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HomeMy WebLinkAbout3/4/2025 Item 6a, CatacutanA DAMSKI M OROSKI M ADDEN C UMBERLAND & G REEN LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW Post Office Box 3835  San Luis Obispo, California 93403-3835 T 805-543-0990  F 805-543-0980  www.ammcglaw.com February 28, 2025 VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL Honorable Mayor Erica A. Stewart 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Email: estewart@slocity.org Re: Waterman Village Development 464 and 466 Dana Street Dear Mayor Stewart: This firm has the pleasure of representing Smart Share Housing Solutions (“Smart Share”) that is applying for project approval to construct 20 affordable “tiny homes” on City property located at 464 and 466 Dana Street. These homes will become the permanent dwellings of low- income residents.1 Smart Share, a non-profit entity, has been providing a variety of housing solutions for lower income residents since 2017. This project before the Council is the culmination of several years of dedicated effort in support of housing for lower and low income residents. Although parsed on five separate grounds, the crux of Appellant’s claim is that the proposed project would violate a purported “restrictive covenant” which, Appellant incorrectly alleges, is found in the grant deed by which Mary Gail Black transferred the property to the City in 1986. Appellant contends that this purported “restrictive covenant” prohibits the use of the property for anything other than park or recreational purposes. This is simply not true as evidenced by the express language of the grant deed. The grant deed from Ms. Black to the City, by its very terms, merely “requests” that the building and trees on the property be used for park or recreational purposes. More specifically, the property is transferred: 1 To mischaracterize the project, Appellant inaccurately references the project as containing “transient dwellings”. The project will have no units which could be considered transient. The intent for all units will be as permanent dwelling. Ironically, one of those named in the appeal as representing Appellant, owns the adjacent property which appears to be providing student housing which, by its nature, is the very definition of transient housing. Page 2 February 28, 2025 “…with the request that the adobe and two adjoining wings that make up the old house, and the trees on the property be maintained by the City for park or recreational purposes.” Thus, in legal terms, the request is not an express condition of the transfer but only a statement of the donor’s desires. The use of request means that, while it would be the donor’s preference, the City is under no obligation to use the property for parks or recreation purposes. It is free to put the property to any use it sees fit. In fact, under the express terms of the grant deed, the City could simply sell the property to a third party for any type of development consistent with City land use regulations. Instead, the City is considering a project that will result in the preservation of the adobe and maintenance of the trees, for the benefit of the community, while concurrently providing much needed permanent housing for lower and lower income residents. There is a significant legal and practical difference between an absolute deed restriction requiring that donated property be put to a specific use and a statement in the deed merely stating the donor’s preferences. A review of relevant case authority shows that, in the former, the language in the donative grant deed must be clear and absolute along the lines of language that “this property is to be exclusively used for” a stated purpose. In accepting such a deed with such language, Courts have consistently held that the entity accepting the donation is bound by the restrictive language and that a violation of the restrictive language is a breach of the deed and, if provided in the grant deed, may require that the property be returned to the donor or its heirs. That is simply not the case here. Rather, the grant deed from Ms. Black expressly provides that it is simply her request that the building and trees be used for park or recreation purposes. Apart from stating her preference, Ms. Black placed no restriction on the use of the property. This use of the phrase “with the request” is not ambiguous or a poor use of the language but is clearly carefully crafted to ensure that the City was not limited to park or recreation use. The City staff report considering the donation states that Ms. Black was represented by counsel during the process. Based on that representation and the obvious skill and care that went into the preparation of a somewhat complex grant deed, if the intent was to restrict the use of the property in perpetuity, the authors of the deed would have said so. Instead, they very carefully chose the wording that the donation was “with the request” not “on the condition”.2 Moreover, the proposed project does, in fact, honor the donor’s intent to the extent practicable. As noted in the current Staff Report, the project calls for the existing adobe to be rehabilitated with the intent that it will be available as a community gathering spot. The rehabilitation of the adobe for community use is very much in line with the donor’s intent and, 2 While the property was donated to the City, it was not without cost. Based on actual conditions, as opposed to requests, in the Grant Deed, during Ms. Black’s lifetime the City was obligated to provide water and sewer services to the property and to maintain buildings on the property, including the adobe dwelling. Page 3 February 28, 2025 given economic and other realities, is likely the closest thing to a park use that the property will ever achieve.3 In the 37 years since the grant deed was recorded, the property has never been used as a park almost certainly because the limited demand for a park at this location along with the high costs of park development do not make a park and recreation use of the park feasible. However, Smart Share will be undertaking repairs to the adobe and, subject to some limitations, will allow the public access to the adobe. Absent the proposed project, it is difficult to imagine a more feasible way to honor Ms. Black’s request. In fact, the project will be called Waterman Village in line with Ms. Black’s request that the name of her friend, Ms. Waterman, be honored. Appellants also claim that the project’s use of the property would violate a City Resolution adopted October 4, 1988. That contention is simply wrong. There is no good faith way to read a use restriction into the Resolution. The subject of the Resolution was the acceptance of the property gift from Ms. Black through a grant deed. Nothing in the Staff Report or the Resolution even hints that the sole use of the gifted property would be for park or recreation purposes. In fact, the Staff Report recommends acceptance of the gift with the conditions of a life estate and certain maintenance responsibilities because “the gift and the potential for park and recreation use of the property far outweigh the cost of repair and maintenance”. More to the point, the entire purpose of the Resolution was to accept the property through the Grant Deed and, as noted above, the Grant Deed made it very clear that park or recreation use was a request from the donor but not a condition. The Resolution could do no more than accept the Grant Deed as drafted. We would also venture an educated guess that the term “with the request” was included at the insistence of the City. This makes sense because at the time of the donation, the City, while expending City funds on maintenance and repair, would not and could not commit to the eventuality that the property would develop for park or recreational purposes. Certainly, the City’s main interest in acquiring the property was along those lines. However, the realities of municipal affairs are that it would be virtually impossible, and certainly imprudent, for a City to guarantee a specified use of donated property without considering the desire for such use and the development and maintenance costs of such a use. This is particularly true in this case where a condition, as opposed to a request, was that the City incur significant maintenance and repair costs while Ms. Black continued to live in the adobe. Finally, the appeal has nothing whatsoever to do with the City’s land use planning or policy. If there is an issue at all, it is an issue between the City and Ms. Black’s heirs. Based on the above analysis, we are confident that the project use of the property does not violate any of the covenants of the Grant Deed and can’t imagine a court determining otherwise. Regardless, 3 The language of the grant deed is clear in one other respect relevant here. The request for park or recreational use (note the request is an either/or request) but as to the adobe and trees alone. Nothing in the grant deed conveys any desire of Ms. Black for use of the land itself. While some (several sick) trees will be removed as part of the project, more than half of the trees will remain and be incorporated into the project. Page 4 February 28, 2025 however, if the heirs disagree, they have a path to challenge whether the project is in breach of the deed covenants. As a land use matter, the phantom deed restriction is entirely irrelevant. The proposed project does not violate any deed restriction or covenant in the deed. To the contrary, the project makes every effort to honor Ms. Black’s request while addressing a very pressing community need. The appeal should be denied. Respectfully submitted, ADAMSKI MOROSKI MADDEN CUMBERLAND & GREEN LLP TY GREEN Cc: San Luis Obispo City Council Christine Dietrick, City Attorney Timmi Tway, Community Development Director Bcc: Anne Wyatt