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HomeMy WebLinkAbout3/4/2025 Item 6a, Rizzo (2) Saro Rizzo < To:E-mail Council Website; Dietrick, Christine Subject:3-4-2025 Appeal Of Waterman Village Project Attachments:County of Solano v Handlery.pdf; SLO City March 6, 2020 Request For Information.pdf; Agenda Report October 4, 1988.pdf; Resolution 6512 (1988 Series).pdf This message is from an External Source. Use caution when deciding to open attachments, click links, or respond. City of San Luis Obispo Attn: Mayor and City Council 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 SUBJECT: Appeal of Planning Commission decision to approve the Waterman Village Project at 466 Dana Street, proposing the construction of 20 low-to very-low-income homes at the historic Rosa Burton Adobe. Dear Mayor and City Council: In my 2/28/2025 letter to you, I referenced the City of SLO's March 6, 2020, “Request for Information - Community Partnership - Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe.” This document states that "it is clear" in the grant deed and in the City Council’s Resolution of Acceptance, that the donation agreement includes a provision that property be maintained by the City for park or recreational purposes. I'm attaching a copy of this document for your reference. I'm also attaching a copy of the October 4, 1988, City Agenda Report for the 1988 hearing where the City accepted the gift of the historical property. It is interesting to note that the report was prepared by the Parks and Recreation Department and that all references in it relate to the gift being a wonderful addition to the City for park and recreation use in the City park system. Also attached is a copy of SLO City Resolution 6512 (1988) accepting the gift of the property. It states, "the City of San Luis Obispo is desirous of accepting the grant of Real property and premises for park and recreation purposes..." I believe these documents, as well as others in the record, make it abundantly clear that all parties involved in the transaction at the time understood that the Mary Gail Black's gift of the property was for park or recreational purposes once her life estate extinguished. I am bringing your attention to these documents because there has been talk that it is not clear whether or not the grant deed limits the use of the property to park or recreational use only. The 1 courts have long held that the intent of the donor is the critical factor if there is any question regarding the interpretation of the grant deed. “The intention of the parties to the deed should control the construction of the instrument. The object in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties, and especially that of the grantor, from the words which have been employed in connection with the subject-matter, and from the surrounding circumstances. (Aller v. Berkeley Hall School Found., 40 Cal.App.2d 31, 35, 103 P.2d 1052 (1940).) Moreover, charitable gifts are favored, and devises attempting to benefit charitable purposes will be liberally construed. Because charitable bequests are favored, they will be upheld if one can possibly be construed as valid by applying liberal rules of construction designed to accomplish the intent of the trustor or testator. (Estate of Breeden, (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 981. Further, if parties have expressed their intention to limit the use of land, that intention shall be carried out, for the primary object in construing restrictive covenants, as in construing all contracts, shall be to effectuate the legitimate desires of the covenanting parties.” (Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, Inc. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 442, 444–445.) (I'm attaching the fairly recent case of County of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (2007) which is similar to the matter at hand and further elaborates on these judicial rules of interpretation regarding restrictive covenants in gifts of land to public agencies.) Moreover, over the years the courts have outlined very important public policy concerns behind California's protective treatment of restrictive covenants or conditions in donations of property for public use. For example, one such concern is that if courts were to permit public entities to accept from donors gifts of property subject to restrictions on the property's use, and then later jettison those restrictions on their own whim, donors would be discouraged from making such gifts in the future. (Save the Wellwood Murray Memorial Library Com. v. City Council (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1003; Big Sur Properties v. Mott, 62 Cal.App.3d 99 (1976); City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 70 Cal.App.4th 613, 628.) The other concern is the general maxim of equity that he who takes the benefit must bear the burden. (County of Solano v. Handlery (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 566 at 577.) Thank you, Saro Rizzo Attorney at Law 1457 Marsh St., Suite 100 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 2 County of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (2007) 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,509, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,805 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1 155 Cal.App.4th 566 Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California. COUNTY OF SOLANO, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent, v. Paul HANDLERY, Individually and as Trustee, etc., Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant. No. A114120 | Sept. 21, 2007. | Rehearing Denied Oct. 10, 2007. | Review Denied Dec. 12, 2007. Synopsis Background: County brought action to quiet title to property donated to it by grantors, seeking a determination that it was sole owner of the property. Grantors' son filed a cross- complaint seeking a declaration as to the parties' respective rights and obligations with respect to the property. The Superior Court, Solano County, No. FCS024233, Paul L. Beeman, J., entered summary judgment in favor of county. Grantors' on appealed. [Holding:] The Court of Appeal, Horner, J., sitting by assignment, held that a triable issue existed as to whether the county assumed a trust-like obligation not to divert use of the property from its dedicated purpose. Reversed. West Headnotes (13) [1]Contracts Intention of Parties Real Property Conveyances Intent of parties With deeds, as with all contracts, the primary object of interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties. West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 1066. 5 Cases that cite this headnote [2]Evidence Deeds In construing a deed, extrinsic evidence is admissible, but not to give the deed a meaning to which it is not susceptible, and it is the deed instrument itself that must be given effect. 2 Cases that cite this headnote [3]Covenants Nature and operation in general With respect to restrictions on the use of land conveyed in a deed, such restrictions will not be read into a restrictive covenant by implication, but if the parties have expressed their intention to limit the use, that intention shall be carried out, for the primary object in construing restrictive covenants, as in construing all contracts, shall be to effectuate the legitimate desires of the covenanting parties. 4 Cases that cite this headnote [4]Appeal and Error Written documents or instruments in general Appeal and Error Construction, interpretation, and application in general Contracts Questions for Jury Contracts Extrinsic facts It is solely a judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence; accordingly, an appellate court is not bound by a construction of the contract based solely upon the terms of the written instrument without the aid of evidence, where there is no conflict in the evidence, or a determination has been made upon incompetent evidence. 2 Cases that cite this headnote [5]Dedication Nature and essentials in general A “dedication” is a voluntary transfer of an interest in land and resembles both a grant and a gift. County of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (2007) 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,509, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,805 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2 [6]Dedication Intent to dedicate The intention to dedicate land need not be expressly stated but can be inferred from the actions of the owner. [7]Dedication Acceptance Dedication Necessity There must be an acceptance by the public of the offer to dedicate land; acceptance may be express or implied. [8]Dedication Official Acts or Proceedings Express acceptance of a dedication of land to the public occurs when formal acceptance is made by the proper authorities. [9]Covenants Nature and operation in general Where a grant deed is for a specified, limited and definite purpose, the subject of the grant cannot be used for another and different purpose. 1 Case that cites this headnote [10]Dedication General rules of construction Where property is acquired by a public entity through private dedication, the deed is strictly construed. 1 Case that cites this headnote [11]Dedication Misuser or diversion Application of the public trust doctrine, ensuring that lands donated for public use are used consistent with their dedicated purposes, is not limited to property containing tidelands. 3 Cases that cite this headnote [12]Real Property Conveyances Construction and operation Summary Judgment Deeds, conveyances, and sales A genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether county, in accepting the terms of quitclaim deed to land donated for dedicated use as a county fair or exposition, assumed a trust- like obligation not to divert use of the property from its dedicated purpose, precluding summary judgment in county's action to quiet title. 3 Cases that cite this headnote [13]Evidence Meaning of Words, Phrases, Signs, or Abbreviations The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. 2 Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms **203 Jonathan R. Bass, Susan K. Jamison, Rachel G. Cohen, Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, San Francisco, for Appellant. Dennis Bunting, Fairfield, Azniv Darbinian, Kimberly Alexander Yarbor, Steven M. Ingram, County of Solano, for Respondent. Opinion HORNER, J.* *569 This appeal arises out of an action by respondent County of Solano (County) to quiet title to certain real property it received as a gift from appellant Paul Handlery's parents, Rose and Harry Handlery, in 1946 (the property). Below, County sought a judicial determination that it owned the property free of certain restrictions on its use that were contained in the grant deed executed by Harry and Rose Handlery in 1946, and reiterated in a quitclaim deed executed by Harry and Rose Handlery in 1947. Appellant Paul Handlery (Handlery), in turn, filed a cross-complaint County of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (2007) 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,509, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,805 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3 seeking a judicial declaration of the parties' respective rights and obligations with respect to the property. The trial court granted summary judgment on both the complaint and cross- complaint in County's favor. For reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1946 and 1947, Rose and Harry Handlery (collectively, Grantors) executed two deeds conveying to County certain real property located in the City of Vallejo, Solano County. Under the first deed, a grant deed executed in 1946, Grantors conveyed the property to County in consideration for $10 for use as “a County Fair or exposition and purposes incident thereto, which may include but not necessarily be limited to a public park, playground and/or recreational area.” The 1946 grant deed expressly prohibited County from selling, assigning or transferring the property, and provided that, should the County breach any condition, restriction or covenant contained in the deed, the property was to “immediately revert to the Grantors herein, their heirs, successors, administrators and assigns, and no public use or interest therein shall be deemed to have been acquired so as to divert or render ineffective said reversion....” The second deed, a quitclaim deed executed in 1947, contained restrictions on the property's use nearly identical to those contained in the 1946 grant deed, but omitted the language providing for a right of reversion to Grantors or their heirs, successors, administrators and assigns in the case of a breach of those restrictions. Specifically, the deed provided: *570 “(a) Said land shall be used only for a county fair or exposition for Solano **204 County and purposes incident thereto, which may include public parks, playground and/or recreational areas, and for such other purposes for which county fair grounds may be used. “(b) Said County of Solano may grant rights of way for sewer, power and other utility purposes. “(c) Said land shall not be sold, assigned, or transferred by said County of Solano.” On June 13, 1947, County adopted a resolution accepting “the quitclaim deed of the [property] which said property is conveyed to said County as a gift for a County Fair site, and other uses, as in said quitclaim deed set forth.” The resolution further consented to recordation of the 1947 quitclaim deed. Harry Handlery died October 12, 1965, and Rose Handlery died October 6, 1970. In June 2003, County wrote a letter to Handlery, Grantors' sole heir, requesting a meeting to discuss a “new vision” for the property. Then, following a phone request from Handlery for more information regarding this “new vision,” County wrote a second letter in September 2003 explaining: “Our vision has as its primary focus the renovation and reconstruction of the existing fair facilities, and a continued commitment to keeping the fair in its current location.” County also stated its belief that any reversionary interest Handlery's family may have held under the 1946 grant deed had expired, but that a cloud still existed on the property's title. County expressed hope the Handlery family would work cooperatively with it to clear the property's title by executing a grant or quitclaim deed, and also stated its intention to commemorate the Handlery family “in a very significant way in [the] new fair facilities.” In June 2004, County filed suit to quiet title to the property against Handlery in his capacity both as an individual and trustee of the Harry Handlery Irrevocable Trust, the Rose H. Handlery Irrevocable Trust dated December 27, 1968, and the Rose H. Handlery Revocable Trust dated January 20, 1970. Specifically, County sought a judicial determination that it is the sole owner in fee of the property and that Handlery has no interest in the property adverse to County. *571 In August 2004, Handlery filed a cross-complaint against County for declaratory relief, seeking a judicial declaration of the parties' rights and obligations with respect to the property. County then moved for summary judgment on its complaint to quiet title and for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, on Handlery's cross- complaint for declaratory relief. On February 28, 2006, following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of County.1 The trial court first determined that the only interest reserved by Grantors in the 1946 grant deed—the right of reverter or, as such right is now referred to under California law, the power of termination—had extinguished, either by surrender upon recordation of the 1947 quitclaim deed or by expiration due to the passage of time pursuant to Civil Code sections 885.030 and 885.060, subdivisions (a) and (b). The trial court then determined the use restrictions contained in the 1946 grant deed and 1947 quitclaim deed were personal covenants that County of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (2007) 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,509, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,805 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4 had become legally unenforceable once Grantors died and the power of termination extinguished. In so concluding, **205 the trial court rejected Handlery's argument that the use restrictions were enforceable as either equitable servitudes or obligations arising under charitable trust principles.2 Finally, with respect to the cross-complaint for declaratory relief, the trial court determined Handlery had no standing to enforce the use restrictions because they were personal covenants enforceable only by the original parties. Thus, the trial court ultimately concluded “County is entitled to have title quieted in fee simple absolute as to all adverse claims and interests, including unenforceable restrictions on use and alienation imposed by the original grantors who are now deceased.” This appeal followed. *572 DISCUSSION On appeal, Handlery contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of County. Specifically, Handlery disputes the trial court's finding that the use restrictions in the 1946 grant deed and 1947 quitclaim deed are legally unenforceable. A trial court's summary judgment rulings are subject to de novo review. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768–769, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 23 P.3d 1143; Barton v. Elexsys Internat. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1187, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 212.) “In performing [the] de novo review, we must view the evidence in a light favorable to ... the losing party [citation], liberally construing [his] evidentiary submissions while strictly scrutinizing [the prevailing party's] own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in [the losing party's] favor.” (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 768–769, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 23 P.3d 1143.) The law of summary judgment provides courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings to determine whether trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.) “If summary judgment was properly granted on any ground, we must affirm regardless of whether the court's reasoning was correct.” (Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1836, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 913.) A “motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the moving party must show by admissible evidence that the “action has no merit or that there is no [available] defense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) A plaintiff meets this initial burden of showing that no defense exists to a cause of action by proving each element of the cause of action entitling the plaintiff to judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff has met this **206 burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that either a triable issue of one or more material facts or a defense exists as to that cause of action. (Ibid.) *573 A cross-defendant moving for summary judgment meets his or her initial burden of showing an action has no merit by proving that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 213–214, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 642.) If the cross-defendant successfully makes this showing, the burden shifts to the cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of material fact or a defense exists as to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Applying these rules to this case, we consider whether County met its burden on summary judgment to show Handlery had no defense with respect to the complaint to quiet title to the property, and that one or more elements of the cause of action could not be established with respect to the cross-complaint for declaratory relief. In deciding these questions, we, like the trial court, must determine the parties' rights and obligations with respect to the property. As such, we turn to the deeds at issue, and the rules governing their interpretation. [1] [2] With deeds, as with all contracts, the primary object of interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties. (City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 238, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 82, 914 P.2d 160; County of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (2007) 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,509, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,805 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5 City and County of San Francisco v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 987, 994, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.) In achieving this purpose, we must keep in mind the following: A grant is to be construed in the same manner as contracts in general (Civ.Code, § 1066); the deed's language determines its interpretation so long as it is clear and explicit (Civ.Code, § 1638); and a grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantee, except that a reservation in a grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor (Civ.Code, § 1069). Further, “[e]xtrinsic evidence is ‘admissible to interpret the instrument, but not to give it a meaning to which it is not susceptible’ [citations], and it is the instrument itself that must be given effect. [Citations.]” (City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 238, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 82, 914 P.2d 160.) [3] With respect to restrictions on the use of land conveyed in a deed, such restrictions “will not be read into a restrictive covenant by implication, but if the parties have expressed their intention to limit the use, that intention shall be carried out, for the primary object in construing restrictive covenants, as in construing all contracts, shall be to effectuate the legitimate desires of the covenanting parties.” (Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, Inc. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 442, 444–445, 211 P.2d 302.) [4] *574 “ ‘It is ... solely a judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence. Accordingly, “An appellate court is not bound by a construction of the contract based solely upon the terms of the written instrument without the aid of evidence [citations], where there is no conflict in the evidence [citations], or a determination has been made upon incompetent evidence [citation].” [Citations.]’ ” (City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 238, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 82, 914 P.2d 160.) Here, we note as an initial matter the deeds subject to our interpretation, the 1946 grant deed and, in particular, the 1947 quitclaim deed, contain clear language **207 of Grantors' intention at the time of conveyance to restrict use of the property to a specific purpose—“only for a county fair or exposition for Solano County and purposes incident thereto, which may include public parks, playground and/ or recreational areas, and for such other purposes for which county fair grounds may be used.” [5] [6] [7] [8] Further, this use restriction on the property was specifically agreed to by County, the grantee. On June 13, 1947, County adopted a resolution accepting and consenting to recordation of the 1947 quitclaim deed of the property. The resolution provided that “said property is conveyed to said County as a gift for a County Fair site, and other uses, as in said quitclaim deed set forth.” Thus, undisputedly, County accepted Grantors' dedication of the property to County as a gift for the public to be used exclusively as a county fair or exposition site.3 Our inquiry, however, does not end here. For, while acknowledging its acceptance in 1947 of the property subject to the use restrictions set forth in the quitclaim deed, County contends those use restrictions are no longer *575 enforceable, either because Grantors quitclaimed their power of termination in the 1947 deed, or because Grantors have since died.4 We disagree. [9] Under circumstances similar to those existing here, California courts have been loathe to cast aside use restrictions on property contained in deeds: “ ‘It is well settled that where a grant deed is for a specified, limited and definite purpose, the subject of the grant cannot be used for another and different purpose. (Roberts v. City of Palos Verdes Estates [ (1949) ] 93 Cal.App.2d 545, 547 [209 P.2d 7]; Griffith v. Department of Public Works [ (1956) ] 141 Cal.App.2d 376, 380 [296 P.2d 838].)’ ” (Big Sur Properties v. Mott (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 99, 103, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835 [Big Sur Properties ]; see also Save the Welwood Murray Memorial Library Com. v. City Council (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1012, 263 Cal.Rptr. 896 [Welwood Murray ].) Likewise, California courts have often held that “ ‘[w]here a tract of land is donated to a city with a restriction upon its use—as, for instance, when it is donated or dedicated solely for a park—the city cannot legally divert the use of such property **208 to purposes inconsistent with the terms of the grant.’ (Spinks v. City of Los Angeles [ (1934) ] 220 Cal. 366, 368 [31 P.2d 193]; City and County of S.F. v. Linares [ (1940) ] 16 Cal.2d 441, 446 [106 P.2d 369].)” (Big Sur Properties, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 103, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835; Baldwin v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 819, 836–837, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 178; see also Slavich v. Hamilton (1927) 201 Cal. 299, 302, 257 P. 60 [“land which has been dedicated as a public park must be used in conformity with the terms of the dedication, and it is without the power of a municipality to divert or withdraw the land from use for County of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (2007) 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,509, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,805 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6 park purposes”]; Marshall v. Standard Oil Co. (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 19, 29, 61 P.2d 520[“[t]he acceptance of a deed containing a covenant on the part of the grantee is equivalent to an agreement on the part of the grantee to perform the same”].) [10] Further, where, as here, property is acquired by a public entity through private dedication, the deed is strictly construed. (Big Sur Properties, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 104, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835; Griffith v. Department of Public Works, supra, 141 Cal.App.2d at p. 380, 296 P.2d 838.) As several California courts have observed: “Courts have guarded zealously the restrictive covenants in donations of *576 property for public use....” (Big Sur Properties, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 104, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835; Welwood Murray, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1013, 263 Cal.Rptr. 896; Roberts v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, supra, 93 Cal.App.2d at p. 548, 209 P.2d 7.) In fact, where property has been donated for public use, some courts have concluded such property “is held upon what is loosely referred to as a ‘public trust,’ and any attempt to divert the use of the property from its dedicated purposes or uses incidental thereto is an ultra vires act. (City of Hermosa Beach [v. Superior Court (1964) ] 231 Cal.App.2d [295,] 299–300, 41 Cal.Rptr. 796.)” (Big Sur Properties, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 104, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835.)5 [11] County claims this so-called public trust doctrine applies only to property, unlike the property at issue here, that contains tidelands. We conclude a line of California appellate decisions proves otherwise. For example, in Welwood Murray, the desert city of Palm Springs acquired property by two grant deeds executed by private donors that restricted use of the property in perpetuity to a public library. (Id. at pp. 1006–1007, 263 Cal.Rptr. 896.) In affirming an order enjoining the City from using the property for purposes other **209 than those related to a public library, the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Two, applied the public trust doctrine: “A public trust is created when property is held by a public entity for the benefit of the general public. (See Big Sur Properties v. Mott, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d 99, 104[, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835]; 89 C.J.S., Trusts, § 19.) Here, title to the library property is held by City to be used by City for the benefit of the general public as a public library. Any attempt to divert the use of the property from its dedicated purposes or uses incidental thereto would constitute an ultra vires act. (Big Sur Properties v. Mott, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 99[, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835].) [¶] Thus, it would be proper not only to issue an injunction to enforce the obligation arising from the existence of the public trust, i.e., to enforce City's obligation to use the property as a public library, but also to prevent an ultra vires, and hence nonlegislative, act. (See *577 ibid.; see also Pughe v. Lyle (D.C.Cal.1935) 10 F.Supp. 245, 248.)” (Welwood Murray, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1017, 263 Cal.Rptr. 896.) Similarly, while the courts in both Big Sur Properties and Roberts v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, supra, 93 Cal.App.2d 545, 209 P.2d 7 [Roberts ], were undoubtedly concerned with “guard[ing] zealously” restrictive covenants in donations of property for public use—the same concern at the heart of what courts have “loosely” labeled the public trust doctrine (e.g. Welwood Murray, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1017, 263 Cal.Rptr. 896)—neither court used any language suggesting their concern was limited to the preservation of tidelands. Rather, both courts expressed concern for protecting donations of property for public parks, which, in the case of Roberts, was “being used as a golf course.” (Roberts, supra, 93 Cal.App.2d at pp. 547–548, 209 P.2d 7; Big Sur Properties, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at pp. 101, 104, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835.) Moreover, the public policy concerns behind California's protective treatment of restrictive covenants or conditions in donations of property for public use are implicated regardless of whether the property at issue contains tidelands. For example, one such concern is that if courts were to permit public entities to accept from donors gifts of property subject to restrictions on the property's use, and then later jettison those restrictions on their own whim, donors would be discouraged from making such gifts in the future. (Welwood Murray, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1014, 263 Cal.Rptr. 896; Big Sur Properties, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 105, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835; City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 613, 628, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 859.) Such concern is valid regardless of the nature of the donated property. A second public policy concern is rooted in “the maxim[ ] of equity ... that ‘[h]e who takes the benefit must bear the burden.’ (Civ.Code, § 3521.) In this context, that means that the donee of a conditional gift may not keep the gift unless the County of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (2007) 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,509, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,805 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7 donee complies with the donor's conditions. That the donee in this case is a public entity, endowed with the power of eminent domain, does not exempt it from that rule. To the contrary, public entities should exemplify equitable conduct. ‘A public office is a public trust created in the interest and for the benefit of the people.’ [Citation.]” (City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 630, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 859.) Again, within the context of this public policy concern, the exact nature of the property is irrelevant. What is relevant is a public entity's heightened duty to act equitably when it accepts a conditional gift from a donor for the public's benefit. **210 [12] *578 Moreover, although we are not concerned here with tidelands, we conclude these public policy concerns are indeed implicated in this case. First, were we to allow County to avoid the use restrictions on the property set forth in the 1947 quitclaim deed—despite having expressly agreed to those restrictions upon accepting the property gift—we would no doubt discourage future such gifts from other donors. Second, we would permit County to accept a benefit without the corresponding burden, in clear violation of its duty as a public entity to “exemplify equitable conduct.” (City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 630, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 859.)6 To avoid these results, we thus rely on the loosely-termed public trust doctrine in adopting a reasonable interpretation of the 1947 quitclaim deed that precludes County from unilaterally casting aside the use restrictions contained in that deed that it expressly agreed to in the June 13, 1947 resolution. (See Big Sur Properties, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 105, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835 [declining to interpret regulations in a manner that would “defeat the public trust doctrine” where “another construction is possible”].) In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge the absence of language in the 1947 quitclaim deed restricting use of the property “forever” or “in perpetuity.” Nonetheless, strictly construing the 1947 quitclaim deed, as the law requires (Big Sur Properties, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 104, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835; *579 Griffith v. Department of Public Works, supra, 141 Cal.App.2d at p. 380, 296 P.2d 838), we do not find this absence of language dispositive. (See also City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 238, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 82, 914 P.2d 160 [“[i]t is ... solely a judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence”].) The 1947 quitclaim **211 deed not only provides that the property shall be used “only” for purposes of a county fair or exposition, it also provides the property “shall not be sold, assigned, or transferred by said County,” and permits County to “grant rights of way for sewer, power and other utility purposes.” The 1947 quitclaim deed contains no clause providing for expiration of these use and transfer restrictions upon a certain date or occurrence, such as upon Grantors' deaths. By limiting County's use of the property and precluding it from ever selling, assigning or transferring the property—terms without expiration and expressly agreed to by County—we conclude the original parties to the deed intended the use restrictions to permanently continue in effect for the benefit of the public, at least until such time as they become obsolete or otherwise unjustified. (See, e.g., Miller & Starr, California Real Estate 3d, Ch. 9, Estates, Restraints, Perpetuities, § 9:39, p. 62 (West Group 2000).) Further, as Grantors' successor-in-interest, we conclude Handlery has standing to enforce those restrictions.7 [13] We also note that Grantors, Handlery as their successor- in-interest, and County as grantee have all continued to honor the use restrictions in the 1946 grant deed and 1947 quitclaim deed. It appears undisputed the property has been used by County as a county fair ground, consistent with the terms of the 1946 grant deed and 1947 quitclaim deed, for nearly 60 years. And in 2003, County expressed to Handlery its “continued commitment to keeping the fair in its current location.” Such evidence further buttresses our conclusion that County should not now be permitted to unilaterally disregard the use restrictions set forth in the deeds exclusively for the public's benefit.8 (City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 246, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 82, 914 P.2d 160 [“ ‘It is well settled that a deed indefinite in its terms may be made certain by the conduct *580 of the parties acting under it. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] In this regard, ‘[t]he test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. [Citations.]’ ”].) Finally, we note County devotes much attention in its brief to the argument that a fee simple absolute was conveyed in the 1947 quitclaim deed, and thus that the use restrictions contained therein were mere personal covenants unenforceable by anyone other than the original parties rather than covenants running with the land. In so arguing, County of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (2007) 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,509, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,805 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8 County focuses exclusively on what have been described by our Supreme Court as “complex and archaic” concepts of American property law **212 (Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson (1995) 12 Cal.4th 345, 348, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 898, 906 P.2d 1314), and ignores the important public policies underlying our property law—particularly those policies set forth above that apply to public entities that receive gifts of property for public use. (E.g., Welwood Murray, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1014, 263 Cal.Rptr. 896; Big Sur Properties, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 105, 132 Cal.Rptr. 835; City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 628, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 859.) In doing so, we conclude County has missed the mark. Even assuming County owns the property as a fee simple absolute, such fact would not affect our conclusion that a triable issue remains whether County, in accepting the terms of the 1947 quitclaim deed, assumed a trust-like obligation not to divert use of the property from its dedicated purpose. (City of Hermosa Beach v. Superior Court, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at pp. 299–300, 41 Cal.Rptr. 796 [denying writ of prohibition where City sought to prohibit further prosecution of a suit to enforce use restrictions in a deed for property donated for public use]; Griffith v. Department of Public Works, supra, 141 Cal.App.2d at p. 381, 296 P.2d 838 [reversing with instructions to overrule demurrer where grantors' son sought to enforce use restrictions in a deed for property donated for public use].) As this court stated many years ago in an opinion by Justice Mosk, quoting an earlier New York case: “ ‘The title conferred upon this public agent is wholly for public purposes. The [public entity] has neither the right nor the power to apply any such property to other than public uses and those included within the objects of the grant.... Whatever estate or interest it holds ... is in trust for the public use.’ [Citation.]” (Marshall v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 17 Cal.App.2d at p. 27, 61 P.2d 520.) Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we conclude triable issues of material fact exist regarding the parties' interests, rights and obligations with respect to the property dedicated by Grantors for the exclusive use by the public as a county fair or exposition. *581 DISPOSITION The order granting summary judgment in County's favor is reversed. We concur: McGUINESS, P.J., and SIGGINS, J. All Citations 155 Cal.App.4th 566, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,509, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,805 Footnotes *Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 1 The trial court treated the County's motion as one for summary judgment as to both the complaint and the cross-complaint after finding County failed to comply with certain statutory rules governing motions for summary adjudication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 342.) 2 The trial court found the use restrictions were not enforceable as equitable servitudes because, while they undoubtedly burdened the property, they were not appurtenant to other benefited property. (Marra v. Aetna Construction Co. (1940) 15 Cal.2d 375, 101 P.2d 490.) The trial court further found the use restrictions were not enforceable under the charitable trust doctrine because no evidence existed that Grantors intended to create a charitable trust in conveying the property to County. (City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 613, 622, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 859.) Rather, the evidence revealed an intent to convey a conditional gift in fee simple. Handlery does not directly challenge these two findings on appeal. Rather, County of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (2007) 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,509, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,805 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9 Handlery argues the trial court had no reason to make the findings, because, as explained in more detail below, the restrictions were enforceable under the public trust doctrine. 3 County does not dispute this case involves a dedication of property for a public purpose. Indeed, it would be difficult to conclude otherwise. “ ‘A dedication is a voluntary transfer of an interest in land and resembles both a grant and a gift. It is therefore governed by the fundamental principles which control such transactions.... The intention to dedicate land need not be expressly stated but can be inferred from the actions of the owner. [Citation.] There must also be an acceptance by the public of the offer to dedicate. [Citation.] Acceptance may be express or implied. [Citation.] Express acceptance occurs when formal acceptance is made by the proper authorities. [Citation.]’ ... Thus, ‘[a] dedication is said to have the characteristics of a contract, in that it requires both an offer and acceptance and is not binding until there has been an acceptance. [Citation.]’ ” (Baldwin v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 819, 837, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 178.) Here, the evidence supports the conclusion that Grantors dedicated the property to County as a gift for use by the public as a county fair or exposition, and that County thereafter expressly accepted the dedication when it adopted the June 13, 1947 resolution. 4 As mentioned above, the 1946 grant deed expressly provided that, in the event of a breach of any condition, restriction or covenant in the deed, the property “shall immediately revert to the Grantors herein, their heirs, successors, administrators and assigns, and no public use or interest therein shall be deemed to have been acquired so as to divert or render ineffective said reversion....” This language, which is now construed as a power of termination (Civ.Code, § 885.010), was omitted from the 1947 quitclaim deed. 5 While “loosely refer[ing]” to such dedicated property as a “public trust,” the case law has made clear that “such a public trust is no more a true charitable trust than was Grover Cleveland's in his expression ‘a public office is a public trust.’ ” (City of Hermosa Beach v. Superior Court, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at p. 299, 41 Cal.Rptr. 796.) “ ‘The language of statutes, courts, and text-writers on this question is generally that of trust. They call the municipality a trustee of the dedicated land. But it is believed that in fact most of the decisions enforce the dedication on theories other than those of trust and that there is really no trust.... [¶]’ ... The prevalent and sound theory seems to be that such actions are either based on compelling the municipal corporation to perform its governmental functions or on the theory of a private property right of a nontrust character. It is believed that the statement that property dedicated to a municipal use by statutory proceedings is held in trust by the municipality for a special purpose and for the benefit of the public is a loose expression, not designed to mean that a strict or true trust exists, but merely that the municipality owes the public a duty to employ the property in a certain way and that the members of the public can proceed in equity to compel the municipality to live up to this part of its governmental obligations.' (1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 34.)” (City of Hermosa Beach v. Superior Court, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at pp. 298–299, 41 Cal.Rptr. 796.) 6 Despite the decision's language regarding a public entity's equitable duty to comply with a donor's condition limiting the use of donated property, County argues City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 613, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, in fact supports its position that the use restrictions in the 1947 quitclaim deed are unenforceable. In so arguing, County points to dicta in that decision that the transferee of property conveyed in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent “has no enforceable duties. The breach of the condition may result in the termination of the transferee's interest, but it does not subject the transferee to actions for damages or to enforce the condition.” (City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 622, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 859.) We find County's argument misplaced. Aside from the decision's equitable duty language, which we find persuasive and thus cite above, City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve is largely inapposite. There, the court considered the compensability of a power of termination in a deed to property donated for a particular public use where the public entity had used its power of eminent domain to eliminate the power of termination. (70 Cal.App.4th at p. 630, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 859.) That court County of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal.App.4th 566 (2007) 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 201, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,509, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,805 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10 did not consider the enforceability of use restrictions set forth in a deed, like the one at issue here, that undisputedly provides for no power of termination. And in particular, that court did not consider, as we do here, the enforceability of use restrictions under the so-called public trust doctrine. (Ibid.) Moreover, as set forth above, courts that have considered this question have concluded the restrictions are in fact enforceable. (E.g., Welwood Murray, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1017, 263 Cal.Rptr. 896; City of Hermosa Beach v. Superior Court, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at pp. 297–298, 41 Cal.Rptr. 796 [“the courts have consistently permitted private parties to maintain suits to enforce ... public rights” where “land is ‘held in trust for the public’ or ... ‘a public trust’ is created”]; see also Griffith v. Department of Public Works, supra, 141 Cal.App.2d at p. 381, 296 P.2d 838 [reversing with instructions to overrule demurrer where plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief based on City's alleged violation of use restrictions set forth in a deed to property executed by plaintiff's parents].) 7 We need not decide here whether any other individual would have standing to enforce these use restrictions. 8 County correctly points out the 1946 grant deed expressly provides that the conditions, restrictions and reservations contained therein “are to run with the land.” The 1947 quitclaim deed, to the contrary, contains no such language. We do not find this omission in the 1947 quitclaim deed dispositive, particularly where County not only took possession of the property with knowledge of the use restrictions, but also expressly accepted those restrictions in its June 13, 1947 resolution. Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, and in particular in light of our obligation to strictly construe deeds that effectuate donations of property for public use, we conclude other language in the 1947 quitclaim deed, as well as the subsequent conduct of the parties acting under it, evidence an intent that the use restrictions continue in effect after the death of Grantors. End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. REQUEST FOR INFORMATION Community Partnership for Rehabilitation and Adaptive Re-Use Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe City of San Luis Obispo Administration Department 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Issuance Date: March 6, 2020 Due Date: April 17, 2020 Request for Information - Community Partnership - Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe 2 Background The City of San Luis Obispo (City) is the owner of the Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe. This building is a fixture in the community as one of four adobe structures owned by the City. The City acquired the property in 1989 as a life estate gift from Mary Gail Black. It is clear in the Grant Deed from Ms. Black to the City and in the City Council’s Resolution of Acceptance that the donation agreement includes provisions for “the adobe and two adjoining wings that make up the old house, and the trees on that property be maintained by the city for park or recreational purposes, and that Mildred Waterman’s name be included in any name that the city give this park area,” and “the City of San Luis Obispo assumes certain maintenance responsibility for the grounds and premises as a condition of this grant.” In the intervening years since the gift and passing of Ms. Black, the City has provided routine maintenance and upkeep of the grounds and premises but has not implemented restoration of the structure or activated any formal uses of the site. The Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe has also been listed as an historic residence on the City’s Master List of Historical Resources. Property Description The Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe is located at 466 Dana Street tangent to the City’s downtown and cultural district. The property is identified as Assessor Parcel Numbers 002-401-002 and 022. The site includes the adobe structure and associated additions, an outbuilding, and the surrounding grounds containing mature landscaping and heritage trees backing up to Stenner Creek. The property is also situated in close proximity to San Luis Obispo Creek, and is located within a FEMA designated 100-year flood zone. The site is zoned R-3-H, or Medium-High Density Residential with an Historical Preservation Overlay. Allowed uses in this zone can be found in the City’s Zoning Regulations (March 2019) at pages 2-6 through 2-10. Definitions of uses allowed by zone are found at pages 9-4 through 9-22. The City must retain sole discretion in the exercise of its land use, zoning, and regulatory authority related to all proposed uses of the site. Statement of Need and Request for Information The City Council has requested that staff issue a 30-day Request for Information soliciting community partners that may be interested in working with the City towards restoration, adaptive reuse, and long-term stewardship of the City’s Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe. It is anticipated that the chosen steward of the adobe will enter into a negotiation period with the City, and if both parties choose to move forward, the steward would enter into a long-term lease or agreement with the City for use of the site. Restoration and/or Rehabilitation Needs It is important to note that the Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe needs extensive refurbishment, restoration, or rehabilitation prior to it being suitable for occupancy. It is anticipated that the non- adobe additions to the rear of the site would be removed and demolished due to their poor condition and because they have been considered to be non-contributing to the historical significance of the adobe structure. The Conservation and Open Space Element of the City’s General Plan provides specific program guidance for rehabilitation and adaptive re-use of City-owned adobes, as follows: Request for Information - Community Partnership - Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe 3 3.6.8 Promote adaptive reuse of historic buildings. The City will, consistent with health, safety and basic land-use policies, apply building and zoning standards within allowed ranges of flexibility, to foster continued use and adaptive reuse of historic buildings. 3.6.9 City-owned adobes and historic structures. The City will preserve and, as resources permit, rehabilitate City-owned historic adobes and other historic structures by aggressively seeking grants, donations, private-sector participation or other techniques that help fund rehabilitation and adaptive reuse. A Condition Assessment and Preliminary Rehabilitation Study was completed in March 1998 by Gil Sanchez, FAIA and is available for review by interested parties. This document contains history, floor plans and periods of construction, detailed descriptions of existing conditions, recommendations for preservation and rehabilitation, cost estimates (in 1998 dollars), and recommendations for additional research and implementation phasing. Ultimately, the City and the selected partner will need to work together to reach agreement as to the expected standard of restoration or rehabilitation in accordance with local, state, and federal guidelines. Qualifications and Information Requested Interested community partnership groups are requested to provide a brief letter submittal that describes its qualifications and provides the following information: 1. The community partner shall be a mission-driven 501(c)(3) non-profit organization or enjoy fiscal sponsorship through a not-for-profit entity to be eligible for consideration. 2. Description of prior experience of the organization or its principal members with historic preservation, restoration, rehabilitation, or adaptive re-use projects. 3. Description of the organization or its principal members’ prior project track record, as well as its plans for the future in terms of governance structure, fundraising, and policies and procedures that demonstrate the organization’s long-term stability and viability. 4. Description of the organization’s vision for the Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe and grounds. Why is the organization interested in partnering with the City and how does your organization propose to use the site? How will your project or proposed use provide significant public benefit to the community? 5. Description of the organization’s preliminary funding/financing strategy and proposed implementation schedule. 6. Any other pertinent or relevant information the organization wishes to share that helps tell a compelling story. Request for Information - Community Partnership - Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe 4 Time for Response and Contact Information Interested community partnership groups are requested to provide their submittal within thirty (30) calendar days from the issuance of this Request for Information. Submittals are therefore due no later than 5:00 PM on Friday, April 17, 2020 and should be addressed as follows: Robert Hill, Sustainability & Natural Resources Official City of San Luis Obispo City Administration Department 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Phone: (805) 781-7211 Email: rhill@slocity.org Additional staff contacts: Brian Leveille, Senior Planner City of San Luis Obispo Community Development Department 919 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Phone: (805) 781-7166 Email: bleveille@slocity.org Greg Hermann, Deputy City Manager City of San Luis Obispo City Administration Department 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Phone: (805) 781-7194 Email: ghermann@slocity.org Submittals shall be made by email in electronic format, not-to-exceed five (5) pages. Site plans, drawings, renderings, models, or photography may also be submitted for consideration. Selection of Community Partner This City Council directed Request for Information process is intended to be informal as well as communicative and collaborative. City staff are available to respond to questions, provide any available information or documentation, or sit down to meet and discuss preliminary concepts and provide feedback. In the event that multiple submittals are received that warrant further evaluation, the City may elect to request additional information, hold interviews, or enter into a formal Request for Proposals process. City staff will provide its evaluation and recommendation to the City Council for its final selection decision. Site Photography and Parcel Map Request for Information - Community Partnership - Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe 5 Front of Residence Walkway approach, arbor, and mature magnolia tree Request for Information - Community Partnership - Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe 6 South side, rear yard North side, rear yard Request for Information - Community Partnership - Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe 7 Coast Redwood grove, front of site Request for Information - Community Partnership - Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe 8 Stenner Creek, rear of site Request for Information - Community Partnership - Rosa Butron de Canet Adobe 9 Master List of Historical Resources Plaque Assessor’s Parcel Map, Nos. 002-401-002 and 020 i 11 city of San Wes OBISPO MEETING DATE: 4- 19RR COUNCIL AG DA REPORT FROM: Recreation - Stockton' SUBJECT: Gift of Historical Property (464-466 Dana Street) to City from Miss Mary Gail Black CAO RECOMMENDATION: Adopt Resolution Accepting Gift of Property and Appropriate Necessary Funds to Accomplish Maintenance Responsibilities Indicated in Grant Deed. BACKGROUND: Some time ago the City was made aware by then Councilman Robert Griffin, that Miss Mary Gail Black was desirous of bequeathing to the City her historic property at 464-466 Dana Street which includes the 150 year old Canet Adobe, currently her home. It was determined at this time that the proposed bequest would be an excellent addition to the City Park and Recreation historical restoration program, as was the Jack House Project, and Miss Black so amended her will. In late July 1988, the City Attorney's Office was contacted by Miss Black's attorney indicating that she would like to give the property to the City now if the City would agree to a Life Estate during the remainder of her natural life and accept maintenance responsibility for the gardens and buildings during this Life Estate. Staff from Parks and Recreation, Public Works and the Attorney's Office met with Miss Black and her attorney to inspect the property and determined that roof cover repair, utility service maintenance and bi-weekly garden and tree maintenance would be necessary. Miss Black also requested that the City be responsible for water and sewer costs necessary to service the property and to maintain her current property and flood insurance policies. The Grant Deed for the property which includes all agreements is attached hereto. CONCURRENCE: The Park and Recreation Commission discussed this proposed gift and were of the consensus that the magnitude of the gift and the potential for park and recreation use of the property far outweighed the costs of repair and maintenance. The Commission recommended acceptance. ALTERNATIVES: 1. Accept grant of property located at 464 and 466 Dana Street from Miss Mary Gail Black and agree to maintain property and services as indicated in Grant Deed. This alternative would add property to the City Park System and require appropriation of funds for Fiscal Year 1988-89 to accomplish the maintenance of the gardens and structures. city of San ' s OBISp0 COUNCIL AGENDA REPORT ALTERNATIVES - CONTINUED 2. Do not accept grant of indicated property. This alternative would eliminate the opportunity to add this property to the City Park System and also relieve the City of any maintenance responsibilities. RECOMMENDATION: Adopt Resolution accepting gift of property located at 464 and 466 Dana Street from Miss Mary Gail Black and appropriate necessary funds to accomplish maintenance responsibilities outlined in Grant Deed. FISCAL IMPACT: The Public Works, Parks Maintenance Divisfon budget would require additional appropriations of $8,000 for Fiscal Year 1988-89. Anticipated expenditures include: 1. Roof cover replacement/repair ---2,500 2. Annual water/sewer service ------ 700 3. Fire/Flood/Property Insurance --- 900 4. Bi-weekly garden/yard maintenance 950 5. Trimming/thinning of mature trees 1,250 6. Emergency contingency ----------- 1.500 Total 7,800 Attachments RESOLUTION Nd. 01988 SERIES) A RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO ACCEPTING A GIFT OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED AT 464 AND 466 DADA STREET, SAN UJIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA AND APPROPRIATING NECESSARY FUNDS TO ACCOMPLISH MAINTENANCE RSSPONSI$ILITIES FOR THE DURATION OF THE LIFE ESTATE AS bUTLINED IN GRANT DEED WHEREAS; Miss Mary Gail Black is desirous of granting to •the City of San Luis Obispo Real Property located At 464 and 466 Dana Street for park or retrpation purposes; and wlitkW; Miss Maty Gail Black reserves A Life Estate during the remaihder of her hatiiral life in and to said property and premises; and wAkPAS; Miss Mary Gail Black tequesis that the City of Sah Luis Obispo assume certain maintenance responsibility for the grounds and premises As a condition of this grant; and WHEREAS; the City of Sah Luis Obispo is desirous of accepting this grant of Real property and premises for park or recreation purposes; and WlikkEAS; the City of Safi Luis Obispo accepts certain maititenAho-6 responsibilities as outlined in the Grant Deed; a copy of which is hereto attached fbr reference and itiarked as Exhiiiii "A". NOV., THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED As follows: 1. tw-e City of S'en Luis 6bi'sp'6 "accepts Phis' most generous grant of Real pr6perties and premises locat'e'd At 464 and 4611 Data Street fr6& Hiss Mary Gail Black; acid 2. The City 6f S'ah Ltiis Obis:PW agrees to the conditions of the Grant Deed and appropriates funds in the amount of $7,800 to accomplishing the required maintenance for Fiscal Year 1988-89. Resolution No. 1988 Series) page 2 3. The City Clerk's Office shall furnish a copy of this Resolution to: Miss Mary Gail Black, the Director of Recreation and the Director of Public Works. On motion of seconded by and on the following roll call vote: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: the foregoing resolution was passed and adopted this day of 1988. Mayor, Ron Dunin ATTEST: City Clerk, Pamela Voges APPROVED: City A inistrative Officer City AtIorney D rector of Finance Director of blic Works 9irecttr of Recreation j _0, 1/ GRANT DEED FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged . and subject to the covenants , conditions , restrictions and reservations set forth. MARY GAIL BLACK. a single woman , Grantor, does hereby grant to the CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO. A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, the hereinafter described real property in the City of San Luis Obispo, County of Sar. Luis Obispo. State of California , commonly referred to as 464 and 4G6 Dana Street , properly called the Canet Adobe ( rather than the "Simmler Adoh-' or the "N':!terman Adobe- Wit is sometimes referred to) with the re:nuw4t that the adobe and two adjoining wings that make up the old house. and the trees on that property be maintained by the City for park or recreational purpose:; . :and that Mildred Wsaterman' s name he included in any name- hhn: the City givas to this park area. Said proporty is described in attacked deed . marked Exhibit "A" . Rescrvinu unto MARY GAIL, BLACK a Lilo Estate during the; rcwoindwr of her natural life in and to said real property and premises and all improvements thereon, including but not limited to, the sole use. controi , benefit.. and income of all of same during her natural life. By the acceptance of this Deed, said City of San Luis Obispo . hereinafter referred to as "City. " agrees : I . To provide water and sewer sarvice for said property. a:•40 Shall inr.iude maintaining continuous water and sewer service for Granl "P . Grantor ' s tenants at. 466 liana Street and th" yard to said property Burn;,. Grantor ' s iifet.ime , and the payment of ap.:• and all hills for sain ser•cict to Grantor and Grantor' s tenants at 4G6 Dana Street. during Grantor ' s lifetime . fA--4 :vran1 deedi 2 . To provides payment for insurance coverage on said property and Grantor' s adjoininti property commonly known as 460 and 462 Dana Street so long as that property is also owned by Grantor during her Lifetime. That. coverage shall include Grantor' s homeowner's. fire, liability and flood insurance to the same extent that she presently has for said property. City to reimburse Grantor for .insurance premiums upon payment thereof by Grantor. 3. To maintain the structures . utility services and yard area un the described property . Said maintenance shall include roof repair as needed , yard ma.irctr.n,nice including thinning and trimming of true , and shrubbery substantially as the yard is now, mowing. edging and removing, leavers and all other maintenance to the yard as needed (City shall he responsible for watering of trees two times a month during Life Estave) and keeping the water and sewer services operable. \uthing provided for herein should be construed as preventing Grantor from calling an electrician, plumber or other service repairman in an emergency. in which event the City will be responsible for said emergency service bill . Except as provided herein. City will be responsible for any necessary repairs to said structure. 4 . To be responsible for all real property taxes and assessments imposed upon said property from the date of this Deed. 5. To allow ingress; and egress over the driveway along: the southwesterly 12 ' of convoyad property to provide access from Dana Street for the residents at 460 Dana and 462 Dana Street to said properties, Grantor' s adjoining property generally described as San Levis Obispo County Assessor's Parcel No. 02 -401- 13 . however, parking of vehicles by said 2 - r residents within the easement shall be prohibitad , except as allowed by Grantor during Grantor' s lifetime. B. io disallow the Pub Iic use of said property during the lifetime of Grantor. 7 .In the: event: of failure to comply with any of the covenants and conditions herein contained, said City, and any successor thereof, shall forfeit: all title to said real property and , in the event of any such forfeiture, title to said real property shall revert to Grantor . Dated this day of 1988. MARY GAIL RLAQ: -- -- --— 3 RECORDING REQUESTED BY: Ticor Title Insurance Ccopa WTIEN RECORDED MAIL TO: City of San Luis Obispo Attorney P. 0. Box 8100 990 Palm Street #10 San Luis Obispo, Ca. 93403 -8100 DOC. NO.. 50159 OFFICIAL RECORDS SAN LUIS OBISPO CO., CA JUL 2 6 1989 FRANCIS M. COONEY Escrow No. 165097 -LS (DS) County CJerk- Recorder THE UNDERSI DECLARES TIME 9 : 05 W wun. IaX IS F rbcacTrHt. DOCUM.EE<`TI'ARY 5r' '11 Computed on full value (Donation) In the City of San Luis Obispo GRANT DEED A.P.N. 002 - 401- 002FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, I o00 RF. o00CABL 4228 y f FILED FEE PAID E MPT OUT OF STATE receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and subject to the covenants, conditions, restrictions and reservations set forth, MARY GAIL BLACK, a single woman, Grantor, does hereby grant to the CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, the hereinafter described real property in the City of San Luis Obispo, County of San Luis Obispo, State of California, commonly referred to as 464 and 466 Dana Street, properly called the Canet Adobe (rather than the "Simmler Adobe" or the "Waterman Adobe" as it is sometimes referred to) with the request that the adobe and two adjoining wings that make up the old house, and the trees on that property be maintained by the city for park or recreational purposes, and that Mildred Waterman's name be included in any name that the city gives to this park area. Said property is described as: ALL THAT PORTION OF BLOCK NO. 60 OF THE CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO IN THE COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA AS LAID DOWN AND DESIGNATED UPON THE MAP THEREOF COMPILED BY HUBERT C. WARD, CITY SURVEYOR, NOVEMBER 1878, AND FILED FOR RECORD ON JUNE 24, 1882, BOOK A, PAGE 168 OF MAPS IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: COMMENCING AT THE MOST SOUTHERLY CORNER OF PARCEL "B" OF PARCEL MAP SLO 76 -565 RECORDED IN BOOK 22, PAGE 76 IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER; THIS IS THE POINT OF BEGINNING; THENCE ALONG THE NORTHERLY LINE OF DANA STREET, SOUTH 53 °07100" WEST A DISTANCE OF 4.98 FEET TO A POINT; THENCE CONTINUING ALONG SAID NORTHERLY LINE OF DANA STREET SOUTH 37 022'00" WEST A DISTANCE OF 137.00 FEET TO A POINT; THENCE LEAVING THE NORTHERLY LINE OF DANA STREET NORTH 52 038'00" WEST TO THE CENTER OF STENNER CREEK; THENCE NORTHEASTERLY ALONG THE CENTER OF SAID CREEK TO THE MOST WESTERLY CORNER OF PARCEL "B" OF SAID PARCEL MAP: THENCE ALONG THE WESTERLY LINE OF SAID PARCEL "B" TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. Reserving unto MARY GAIL BLACK a Life Estate during the remainder of her natural life in and to said real property and premises and all Improvements thereon, including but not limited to, the sole use, control, benefit, and income of all of same during her natural life. LRRh By acceptance of this deed, said City of San Luis Obispo, hereinafter referred to as "City ", agrees: JUL 3 1 1989 CLERK 1. To provide water for said property, which shall include C1-1 Y OBISPO, CA maintaining continuous water service for Grantor, Grantor's tenants and I UL 335 5 PAGE 683- the yard to said property during Grantor's lifetime, and the payment of any and all bills for said service. 2. To provide insurance coverage on said property and Grantor's adjoining property commonly known as 460 and 462 Dana Street.so long as that property is also owned by Grantor during her lifetime. That coverage shall include Grantor's homeowner's, fire, liability and flood insurance to the same extent that she presently has for said property. 3. To maintain the structures, utility services and yard area on the described property. Said maintenance shall include structural roof repair as needed, yard maintenance including thinning and trimming of trees and shrubbery substantially as the yard is now, and keeping the water and sewer services operable. Nothing provided for herein should be construed as preventing Grantor from calling an electrician, plumber or other service repairman in an emergency, in which event the City will be responsible for said emergency service bill. Except as provided herein, City will be responsible for any necessary repairs to said structure unless the necessity is denied by the City within ten (10) days of receiving written notice that said repair or maintenance is required. 4. To be responsible for all real property taxes and assessments imposed upon said property from the date of this deed. 5. To allow ingress and egress over the driveway along the southwesterly 12' of conveyed property to provide access from Dana Street to the residences at 460 Dana and 462 Dana Street, Grantor's adjoining property generally described as San Luis Obispo County Assessor's Parcel No. 02- 401 -11. 6. To disallow the public use of said property during the lifetime of Grantor. 7. In the event of failure to comply with any of the covenants and conditions herein contained, said City, and any successor thereof, shall forfeit all title to said real property and, in the event of any such forfeiture, title to said real property shall revert to Grantor. Dated this 6th day of January, 1989. MARY GAIL BLACK JS" ' '84Vu v PARE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ss. COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO ) A'-1a —3 Pd On , 1989 before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for the State, personally appeared MARY GAIL BLACK, personally known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that she executed the same. WITNESS my hand and official seal. 2.d ca:d/d P1. dzawu Notary Public GERALD W. SHIPSEY NOTARY PUBLIC SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY . CALIFORNIA MY C xnmission Expires on June Z 1989 VuL J 55 PAGE 5 C E R T I F I C A'T E O F A C C E P T A N C E THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the interest in real property conveyed by the GRANT DEED dated January 6 19 89 from MARY GAIL BLACK to the CITY OF SAN 016 OBISPO; a Political Corporatlon, ie hereby accepted by the undereigiied officer on bioihjf of the City Council pursuant to authority conferred by Resolatlon No. 5370 (1884 Series), recorded June 161 1984, in Volume 2604, Official Records: Page 878, Son Luis Obispo . County; California, and the Grantee consents to recordation thereof by its duly authorized officer or his agent. Date: ITI, r . 'K, es City Cl CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO Aq on Dunin, Mayor WL 3355 PAGE 686 •• • RESOLUTION NO. 6512 (1988 SERIES) A RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO ACCEPTING A GIFT OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED AT 464 AND 466 DANA STREET, SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA AND APPROPRIATING NECESSARY F1JNDS TO ACCOMPLISH MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE DURATION OF THE LIFE ESTATE AS OUTLINED IN GRANT DEED WHEREAS, Miss Mary Gail Black is desirous of granting to the City of San Luis Obispo Real Property located at 464 and 466 Dana Street for park or recreation purposes; and WHEREAS, Miss Mary Gail Black reserves a Life Estate during the relia1nder of her natural life 1n and to said property and premises; and WHEREAS, Miss Mary Gail Black requests that the City of San Luis Obispo assume certain maintenance responsibility for the grounds and premises as a condition of this grant; and WHEREAS, the City of San Luis Obispo is desirous of accepting this grant of Real property and premises for park or recreation purposes; and WHEREAS, the City of San Luis Obispo accepts certain maintenance responsibilities as outlined in the Grant Deed, a copy of which is hereto attached for reference and marked as Exhibit "A". NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED as follows: 1.The City of San Luis Obispo accepts this most generous grant of Real properties and premises located at 464 and 466 Dana Street from Miss Mary Gail Black; and 2.The City of San Luis Obispo agrees _to the conditions of the Grant Deed and appropriates funds in the amount of �-7 ,;ltoo to accomplishing the required maintenance for Fiscal Year 1988-89. R6512 -VGL 3355 PAGt 687 4 Resolution No. 65 (1988 Series) ' 'page 2 3. The City Clerk's Office shall furnish a copy of this Resolution to: Miss Mary Gail Black, the Director of Recreation and the Director of Public Works. On motion of Councilman Settle , seconded by Councilwoman Rappa and on the following roll call vote,: AYES: Councilmembers Settle, Rappa, Pinard, Reiss and Mayor Dunin NOES: None ABSENT: None the foregoing resolution was passed and adopted this 4th day of October , 1988. ATTEST city. C1 k, Pamela Voge APPROVED: Qftty-A inistrative Officer City At ney D rector of Finance irector of0i blic Works of Recreation VOL 3355 PAGE 68$ END OF DOCUMENT