; departure from it is exceptional, requiring "special justification," Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164, especially where, as here, the principle at issue has become settled through iteration and reiteration over a long period. There is no special justification here. Subsequent case law has not made Buckley a legal anomaly orotherwise undermined its basic legal principles. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405. Nor is there any demonstration that circumstances have changed so radically as to undermine Buckley's critical factual assumptions. The respondents have not shown, for example, any dramatic increase in corruption or its appearance in Vermont; nor have they shown that expenditure limits are the only way to attack that problem. Cf. McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619. Finally, overruling Buckley nowwould dramatically undermine the considerable reliance thatCongress and state legislatures have placed upon it in drafting campaign finance laws. And this Court has followed Buckley, upholding and applying its reasoning in later cases. Pp. 2489 —2490. Justice ALITO agreed that Act 64's expenditure and contribution limits violate the First Amendment, but concluded that respondents' backup argument asking this Court to revisit Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, need not be reached because they have failed toaddress considerations of stare decisis. Pp. 2500 —2501. Justice KENNEDY agreed that Vermont's limitations on campaign expenditures and contributions violate the First Amendment, but concluded that, given his skepticism regarding this Court's campaign finance jurisprudence, see, e.g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 286 -287, 313, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491, it is appropriate for him to concur onlyin the judgment. P. 2501. Justice THOMAS, joined by Justice SCALIA, agreed that Vermont's Act 64 is unconstitutional, but disagreed with the plurality's rationale for striking down that statute. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, provides insufficient protectionto political speech, the core of the First Amendment, is therefore illegitimate and not protected by stare decisis, and should be overruled and replaced with a standard faithful tothe Amendment. ThisCourt erred in Buckley when it distinguished between contribution and expenditure limits, finding the former to be a less severe infringement on First Amendmentrights. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410 -418, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886. Both the contribution and expenditure restrictions of Act 64 should be subjected to strict scrutiny, which they would fail. See, e.g., Colorado Republican Federal *235 Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 640 -641, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795. Pp. 2501 — 2506. BREYER, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined, and inwhich ALITO, J., joined except as * *2485 toParts II —B -1 and II —B -2. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 2500. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 2501. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which SCALIA, J., joined, Y-,Jla,r, Ne t' © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 B2 - 29 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. DailyOp. Serv. 5503... post, p. 2501. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 2506. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in whichGINSBURG, J., joined, and in which STEVENS, J., joined as to Parts II and III, post, p. 2511. Attorneys and Law Firms Peter F. Langrock, Mitchell L. Pearl, Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP, Middlebury, VT, Mark J. Lopez, Steven R. Shapiro, Joel M. Gora, New York, NY, for Petitioners. James Bopp, Jr., Susan Lee James, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Terre Haute, IN, for Petitioners. Carter G. Phillips, Esq., Sidley Austin, LLP, William H. Sorrell, Vermont Attorney General, Timothy B. Tomasi, Eve Jacobs - Carnahan, Bridget C. Asay, Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier, Vermont, for Respondents /Cross- Petitioners William H. Sorrell, et al. Thomas C. Goldstein, Goldstein & Howe, P.C., Washington, DC, Scott P. Lewis, James Hlawek, Daniel Cromack, Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge, LLP, Boston, MA, Brenda Wright, Lira J. Danetz, John C. Bonifaz, Boston, MA, for Respondents, Cross - Petitioners. Opinion Justice BREYER announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, and in which Justice ALITO joins except as to Parts II —B -1 and II —B -2. 236 We here consider the constitutionality of a Vermont campaign finance statute that limits both (1) the amounts that candidates for state office may spend on their campaigns (expenditure limitations) and (2) the amounts that individuals, organizations, and political parties may contribute to those campaigns (contributionlimitations). Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2801 et seq. (2002). We hold that both sets of limitations are inconsistent with the First Amendment. Well- established precedent makes clear that the expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 -58, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). The contribution limits 237 are unconstitutional because in their specific details involving low maximum levels and other restrictions) they fail to satisfy the First Amendment's requirement of careful tailoring. Id., at 25 -30, 96 S.Ct. 612. That is to say, they imposeburdens upon First Amendment interests that (when viewed in light of the statute's legitimate objectives) are disproportionately severe. I A Prior to 1997, Vermont's campaignfinance law imposed no limit upon the amount a candidate for state office could spend. It did, however, impose limits upon the amounts that individuals, corporations, and political committees couldcontribute to the campaign of such a candidate. Individuals and corporations could contribute no more than $1,000 to any candidate for state office. § 2805(a) (1996). Political committees, excluding political parties, could contribute no more than * *2486 $3,000. § 2805(b). The statute imposed no limit on the amount that political parties could contribute to candidates. In 1997, Vermont enacted a more stringent campaign finance law, Pub. Act No. 64, codified at Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2801et seq. (2002) (hereinafter Act or Act 64), the statute at issuehere. Act 64, which tookeffect immediately after the 1998 elections, imposes mandatory expenditure limits on the total amount a candidate for state office can spend during a "two -year general election cycle," i.e., the primary plus the general election, in approximately the following amounts: governor, 300,000; lieutenant governor, $100,000; other statewide offices, $45,000; state senator, $4,000 (plus an additional 2,500 for each additional seat in the district); state representative (two- member district), $3,000; and state representative (single member district), $2,000. § 2805a(a). These limits are adjusted for inflation in odd - numbered years based on the Consumer Price Index. 2805a(e). Incumbents seeking reelection to statewide office may spend no *238 morethan 85% of the above amounts, and incumbents seeking reelection to the State Senate or House may spend no more than 90% of the above amounts. § 2805a(c). The Act defines e]xpenditure" broadly to mean the payment, disbursement, distribution, advance, deposit, loan or gift of money or anything of value, paid or promised to be paid, for the purpose of influencing an election, advocating a position on a public question, or supporting or opposing one or more candidates." § 2801(3). With certain minor exceptions, expenditures over $50 made on a candidate's behalf by others count against the candidate's expenditure limit if those expenditures are intentionally facilitated by, solicited by or approved by" the candidate's campaign. §§ 2809(b), (c). These provisions apply so as to count against a campaign's expenditure limit any spending by political parties or committees that iscoordinated with the campaign and benefits the candidate. And any party expenditure that primarily benefits six or fewer candidates who are associated with the political party" is "presumed" to be coordinated with the campaign and therefore to count against the campaign's expenditure limit. §§ 2809(b), (d). Act 64 also imposes strict contribution limits. The amount any single individual can contribute to the campaign of a candidate for state office during a "two -year general election cycle" is limited as follows: governor, lieutenant Ve,tla +Text° © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. GovernmentWorks. B2 - 30 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Gal. DailyOp. Serv. 5503... governor, and other statewide offices, $400; state senator, 300; and state representative, $200. § 2805(a). Unlike its expenditure limits, Act 64's contribution limits are not indexed forinflation. A political committee is subject to these same limits. Ibid. So is a political party, ibid., defined broadly to include any subsidiary, branch or local unit" of a party, as well as any "national orregional affiliates" of a party (taken separately or together). § 2801(5). Thus, for example, the statute *239 treatsthe local, state, and national affiliates of the DemocraticParty as if they were a single entity and limits their total contribution to a single candidate's campaign for governor (during the primary and the general election together) to $400. The Act also imposes a limit of $2,000 upon the amount any individual can giveto a political partyduring a 2 —year general electioncycle. § 2805(a). The Act defines "contribution" broadly in approximately the same way it defines "expenditure." § 2801(2). Any expenditure made on a candidate's behalf counts asa contribution to the candidate if it is "intentionally facilitated by, solicited by or * *2487 approved by" the candidate. §§ 2809(a), (c). And a partyexpenditure that primarily benefits six or fewer candidates who are associated with the" party is "presumed" tocount against the party's contribution limits. §§ 2809(a), (d). There are a few exceptions. A candidate's own contributions to the campaign and those of the candidate's family fall outside the contribution limits. § 2805(f). Volunteer services do not count as contributions. § 2801(2). Nor does the cost of a meet - the - candidate function, provided that the total cost for the function amounts to $100 or less. § 2809(d). In addition to these expenditure and contribution limits, the Act sets forth disclosure and reporting requirements and creates a voluntary public financing system for gubernatorial elections. §§ 2803, 2811, 2821 -2823, 2831, 2832, 2851 -2856. None of these is atissue here. The Act also limits the amount of contributions a candidate, political committee, or political party can receive from out -of -state sources. § 2805(c). The lower courts held these out -of -state contribution limits unconstitutional, and the parties do not challenge that holding. B The petitioners are individuals who have run for state office in Vermont, citizenswho vote in Vermont elections and *240 contribute to Vermont campaigns, and political parties and committees that participate in Vermont politics. Soon after Act 64 became law, they brought this lawsuit in Federal District Court against the respondents, state officials charged with enforcement of the Act. Several other private groups and individual citizens intervened in the District Court proceedings in support of the Act and are joined here as respondents as well. The District Court agreed with the petitioners that the Act's expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659. The court also held unconstitutional the Act's limits on the contributions of political parties to candidates. At the same time, the court found the Act's other contribution limits constitutional. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F.Supp.2d 459, 470 (Vt.2000). Both sides appealed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that all of the Act's contribution limits are constitutional. It also held that the Act's expenditure limits may be constitutional. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2004). It found those limits supported by two compelling interests, namely, an interest in preventing corruption or theappearance of corruption and an interest in limiting the amount of time state officials must spend raising campaign funds. The Circuit thenremanded the case to the District Court with instructions to determine whether the Act's expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to those interests. The petitioners andrespondents all sought certiorari. They asked us to consider the constitutionality of Act 64's expenditure limits, its contribution limits, and a related definitional provision. We agreedto do so. 545 U.S. 1165, 126 S.Ct. 35, 162 L.Ed.2d 933 (2005). II We turn first to the Act's expenditure limits. Do those limits violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantees? 241 A In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 3, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq., a statute that, much like the * *2488 Act before us, imposed both expenditure and contribution limitations on campaigns forpublic office. The Court, while upholding FECA's contributionlimitations as constitutional, held that the statute's expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment. 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. B2 - 31 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... Buckley stated that both kinds of limitations "implicate fundamental First Amendment interests." 424 U.S., at 23, 96 S.Ct. 612. It noted that the Government had soughtto justify the statute's infringement on those interests in terms of the need toprevent "corruption and the appearance of corruption." Id., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also id., at 55, 96 S.Ct. 612. In the Court's view, this rationale provided sufficient justificationfor the statute's contribution limitations, but it did not provide sufficient justification for the expenditure limitations. The Court explained that the basic reason for this difference between the two kinds of limitations is that expenditure limitations "impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than" do contribution limitations. Id., at 23, 96 S.Ct. 612. Contribution limitations, though a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication," nevertheless leave the contributor "fre[e] to discuss candidates and issues." Id., at 20 -21, 96 S.Ct. 612. Expenditure limitations, by contrast, impose "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign." Id., at 19, 96 S.Ct. 612. They thereby necessarily "reduc[e] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." Ibid. Indeed, the freedom "toengage inunlimited political expression subject to a ceiling onexpenditures is like being freeto drive an automobile as far *242 and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline." Id., at 19, n. 18, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court concluded that "[n]o governmental interest that has beensuggested is sufficient to justify the restriction on the quantity of political expression imposed by" the statute's expenditure limitations. Id., at 55, 96 S.Ct. 612. It decidedthat the Government's primary justification for expenditure limitations, preventing corruption and its appearance, was adequately addressed by the Act's contributionlimitations and disclosurerequirements. Ibid. The Court also consideredother governmental interests advanced in support of expenditure limitations. It rejected each. Id., at 56 -57, 96 S.Ct. 612. Consequently, it held that the expenditure limitations were "constitutionally invalid." Id., at 58, 96 S.Ct. 612. Over the last 30years, in considering the constitutionality of a host of different campaign finance statutes, this Court has repeatedly adhered to Buckley's constraints, including those on expenditure limits. See McConnell v. FederalElection Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 134, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003); Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001) Colorado II); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 2000) (Shrink) ; Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 610, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) Colorado I) (plurality opinion); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259 -260, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986); FederalElection Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 491, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985); California Medical * *2489 Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 194 -195, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981) plurality opinion). B 1 The respondents recognizethat, in respect to expenditure limits, Buckley appears to be a controlling -and unfavorable - precedent. They seek to overcome that precedent in *243 two ways. First, they ask us in effect to overrule Buckley. Post - Buckley experience, they believe, has shown that contribution limits (and disclosure requirements) alone cannot effectively deter corruption or its appearance; hence experience has undermined an assumption underlying that case. Indeed, the respondents have devoted several pages of their briefs toattacking Buckley's holding on expenditure limits. See Brief for Respondent/Cross- Petitioner Vermont Public Interest Research Group etal. 6 -39 (hereinafter VPIRG Brief) arguingthat "sound reasons exist to revisit the applicable standard of review" for expenditure limits); Brief for Respondent/Cross- Petitioner William H. Sorrell etal. 28 -31 (hereinafterSorrell Brief) (arguing that "the Court should revisit Buckley and consider alternative constitutional approaches to spending limits "). Second, in the alternative, they ask us to limit thescope of Buckley significantly by distinguishing Buckley from the present case. They advance as a ground for distinction a justification for expenditure limitations that, they say, Buckley did not consider, namely, that such limits help to protect candidates from spending too much time raising moneyrather than devoting that time to campaigning among ordinary voters. We find neither argument persuasive. 2 The Court has oftenrecognized the "fundamental importance" of stare decisis, the basic legal principle that x'' "" a:.atla, %Next © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. B2 - 32 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... commands judicial respect for a court's earlier decisions and the rules of law they embody. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556 -557, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (plurality opinion) (citing numerous cases). The Court has pointed out that stare decisis " promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributesto the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.' " United States v. International Business MachinesCorp., 517 U.S. 843, 856, 116 S.Ct. 1793, 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996) quoting Payne v. *244 Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)). Staredecisis thereby avoids the instability and unfairness that accompany disruption of settled legal expectations. For this reason, the rule of law demands that adhering to our prior case law be the norm. Departure from precedent is exceptional, and requires "special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). This is especially true where, as here, the principle has become settled through iteration and reiteration over a long period of time. We can find here no such special justification that would require us to overrule Buckley. Subsequent case law has not made Buckley a legal anomaly or otherwise undermined its basic legal principles. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). We cannot find in the respondents' claims any demonstration that circumstances have changed so radically as to undermine Buckley's critical factual assumptions. The respondents have not shown, for example, any dramatic increase in corruption orits appearance in Vermont; * *2490 nor have theyshown that expenditure limits are the only way to attackthat problem. Cf. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491. At the same time, Buckley has promoted considerable reliance. Congress and state legislatures haveused Buckley when draftingcampaign finance laws. And, as we have said, this Court has followed Buckley, upholding and applying itsreasoning in later cases. Overruling Buckleynow would dramatically underminethis relianceon our settled precedent. For all these reasons, we find this a case that fits the stare decisis norm. And we do notperceive the strong justification that would be necessary to warrant overruling so well established a precedent. We consequently decline the respondents' invitation toreconsider Buckley. 3 The respondents alsoask us to distinguish these cases from Buckley. But we can find no significant basis for that 245 distinction. Act 64's expenditure limits are not substantially different from those at issue in Buckley. In both instances the limits consist of a dollar cap imposed upon a candidate's expenditures. Nor is Vermont's primary justification for imposing its expenditure limits significantly differentfrom Congress' rationale for the Buckley limits: preventing corruption and its appearance. The sole basison which the respondents seek to distinguish Buckley concerns a further supporting justification. They argue thatexpenditure limits are necessary in order to reduce the amount of time candidates must spend raisingmoney. VPIRG Brief 16 -20; Sorrell Brief 22 -25. Increased campaign costs, together with the fear of a better - fundedopponent, mean that, without expenditure limits, a candidate must spend too much time raising money instead of meeting the voters and engaging in public debate. Buckley, the respondents add, did not fully consider this justification. Had it done so, they say, the Court would have upheld, not struckdown, FECA's expenditure limits. In our view, it is highly unlikely that fuller consideration of this time protection rationale would have changed Buckley's result. The Buckley Court was aware of the connection between expenditure limits and a reduction in fundraising time. In a section of the opinion dealing with FECA's public financing provisions, it wrote that Congress was trying to "freecandidates from the rigors of fundraising." 424 U.S., at 91, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also id., at 96, 96 S.Ct. 612 ( "[L]imits on contributions necessarily increasethe burden of fundraising," and "public financing" was designed in part to relieve Presidential candidates "from the rigors of soliciting private contributions "); id., at 258 -259, 96 S.Ct. 612 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). The Court of Appeals' opinion and the briefs filed in this Courtpointed out that a natural consequence of higher campaignexpenditures was that "candidates were compelled to allow to fund raising increasing and extreme amounts of money and energy." *246 Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838 C.A.D.C.1975); see also Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae in Buckley v. Valeo, O.T.1975, Nos. 75 -436 and 75 -437, p. 36 ( "Fund raising consumes candidate time that otherwise would be devoted to campaigning "). And, in anyevent, the connection between high campaign expenditures and increased fundraising demands seems perfectly obvious. Under these circumstances, the respondents' argument amounts to no more than * *2491 an invitation so to limit Buckley's holding as effectively to overrule it. For the reasons set forth above, we declinethat invitation as well. And, given Buckley's continued authority, we must O 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. GovernmentWorks. B2 - 33 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... conclude that Act 64's expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. III We turn now to a more complex question, namely, the constitutionality of Act 64's contribution limits. The parties, while accepting Buckley's approach, dispute whether, despite Buckley's general approval of statutes that limit campaign contributions, Act 64's contribution limits are so severe that in the circumstances its particular limits violate the First Amendment. A As with the Act's expenditure limits, we begin with Buckley. In that case, the Court upheld the $1,000 contribution limit before it. Buckley recognized that contribution limits, like expenditure limits, "implicate fundamental First Amendment interests," namely, the freedoms of "political expression" and "political association." 424 U.S., at 15, 23, 96 S.Ct. 612. But, unlike expenditure limits (which "necessarily reduc[e] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, andthe size of the audience reached," id., at 19, 96 S.Ct. 612), contribution limits "involv[e] little direct restraint on" the contributor's speech, id., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. They do restrict "one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association," namely, the contributor's ability to support a favored candidate, but they nonetheless permi[t] *247 the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution," and they do "not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discusscandidates and issues." Id., at 21, 24, 96 S.Ct. 612. Consequently, the Court wrote, contributionlimitations are permissible as long as the Government demonstrates that the limits are "closely drawn" to match a "sufficiently important interest." Id., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. It found that the interest advanced in the case, "prevent[ing] corruption" and its "appearance," was "sufficiently important" to justify thestatute's contribution limits. Id., at 25 -26, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court also found that the contribution limits before it were "closely drawn." It recognizedthat, in determining whether a particular contribution limit was "closely drawn," the amount, or level, of that limit could make a difference. Indeed, it wrote that "contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy." Id., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. But the Court added that such "distinctions in degree become significantonly when they can be said to amount todifferences in kind." Id., at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. Pointing out that it had " `no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000,' " ibid., the Court found "no indication" that the $1,000 contribution limitations imposed by the Act would have "any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns," id., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. It therefore found the limitations constitutional. Since Buckley, the Court has consistently upheld contribution limits in other statutes. Shrink, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 ($1,075 limit on contributions to candidates for Missouri state auditor); California Medical Assn., 453 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 ($5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees). The Court has recognized, however, that contribution limits * *2492 might sometimes work moreharm to protected First Amendment interests than their anticorruption objectives 248 could justify. See Shrink, supra, at 395 -397, 120 S.Ct. 897; Buckley, supra, at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. And individual Members of the Court haveexpressed concern lest too low a limit magnify the "reputation- related or media - related advantages of incumbency and thereby insulat[e] legislators from effective electoral challenge." Shrink, supra, at 403 -404, 120 S.Ct. 897 (BREYER, J., joinedby GINSBURG, J., concurring). In the cases before us, the petitioners challenge Act 64's contribution limits on that basis. B 121 Following Buckley, we must determinewhether Act 64's contribution limits prevent candidates from amassing the resources necessary for effective campaign] advocacy," 424 U.S., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612; whether they magnify theadvantages of incumbency to the point where they put challengers to a significant disadvantage; in a word, whether they are too low and too strict to survive First Amendment scrutiny. In answering these questions, we recognize, as Buckley stated, that we have " `noscalpel to probe' " each possible contribution level. Id., at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. We cannot determine with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute's legitimate objectives. In practice, the legislature is better equipped to make such empirical judgments, as legislators have "particular expertise" in matters related to the costs and nature of running for office. McConnell, 540 U.S., at137, 124 S.Ct. 619. Thus ordinarily we have deferred to the legislature's determination of such matters. 131 Nonetheless, as Buckley acknowledged, wemust tlav, /'Next° © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. B2 - 34 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503..: recognize the existence of some lower bound. At some point the constitutional risks to the democraticelectoral processbecome too great. After all, the interests underlyingcontribution limits, preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, "directly implicate the integrity of ourelectoral process." McConnell, supra, at 136, 124 S.Ct. 619 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet that rationale does not simply mean "the lower the limit, the better." That is because contribution *249 limits that are too low can also harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability. Were we to ignore that fact, a statute that seeks to regulate campaign contributionscould itself prove an obstacle to the very electoral fairness it seeks to promote. Thus, we see no alternative to the exercise of independent judicial judgment as a statute reaches those outer limits. And, where there is strong indication in a particular case, i.e., danger signs, that such risks exist (both present in kind and likely serious in degree), courts, including appellate courts, must review the record independently and carefully with an eye toward assessing thestatute's tailoring," that is, toward assessing the proportionality of the restrictions. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) ( "[A]n appellate court has an obligation to `make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that `the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression' " (quoting New York TimesCo. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284 -286, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964))). We find those danger signs present here. As compared with the contribution limits upheld by the Court in the past, and with those in force in other States, Act 64's 2493 limits are sufficiently low as to generate suspicion that they are not closely drawn. The Act sets its limits per election cycle, which includes both a primary and a general election. Thus, in a gubernatorial race with both primary and final election contests, the Act's contribution limit amounts to $200 per election per candidate (with significantly lower limits for contributions to candidates for State Senate and House of Representatives, see supra, at 2486). These limits apply both to contributions from individuals andto contributions from political parties, whether made in cash or in expenditurescoordinated (or presumed to be coordinated) with the candidate. See supra, at 2486 – 2487. 250 These limits are well below the limits this Court upheld in Buckley. Indeed, in terms of real dollars (i.e., adjusting for inflation), the Act's $200 perelection limit on individual contributions to a campaign for governor is slightly more than one - twentieth of the limit on contributions to campaigns for federal office before the Court in Buckley. Adjusted to reflect its value in 1976 (the year Buckley was decided), Vermont's contribution limit on campaigns for statewide office (including governor) amounts to $113.91 per 2 –year election cycle, or roughly 57 per election, as compared to the $1,000 per election limit on individual contributions at issue in Buckley. (The adjustedvalue of Act 64's limit on contributions from political parties to candidates for statewide office, again 200 per candidate per election, is just over one one - hundredth of the comparable limit before the Court in Buckley, $5,000 per election.) Yet Vermont's gubernatorial district —the entire State —is no smaller thanthe House districts to which Buckley's limits applied. In 1976, the average congressional district contained a population of about 465,000. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 459 1976) (Statistical Abstract) (describing results of 1970 census). Indeed, Vermont's population is 621,000 —about one -third larger. Statistical Abstract 21 2006) (describing Vermont's population in 2004). Moreover, considered as a whole, Vermont's contribution limits are the lowest in the Nation. Act 64 limits contributions to candidates for statewide office including governor) to $200 per candidate per election. We have found no State that imposes a lower per election limit. Indeed, we have found only seven States that impose limits on contributions to candidates for statewide office at or below $500 per election, more than twice Act 64's limit. C£ Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 16 -905 (West Cum.Supp.2005) ($760 per election cycle, or $380 per election, adjusted for inflation); Colo. Const., Art. XXVIII, § 3 ($500 per election, adjusted for inflation); 251 Fla. Stat. § 106.08(1)(a) (2003) ($500 per election); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann., Tit. 21 –A, § 1015(1) (West Supp.2005) ($500 for governor, $250 for other statewide office, per election); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 55, § 7A (West Cum.Supp.2006) ($500 per year, or $250 per election); Mont.Code Ann. § 13- 37- 216(1)(a) (2005) ($500 for governor, $250 for other statewide office, perelection); S.D. Codified Laws § 12- 25 -1.1 (2004) ($1,000 per year, or $500 per election). We are aware of no State that imposes a limit on contributions from political parties to candidates for statewide office lower than Act 64's $200 per candidateper election limit. C£ Me.Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21 –A, § 1015(1) (next lowest: $500 for contribution from party to candidate for governor, $250 for contribution from party to candidate for other statewide office, both per election). Similarly, we have found only three States that have limits on contributions to candidates for state legislature below Act 64's $150 and $100 per W,,? tla wNext' © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 B2 - 35 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L,Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... 2494 election limits. Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 16 -905 296per election cycle, or $148 per election); Mont.Code Ann. § 13- 37- 216(1)(a) ( $130 per election); S.D. Codified Laws § 12- 25 -1.1 ($250 peryear, or $125 per election). And we are aware of no State that has a lower limit on contributions from political parties to state legislative candidates. Cf. Me.Rev.Stat. Ann., Tit. 21 —A, 1015(1) (next lowest: $250 per election). Finally, Vermont's limit is well below the lowest limit this Court has previously upheld, the limit of $1,075 per election (adjusted for inflation every two years, see Mo.Rev.Stat. § 130.032.2 (Cum.Supp.1998)) for candidates for Missouri state auditor. Shrink, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S.Ct. 897. The comparable Vermont limit of roughly $200 per election, not adjusted forinflation, is less than one -sixth of Missouri's current inflation- adjusted limit ($1,275). We recognize that Vermont's population is much smaller than Missouri's. Indeed, Vermont is about one -ninth of the size of Missouri. Statistical Abstract 21 (2006). Thus, per citizen, Vermont's limit is slightly more generous. As of *252 2006, the ratio of the contribution limit to the size of the constituency in Vermont is .00064, while Missouri's ratio is .00044, 31% lower. Cf.App. 55 (doing same calculation in 2000). But this does notnecessarily mean that Vermont's limits areless objectionable than the limit upheld in Shrink. A campaign for state auditor is likely to be less costly than a campaign for governor; campaign costs do not automatically increase or decrease in precise proportion to the size of an electoral district. See App. 66 (1998 winning candidate for Vermont state auditor spent about 60,000; winning candidate for governor spent about 340,000); Opensecrets.org, The Big Picture, 2004 Cycle: Hot Races, available at http: / /www.opensecrets.org/ bigpicture /hotraces.asp ?cycle =2004 (as visited June22, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court's case file) (U.S. Senate campaigns identified as competitive spend less per voter than U.S. House campaigns identified as competitive). Moreover, Vermont's limits, unlike Missouri's limits, apply in the same amounts to contributions made by political parties. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 130.032.4 (2000) (enacting limits on contributions from political parties to candidates 10 times higher than limits on contributions from individuals). And, as we have said, Missouri's (current) $1,275 per election limit, unlike Vermont's $200 per election limit, is indexed for inflation. See supra, at 2494; see also Mo.Rev.Stat. § 130.032.2 (2000). The factors wehave mentioned offset any neutralizing force of population differences. At the very least, they make it difficult to treat Shrink's (then) $1,075 limit as providingaffirmative support for the lawfulness of Vermont's far lower levels. Cf. 528 U.S., at 404, 120 S.Ct. 897 (BREYER, J., concurring) (The Shrink "limit ... is low enough to raise ... a [significant constitutional] question "). And evenwere that not so, Vermont's failure to index for inflation means that Vermont's levels would soon be far lower than Missouri's regardless of the method of comparison. 253 In sum, Act 64's contribution limits are substantially lower than both the limits we have previously upheld and comparable limits in other States. These are dangersigns that Act 64's contribution limits may fall outside tolerable First Amendment limits. We consequently must examine the recordindependently and carefully to determine whether Act 64's contribution limits are "closely drawn" to match the State's interests. C Our examination of the record convinces us that, from a constitutional perspective, * *2495 Act 64's contribution limits are too restrictive. We reach thisconclusion based not merely on the low dollar amounts of the limits themselves, but also on the statute's effect on political parties and on volunteer activity in Vermont elections. Taken together, Act 64's substantial restrictions on the ability of candidates to raise the funds necessary to run a competitive election, on the ability of political parties to help their candidates get elected, andon the ability of individual citizens to volunteer their time to campaigns show that the Act is not closely drawn to meet its objectives. In particular, five factors together lead us to this decision. First, the record suggests, though it does not conclusively prove, that Act 64's contribution limits will significantly restrict the amount of funding available for challengersto run competitive campaigns. For one thing, the petitioners' expert, Clark Bensen, conducted a race -by -race analysis of the 1998 legislative elections (the last to take place before Act 64 took effect) and concluded that Act 64's contribution limits would have reduced the funds available in 1998 to Republican challengers in competitive races in amounts ranging from 18% to 53% of their total campaign income. See 3 Tr. 52 -57 estimating loss of 47% of funds for candidate Tully, 50% for Harvey, 53% for Welch, 19% for Bahre, 29% for Delaney, 36% for LaRocque, 18% for Smith, and 31% for Brown). 254 For another thing, the petitioners' expert witnesses Aeltla,.,,vNext` © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11 B2 - 36 Randallv. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... producedevidence and analysis showing that Vermont political parties (particularly the Republican Party) target" their contributions to candidates in competitive races, that those contributions represent a significant amount of total candidate funding in such races, andthat the contribution limits will cut the parties' contributions to competitive races dramatically. See 1 id., at189 -190; 3 id., at50 -51; 8 id., at 139; 10 id., at 150; see also, e.g., Gierzynski & Breaux, The Role of Parties in Legislative Campaign Financing, 15 Am. Rev. Politics 171 (1994); Thompson, Cassie, & Jewell, A Sacred Cow or Just a Lot of Bull? Party and PAC Money in State Legislative Elections, 47 Pol. Research Q. 223 (1994). Their statistics showed that the party contributions accounted for a significant percentage of the total campaign income in those races. And their studies showed that Act 64's contribution limits would cut the party contributions by between 85% (for the legislature on average) and 99% for governor). More specifically, Bensen pointed outthat in 1998, the Republican Party made contributions to 19 Senate campaigns in amounts that averaged $2,001, which on average represented 16% of the recipient campaign's total income. 3 Tr. 84. Act 64 would reduce these contributions to $300 per campaign, an average reduction of about 85 %. Ibid. The partycontributed to 50 Housecampaigns in amounts averaging $787, which on average represented 28% of the recipient campaign's total income. Id., at 85. Act 64 would reduce these contributions to $200per campaign, an average reduction of 74.5 %. Ibid. And the party contributed $40,600to its gubernatorial candidate, an amountthat accounted for about 16% of the candidate's funding. Id., at 86. The Act would have reduced that contribution by 99 %, to $400. Bensen added that 57% of all 1998 Senate campaigns and 30% of all House campaigns exceeded Act 64's expenditure limits, which were enacted along with the statute's contribution limits. 7 Trial Exhs. in No. 00- 9159(L) etc. (CA2), Exh. *255 8, p. 2351. Moreover, 27% of all Senate campaigns and 10% of all House campaigns spent morethan double those limits. Ibid. 2496 The respondents did not contest these figures. Rather, they presented evidence that focused, not upon strongly contestedcampaigns, but upon the funding amounts available for the average campaign. The respondents' expert, Anthony Gierzynski, concluded, for example, that Act 64 would have a "minimal effect on ... candidates' ability to raise funds." App. 46. But he rested this conclusion upon his finding that "only a small proportion of all contributions to all campaigns for state office "made during thelast three elections would have been affected by the new limits." Id., at 47; see also id., at 51 (discussing "averageamount of revenues lost to the limits" in legislative races (emphasis added)); id., at 52 -53 (discussing total number of campaigns receiving contributions over Act 64's limit). The lower courts similarly relied almost exclusively on averages in assessing Act 64's effect. See 118 F.Supp.2d, at 470 Approximately 88% to 96% of the campaign contributions to recentHouse races were under $200" emphasisadded)); id., at 478 ( "Expert testimony revealed that over the last three election cycles the percentage of all candidates' contributions received over the contribution limits was less than 10 %" (emphasis added)). The respondents' evidence leaves the petitioners' evidence unrebutted in certain key respects. That is because the critical question concerns not simply the average effect of contribution limits on fundraising but, more importantly, the ability of a candidate running against an incumbent officeholder to mount an effective challenge. And information about average races, rather than competitive races, is only distantly related to that question, because competitive races are likely to be far more expensivethan the averagerace. See, e.g., N. Ornstein, T. Mann, & M. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress 2001 -2002, pp. 89 -98 (2002) (data showing that spending in competitive elections, i.e., where incumbent *256 wins with less than 60% of vote or where incumbent loses, is far greater than in most elections, where incumbent wins with more than 60% of the vote). We concede that the record does contain some anecdotal evidence supporting the respondents' position, namely, testimony about a post— Act -64 competitive mayoral campaign in Burlington, which suggests that a challenger can "amas[s] the resourcesnecessary for effective advocacy," Buckley, 424 U.S., at21, 96 S.Ct. 612. But the facts of that particular election are not described in sufficient detail to offer a convincingrefutation of the implication arising from the petitioners' experts' studies. Rather, the petitioners' studies, taken together with low average Vermont campaign expenditures and the typically higher costs that a challenger must bear to overcome the name - recognition advantage enjoyed by an incumbent, raise a reasonable inference that the contribution limits are so low that they may pose a significant obstacle to candidates in competitive elections. Cf. Ornstein, supra, at 87 -96 (In the 2000 U.S. House and Senate elections, successful challengers spent far more than the average candidate). Information about average races does not rebutthat inference. Consequently, the inference amounts to one factor (amongothers) that here counts against the constitutional validity of the 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12 B2 - 37 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... contribution limits. Second, Act 64's insistence that political parties abide by exactly the same low contribution limits that apply to other contributors threatens harm to a particularly important political right, the right to associate in a political party. See, e.g., California DemocraticParty v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574, 120 S.Ct. 2402, 147 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000) (describing constitutional importance of associating inpolitical parties to elect candidates); Timmonsv. Twin * *2497 Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) same); Colorado I, 518 U.S., at 616, 116 S.Ct. 2309 same); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992) (same). Cf. Buckley, supra, at 20 -22, 96 S.Ct. 612 (contribution limits constitute only a marginal restriction" on First Amendmentrights because contributor remains free to associate *257 politically, e.g., in a political party, and "assist personally" in the party's "efforts on behalf of candidates "). The Act applies its $200 to $400 limits— precisely the same limits it applies to an individual —to virtually all affiliates of a political party takentogether as if they were a single contributor. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2805(a) 2002). That means, for example, that the Vermont DemocraticParty, taken together with all its local affiliates, canmake one contribution of at most $400 to the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, one contribution of at most $300 to a Democratic candidate for State Senate, and one contribution of at most $200 to a Democratic candidate for the State House of Representatives. The Act includes within these limits not only direct monetary contributions but also expenditures in kind: stamps, stationery, coffee, doughnuts, gasoline, campaign buttons, and so forth. See § 2801(2). Indeed, it includes all party expenditures "intended to promote the election of a specific candidate or group of candidates" as long as the candidate's campaign "facilitate[s]," solicit[s]," or "approve[s]" them. §§ 2809(a), (c). And a party expenditure that "primarily benefits six or fewer candidates who are associated with the" party is presumed" to count against the party's contribution limits. § 2809(d). In addition to the negative effect on "amassing funds" that wehave described, see supra, at 2494 – 2496, the Act would severely limit the ability of a party to assist its candidates' campaigns by engaging in coordinated spending on advertising, candidate events, voter lists, mass mailings, even yard signs. And, to an unusual degree, it would discourage those who wish to contribute small amounts of money to a party, amounts that easily comply with individual contribution limits. Suppose that many individuals do not know Vermont legislative candidates personally, but wish to contribute, say, $20 or 40, to the State Republican Party, with the intent that the party use the money to help elect whichever candidates the party believes would best advance itsideals and *258 interests —thebasic object of a political party. Or, to take a moreextreme example, imagine that 6,000 Vermont citizens each want to give $1 tothe State Democratic Party because, though unfamiliar with the details of the individual races, they would like to make a small financial contribution to the goal of electing a Democratic state legislature. And further imagine that the party believes control of the legislature will depend on the outcome of three (and only three) House races. The Act prohibits the party from giving $2,000 (of the $6,000) to each of its candidates in those pivotal races. Indeed, it permits the party to give no more than $200 to each candidate, thereby thwarting the aims of the 6,000 donors from making a meaningful contribution to state politics by giving a small amount of money to the party they support. Thus, the Act would severely inhibit collective political activity by preventing a political party from using contributions by small donors to provide meaningful assistance to any individual candidate. See supra, at 2496 -2497. We recognize that we have previously upheld limits on contributions from political parties to candidates, in particular the federal limits on coordinated party spending. * *2498 Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461. And we also recognize that any such limit will negativelyaffect to some extent the fund- allocating partyfunction just described. But the contribution limits at issue in Colorado II were far less problematic, for they were significantly higher than Act 64's limits. See id., at 438 -439, andn. 3, 442, n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (atleast $67,560 in coordinated spending and 5,000 in direct cash contributions for U.S. Senate candidates, at least $33,780 in coordinated spending and 5,000 in direct cash contributions for U.S. House candidates). And they were much higher than the federal limits on contributions fromindividuals to candidates, thereby reflecting an effortby Congress to balance (1) the need to allow individuals to participate in the political process by contributing to political parties that help elect candidates with *259 2) the need to prevent the use of political parties "to circumvent contribution limits that apply to individuals." Id., at 453, 121 S.Ct. 2351. Act 64, by placing identical limits upon contributions to candidates, whether made by an individual or by a political party, gives to the former consideration no weight at all. 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 13 B2 - 38 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... Weconsequently agree with the District Court that the Act's contribution limits "would reduce the voice of political parties" in Vermont to a "whisper." 118 F.Supp.2d, at 487. And we count the special party - related harms that Act 64 threatens as a further factor weighing against the constitutional validity of the contribution limits. Third, the Act's treatment of volunteer services aggravates the problem. Like itsfederalstatutory counterpart, the Act excludes from its definition of contribution" all "services provided without compensation by individuals volunteering their time on behalf of a candidate." Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2801(2) 2002). Cf. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(i) (2000 ed. and Supp. IIl) (similar exemption in federal campaignfinance statute). But the Act does not exclude theexpensesthose volunteers incur, such as travel expenses, in the course of campaign activities. The Act's broad definitions would seem to count thoseexpenses against the volunteer's contribution limit, at least where the spending was facilitated or approved by campaign officials. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2801(3) (2002) ( "[E]xpenditure" includes anything of value, paid ... for the purpose of influencing an election "); §§ 2809(a), (c) (Any "expenditure ... intentionally facilitated by, solicited by or approved by the candidate" counts as a "contribution "). And, unlike the Federal Government's treatment of comparable requirements, the State has not (insofar as we are aware) created an exception excluding such expenses. Cf. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)(B)(iv), (ix) (2000 ed. and Supp. III) excluding from the definition of "contribution" volunteer travel expenses up to $1,000and payment by political party for campaign materials used in connection with volunteer activities). 260 The absence of some such exception may matterin the present context, where contribution limits are very low. That combination, low limits and no exceptions, means that a gubernatorial campaign volunteer who makes four or five round trips driving across the State performing volunteer activities coordinated with the campaign can find that he or she is near, or has surpassed, the contribution limit. So too will a volunteer who offers a campaign the use of her house along with coffee and doughnuts for a few dozen neighbors to meet the candidate, say, two or three times during a campaign. Cf. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2809(d) (2002) (excluding expenditures for such activities only up to $100). Such supporters will have to keep careful track of all miles driven, postage supplied (500 stamps equals $200), pencils * *2499 and pads used, and so forth. And any carelessness in this respect can prove costly, perhaps generating a headline, "Campaign laws violated," that works serious harm to the candidate. These sorts of problems are unlikely toaffect the constitutionality of a limit that is reasonably high. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 36 -37, 96 S.Ct. 612 (Coordinated expenditure by a volunteer "provides material financial assistance to a candidate," and therefore "may properly be viewed as a contribution "). But Act 64's contribution limits are so low, and its definition of "contribution" so broad, that the Act may well impede a campaign's ability effectively to use volunteers, thereby making it more difficult for individuals to associate inthis way. Cf. id., at 22, 96 S.Ct. 612 (Federal contribution limits "leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates "). Again, the very low limits at issue help to transform differences in degree into difference in kind. And the likelihood of unjustified interference in the present context is sufficiently greatthat we must consider the lack of tailoring in the Act's definition of "contribution" as an added factor counting against the constitutional validity of the contribution limits before us. 261 Fourth, unlike the contribution limits we upheld in Shrink, see supra, at 2494, Act 64's contribution limits are not adjusted forinflation. Its limits decline in real value each year. Indeed, in real dollars the Act's limits have alreadydeclined by about 20% ($200 in 2006 dollars has a real value of $160.66 in 1997 dollars). A failure to index limits means that limits which are already suspiciously low, see supra, at 2492 — 2494, will almost inevitably become too low over time. It means that future legislation will be necessary to stop thatalmost inevitable decline, and it thereby imposes the burden of preventing the decline upon incumbent legislatorswho may not diligently police the need for changes in limit levels to ensure the adequate financing of electoral challenges. Fifth, we have found nowhere in the record any special justification that might warrant a contribution limit so low or so restrictive as to bring about the serious associational and expressive problems that we have described. Rather, the basic justifications the State has advanced in support of such limits are those present in Buckley. The record contains no indication that, for example, corruption (or its appearance) in Vermont is significantly more serious a matter than elsewhere. Indeed, other things being equal, one might reasonably believe that a contribution of, say, 250 (or $450) to a candidate's campaign was less likely to prove a corruptive force than the farlarger contributions at issue in the other campaignfinance cases we have considered. See supra, at 2493 — 2494. 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. GovernmentWorks. B2 - 39 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... These five sets of considerations, taken together, lead us toconclude that Act 64's contribution limits are not narrowly tailored. Rather, the Act burdens First Amendment interests by threateningto inhibit effective advocacy by those who seek election, particularly challengers; its contribution limits mute the voice of political parties; they hamper participation in campaigns through volunteer activities; and they are not indexed for inflation. Vermont does not point to a legitimate statutory objective that might justify these special *262 burdens. We understand that many, though not all, campaign finance regulations impose certain of these burdens to some degree. We also understand the legitimate need for constitutional leeway in respect to legislative line- drawing. But our discussion indicates why we conclude * *2500 that Act 64 in this respect nonetheless goes too far. It disproportionately burdens numerous First Amendment interests, and consequently, in our view, violates the First Amendment, 141 We add that we do not believe it possible to sever some of the Act's contribution limit provisions from others that might remain fully operative. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932) ( "invalid partmay be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law "); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191, 119 S.Ct. 1187, 143 L.Ed.2d 270 1999) (severability "essentially an inquiry into legislative intent "); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 1, § 215 (2003) (severability principles apply to Vermont statutes). To sever provisions to avoid constitutional objection here would require us to write words into thestatute (inflation indexing), or to leave gaping loopholes (no limits on party contributions), orto foresee which of many different possible ways the legislature might respond to the constitutional objections we have found. Given these difficulties, we believe the Vermont Legislature would have intended us to set aside the statute's contribution limits, leaving the legislature free to rewrite those provisionsin light of the constitutional difficulties we have identified. IV We concludethat Act 64's expenditure limits violate the First Amendment as interpreted in Buckley v. Valeo. We also conclude that the specific details of Act 64's contribution limits require us to hold that those limits violate the First Amendment, for they burden First Amendment interests in a manner that is disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance. Given our holding, we need not, *263 and do not, examine the constitutionality of the statute's presumption that certain party expenditures are coordinated with a candidate. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2809(d) (2002). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings. It isso ordered. Justice ALITO, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I concur in the judgment and join in Justice BREYER's opinion except for Parts II —B -1 and II —B -2. Contrary to the suggestion of those sections, respondents' primary defense of Vermont's expenditure limits is that those limits are consistent with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). See Brief for Respondent/Cross— Petitioner William H. Sorrell et al. 15 -28 (hereinafter Sorrell Brief); Brief for Respondent/Cross— Petitioner Vermont Public Interest Research Group etal. 5 -36 (hereinafter VPIRG Brief). Only as a backup argument, an afterthought almost, do respondentsmake a nakedplea for us to "revisit Buckley." Sorrell Brief 28; VPIRG Brief 36. This is fairly incongruous, given that respondents' defense of Vermont's contribution limits rests squarely on Buckley and later decisions that built on Buckley, and yet respondents fail to explain why it would be appropriate to reexamine only one part of the holding in Buckley. More to the point, respondents fail to discuss the doctrine of stare decisis or the Court's cases elaborating on the circumstances in which it is appropriate to reconsider a prior constitutional decision. Indeed, only once in 99 pages of briefing from respondents do the words "stare decisis " appear, and that reference is in connection with contribution limits. See Sorrell Brief 31. Such an incomplete presentation * *2501 is reason enough to refuserespondents' invitation to reexamine Buckley. See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856, 116 S.Ct. 1793, 135 L.Ed.2d 124 1996). 264 Whether or not a case can be made for reexamining Buckley in whole or in part, what matters is that respondents do not do so here, and so I think it unnecessary to reach theissue. Justice KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment. The Court decides the constitutionality of the limitations Vermont places on campaign expenditures and contributions. I agree that both limitations violate the First Amendment. MJ1,iwNeff © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works 15 B2 - 40 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... As the plurality notes, our cases hold that expenditure limitations "place substantial and direct restrictionson the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannottolerate." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 -59, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam); see also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 618, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) principal opinion); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985). The parties neither ask the Court to overruleBuckley in full nor challengethe level of scrutiny that decision applies to campaign contributions. Theexacting scrutiny the plurality applies to expenditure limitations, however, is appropriate. For the reasons explained in the plurality opinion, respondents' attempts to distinguish the present limitationsfrom those wehave invalidated are unavailing. The Court has upheld contribution limits that do "not come evenclose topassing any serious scrutiny." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). Those concerns aside, Vermont's contributions, as the plurality's detailed analysis indicates, are even more stifling than the ones that survived Shrink's unduly lenient review. The universe of campaign finance regulation is one this Court has in part created and in part permitted by its course of decisions. That newordermay cause more problems than *265 it solves. On a routine, operational level the present system requires us to explain why $200 is too restrictive a limit while $1,500 is not. Our own experience gives us little basis to make these judgments, and certainly no traditional or well - established body of law exists to offer guidance. On a broader, systemic level political parties have been denied basic FirstAmendment rights. See, e.g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 286 -287, 313, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Enteringto fill the void have been new entities such as political action committees, which are as much the creatures of law as of traditional forces of speech and association. Those entities can manipulate the system and attract their own elite power brokers, who operate in ways obscure to the ordinary citizen. Viewed within the legal universe we have ratified and helped create, the result the plurality reaches is correct; given my own skepticism regarding that systemand its operation, however, it seems to me appropriate to concur only in the judgment. Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice SCALIA joins, concurring in the judgment. Although I agree with the plurality that Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2801 et seq. * *2502 (2002) (Act 64 or Act), is unconstitutional, I disagree with itsrationale for striking down thatstatute. Invoking stare decisis, the plurality rejects the invitation to overrule Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam).' It thenapplies Buckley to invalidate the expenditure limitations and, less persuasively, the contribution limitations. *266 I continue to believe that Buckley provides insufficient protection to political speech, the core of the First Amendment. The illegitimacy of Buckley is further underscored by the continuing inability of the Court (andthe plurality here) to apply Buckley in a coherent and principled fashion. As a result, stare decisis should poseno bar to overruling Buckley and replacing it with a standard faithful to the First Amendment. Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment. I adhereto my view that this Court erred in Buckley when it distinguished between contribution and expenditure limits, finding the former to be a less severe infringement on First Amendment rights. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410 -418, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) (Shrink ) (dissenting opinion); Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465 -466, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001) (Colorado II) (same); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 635 -644, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (Colorado I) (opinion concurring injudgment and dissenting in part). "[U]nlike the BuckleyCourt, I believe that contribution limits infringe as directly and as seriously uponfreedom of political expression and association as do expenditure limits." Id., at 640, 116 S.Ct. 2309. The Buckley Court distinguished contributions from expenditures based on the presence of an intermediary between a contributor and the speech eventually produced. But that reliance is misguided, given that "[e]ven in the case of a direct expenditure, there is usually some go- betweenthat facilitates the dissemination of the spender's message." Colorado I, supra, at638 -639, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); Shrink, supra, at 413 -418, 120 S.Ct. 897 THOMAS, J., dissenting). Likewise, Buckley's suggestion that contribution caps onlymarginally restrict speech, because "[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but 4- stll'lvvNeff © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. GovernmentWorks. 16 B2 - 41 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... does notcommunicate the underlying basis for the support," *267424 U.S., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612, even if descriptively accurate, does not support restrictions on contributions. After all, statements of general support are as deserving of constitutional protection as those that communicate specific reasons for thatsupport. Colorado I, supra, at 639 -640, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); Shrink, supra, at 414 -415, and n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 897 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I would overrule Buckley and subject both the contribution and expenditure restrictions of Act 64 to strict scrutiny, which they would fail. See Colorado I, supra, at 640 -641, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) ( "I am convinced that under traditional strict scrutiny, broad prophylactic caps on both spending and giving in the political process ... are unconstitutional" * *2503 ). See also Colorado II, supra, at 465 -466, 121 S.Ct. 2351 THOMAS, J., dissenting). II The plurality opinion, far from making the case for Buckley asa rule of law, itself demonstrates that Buckley's limited scrutiny of contribution limits is insusceptible of principled application," and accordingly is not entitled to stare decisis effect. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). Indeed, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.' " Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004) (plurality opinion) quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991); internal quotation marks omitted). Today's newly minted, multifactor test, particularly when read in combination with the Court's decision in Shrink, supra, places this Court in the position of addressing the propriety of regulations of political speechbased upon little more than itsimpression of the appropriate limits. The plurality sets forth what appearsto be a two -step process for evaluating the validity of contribution limits: First, determine whether there are "danger signs" in a particular case that the limits are too low; and, second, use independent judicial judgment" to "review the record independently *268and carefully with an eye toward assessing the statute's `tailoring,' that is, toward assessing the proportionality of the restrictions." Ante, at 2492. Neither step of this test can be reduced to a workable inquiry to be performed by States attempting to comply with this Court's jurisprudence. As to the first step, it is entirely unclear how to determine whether limits are so low as to constitute "danger signs" that require a court to "examine the recordindependently and carefully." Ante, at 2494. The plurality points to several aspects of the Act that support its conclusion that such signs are present here: (1) The limits are set per electioncycle, rather than divided between primary and general elections; (2) the limits apply to contributions from political parties; (3) the limits are the lowest in the Nation; and (4) the limits are below those wehave previously upheld. Ante, at 2492 — 2494. The first two elements of the Act are indeed constitutionally problematic, but they have no bearing on whether the contribution limits are too low. The first substantially advantages candidates in a general election who did not face a serious primary challenge. In practice, this restriction will generally suppress more speech by challengers than by incumbents, without serving the interests the Court has recognized as compelling, i.e., the prevention of corruption or the appearance thereof Cf. B. Smith, Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform 50 -51 (2001) (hereinafter Smith) (describing the ability of incumbents to amass moneyearly, discouraging serious challengers from entering a race). The second element has no relation to these compelling interests either, given that " `[t]he veryaim of a political party is to influence its candidate's stance on issues and, if the candidate takes office or is reelected, his votes.' " Colorado II, supra, at 476, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (citing Colorado I, supra, at 646, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)). That these provisions are unconstitutional, however, does not make the contribution limits on individuals unconstitutionally low. 269 We are left, then, with two reasons to scrutinize Act 64's limitations: They are * *2504 lower than those of other States, and lower than those we have upheld in previous cases, i.e., Buckley and Shrink. But the relative limits of other States cannot be the key factor, for such considerations are nothing morethan a moving target. After all, if the Vermont Legislature simply persuaded several other States to lower theircontribution limits to parallel Act 64, then the Act, which would still significantly restrict the amount of funding available for challengers to run competitive campaigns," ante, at 2495, would survive this aspect of the plurality's proposed test. Nor is the relationship of these limits to those in Buckley and Shrink a critical fact. In Shrink, the Court specifically determinedthat Buckley did not "set a minimum constitutional threshold for contribution limits," rejecting such a contention as a "fundamental misunderstanding of what we held." 528 U.S., at 396, 120 S.Ct. 897. The etAl.awNext' © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. GovernmentWorks. 17 B2 - 42 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... plurality's current treatment of the limits in Shrink as a constitutional minimum, or at least as limits below which danger signs" are present, thus cannot be reconciled with Shrink itself. Having nevertheless concludedthat these "danger signs" require us to scrutinize the record, the plurality embarks on an odd review of the contribution limits, combining unrelated factors to determine that, "[tlaken together," ante, at 2495, the restrictions of Act 64 are not closely drawn to meet their objectives. Two of these factors simply cause the already stringent limitations on individual contributions to be more stringent; i.e., volunteer services count toward the contribution limit, ante, at 2498 — 2499, and the limits do not change with inflation, so they will become even more stringent in time, ante, at 2499.2 While these characteristics confirm the plurality's *270 impression that these limits are, indeed, quite low, they have nothing whatsoever to do with whether the restrictions are closelydrawn to meet their objectives. The plurality would presumably uphold a limit on contributions of $1 million, even if volunteer services counted toward that limit and the limit did not change with inflation. Characterizing these facts as shifting Act 64's limits from "suspiciously low" to "too low," ibid., provides no insight on how to draw this constitutional line. The plurality next departs from the general applicability of the contribution limits entirely, and notes the substantial interference of the contribution limits with the activities of parties. Again, I do not dispute that the limitation on party contributions is unconstitutional; as I have previously noted, such limitations are unconstitutional even under Buckley. See Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 476 -477, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (dissenting opinion). But it is entirely unclear why the mere fact that the "suspiciously low" contribution limits also apply to parties should meanthat those limits are in fact "too low" when they are applied to individuals. If the limits impermissibly intrude upon the associational rights of parties, then the limits are unconstitutional as applied to parties. But limits on individuals cannot be * *2505 transformed from permissible to too low simply because they also apply to political parties.' 271 We are left, then, with two arguably relevantpoints to transform these contribution limits from the realm of the "suspicious" to the realm of the impermissible. First, the limits affect a substantial portion of the money given to challengers. But contribution limits always disproportionately burden challengers, who often have smaller bases of support than incumbents. See Smith 66 -70. In Shrink, the Court expresslyrejected the argument that a negative impact on a challenger could render a contribution limit invalid, relying on the same sort of analysis of the "average effect of contribution limits on fundraising," ante, at 2496, that the plurality today rejects. See 528 U.S., at 396, 120 S.Ct. 897 (noting that 97.62% of all contributors for state auditor made contributions of less than $2,000, and that "[e]ven if we were toassume that the contribution limits affected respondent['s] ability to wage a competitive campaign ... a showing of one affected individual does not point up a system of suppressed political advocacythat would be unconstitutional underBuckley "). Cf. id., at 420, 120 S.Ct. 897 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) ( "The Court in Buckley provided nobasis for suppressing the speech of an individual candidate simply because other candidates or candidates in theaggregate) may succeed in reaching the voting public.... [A]ny such reasoning would fly in the face of the premise of our political system — liberty vested in individual hands safeguards the functioning of our democracy "). An individual's First Amendment right is infringed whether his speech is decreased by 5% or 95 %, and whether he suffers *272alone or shares his violation with his fellow citizens. Certainly, the First Amendment does not authorize us to judge whether a restriction of political speech imposes a sufficiently severe disadvantage on challengers that a candidate should be able to complain. See Shrink, supra, at 427, 120 S.Ct. 897 THOMAS, J., dissenting) ( "[C]ourts have no yardstick by which to judge the proper amount and effectiveness of campaign speech "). The plurality's final justification faresno better. Arguing that Vermont offers no justification for imposing a limit lower than that imposed in any other Stateis simply another way of saying that the benchmark for whether a contribution limitation is constitutional is what other States have imposed. As I have noted above, supra, at 2503 -2504, tying individuals' First Amendmentrights to the presence or absence of similar laws in other States is inconsistent with the FirstAmendment. The plurality recognizes that the burdens which lead it to invalidate Act 64's contribution limits are present under 2506 "many, though not all, campaignfinance regulations." Ante, at 2499. As a result, the plurality does not purport to offer any single touchstone for evaluating the constitutionality of such laws. Indeed, its discussion offers nothing resembling a rule at all. From all appearances, the plurality simply looked at these limits andsaid, in its "independent judicial judgment," ante, at 2492, that they are too low. Theatmospherics — whether they vary with inflation, whether they are as high as those in other States or those in Shrink and Buckley, whether they apply to volunteeractivities and parties —no doubt v' ,tGawNext" © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 18 B2 - 43 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... help contribute to the plurality's sentiment. But a feeling does not amount to a workable rule of law. This is not to say that the plurality errs in concluding that these limits are too low to satisfy even Buckley's lenient standard. Indeed, it is almost impossible to imagine that any legislatorwould ever find hisscruples overcome by a 201 donation. See Shrink, supra, at 425, 120 S.Ct. 897 THOMAS, J., dissenting) *273 ( "I cannot fathom how a 251 contribution could pose a substantial risk of secur[ing] a political quid pro quo ' " (quotingBuckley, 424 U.S., at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612)). And the statistics relied on by the plurality indeed reveal that substantial resources will be lost by candidates running campaignsunder these limits. See ante, at 2494 - 2496. Given that these contribution limits severely impinge on the ability of candidates to run campaigns and on the ability of citizens to contribute to campaigns, anddo so without any demonstrable need to avoid corruption, they cannot possibly satisfy even Buckley's ambiguous level of scrutiny. But the plurality's determination thatthis statute clearly lies on the impermissible side of the constitutional line gives no assistance in drawing this line, and it is clear that nosuch line can be drawn rationally. There is simply no way to calculate just how much money a person would need to receivebefore he would be corruptor perceivedto be corrupt (and such a calculation would undoubtedly vary by person). Likewise, there is no meaningful way of discerning just howmany resources must be lost before speech is "disproportionately burden[ed]." Ante, at 2500. Buckley, as the plurality has applied it, gives us license to simply strike down any limits that just seem to be too stringent, andto uphold the rest. The First Amendment does not grant us this authority. Buckley provides no consistent protection to the core of the First Amendment, and must be overruled. For these reasons, I concur onlyin the judgment. Justice STEVENS, dissenting. Justice BREYER and Justice SOUTER debate whether the per curiam decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), forecloses any constitutional limitations on candidateexpenditures. This is plainly an issue on which reasonable minds can disagree. The Buckley Court never explicitly addressed 274 whether the pernicious effects of endless fundraising can serve as a compelling state interest that justifies expenditure limits, post, at 2511 ( SOUTER, J., dissenting), yet its silence, inlight of the record before it, suggests that itimplicitly treated this proposed interest insufficient, ante, at 2490 -2491 (plurality opinion of BREYER, J.). Assuming this to be true, however, I am convinced that Buckley's holding onexpenditure limits is wrong, and that the time has come to overrule it. I have not reached this conclusion lightly. As Justice BREYERcorrectly observes, stare decisis is a principle of " `fundamental * *2507 importance.' " Ante, at 2489. But it is not an inexorable command, and several factors, taken together, provide special justification for revisiting the constitutionality of statutory limits on candidate expenditures. To begin with, Buckley's holding on expenditure limits itself upset a long - established practice. For the preceding 65 years, congressional races had been subject to statutory limits on both expenditures and contributions. See Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 28; Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1073; Federal Election Campaign Finance Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 5; Federal Election CampaignAct Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263; United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575 -576, 77 S.Ct. 529, 1 L.Ed.2d 563 (1957); McConnell v. FederalElection Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 115 -117, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003). As the Court of Appeals had recognizedin Buckley v. Valeo, 519F.2d 821, 859 (C.A.D.C.1975) (en banc) (per curiam), our earlier jurisprudence provided solid support for treating these limits as permissible regulations of conductrather than speech. Ibid. (discussing Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 54 S.Ct. 287, 78 L.Ed. 484 (1934), and United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954)); see also 519 F.2d, at 841, and n. 41, 851, andn. 68. While Buckley's holding on contribution limits was consistent with this backdrop, its holding on expenditure limits "involve[d] collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience," Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604 1940). 275 There are further reasons for reexamining Buckley's holding on candidate expenditure limits that do not apply to its holding on candidate contribution limits. Although we have subsequently reiterated the line Buckley drew between these two types of limits, we havedone so primarily in cases affirming the validity of contribution limits or their functional equivalents. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 134 -138, 124 S.Ct. 619; Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 440 -442, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri V°'y' ,lt..Lw eNex:t © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works 19 B2 - 44 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 -387, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000); cf. California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 194 -195, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981) (plurality opinion). In contrast, these are our first post - Buckley cases that raise the constitutionality of expenditure limits on the amounts that candidates for office may spend on their own campaigns.' Accordingly, while we have explicitly recognized the importance of staredecisis in the context of Buckley's holding on contribution limits, McConnell, 540 U.S., at 137 -138, 124 S.Ct. 619, we have never before done so with regard to its rejection of expenditure limits. And McConnell's recognition rested largely on an interest specific to Buckley's holding on contribution limits. There, we stated that "[c]onsiderations of stare decisis, buttressed by the respect that the Legislative and Judicial 2508 Branches owe toone another, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of contribution limits that the Court has consistently followed since Buckley was decided." 540 U.S., at 137 -138, 124 S.Ct. 619 (emphasisadded). This powerful buttress is absent from Buckley's refusal *276 to defer to the Legislature's judgment as to the importance of expenditure limits. Relatedly, while Congress and state legislatures have long relied on Buckley's authorization of contribution limits, Buckley's rejection of expenditure limits "has not induced [comparable] detrimental reliance," Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003). See also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting lessened staredecisisconcernwhere "it is hard toimagine how any action taken in reliance upon [the prior case] could conceivably be frustrated "). Perhaps in partial recognition of these points, Justice White refused to abandon his opposition to Buckley's holding on expenditure limits. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 271, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 507 -512, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985) (dissenting opinion). He believed Buckleydeeply wrong on this issuebecause it confused the identification of speech with its antecedents." National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 508, 105 S.Ct. 1459. Over the course of his steadfast campaign, he converted at least one other Buckley participant to this position, see National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 518 -521, 105 S.Ct. 1459 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and his reasoning has since persuaded me -the nonparticipating Member of the Buckley Court-as well. As Justice White recognized, it is quite wrong toequate money and speech. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 263, 96 S.Ct. 612 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). To the contrary: The burden on actual speech imposed by limitations on the spending of money is minimal and indirect. All rights of direct political expression and advocacy are retained. Evenunder the campaign laws as originally enacted, everyone was free to spend as much as they chose to amplify their views on general political issues, just not specific candidates. The restrictions, to the extent *277 they do affect speech, are viewpoint- neutral and indicate no hostility to the speech itself or its effects." National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 508 -509, 105 S.Ct. 1459 (White, J., dissenting). Accordingly, these limits on expenditures are far more akin to time, place, and manner restrictions than to restrictions on the content of speech. Like Justice White, I would uphold them "so long as thepurposes they serve are legitimate and sufficiently substantial." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 264, 96 S.Ct. 612. Buckley's conclusion to the contrary relied on the following oft - quoted metaphor: Being free to engage in unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline." Id., at 19, n. 18, 96 S.Ct. 612. But, of course, while a car cannot run without fuel, a candidate can speak without spending money. Andwhile a car can only travel so many miles per gallon, there is no limit on the number of speeches or interviews a candidate maygive on a limited budget. Moreover, provided that this budget is above a certain threshold, a candidate 2509 can exercise due care to ensure thather message reaches all voters. Just as a driver need not use a Hummer to reach her destination, so a candidate need not flood the airways with ceaseless sound -bites of trivial information in order to provide voters with reasons to support her. Indeed, the examples of effective speech in the political arena that did not depend on any significant expenditure by the campaigner are legion. It was the content of William Jennings Bryan's comments on the "Cross of Gold" -and WilliamMcKinley's responses delivered from his front porch in Canton, Ohio - rather than any expenditure of money that appealed to their cost -free audiences. Neither Abraham Lincoln nor John F. Kennedy paid for the opportunity to engage in the debates with Stephen Douglas and Richard *278 Nixon that may 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. GovernmentWorks. 20 B2 - 45 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... well have determined the outcomes of Presidential elections. When the seasoned campaigners who were Members of the Congress that endorsed the expenditure limits in the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 concluded that a modest budget would not preclude them from effectively communicating with the electorate, they necessarily rejected the Buckley metaphor. These campaigners also identified significant government interests favoring the imposition of expenditure limits. Notonly do these limits serve as an important complement to corruption- reducing contribution limits, see id., at 264, 96 S.Ct. 612 (opinion of White, J.), but they also "protect equal access to the political arena, [and] free candidates and their staffs from the interminable burden of fundraising." Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 649 -650, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) STEVENS, J., dissenting). These last two interests are particularly acute. When campaign costs are so high that only the rich have the reach to throw their hats into the ring, we fail "to protect the political process from undue influence of large aggregations of capital and to promote individual responsibility for democratic government." Automobile Workers, 352 U.S., at 590, 77 S.Ct. 529. States have recognized this problem,' but Buckley's perceived ban on expenditure limits severely limits their options in dealing with it. The interest in freeing candidates from the fundraising straitjacket is even more compelling. Without expenditure limits, fundraising devours the time and attention of political leaders, leaving them too busyto handle their public responsibilities effectively. That fact was well recognized by backers of the legislation reviewed in Buckley, by the Court of Appeals judges whovotedto uphold the expenditure limitations in that statute, and by Justice White —who not incidentally *279 had personal experience as an active participant in a Presidential campaign. Cf. 519 F.2d, at 838 (and citations to legislativehistory contained therein); 424 U.S., at 265, 96 S.Ct. 612 (opinion of White, J.). The validity of their judgment has surely been confirmed by the mountains of evidence that has been accumulated in recent years concerning the time that elected officials spend raising money for future campaigns and the adverse effect of fundraising on the performance of their official duties.' 2510 Additionally, there is no convincing evidence that these important interests favoring expenditure limits are fronts for incumbency protection. Buckley's cursory suggestion to the contrary, id., at 56 -57, 96 S.Ct. 612, failed to take into account the mixed evidence before it on this issue. See 519 F.2d, at 861, 862 (detailing how "[t]he material available to the court looks both ways "). And only by "permit[ting] States nationwide to experiment with these critically- needed reforms " —as 18 States urge us to do —will we enable further research on how expenditure limits relate to ourincumbent reelection rates. See Brief for State of Connecticut et al. as Amici Curiae 3.^ In the meantime, a legislative judgment that "enough is 280 enough" should command the greatest possible deference from judges interpreting a constitutional provision that, at best, has an indirect relationship to activity that affects the quantity— rather than the quality or the content—of repetitive speech in the marketplace of ideas. One final point bears mention. Neither the opinions in Buckley nor those that form today's cacophony pay heed to how the Framers would have viewed candidate expenditure limits. This is not an unprincipled approach, as the historical context is "usually relevantbutnot necessarily dispositive." Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 123, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 1528, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) STEVENS, J., concurring). This is particularly true of contextsthat are so different. At the time of the framing the accepted posture of the leading candidates was one of modesty, acknowledging a willingness to serve rather than a desire to compete. Speculationabout how the Framers would have legislated if they had foreseen the era of televised sound -bites thus cannot provide us with definitive answers. Nevertheless, I am firmly persuaded that the Framers would have been appalled by the impact of modern fundraising practices on the ability of elected officials to perform theirpublic responsibilities. I think they would have viewed federal statutes limiting the amount of money that congressional candidates might spend in future elections as well within Congress' authority.' And they surely would *281 not have expected judges to interfere with the * *2511 enforcement of expenditure limits that merely require candidates to budget their activities without imposing any restrictions whatsoever on what they may say in their speeches, debates, and interviews. For the foregoing reasons, I agree with Justice SOUTER that it would be entirely appropriateto allow further proceedings on expenditure limits to go forward in these cases. For the reasons given in Parts II and III of his dissent, I also agree that Vermont's contribution limits and presumption of coordinated expenditures by political parties are constitutional, and so join those portions of his opinion. Justice SOUTER, with whom Justice GINSBURG joins, Westla. Next' © 2013 ThomsonReuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. B2 - 46 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... and with whom Justice STEVENS joins as toParts II and III, dissenting. In 1997, the Legislature of Vermont passed Act 64 after a series of public hearingspersuaded legislators that rehabilitating the State's political process required campaignfinance reform. A majority of the Court today decides that the expenditure and contribution limits enacted are irreconcilable with the Constitution's guarantee of free speech. I would adhere to the Court of Appeals's decision to remand for further enquiry bearing on the limitations on candidates' expenditures, and I think the contribution limits satisfy controlling precedent. I respectfully dissent. Rejecting Act 64's expenditure limits as directly contravening Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), ante, at 2489 — 2491 opinion of BREYER, J.), is at least premature. We said inBuckley that "expenditure limitations impose far greaterrestraints on the freedom of speech and association than do ... contribution limitations," 424 U.S., at 44, 96 S.Ct. 612, but the Buckley Court did not categorically foreclose the possibility that some spending limit might comport with the *282 First Amendment. Instead, Buckley held that the constitutionality of an expenditure limitation "turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in itssupport satisfy the applicable] exacting scrutiny." Ibid. In applying that standard in Buckley itself, the Court gave no indication that it had given serious consideration to an aim that Vermont's statute now pursues: to alleviate the drain on candidates' and officials' time caused by the endless fundraising necessary to aggregate many small contributions to meet the opportunities for evermore expensive campaigning. Instead, we dwelt on rejecting the sufficiency of interests in reducing corruption, equalizing the financial resources of candidates, and capping the overall cost of political campaigns, see id., at 55 -57, 96 S.Ct. 612. Although Justice White went a step further in dissenting from the Court on expenditures, and made something of the interest in getting officials off the treadmill" driven by the "obsession with fundraising," see id., at 265, 96 S.Ct. 612 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), this lurking issue was not treated as significant on the expenditurequestion in the per curiam opinion. Whatever the observations made to the BuckleyCourt about the effect of fundraising on candidates' time, the Court did not squarely address a time - protection interest as support for the expenditure limits, much less one buttressed by as thorough a record as we have here! 2512 *283 Vermont's argument therefore does not ask us to overrule Buckley; it asks us to apply Buckley's framework to determine whether its evidence here on a need to slow the fundraising treadmill suffices to support the enacted limitations. Vermont's claim is serious. Three decades of experience since Buckley have taught us much, and the findings made by the Vermont Legislature on the pernicious effect of the nonstop pursuit of money are significant. See, e.g., Act 64, H. 28, Legislative Findings and Intent, App. 20 (hereinafter Legislative Findings) (finding that "candidates for statewide offices are spending inordinate amounts of time raising campaign funds "); ibid. (finding that "[r]obust debate of issues, candidate interaction with the electorate, and public involvement and confidence in the electoral processhave decreased as campaign expenditures have increased "); see also Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F.Supp.2d 459, 467 (Vt.2000) noting testimony of Sen. Shumlin before the legislature that raising funds "was one of the most distastefulthings that I've had to do in public service" (internalquotation marks omitted)); Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 123 C.A.2 2004) (public officials testified at trial that elected officials spend time with donors rather than on their official duties "). The legislature's findings are surely significant enough to justify the Court of Appeals's remand tothe District Court to decide whether Vermont's spending limits are the least restrictive means of accomplishing what the court unexceptionably found to be worthy objectives. See id., at 124 -125, 135 -137. The District Court was instructed to examine a variety of outstanding issues, including alternatives considered by Vermont's Legislature and the reasons for rejecting them. See id., at 136. Thus, the constitutionality of the expenditure limits was not conclusively decided by the Second Circuit, and I believe the evidentiary work that remained to bedone would have raised the prospect for a sound answer to that question, whatever the answer might havebeen. Instead, 284 we are left with an unresolved question of narrow tailoring and with consequent doubt about the justifiability of the spending limits as necessaryand appropriatecorrectives. This is not the record on which to foreclose the ability of a State to remedy the impact of the money chase on the democratic process. I would not, therefore, disturb the Court of Appeals's stated intention to remand. II Although I would defer judgment on the merits of the expenditure limitations, I believe the Court of Appeals W,st1,.wvNext' © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. GovernmentWorks. 22 B2 - 47 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW4435, 06 Cal. DailyOp. Serv. 5503... correctly rejected the challenge to the contribution limits. Low though they are, one cannot say that "the contribution limitation[s are] so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000). The limits set by Vermont are not remarkable departures either from those previously upheld by this Courtor from those lately adopted by other States. The * *2513 plurality concedes that on a per- citizen measurement Vermont's limit for statewideelections "is slightly more generous," ante, at 2494, than the one set by the Missouri statute approved by this Court in Shrink, supra. Not only do those dollar amounts getmore generous the smaller the district, they are consistent withlimits set by the legislatures of many other States, all of them with populationslarger than Vermont's, some significantly so. See, e.g., Montana Right to Life Assn. v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085, 1088 (C.A.9 2003) (approving $400 limit for candidates filed jointly for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, sinceincreased to $500, see Mont.Code Ann. § 13- 37- 216(1)(a)(i) (2005)); Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 452 (C.A.1 2000) ($500 limit for gubernatorial candidates in *285 Maine); Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley, 427 F.3d 1106, 1113 C.A.8 2005) ($500 limit on contributions to legislative candidates in election years, $100 in other years); Florida Right to Life, Inc. v. Mortham, No. 6:98- 770- CV.ORL -19A, 2000 WL 33733256, *3 M.D.Fla., Mar.20, 2000) ($500 limit on contributions to any state candidate). The point is not that this Court is bound by judicial sanctions of those numbers; it is that the consistency in legislative judgment tells us that Vermont is not an eccentric party of one, and that this is a case for the judicial deference that our own precedents say we owe here. See Shrink, supra, at 402, 120 S.Ct. 897 (BREYER, J., concurring) ( "Where a legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise, as, for example, in the field of election regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical legislative judgments "); see also ante, at 2492 plurality opinion) ( "[O]rdinarily we have deferred to the legislature's determination of [matters related to the costs and nature of running for office] "). To place Vermont's contribution limits beyond the constitutional pale, therefore, is to forgetnot only the facts of Shrink, but also our self - admonition against second - guessing legislativejudgments about the risk of corruption to which contribution limits have to be fitted. See Shrink, supra, at 391, and n. 5, 120 S.Ct. 897. And deference here would surely not be overly complaisant. Vermont's legislators themselves testified at length about the money that gets their special attention, see Legislative Findings, App. 20 (finding that "[s]ome candidates and elected officials, particularly when time is limited, respond and give access to contributors who makelarge contributions in preference to those who make small or no contributions "); 382 F.3d, at 122 (testimony of Elizabeth Ready: "If I have only got an hour at night when I get home to return calls, I am much more likely to return [a donor's] call than I would [a non - donor's].... [W]hen you only have a few minutes to talk, there are certain people that get access" (alterations in original)). The record revealed the *286amount of money the public sees as suspiciously large, see 118 F.Supp.2d, at479 -480 ( "The limits set by the legislature ... accurately reflect the level of contribution considered suspiciously large by the Vermont public. Testimony suggested that amounts greater than the contribution limits are considered large by the Vermont public "). And testimony identified the amounts high enough to pay for effective campaigningin a State where the cost of running tends to be on the low side, see id., at 471 ( "In the context of Vermont politics, 200, $300, and $400 donations are clearly large, as the legislature determined. Small donations are considered to be strong acts of political support in this state. William Meub testified * *2514 that a contribution of $1 is meaningful because it represents a commitment by the contributor that is likely to become a vote for the candidate. Gubernatorial candidate Ruth Dwyer values the small contributions of $5 so muchthat she personally sends thank you notes to those donors "); id., at 470 -471 In Vermont, many politicians have runeffective and winning campaigns with very little money, and some with no money at all .... Several candidates, campaign managers, and past and present government officials testified that they will be able to raiseenough money to mount effective campaigns in the system of contribution limits established by Act 64 "); id., at 472 ( "Spending in Vermont statewideelections is very low .... Vermont ranks 49th out of the 50 states incampaign spending. The majority of major party candidates for statewide office in the last three election cycles spent less than what the spending limits of Act 64 would allow .... In Vermont legislative races, low -cost methodssuch as door -to -door campaigning are standardandevenexpected by the voters "). Still, our cases do not say deference should be absolute. We can allimagine dollar limits that would be laughable, and per capita comparisonsthat would be meaningless because aggregated donations simply could not sustain effective campaigns. The plurality thinks that point has beenreached in *287 Vermont, and in particular that the Pv'ex ,tlav%,,Next' © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 23 B2 - 48 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. DailyOp. Serv. 5503... low contribution limits threaten the ability of challengers to run effective races against incumbents. Thus, the plurality's limit of deference is substantially a function of suspicion that political incumbents in the legislature set low contribution limits because their public recognition andeasy access to free publicity will effectively augment their own spending power beyond anything a challenger can muster. The suspicion is, in other words, that incumbents cannot be trustedto set fair limits, because facially neutral limits do not in fact give challengers an even break. But this received suspicion is itself a proper subject of suspicion. The petitioners offered, and the plurality invokes, no evidence that the risk of a pro- incumbent advantage has been realized; in fact, the record evidence runs the other way, as the plurality concedes. See ante, at 2496 ( "[T]he record does contain some anecdotal evidence supporting the respondents' position, namely, testimony about a post—Act-64 competitive mayoralcampaign in Burlington, which suggests that a challenger can `amas[s] the resources necessary for effective advocacy,' Buckley, 424 U.S., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612 "). I would not discount such evidence that these lowlimits are fair to challengers, for the experience of the Burlington race is confirmed by recent empirical studies addressing this issue of incumbent's advantage. See, e.g., Eom & Gross, Contribution Limits and Disparity in Contributions Between Gubernatorial Candidates, 59 Pol. Research Q. 99 (2006) ( "Analyses of both the number of contributors and the dollar amount of contributions [to gubernatorial candidates] suggestno support for an increasedbias in favor of incumbents resulting from thepresence of campaign contribution limits. If anything, contribution limits can work to reduce the bias that traditionally works in favor of incumbents. Also, contribution limits do not seem to increase disparities between gubernatorial candidates in general" emphasis deleted)); Bardwell, Money and Challenger Emergence in GubernatorialPrimaries, 55 Pol. Research Q. 653 (2002) (finding that *288 contribution limits favor neitherincumbents nor challengers); Hogan, The Costs of Representation in State Legislatures: Explaining Variations in Campaign Spending, 81 Soc. Sci. Q. 941, 952 (2000) (finding that contribution limits reduce incumbent spending but have no effect on challenger or open- * *2515 seat candidatespending). The Legislature of Vermont evidentlytried to account for the realities of campaigning in Vermont, and I see no evidence of constitutional miscalculation sufficient to dispense with respect for its judgments. III Four issues of detail call for some attention, the first being the requirement that a volunteer's expenses count against the person's contribution limit. The plurality certainly makes out the case thataccounting for these expenses will be a colossal nuisance, but there is no case here that the nuisance will noticeably limit volunteering, or that volunteers whose expenses reach the limit cannot continue with their efforts subject to charging their candidates for the excess. Granted, if the provisions for contribution limits were teetering on the edge of unconstitutionality, Act 64's treatment of volunteers' expenses might be the finger -flick that gives the fatal push, but it has no greater significance than that. Second, the failure of the Vermont law to index its limits forinflation is even less important. This challenge is to the law as it is, not to a law that may have a different impact after future inflation if thestate legislature fails to bring it up to economic date. Third, subjecting political parties tothe same contribution limits as individuals does not condemn the Vermont scheme. What we said in Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 454 -455, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 2001), dealing with regulation of coordinated expenditures, goes here, too. The capacity and desire of parties to makelarge contributions to competitive candidates with uphill *289 fights are shared by rich individuals, and the risk that large party contributions would be channels to evade individual limits cannot be eliminated. Nor are these reasonsto support the party limits undercut by claimsthat the restrictions render parties impotent, for the parties are not precluded from uncoordinated spending to benefit their candidates. That said, I acknowledge the suggestions in the petitioners' briefs that such restrictions in synergy with other influences weakening party power would justify a wholesale reexamination of the situation of party organization today. But whether such a comprehensive reexamination belongs in courts or only in legislatures is not an issue presented by these cases. Finally, there is the issue of Act 64's presumption of coordinated expenditures on the part of political parties, Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2809(d) (2002). The plurality has no occasion to reach it; I do reach it, but find it insignificant. The RepublicanPartypetitioners complain that the relatedexpenditure provision imposes on both the candidate andthe party the burden in some circumstances to provethat coordination of expenditure did not take place, thus threatening to charge against a candidate's spending limits some party expendituresthat are in fact independent, with an ultimate consequence of chilling speech. See Brief for Petitioner Vermont Republican State Committee et al. 45 -46. On the contrary, however, M3:,t1avvNext © 2013 Thomson Reuters, No claim to original U.S. GovernmentWorks KAI B2 - 49 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... we can safely take the presumption on the representation to this Court by the Attorney General of Vermont: the law imposes not a burden of persuasion but merely one of production, leaving the presumptioneasily rebuttable. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 39 -41 (representationthat the presumption disappears once credible evidence, such as an affidavit, is offered); see also Brief for Respondent/Cross- Petitioner William H. Sorrell et al. 48 The presumption "contributes no evidence and disappears when * *2516 facts appear. In a case covered by the presumption, a political party need only present some evidencethat the presumed fact is not true and *290 the presumption vanishes .... Simple testimony that the expenditure was not coordinated would suffice to defeat the presumption" (citations, internalquotation marks, and alterations omitted)). As so understood, the rebuttable presumption clearly imposes no onerous burden like the conclusive presumption in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 619, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) principal opinion), or the nearly conclusive one in Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 785 -786, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). Requiring the party in possession of the pertinent facts to Footnotes come forward with them, as easily as by executing an affidavit, does not rise to the level of a constitutionally offensive encumbrance here. Cf. County Court of Ulster Cry. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 158, n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) ( "To the extentthat a presumption imposes an extremely low burden of production -e.g., beingsatisfied by `any' evidence -it may well be that its impact is no greater than that of a permissive inference "). IV Because I would not pass upon the constitutionality of Vermont's expenditure limits prior to further enquiry into their fit with the problem of fundraising demandson candidates, andbecause I do not see the contribution limits as depressed to the level of political inaudibility, I respectfully dissent. Parallel Citations 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503, 06 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8056, 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 354, 19 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 659 The syllabusconstitutes no part of the opinion of the Courtbut has been prepared by theReporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. 1 Although the plurality's stare decisis analysis is limited to Buckley's treatment of expenditure limitations, its reasoning cannot be so confined, and would apply equally to Buckley's standard for evaluating contribution limits. See ante, at 2489 -2490 (noting, inter alia, thatBuckley has engendered "considerablereliance" that would be "dramatically undermine[d]" byoverruling it now). 2 Ironically, the plurality is troubled by the fact that the absence of a provision adjusting the limits for inflation means that the real value of the limits will decline, and that "the burden of preventing the decline [lies] upon incumbentlegislatorswho may not diligently police the need for changes in limit levels to ensure the adequate financing of electoral challenges." Ante, at 2499. It is impossible to square this wariness of incumbents' disinclination to enact future laws protecting challengers with the plurality's deference to those same incumbents when they make empirical judgmentsregarding "the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute's legitimate objectives" in the first place. Ante, at 2492. 3 The plurality's connection of these two factors implies that it is concerned not with the impact onthe speech of contributors, but solely with the speech of candidates, for whom the two facts might be connected. See ante, at 2494 -2495. Indeed, the plurality notably omits interference with participation in campaigns throughmonetary contributions from the list of reasons the Act is unconstitutional. See ante, at 2495, 2499. But contributors, too, have a right tofree speech. See Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 637, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) (THOMAS, J., concurringinjudgment and dissenting in part) ( "If an individual is limited in the amount of resources he can contribute to the pool, he is most certainly limited in his ability to associate for purposes of effective advocacy "). Even Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), recognizes that contribution limits restrict the free speech of contributors, even if it understates the significance of this restriction. See id., at 2495 2496 ( "[A] limitation upon the amount that anyone person or group may contribute to a candidate ... entails only a marginal restriction uponthe contributor's ability to engage in free communication "). We have, of course, invalidated limits on independent expenditures by third persons. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996); cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Cilizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986). In these cases the principal parties accepted Buckley's holding on candidate expenditure limits and gave us no cause to consider how much weight to give stare decisis. iVesy la,,vNext © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 25 B2 - 50 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482, 74 USLW 4435, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5503... See Brief for State of Connecticut et al. as Amici Curiae 16 -17 (citing Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 16- 940(B)(7); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 1-45 -102; Neb.Rev.Stat. § 32- 1602(1); and R.I. Gen. Laws § 17- 25 -18). See, e.g., Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling Government Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials, 37 Loyola U. Chi. L.J. 669, 673 -683 (2006); see also post, at 2512 (SOUTER, J., dissenting). Indeed, the example of the city of Albuquerque suggests that concerns about incumbent entrenchment are unfounded. In 1974, the city set expenditure limits on municipal elections. A 2 –year interlude aside, these limits applied until 2001, when theywere successfullychallenged by municipal candidates. Homans v. Albuquerque, 217 F.Supp.2d 1197, 1200 (NM 2002), affd, 366 F.3d 900 (C.A.10), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1002, 125 S.Ct. 625, 160 L.Ed.2d 461 (2004). In its findings of fact, the Federal District Court determined that "[n]ationwide, eighty -eight percent (88 %) of incumbent Mayorssuccessfully sought reelection in 1999. In contrast, since 1974, the City has had a zero percent (0 %) success rate for Mayors seeking reelection." 217 F.Supp.2d, at 1200 citation omitted). Thecourt further concluded that the "system of unlimited spending has deleterious effects on the competitiveness of elections because it gives incumbent candidates an electoral advantage." Ibid. While far from conclusive, this example cuts against the view that there is a slam -dunkcorrelation between expenditure limits and incumbent advantage. See also Brief for Center for Democracy and Election Management at American University as AmicusCuriae (concluding that Canada, the UnitedKingdom, New Zealand, and Malta —all of which have campaign expenditure limits —have more electoral competition than the United States, Jamaica, Ireland, and Australia —all of which lack such limits). See Art. I, § 4 (providing that the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed ineachState by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any timeby Law make or alter such Regulations "); see also § 5 (providing that "Each House may determinethe Rules of its Proceedings "). In approving the public funding provisions of the subject campaign finance law, Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code, the BuckleyCourt appreciatedthat in enacting the provision Congress was legislating in part "to free candidates from the rigors of fundraising," 424 U.S., at 91, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also id., at 96, 96 S.Ct. 612 ( "Congress properly regarded public financing as an appropriate means of relieving major -party Presidential candidates from the rigors of soliciting privatecontributions "). Recognition of theinterest as to Subtitle H, a question of congressional power involving a different evidentiary burden, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987); see also Buckley, supra, at 90, 96 S.Ct. 612, does not imply a conclusive rejection of it as to the separate issue of expenditure limits. End of Document O 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claimto original U.S. GovernmentWorks. VA. tlat,N,Next' © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 26 B2 - 51 B2 - 52 B2 - 53 B2 - 54 B2 - 55 B2 - 56 B2 - 57 B2 - 58 B2 - 59 B2 - 60 B2 - 61 B2 - 62 B2 - 63 B2 - 64 B2 - 65 B2 - 66 B2 - 67 B2 - 68 B2 - 69 B2 - 70 B2 - 71 B2 - 72 B2 - 73 B2 - 74 B2 - 75 B2 - 76 B2 - 77 B2 - 78 B2 - 79 B2 - 80 B2 - 81 B2 - 82 B2 - 83 B2 - 84 B2 - 85 B2 - 86 B2 - 87 B2 - 88 B2 - 89 B2 - 90 B2 - 91 B2 - 92 B2 - 93 B2 - 94 B2 - 95 B2 - 96 B2 - 97 B2 - 98 B2 - 99 B2 - 100 B2 - 101 B2 - 102 AGENDA CORRESPONDENCE Date d a Item # - Anthony Mejia, City Clerk 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 STEW ]ENKINS ATTORNEY 1336 Morro Street, San Luis Obispo CA 93401 Phone: (805) 541 -5763 FAX: (805) 547 -1608 February 4, 2014 FEB 0 4 2014 Atten: Mayor Jan Marx, and Council Members John Ashbaugh, Dan Carpenter, Kathy Smith, Carlyn Christianson Re: SLO City Municipal Code, Chapter 2.40, ELECTION CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS; Council Agenda Item B2. Dear Mr. Mejia: I hope that you will pass this note on to the members of the City Council as they consider campaign finance ordinances now in place, and any consider replacement ordinances. This letter objects to readoption of Chapter 2.40 as presently written, or as recommended with minor amendments by the staff report at tonight's city council meeting. It recommends, instead, that the City explore drafting a voluntary public financing ordinance in order to assure the integrity of elections while protecting citizen's rights to free speech and political active participation in City elections. Chapter 2.40 of the Municipal Code is scheduled to sunset. The terms of the current City campaign finance ordinances are strikingly similar to a Vermont statute held to be unconstitutional in 2006 as violative of individual rights of free speech and free assembly. Those speech and assembly rights are amplified by stronger provisions in Article I, Sections 1 -3 of the California Constitution. Specifically the case of Randall v. Sorrell (2006) 126 S.Ct. 2479 held that restriction of donors to contributing no more than $200 to the campaign of a candidate for state representative (tantamount to California's state assembly) so impaired these important inalienable rights that they had to be struck down. Before concluding that there is a distinction between a Vermont state representative campaign and that of a San Luis Obispo City council or mayoralty campaign it would be wise to look at the population of state representative districts and compare them to the number of residents represented by a SLO council member or mayor. According to the 2010 census and publically available information from Vermont that state's "state representative" districts contained barely over 40,000 residents. Each council member and the mayor of San Luis Obispo represent over 45,000 residents. It is clear from a reading of Randall v. Sorrell that when a campaign regulation restricts contributions to such a constrictive level, there is an unjustified impairment of www.stewjenkins.com every citizen's right to speak and to be politically active in their community. I understand that the Council has received a recommendation to raise the limit on campaign contributions to $300. In considering what is right to do in line with your obligation to give effect to the U.S. and the California constitutions, you should know that in Randall v. Sorrell a $300 limit on campaign contributions to candidates for Vermont state senate was also struck down; as well as a $400 limit on contributions to candidates for other state offices. Although Randall v. Sorrelll was decided with a number of opinions written by a number of justices, some statements made were important to your consideration. To paraphrase in part Justice Bryer's lead Opinion: The interests underlying contribution limits, preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, "directly implicate the integrity of our electoral process. McConnell, supra, at 136, 124 S.Ct. 619. Yet that rationale does not simply mean the lower the limit, the better." Contribution limits that are too low can also harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability. A court must exercise independent judgment when a statute that seeks to regulate campaign contributions is so severe that it could itself prove an obstacle to the electoral fairness it purports to promote. Contribution limits "implicate fundamental First Amendment interests" including freedom of expression and association. The lowest campaign contribution previously upheld by the Supreme Court was $1,075, and Vermont's severe limits on campaign contributions prevented candidates from `amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy,' thus magnifying the advantages of incumbency to the point that challengers were put to such a significant disadvantage that the statute could not survive First Amendment scrutiny. Justice Bryer's opinion was joined in by Chief Justice Robers and Justice Alioto. In San Luis Obispo, where one quarter page advertisement in the primary daily costs $1,232, or one sticker ad addressed to the City's circulation on a Sunday is $1,229, a $300 campaign contribution limit for city office can not withstand First Amendment scrutiny. The cost of radio, television, mailings, and door hangers amplifies how unreasonably low such an extreme campaign limitation is constitutionally. Justice Kennedy and Thomas, in the Randall v. Sorrell concurrences indicated that they agreed with the result, but in varying language indicated that they would have gone farther to reverse older opinions upholding the concept of campaign contribution limits. Readoption of Chapter 2.40 of the Municipal Code restricting campaign contributions to only $300 would be foolhardy and poses significant risk for drawing the City into violations of individual and collective rights to exercise free speech, free press, and free assembly. As the Council knows the nation's highest court has been very active in reviewing and striking down campaign finance limits. Comments made by a majority of the Justices in the back to back opinions of Citizens United and American Tradition Partnership, Inc., vs Steve Bullock, Attorney General of Montana have prefaced a sea change in campaign finance regulation. www.stewjenkins.com 2 On October 8, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission which examines whether placing a limit on contributions to non - candidate and to candidate committees can be imposed at all by statute (or by extension by a local ordinance). No reason exists to put the city at risk of being sued by civil rights advocates by re- adopting an ordinance already unconstitutional under Randall v. Sorrell. Before moving to craft a replacement (whether with higher limits on campaign contributions or other regulations) a sensible move for the city council would be to wait, and to permit the ultimate decision in McCutcheon to inform your decision. While a reading of Randall v. Sorrell might suggest that setting higher limits on contributions to City Council candidates that matched those imposed on California state assembly and state senate candidates might pass muster, clearly a decision in McCutcheon may well make those higher limits unlawfully restrictive. Waiting to craft local ordinances tied to restricting campaign contributions until after the Supreme Court issues its opinion in McCutcheon would be the City's most prudent action. But the City need not ridgidly tie itself to outmoded models restricting campaign contribution. Several municipalities and states have built voluntary public campaign finance systems which work well, prevent corruption, and largely free candidates and office holders from spending most of their "campaign time" seeking donations from special interests. Officeholders and candidates have found themselves free to spend their time finding out what their constituents actually needed. Lobbying by large donors and bundlers representing special interests became a thing of the past. Though voluntary, where these systems have been built the public support for their use has made those who remained outside those programs to instead fund their campaigns with large contributors and corporate interests less attractive to the public. Like any new idea these have generated some legal challenges. But, except for matters in the margines of the adopted public finance statutes, these public financing systems have largely been upheld. Instead of defending an ordinance structure likely to be found unconstitutional, I urge the Council to consider instead drafting a public campaign finance ordinance that will in fact be better for the citizens of San Luis Obispo than Chapter 2.4 enkins www.stewjenkins.com Goodwin, Heather From: Sent: To: Subject: Attachments: Anthony J. Mejia I City Clerk City of San Luis Obispo 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 tel 1 805.781.7102 Mejia, Anthony Tuesday, February 04, 2014 8:28 AM Goodwin, Heather FW: Campaign Finance Regulations council campaign finance.doc FEB "O 4 2014 AGENDA CORRESPONDENCE Date d2�La it ®m# 13Z - - - -- Original Message---- - From: rschmidt @rain.org [mailto:rschmidt @rain.org] Sent: Monday, February 03, 2014 10:13 PM To: Marx, Jan; dcarpen @slocity.org; Ashbaugh, John; Smith, Kathy; Christianson, Carlyn; Mejia, Anthony Subject: Campaign Finance Regulations Dear Council Members, Attached is a letter for your consideration urging you to REJECT ALL OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS to emasculate the current campaign regulations. The committee that came up with this did not represent the public broadly and did not understand the actual issues, and came up with a set of very bad, very untimely recommendations. This is about good government, and your endorsement of their recommendations would be disrespectful of the very concept of good government. Please don't go there. Please don't adopt these bad ideas. My letter tells more specifics. Richard Schmidt Feb. 3, 2014 Re: Campaign Finance Protections Dear Council Members: urge you to totally reject the outrageous recommendations coming from the committee you appointed to "review" San Luis Obispo' campaign finance protections. This committee has gone rogue, and as the history presented to them by the previous acting city clerk shows clearly, past Councils have repeatedly rejected rogue recommendations from such a committee. You need to do the same this time around. These protections were established to assure honest elections. I find it absolutely incredible that in the staff report's bland recitation to you about the history of this set of protections, they totally neglect to state the actual reasons they were enacted in 1974: to clearly state the Council's intent to shine bright light into dark places, and to prevent corruption. Today, more than ever, both of those needs remain. If the Council wishes to make a strong statement of its respect for honest government and honest campaigns, it will keep the protections that exist today. I will add that I have a lot of background and experience with what I'm writing about. I have proudly served on the election protections committee; I have run three city campaigns; and I have served as treasurer for numerous city campaigns. I have never found the regulations to be onerous or a "hassle" as Kevin Rice claims them to be, have proudly administered them as a campaign treasurer, and was likewise proud by following them to do my part to keep our elections open and honest. Further, when on occasion a donor would try to do something dicey or off -key, it was really nice to just be able to say: "That's not permitted by city law, and here's your contribution back," and be rid of the potential problem and the icky situation. Clearly, the protections do further the honesty of our elections. The arguments advanced for the proposed changes don't pass any sort of test. They're mainly libertarian nonsense: 1. Eliminating disclosure of contributions of less than the state disclosure minimum (currently $100, but likely to be raised). This, we are told, is no longer necessary because "times have changed." Really? In the 2012 city election, what the committee proposes to henceforth turn into completely anonymous contributions amounted to 42% of total amounts subject to state disclosure! How is it no longer important to shine light into dark places where so much money comes from? (The staff report seems to indicate the city doesn't require filings for contributions of $100 or more up to the city limit. Is that correct? When were those dropped from the city's filing requirements? They should be reported, as the city reports are immediate and local, the state reports harder /slower for the public to access.) 2. Elimination of city campaign filings. There is no credible reason for this. As indicated above, filling out the forms is NOT a "hassle" and the city clerk's rapid publication of the filings is a public service. Without them, the public will be kept in the dark about who's contributing to whom. 3. Raising contribution limit to $300. Let's put this another way. What the committee proposes is green lighting higher contribution limits so that every couple in San Luis Obispo will be free to contribute $1800 to influence people who serve on our city council (i.e., $600 each to two winning council candidates and the mayor). $1800 is not the sort of money normal people can or would contribute to city campaigns. It's the sort of money that people with vested interests who want to make money off city actions will and can contribute — sorta like a business expense, an investment. The higher the limit, the more the forces of wealth and commerce will control the city, and the more marginalized normal voters will become; and the more marginalized normal voters become, the less they will respect the city and its actions and the more alienated they become from electoral politics and the less they feel a part of the common enterprise city government should be. Raising campaign contribution limits is just one more nail in the coffin of the happiest place, one more thing that will send the happiest place down the road to becoming Anaheim North. I know well that all of you think it would be neatsy keene to be able to raise more money from fewer people, but should you put your own convenience above good government? think not.' 4. Eliminating requirement to close campaign accounts. This makes no sense at all. Campaign funds shouldn't be allowed to become permanent slush funds, and indeed state law prevents that. When the campaign's over, the campaign account should be empty. So why in the world (and for what purpose) should an empty campaign account continue to exist? And who's paying its monthly fees? (It's not proper to comingle personal and campaign funds, so this is a very interesting question your committee ignores.) Unless you're Harold Stassen or Kevin Rice, why would you want a perpetual campaign account? The city's requirement makes certain that the intent of closing out a campaign actually gets carried out — by closing its money depository and requiring donation of any leftover funds to charity. That's good government! Why mess with it? Again, this is an imaginary "hassle." In CONCLUSION, the Council would do well to reject all the recommendations of this rogue committee, and keep things as they are — unless, of course, any of you are truly champions of good government and clean elections to the point you'd like to shine even more light on things by lowering the reporting threshold back to $25, which seems like a totally reasonable and workable level, and one I've worked happily with. ' Campaigns don't have to cost what you all have paid, and don't need to be run that way either. All the campaigns I've run were bare bones operations we weren't supposed to be able to win, and we won them all, with tiny budgets compared to any of yours, by being democratic, clever, smart, and strategic. If we could get money out of city campaigns, actual democracy could thrive. Sincerely, Richard Schmidt PS. Why was Allen Settle, who lives outside the city and has been fined by a state agency for political corruption, on this good government committee?