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HomeMy WebLinkAbout06/04/1996, COMM 1 - MARCH FOR JESUS ki"TING AGENDA DATE " ' 6ITEM # D�►M. I June 4, 1996 MEMORANDUM TO: Council Colleagues FROM Dodie Williams SUBJECT: March for Jesus The March for Jesus held in the downtown area over Memorial Day weekend has elicited a number of phone calls to me from downtown business owners. They are concerned about many issues, a few of which I have listed for your consideration. 1) The timing. Holding such a march over a holiday weekend, closing the downtown to traffic from early morning to after the noon hour was a true hardship on our businesses. Cities both north and south had major events nu rung at the same time—and we had no traffic. 2) Only six monitors showed up for training and of the 34 required, only 30 monitors were at the march. 3) Monitors would not allow business owners, downtown residents or at one point, a hearse going to a funeral at Reis Chapel, pass the barricades. 4) Inst year when the march was held, the organizers told our staff they would hold it in a different city each year. I believe this is fair for all concerned Council Member Romero has been involved in the 1995 and 1996 marches as both a speaker and march participant. For this reason, I recommend that he be asked to serve with staff as a City Council liaison to the group in an effort to resolve the issues of concern to both staff and downtown business owners.— DW-ss wners.—DW:ss Ll+*VL--,, v�Gt� �UNCIL ❑ CDD DIR CAO ❑ FIN DIR W®� O ❑ FIRE CHIEF TTORNEY ❑ PW DIR PoCLERKIORIG ❑ LICE CHF ❑ MGMT TEAM ®'REC DIR ❑ 1REND FILE ❑ UTIL DIR ❑ PERS DIR b —a. W.�eorge _0A 1228 A Palm Street, P. O. Box 1145 June 3, 1996 San Luis Obispo, CA 93406- 1145 V Phone I lax (805) 545 -5919 Members of the City Council Other offices in Switzerlarid��h 061Sffd'-. City of San Luis Obispo JUN 4 1996 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 CITY CLERK AGO" Dear Members of the City Council: SAN LUIS OBISPO,CA I write concerning the development.of the multi-modal center in San Luis Obispo.Although I was unable to attend the"stakeholders" meeting of May 17 and I realize that great efforts have been made to identify.a suitable location for the center, I believe that a better solution must, and can be found. This solubon will keep downtown SLO as the"hub"of activity and maintain the pulse of the existing transit system. Re-locating the main transit"hub"along the railroad is an unatt ractive proposal for several reasons, including: - it does not serve the main destination of those coming to San Luis Obispo (whether by bus or car); - bus passengers are required to walk as far as four blocks to access the rail station and, because the transit terminal is linearly oriented, bus passengers must walk relabvely long distances to access other buses; - operationally,the proposed system adds expensive"detour" miles to the transit system; and - as far as I am aware,there are no successful transit systems in operation that have the main transfer point outside of the"hub"of activity or the city center. For these and other reasons, I would like to ask the Council to consider an alternative approach which may ultmately cost a fraction of what is currently being proposed and better serve the needs of transit users. The attached page shows a sketch of the downtown street system where buses utilize on-street facilities and circulation in a portion of the downtown is altered to better accommodate the system. This arrangement will allow for the conversion of the"Court Street'area to a cross-shaped transfer center and will accommodate 18 buses. This will greatly improve downtown access for bus passengers and offers opportunities to complete downtown beaubfication and pedestrianization projects with available funding sources. The project could be made attractive enough to attract a tremendous increase in customers to nearby shops. Please consider the attached sketch as only an initial attempt at providing a better alternative to the proposed railroaq transfer center. Also, during the upcoming "Downtown Access Study"we will certainly hear more debate about issues raised over the different modes of access.Therefore, if possible, we should remain flexible on the location of this center. I believe that a strategy, such as the one I have outlined for you, will ultimately result in a more successful transit system. Please contact me if you have any further questions. Sincerely, OUNCIL H 7 ;C?P�UNCIL�<66 eC9AO D )DR 4 ar� 0 FIN 0 N�;AACAO IIR Eugene H. Jud 122 0 IF E�CHIEF RNEY WWDIR Jud Consultants r CLEIIKORIC 0 POLICE CHF attachment 0 MGMT TEAM 0 REC DIR LEI 1 0 UTIL IDIR FILE ER� c: Mike McCluskey 0 PERs DIR Pete Rodgers (SLOCOG) RAJrA i V�ON `, • .� � O.�os 1j 3 , No R ItoLt 10 10 SS LLQ LEND: -� Pia. &�Nc V(f 6Ky 4a..,�� JUU CONSULTANTS Pa:.r. 24ra+� (vorr.P ��Sve rat P.C.Boa 1145 ?Cot. 2. Izz"Palm Sbool San Luh Obispo,CA 934061145 ao5r4 5919 ❑ cep u1R cv&_TT _ cno ❑0WDIR MEET rnlG AGENDA p'/►°Ao Ud FIRE CHIEF DATEC�EM # [] ,�(TORNEY ❑ PW DIR "' CLERK/ORIC ❑ POLICE CHF ❑ MGMT TEAM ❑ REC DIR San Luis Obis o ;� °ef ef'�T'Ass ciation 748 Pismo Street, San Luis Obispo; R�DIR RGCE1 l/ EV CITr COUNCIL Monday 3 June 1996 ' ^� ED Honorable Mayor and City Council R C E I V City of San Luis Obispo JUN 3 1996 990 Palm Street San Luis Obispo, California 93401 01'Fr CLERK .AN LUIS OBISPO.CA The intent of this letter is to respond to the Council Agenda Report which recommends the implementation of an Apprentice/Firefighter-1 program as a means of reducing the Fire Department's overtime expenditures. We believe the proposal insufficiently addresses many reasonable questions and concerns we have (e.g. level of service reduction, safety, liability, the true cost of such a program, training impacts). We believe that the proposal greatly overstates the benefits of a reserve program and does not enumerate the negative aspects . The SLO Firefighters Association stands behind its commitment to Meet and Confer on the issue of a Reserve Firefighter Program. The concept of a reserve firefighter program which would augment the existing professional firefighting force is agreeable to us. It is our understanding that the City's primary reason for implementing such a program is based upon its desire to control overtime costs. A review of the current overtime situation indicates that the hiring of the 3 firefighters in Julv of 1995 has finally achieved its intended effect. A comparison of the first four months of calendar 1995 to the same time period in 1996 shows a reduction in expenditures of over 40%. We feel this is a significant reduction that will continue on into the future. The cost estimates in this proposal are optimistic at best. One year cost estimates for implementation and maintenance vary from $68,700 (Neumann) to $87,360 (Hunt Management Study) to $121,827 (SLOFFA Study). We believe the SLOFFA study most accurately estimates all of the true costs involved in implementing such a program. The projected savings of the proposal depend entirely on reductions in actual services. Spending a given amount of money to potentially save an equivalent amount of money is poor fiscal management any way you look at it. While supplementing the existing force of Public Safety Professionals is a worthwhile goal, replacing Professional Firefighters with reserve firefighters would constitute a PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER reduction in the high quality of service we provide. We are confident that this would be unacceptable to our customers, the citizens. None of the comparison cities named on Attachment #1 of the Council Agenda report utilize reserve firefighters as part of their minimum staffing in any way or form. The proposal depends entirely on the replacement of Professional Firefighters with reserve firefighters for its projected savings. High turn- over rates among personnel are common to all reserve programs. This proposal overlooks the significant on-going costs of recruitment and training necessary to maintain an effective force of reserve firefighters. Another issue which needs to be addressed is the impact that training reserves will have on existing programs. The Fire Department will be involved in the constant, repetitive training of an endless stream of transient personnel. The best we could hope for would be a group of less qualified personnel taking the place of seasoned professional firefighters. The services provided would be of less than the high quality our citizens have rightfully come to expect. The proposal to hire professional firefighters from among this group of reserve firefighters carries with it the certainty of a declining level of professionalism within your Fire Department. Please remember, of the last six recruits hired by your Fire Department, four arrived already trained as Paramedics, and four of the six held Bachelors Degrees. All of them brought with them significant experience working for other fire departments. The Fire Department does not hire people who are just minimally qualified. We hire the best of the best. I am requesting the opportunity to meet with Council and Department Staff to discuss in detail our concerns with this proposal. We support the concept of a Reserve/Apprentice program, but we cannot support this proposal. The Firefighters Association would like to work together with Council and Department Staff, as well as members of the public (our customers) to design and implement a long term (five year) plan that encompasses the level of service the community wants and that the City would support. Please take some time to read the attached document, particularly the recommendations on the last page. The document represents a considerable off-duty effort by members of our Association. Mark McCullough, President San Luis Obispo Firefighters Association SLOFFA RESERVE/APPRENTICE PROGRAM CON NE=E REPORT PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT BOB WILKINSON and SLOFFA BOARD OF DIRECTORS APRIL 17, 1996 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED by FF Bob Bisson FF Ron Veillette FF Lucy Clark Eng Mike Clinite FF Gary Bale Eng Dave Podhorsky FF Matt Lipson Capt Bob Rutledge PREFACE The Reserve/Apprentice Program Committee was formed to research existing programs in fire departments of comparable size as well as municipalities with similar demographics. The initial purpose of this committee was to examine these various programs and attempt to identify the key points necessary in developing a program if the San Luis Obispo City Fire Department were to pursue such a goal in the future. The participants were volunteers who recognized the importance of such a potential implementation, in both defining appropriate concerns of the labor unit and uncovering the positive and negative aspects of the programs already in existence. After examining numerous California paid fire departments with such programs in place, repetitive concerns continued to surface, causing a shift in direction of the committee. Therefore, this report does not define the "pros and cons" of various programs, however, it does attempt to educate the reader in areas that must be addressed prior to acceptance or implementation of any reserve/apprentice program. Fire Departments participating in this study: Morro Bay South Bay Santa Rosa Santa Monica Culver City Petaluma Oxnard Salinas Orange County Davis Pleasanton Chico Napa Lompoc Monterey Santa Cruz Buena Park Redding - Merced Santa Maria Del Mar Corona Rancho Santa Fe West Covina * Not all departments contacted utilize apprentice/reserve programs, however, information regarding reasons for non-participation was requested when appropriate. RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY In response to Chief Neumann's proposal titled "Firefighter Apprentice Program", dated January 23, 1996 ; References are made to specific terminology that this committee determined critical in definition for clarity of discussion. Webster's New Collegiate dictionary defines as: 1. Apprentice: A. One bound by indenture to serve another for a prescribed period with a view to learning an art or trade. B. One who is leaming by practical experience under skilled professionals, a trade, art, or calling. C. An inexperienced person: novice. 2. Reserve: A. Something stored or kept available for future use or need. B. Something reserved or set aside for a particular purpose, use, or reason; as a (1): a military force withheld from action for later decisive use; (2): forces not in the field, but available; (3): the military forces of a country not part of the regular services. 3. Augment: A. To make (something well or adequately developed) greater, more numerous, larger, or more intense. SLOFFA RESERVE/APPRENTICE COMMITTEE REPORT STATEMENT ON MINIMUM STAFFING LEVEL All too often, the issue of fire fighter staffing boils down to simplistic arguments in a local budget battle. Municipal officials, forced to reduce the community's annual budget, make arbitrary cuts in fire fighter staffing without looking at the repercussions, or understanding the direct relationship between staffing levels, public safety, and the protection of property. Minimum staffing is not an issue of labor versus management, fire fighters versus fire chiefs, or large departments versus small departments. The key element of the staffing issue is safety. It is generally accepted that a municipality has the right to determine the overall level of fire protection it wants. However, regardless of the level of fire protection chosen by the citizens, neither they nor their elected representatives have the right to jeopardize the safety of the employees providing those services. Citizens pay for protection of life and property through their tax dollars, and they assume that their elected and appointed officials will make informed decisions regarding that protection. Too often, that decision making process has been based solely on budgetary expedience. However, irrespective of the resources provided, citizens continue to believe that fire fighters are prepared to provide an aggressive interior assault on fires, successfully accomplishing victim rescue, fire control, property conservation, HazMat control, and emergency medical services. They do not expect fire fighters to take defensive actions, i.e., to simply surround a fire and drown it , because to do so would be to concede preventable loss of both life and property. However, when staffing levels are reduced, misguided economics and community expectations collide, with city leaders insisting that potential budgetary savings will not affect the level of service. Unless citizens understand the relationship between staffing levels and their own life safety and the protection of their property, it is not realistic for fire fighters to expect them to insist on appropriat- service levels, including minimum staffing. Elected officials and managers cannot be expected to make appropriate decisions concerning the level of service without an education in effective firefighting and an understanding of the impact their policy decisions have on the citizens they represent. Therefore, it is essential to make clear to the community that reduced staffing equates to reduced service levels, and that if they expect a continued aggressive attack on fires, they must provide the department with at least the minimum resources required to meet the community's expectations. To do less forces fire fighters to accept a level of risk to their own health and safety that the community at large finds unacceptable for itself. It is widely recognized that while firefighting is one of the most dangerous and most stressful occupations in this country, it is also the second most stressful occupation as per "USA Weekend Magazine". Therefore fire fighters should be provided the safest possible working environment. Thus, staffing affects not only the public safety but also the safety of fire fighters and as such is a condition of employment. Although firefighting is by its nature dangerous, that does not justify employers increasing that inherent level of risk by reducing safe minimum staffing under the guise of financial difficulty. Historically, the fire service has pursued an offensive attack in situations involving structural fire. Study after study , as examined for this report, has demonstrated that if the force available to initiate an interior fire attack is less than fifteen personnel, the goals of victim rescue, fire control, and property conservation are seriously compromised. These studies state that when fireground staffing is reduced below the level necessary for aggressive tactics, the inevitable result is that fire fighters may resort to defensive rather than offensive operations or risk their own safety. SLOFD's minimum staffing is twelve personnel, already below the nationally recommended standards.of fifteen for safe fireground operations. Although new technology has improved firefighting equipment and protective gear, it is fire fighters who still make critical decisions concerning life threatening situations and perform the critical tasks necessary to contain and control whatever emergency they may face. When staffing falls below minimum acceptable levels, so does service, and the goals and expectations set by the community are essentially abandoned. This position has been recognized by many organizations such as the International Association of Fire Fighters, Metropolitan Fire Chiefs' Division of the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the U.S. Fire Administration. Even the International City Management Association has stated: ...too few companies or poorly manned ones, can result in property and life loss beyond community accepted norms. Also, the cost of a fire fighter death or disabling injury may far exceed the expense of a fire company. This is not to say that there is a fixed value on a life or injury. The point is that the firefighting forces are the asset that protects the economic and tax base as well as its health and welfare. This asset is a valuable one and must be carefully provided and wisely managed. NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (NFPA) In 1966, the NFPA issued Standard 197, Training Standard on Initial Fire Attack. This standard set forth the evolutions required for an initial interior attack on working structural fires. The minimum standard required sufficient number of fire fighters and equipment to deploy two attack 1-1/2" lines producing at least 150 gpm within 60 seconds of arrival, followed by a 2-1/2" backup line providing at least 250 gpm within 3 minutes of arrival. Although NFPA 197 was silent on the minimum number of fire fighters necessary to safely conduct these evolutions, the National Fire Protection Association clearly defined in its book, Fire Attack-1, the number of personnel required: Standard initial fire attack for isolated buildings of average size such as one or two story single family dwellings consists of ability to quickly apply 1 1/2" attack lines plus at least one standard 250 gpm stream from a 2 1/2" hose supplied by a pumper. The latter is required for knocking down any heavy volume of fire and for protecting exposures where necessary. Such an attack requires two pumper companies with adequate manning to run the lines and operate the nozzles and pumps, plus a truck company capable of simultaneously performing forcible entry, search and rescue, ventilation, raising ladders, salvage, operations of tools such as generators, lights and smoke removal equipment. The entire operation is directed and coordinated by a chief officer. The desirable number of personnel normally required to respond with the apparatus to give this level of performance with properly manned hose streams and equipment would be approximately 15 plus a chief officer. The NFPA further cross-referenced the initial attack criteria of NFPA 197 in the Fire Protection Handbook, stating: Regardless of how companies are organized, response to alarms for structural fires should include sufficient apparatus and manpower under at least one chief officer. Normally, a minimum initial response would be two pumpers, a vehicle for truck service, and 12 to 15 men and a chief. An initial response of this level should be able to handle the immediate tactical fire fighting and rescue requirements for structures where there are no major rescue problems, no serious internal or external exposures and where the possible area involved in fire, heat or smoke normally will be less than 12,500 cubic feet (approx. 1,500 sq ft.). In 1985, a revised Training Standard on Initial Fire Attack was adopted as NFPA 1410. This revised standard continued the standards of NFPA 197 and presented language for complying with safe minimum staffing per unit that later appears in NFPA 1500, stating: ...It is recommended that a minimum acceptable fire company staffing level should be 4 members responding on or arriving with each engine and each ladder company responding to any type of fire. ...These recommendations are based on experience derived from actual fires and in- depth fire simulations and are the result of critical and objective evaluation of fire company effectiveness. These studies indicate significant reductions in performance and safety where crews have fewer members than the above recommendations. In its 1991 version of the Fire Protection Handbook, the NFPA stated: The effectiveness of pumper companies must be measured by their ability to get required hose streams into service quickly and efficiently. NFPA 1410 should be used as a guide in measuring this ability. Seriously understaffed fire companies generally are limited to the use of small hose streams until additional help arrives. Often this action may be totally ineffective in containing even a small fire and in conducting effective rescue operations. Critical task analysis indicates that fewer than eleven fire fighters would be most hard pressed to accomplish safe, effective, initial interior fire attack in a timely manner at a detached single family dwelling. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION (ICMA) In its second edition of Managing Fire Services, published in 1988, the ICMA supported the minimum level for safe fireground staffing called for in NFPA 1410 and NFPA 1500 FIRE DEPT STUDY, COLUMBUS, OH Ohio State University in a 1980 study of actual fireground operations of the Columbus Fire Department developed data on fire fighter injuries and rate of fire spread involving 404 structure fires. The data showed that when the total number of fire fighters at the scene fell below 15 the rate of fire fighter injuries per 10 residential structural fires increased 46.7%, and the number of fires which spread beyond 25 square feet per 10 residential fires increased 24%. The data associated with large risk fires showed that staffing had an even more dramatic impact on fire fighter injuries. When fireground staffing was reduced in those types of fires to less than 23 personnel, the rate of fire fighter injuries per 10 structure fires increased 73.5%, while the number of fires which spread beyond 25 square feet per 10 fires increased 17.2%. FIRE DEPT STUDY, SEATTLE WA In 1982, the NFPA published the results of a study conducted by the Seattle Fire Dept. Based on a series of textbook training drills and live fire drills, the SFD calculated model effectiveness data of various levels of manpower as follows: 6 person: Engine Co: 100% Truck Co: 100% 5 person: Engine Co: 79% Truck Co: 78% 4 person: Engine Co: 59% Truck Co: 57% 3 person: Engine Co: 45% Truck Co: n/a The effectiveness data related to the time required to successfully complete all the given tasks required by a particular evolution in the initial fire attack. FIRE DEPT STUDY, DALLAS TX In 1984, the Dallas Fire Dept conducted textbook drills and live fire tests to compare effectiveness among various levels of staffing. The study concluded that deficient levels of staffing will result in an inability to cover critical tasks.' As the numbers of fire fighters decrease without eliminating any of the tasks to be accomplished, Incident Command must delay some of the required tasks or attempt to perform all the tasks unsafely with inadequate staff. The Dallas study, in addressing this issue indicated that inadequate staffing resulted in: 1. A cumulative effect created by combined delays and lost functions on the part of each crew resulting in an even greater loss of overall effectiveness; 2. Increased physiological stress on fire fighters as they try to compensate for the lower staffing level; and 3. Increased risk to the fire fighters when aggressive procedures are undertaken without the support necessary to complete them safely. FIRE DEPT STUDY, AUSTIN TX In 1993, the Austin Fire Dept embarked on a study to determine whether companies staffed with 4 fire fighters were safer and more effective than the 3 person companies the Dept was currently deploying. AFD conducted drills consisting of a series of common fireground tasks divided into three scenarios: a simulated two story residential fire, a simulated aerial ladder evolution, and a simulated engine company high-rise fire. These simulations revealed, once again, that with an insufficient number of personnel to conduct the tasks efficiently, life and property continue to suffer inevitably. The AFD's report stated: In the two story residential fire the efnciencv or tine improvement between the three person and four person crews was 73i�. In the aerial ladder evolution the efficiency improvement between three and four -oerson crews was 66%. In the high-rise fire the efficiency improvement between three and four persons crews was 35%. Averaging all scenarios the improved efficiency was 58%. The Austin study also examined the physiological impact of the increased company level staffing had on fire fighters. Before and immediately after the completion of each scenario, medical evaluations including pulse, respiration, blood pressure, EKG strips, body temperature, and visual assessment were given to each fire fighter. Not surprisingly, the crews consisting of four fire fighters recorded a notable decrease in their pulse rate and respirations than did the three person crews. FIRE DEPT ACTION, CLARK CO., NV Ignoring "industry standards" was the basis of a 1989 complaint filed by the Division of Occupational Safety and Health of the Nevada Department of Industrial Relations against the Clark County Fire Dept. Citing that the Clark Co. FD had prior knowledge that units staffed with three personnel were unsafe, NDOSH issued a complaint that the FD had willfully violated the industry standards relating to fire fighter safety. In late 1990, the NDOSH agreed to rescind the violation when the FD agreed that it would immediately maintain minimum staffing levels at four persons per company. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY and HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA) On May 1, 1995, Federal OSHA issued a compliance instruction to all OSHA Regional and Area Offices, Compliance Officers and State Agencies having responsibility for enforcing safety and health regulations. This compliance instruction was based on OSHA's interpretation addressing SCBA use and application of standards to fire fighters responding to hazardous materials incidents and structure fires. The Compliance standard known as the "2 in/2 out" rule provides federally enforced protection for all professional fire fighters, whether state, county, or municipal, in any of the states where an OSHA State Plan agreement is in effect; California included. EMS REFERENCE In 1992, the National Conference on Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiac Care, listed among its recommendations the minimum fire fighter staffing per EMS response, stating: Early ACLS. provided by paramedics at the scene is another critical link in the management of cardiac arrest. EMS systems should have sufficient staffing to provide a minimum of two rescuers trained in ACLS to respond to the emergency. Additionally, because of the difficulties in treating cardiac arrest in the field, additional responders should be present. In systems that have attained survival rates higher than 20% for patients with ventricular fibrillation, the response teams have a minimum of two ACLS providers plus a minimum of two BLS personnel at the scene. Most experts agree that four responders (at least two trained in ACLS and two trained in BLS) are the minimum required to provide ACLS to cardiac arrest victims.. PROFESSIONAL vs. RESERVE FIREFIGHTERS There is a very significant difference between professional firefighters and reserve fire fighters. The most obvious differences are the amount of knowledge, experience, and education. Professional firefighters gain experience every ddy they come to work and most professional firefighter's careers last from 20 to 30 years. Reserve firefighters start work with usually no experience, they gain experience at a slower rate due to less hrs. worked, and then after a year or two they leave for fulltime employment. Every position on the fire department, no matter what rank they are, at times must make critical decisions and gather needed information to give to their superior. Professional firefighters are more experienced and better trained to recognize threatening conditions than reserves who are less competent may not be able to recognize, possibly resulting in injuries and/or death. When someone has only 1 to 2 years of experience their effectiveness is reduced compared to professional firefighters with multiple years of experience. Professional firefighters assume a risk when they choose this career, therefore they have a greater commitment to learning and doing their job well. Can we expect someone, such as a reserve, with a lesser commitment to assume that same risk? As stated earlier, firefighting is a very stressful occupation. When a fire company makes an interior attack the company officer must be focused and not have to worry about inexperienced, less knowledgeable personnel. The situation is already stressful, it doesn't need to be made more stressful. The amount of knowledge one has directly relates to how effective that person is. A reserve firefighter may be required to obtain a Firefighter I certification prior to employment. At Allan Hancock's academy the FFI certification takes about 400 hrs. SLOFD firefighters have that FFI certification plus approximately 120 hrs from our academy and training received usually oma daily basis. Additionally most of our firefighters have received hundreds of hours of training from attending classes outside the fire department. This knowledge is necessary when operating at incidents with a minimum staffing of 12 personnel (3 below the minimum recommended level of 15). A fire company of professional firefighters works together, trains together and lives together while at the station. We learn what capabilities each other has and this makes the team more effective. When a different person is regularly placed on the team, such as a transient reserve population, uncertainty and stress increases while effectiveness and productivity decreases. SUMMARY Numerous studies in addition to those mentioned continue to substantiate the relationship of staffing levels and safe operations at any emergency scene. Most of the data compiled in these studies results from examination of three to six person engine companies performing standard evolutions of firefighting principles. Conclusively these studies, and recommended standards from NFPA, repeatedly profess the importance of engine company staffing at four persons and a minimum of 15 personnel on scene of a one story, single family residence structure fire. Currently, SL:OFD operates at a minimum staffing level of 12. An example of functional units is as follow: Engine Co 1: 3 person Engine Co 2: 3 person Engine Co 3: 2 person Engine Co 4: 3 person When we operate at above minimum staffing we are able to put a third person on the 2 person engine and possibly a fourth on engine L With our staffing level already 2-3 people below safe industry standards, our city administrators, civilians, and firefighters have assumed an additional risk. By reducing our minimum staffing even more, that risk is increased while our effectiveness is decreased dramatically, as shown in previous studies. The public expects the fire department to respond quickly, help their family and friends by effectively handling whatever emergency is threatening life, property and/or the environment. They have expectations of their fire department that we are able to meet, a reduction in service is not what they expect or could possibly live with. To improve overall safety, additional staffing is needed. This supplemental staffing needs to be in addition to our minimum staffing of 12, not replacement of professional firefighters. Reserve firefighters have a place in providing additional help, but due to their lack of experience, training, and knowledge, they are not comparable replacements of professional firefighters. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS Pursuant to any program where any additional employees are added to the city's work force, certain legal concerns should be identified and researched to best serve and protect the parties involved. This committee raised numerous questions of legal nature, some easily answered by research, others requiring research that yielded no definitive closure or further direction. Without the availability of legal assistance in interpretation, some of our concerns remain unanswered. The following information address those concerns that are best answered by actual law or code reference. When law or code reference was unavailable, professional contacts within agencies that specialize in that subject, provided guidance in interpretation. 1. How many hours may an apprentice work? Answer: Depending on the employment status of the apprentice, will define what that apprentice can work. Clarification: As referenced in G.O. 201.01(*1), employees who normally work less than 20 hours per week or work on a full time appointment for_six . months or less will be referred to as " temporary employees ". Temporary employees may be hired only to meet the temporary needs of the City of San Luis Obispo which result from seasonal work, emergencies, special projects limited to a six month term, unprogrammed surges in workload, or to provide substitutes for permanent employees. Department heads may hire temporary employees for up to 1000 hours of one fiscal year within their budgetary personnel limitations established by the City Council. The CAO is authorized to extend temporary employee appointments beyond 1000 hours if the appointment is within budgetary and personnel limitations established by the City Council. These temporary employees will be known as part-time PERS members. Part-time PERS members automatically acquire PERS membership with all PERS benefits on the first day of the month following the month in which they exceed 1000 hours within the fiscal year. Once established as a PERS member, the employee will remain a PERS member from that day on, regardless of the number of hours worked in one fiscal year. A report recording the hours worked in each pay period with the total number of hours worked in the current fiscal year for each temporary employee hired will be provided to the Finance Department each pay period. This is to ensure that temporary employees never work over the 1000 hour maximum. 2. Which entity will provide the apprentice (APP) workers compensation fee? Answer: If the employee is paid, that entity which is paying the APP is responsible for the workers compensation fee.(*2,*3,*4,*5,*6,*7,*8) 3. Do APP qualify for affirmative action goals? Answer: According to chapter 60 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Code of Federal Regulations of the U.S. Department of Labor(*9), and persons in which we spoke with at OFFCCP; Any person who is not a full-time employee would not qualify for the City,of San Luis Obispo affirmative action goals. 4. Is the City required to administer Hepatitis "B" vaccinations to APP? Answer: The City is required to provide Hepatitis "B" vaccinations to all employees who may be exposed to Hepatitis "B".(*10) 5. May an APP qualify for " Joint APP Committee " funding? Answer: If the Fire Department does not have the intention of hiring the APP as a full-time firefighter,. and / or there is a substantial difference in salary between the APP and a full- time firefighter, then the APP firefighter does not qualify for "JAC" funding.(*11) 6. May an APP fill in place of full-time staffing levels? Answer: The City ultimately has the right to define who is trained and experienced enough to fill staffing levels. There are basic minimum qualifications a firefighter must have to be employed, but we must remember there are departments that function on a fully volunteer status with much less training and experience than we will be requiring our APP to have. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. G.O. 201.011 City of San Luis Obispo. 2. State Of California OES, Workers compensation benefits for the Disaster Service Worker. 3. U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 4. Office of Emergency Services, Fire and Rescue Division, Workers Compensation, Disaster Service Workers/Auxiliary Fireman.. 5. Office of Emergency Services, State Emergency Plan - Part III, Rules and Regulations Disaster Service Workers). 6. Office of Emergency Services, Workers Compensation, Auxiliary Fireman. 7. California Emergency Services Act, Rules and Regulations. 8. Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards, Labor Code Sections 3361, 3365, and others. 9. U.S. Department of Labor, Chapter 60: Equal Employment Opportunity, Code of Federal Regulations. 10. The City of San Luis Obispo Infectious Control Plan, 902.09 11. Joint Apprentice Committee (JAC), Rules and Regulations. 12. Websters New Collegiate Dictionary, 1981 APPRENTICE PROGRAM COSTS "Apprentice" defined: "one who is learning by practical experience under skilled workers, a trade, art, or calling."--Webster's Dictionary Listed below are various fixed costs of having an Apprentice program. These costs come from many necessities such as wages, equipment, employee wage taxes, and uniforms. Some of the costs below are based either on the hourly expense of having an Apprentice on duty or the cost per Apprentice due to fixed expenses such as uniforms and safety gear. When estimating costs we have assumed minimal figures. Therefore, the totals given for the components of this program should be considered conservative. This outline discusses costs associated with staffing 3 Apprentices ( one Apprentice on duty each day, spread over three platoons ). Please refer to the end of the document for comparison table of costs between staffing 3 and. 6 Apprentices. SALARY Figures represent one Apprentice on duty for each shift, 365 days per year. 365 days X 24 hrs. X $4.25/hr. = $37,230 per year " X $5.50/hr = $48,180 per year " X S6.75/hr = S59.130 per year PERSONNEL Figures for the cost of workman's comp. are derived from the current yearly cost to the City for the existing Fire Dept. personnel. S142,100. This value represents 122,640 total scheduled working hours based on existing staffincr levels and total personnel. The per hour cost for workman's comp for existing staffing is shown below: S1427100 / 122,640 hours = $1.16 per work hour. Workman's Comp: Cost for Apprentice program: 365 days X 24 hrs. X $1.16 = $10,160 per year Turnover Rate: We calculate the average service time of an Apprentice to be 1.5 years. This means that for a staff of three, an Apprentice will leave the program every six months on average. Hiring Process - Establish a hiring list very two years. Accept 100 applications, use flyer to announce. Admin. Estimate = $205 Screen for 20 candidates, 20 min./App. X $15/hr = $100 Interview 20 @ 1/2hr/interview X $15/hr X 2 interviewers = $300 Total cost : $605 every two years = $302.50 per year Employee Start-up - Background checks = $400 Physical = $440 Hep B shots = $45 Total start-up : $885 per Apprentice UNIFORMS 2 Pants 2 Polo shirts 1 Class A Shirt Hat, Belt Uniform Cleaning $400 per Apprentice per year SAFETY GEAR Turnouts $1000.00 Turnout Boots $100.00 Wildland Clothin; S150.00 Gloves 550.00 Tools, lights $25.00 Helmet $200.00 Misc.(name tags) $25.00 Total $1550 We estimate a four year life span for turnout gear, giving a yearly cost below: S1550/4 = $387.50 per Apprentice per year TRAINING When determining training costs, it is important to make the distinction between training costs that are tangible and easily calculated, and those which are intangible due to the time spent operating the program. Time spent operating the program will take away from other current programs (In the language of economics these intangible costs are referred to as opportunity costs, or utility costs). To determine a dollar figure value for training, the hourly rate of $15 was used to represent the value of one instructor's time. An important fact to recognize is that without staffing a person to run this program or without providing overtime to full-time personnel for their extra time spent, this program must function within the normal work schedule and will take time away from other programs. EMT - $60 every two years = $30 per Apprentice per year HazMat "FRO" - $25 per Apprentice per year Training Apprentices - EMT 1/Academy trained already when they arrive. Orientation Academy - Approx. two weeks, total 80 hrs. Training prep takes 2 hrs for every hr. of delivery, total 160 hrs. 240hrs X $15/hr X 2 Academies per year = $7200 per year (turnover rate of 1 person every 6 months = 2 academies/year) On duty training - one hour per day X 365 days X $15/hr = $5475 per year SUMMARY OF COSTS Based on staffing 3 Apprentices and a turnover rate of 1 Apprentice every six months, below are listed the annual costs for this program. Salary $377230 (@ $4.25/hr) Personnel $121232.50 ($10,160 + $302.50 + (2 X $885)) Uniforms $11200 Safety Gear $1162.50 Training $12,840 ($7,200 + $5,475 + (3 X S55)) TOTAL (@ $4.25/hr) $64,665 Annual Cost of Program (@ $5.50/hr) $75,615 (@ $6.75/hr) $86,565 Based on staffing 6 Apprentices total, with 2 on duty every shift, the costs are as follows (remember that turnover and training numbers increase as staffing increases): Salary $74,460 (@ $4.25/hr) Personnel $24116250 ($202320 + $302.50 + (2 X $885)) Uniforms $22400 Safety $22325 Training $18,480 ($7,200 + $10,950 + (6 X $55)) TOTAL (@ $4.25/hr) $121,827.50 Annual Cost of Program (@ $5.50/hr) $143,727.50 (@ $6.75/hr) $1652627.50 CONCLUSIONS It is no surprise that the governing body of the City of San Luis Obispo is constantly reviewing the operating budgets of departmental services it is commissioned to provide its' citizens. It is also no surprise that the overtime portion of the fire department's past budget appears excessive; for which it has come under great scrutiny. During the recent financial difficulties experienced throughout California, vacated positions in the SLOFD were (perhaps wisely) affected by a city-wide hiring freeze that theoretically produced a salary cost savings. In retrospect the overtime costs in filling the vacated positions to insure a critical minimum staffing level of 12 apparently approached or exceeded the projected cost savings. As a result the Fire Chief has been directed to "find another way" of eliminating overtime costs; hence the pursuit of a reserve/apprentice program, and the formulation of this committee. During the past two years our department was permitted to slowly fill the vacated positions and as of March, 1996 current staffing levels are at fourteen per shift. Already, overtime costs have been drastically reduced simply by the reduction in necessary coverage for minimum-staffing positions. When projected throughout the budget duration, one can conclude that costs identified in this report for an implemented reserve program will possibly exceed current projected overtime costs. Reserve/apprentice programs, as viewed from a proposal level, appear to solve a variety of issues that continue to surround budgetary concerns. Many of the departments contacted expressed positive aspects of their programs in terms of: ...additional personnel available at times of major emergencies. ...providing an opportunity for people to get started in the fire service. smffinE available for proje`ts that are more suite to nor:-suopression positions. a chance to view a potential rlreIighter prior to hurrig into a rull time position. However. overall concerns that repeatedly came to the forefront were expressed in negative (or potentially negative) aspects: ...do not allow reserve/apprentice participants to work in place of full time personnel when staffing drops below minimum. ...high turnover rate. ...high cost of implementation and maintenance. ...potential liabilities. ...decreased level of service. ...morale problems. The citizens of San Luis Obispo have come to expect a level of emergency service that has continued to improve through a tradition of 150 years. The members of this fire department are dedicated to continue to provide and improve that service by focusing on recommended industry standards of training and safety. Typically these members are not here for an "introduction" into the fire service, a stepping stone to places elsewhere, but individuals dedicated to a successful "thirty-yearn career of contribution to the community. Therefore, it is the opinion of this committee that our City Council continue to review overtime expenditures on a basis of updates provided by the Fire Chief, enabling the budget to "run its' course" at current staffing levels. We are confident that overtime costs will dramatically fall to acceptable levels of past years without the disruption of an additional program laced with hurdles and destined to continual maintenance. At the end of the current budget, if overtime costs are unacceptable when compared to historical figures, additional avenues of departmental cost reduction should be examined, however it becomes apparent that at some point our leaders must accept that providing emergency services has a cost, and further cuts in budget or staffing will certainly reduce overall safety and level of service to the community. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. As previously concluded, the City Council should allow this budget to "run its' course" with appropriate review for a basis of comparison and future decisions. 2. Departmental Administration and members throughout are visibly overloaded with an influx of demands, programs, and projects, all laced with longlasting legal and logistical ramifications. At this time the committee cannot support further imbrication of yet another open-ended program that appears driven by "cost saving" contentions. 3. If a program is implemented, protection of minimum staffing of 12 hill-time firefighters is critical to insure current level of service to the community. 4. Future minimum staffing of full-time firefighters should be increased as the city boundaries and population grows. MEETING AGENDA DATE " ' d ITEM June 4, 1996 MEMORANDUM TO: Council Colleagues FROM: Dodie Williams �l SUBJECT: March for Jesus The March for Jesus held in the downtown area over Memorial Day weekend has elicited a number of phone calls to me from downtown business owners. They are concerned about many issues, a few of which I have listed for your consideration. 1) The timing. Holding such a march over a holiday weekend, closing the downtown to traffic from early morning to after the noon hour was a true hardship on our businesses. Cities both north and south had major events running at the same time—and we had no traffic. 2) Only six monitors showed up for training and of the 34 required, only 30 monitors were at the march. 3) Monitors would not allow business owners, downtown residents or at one point, a hearse going to a funeral at Reis Chapel, pass the barricades. 4) Last year when the march was held, the organizers told our staff they would hold it in a different city each year. I believe this is fair for all concerned Council Member Romero has been involved in the 1995 and 1996 marches as both a speaker and march participant For this reason, I recommend that he be asked to servewith staff as a City Council liaison to the group in an effort to resolve the issues of concern to both staff and downtown business owners. DW-ss �UNCIL ❑ CDD DIR CAO ❑ FIN DIR �AO ❑ FIRE CHIEF P<TTORNEY ❑ PW DIR ROCLERK/ORIG ❑ LICE CHF ❑ MGMT TEAM j'REC DIR ❑ D FILE ❑ UTIL DIR ❑ PERS DIR Mayor Settle and Councilmembers Roahnan;. "-'Tuesday; June 4, 1996 Romero, Smith and Williams City of San Luis Obispo { 't Dear Mayor and Councilmembers: .._. -' I apologize for the lateness of this letter- I have just returned from a four day visit with our daughter in the Bay area. Nevertheless, I.want to communicate my thoughts about the request being made of the City to guarantee a one million dollar loan to complete the Performing Arts Center of the Cal Poly campus. The need for this loan is not of the City's making. Obviously,the fund raising drive has fallen short. It is also clear that the other partners cannot guarantee that the loan the City is requested to make will be repaid. Looking at the worst case scenario,the City could be left holding the proverbial bag. If so,from what fiords will you Propose making the loan payments? I think this situation needs to be thought out in advance. Will you place a moratorium on salary and wage increases; operations and equipment budgets; CIP projects? It certainly doesn't seem appropriate to impact personnel or other city operations for such a purpose. The circles of acquaintances we have are almost unanimous in saying that the naming of the PAC has completely chilled their desire to make additional contributions. Should the feelings of our friends represent those of other segments of San Luis Obispo,then I think future donations will be very difficult to obtain. It would certainly be nice if the Foundation and Cal Poly would reconsider their position regarding the naming of the Center. However, short of that, I believe the only way available for loan repayment to occur in an equitable manner and guarantee that the City would meet its repayment schedule is to place a surcharge on all tickets to all PAC events. Further, such a surcharge should be made a percentage of the ticket cost and not a flat fee. �. I hope these thoughts might prove usefi>I to you in your deliberations. ❑ Cr)--1 G'iRerations. 9-CAO ❑ FIN DiR `i SAO ❑ FIRE CHIEF Sincerely; l [].ATTORNEY ❑ PW DIR II ' El 'e[ERKIORIC ❑ POLICE CHF' ❑ MGMT TEAA7 ❑ REC DIR ❑ C RIW FILE ❑ UT!L DIR r ❑ PERS On K eth E. c wartz 201 uena Vista San Luis Obispo, CA 93405 n Iii V E ® c: John Dunn JUN 4 1996 CITY CLERK SAN LUIS OBISPQ,CA _u4EMNG AGENDA RICHARD SCHMIDT 112 Broad Street, Sdn Luis Obispo, CA 934Q > A4-4247, Q lL -a� Q I•�sCchmldt® ❑" ❑kLCAO ❑ FIRE CHIEF I June 4, 1996 I ❑.ATTORNEY ❑ PW DIR Y B-tLERKIORIG ❑ POLICE CHF ` Re: More Funds For Performing Arts Center 1 ❑ MGMTTEAM ❑ REC DIR ! OCR FILA ❑ UT!L DIR To the City Council: o °Ens-01P ' I urge you not to become further entangled in the finances of the Performing Arts Center. There is no guarantee that this venture will be a financial success and that the city's involvement will be anything other than an on-going financial drain. The city has already put too much of its financial resources and good faith into this project, and, now that the center is nearing completion, a press account indicates that the city has signed a blank check to cover the center's operating losses! This is already outrageous. To further commit the city is irresponsibility to the nth degree! A number of points need to be addressed: 1. What is the nature of the city's on-going obligation to cover financial losses from operation of the center? A recent press account quotes Mr. Dunn as saying, 'The one provision we made [with Cal Poly] was that any operational deficit will be picked up by the FPAC and the city." Really? I'd never heard that before. What does this mean? Who made this commitment to Cal Poly? Is it even legal (Seems to me, nobody can obligate future councils to specific expenditures, if I remember the lessons taught by former city attorneys). Is the council aware that this could be a drain on the city treasury amounting tootp entially hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars per year? How can such a blank check be squared with the city's alleged concern with fiscal responsibility? How can such a blank check be squared with the fact the city will have little meaningful role in the management of the center which will determine the size of the deficit? If this press report has a shred of truth to it, I think you have a good bit of explaining to do to the people whose surrogates you are. 2. Given his blatant conflicts of interest in the matter of the performing arts center, how can Mr. Dunn make any financial recommendations about it to the Council? Mr. Dunn, of course, is our city administrator, supposedly a non-political managerial position. Mr. Dunn is also president of the Mozart Festival, a prime beneficiary of the center, whose festival director was also a'prime booster of and mover in getting the center built.. Mr. Dunn has fiduciary responsibility to the people of this city to manage their city in a responsible manner. This dual role puts Mr. Dunn in a position of blatant conflict between two different masters with differing interests. His personal indiscipline in accepting the Mozart position w"qir6nLrVV0tMpotential conflicts it creates is emblematic of the ethical insensitivities of JUN 4 1Pt CITY PGERK the entire city hall regime that operates beneath him. Apropos this conflict, it would be interesting to know. for example, on whose behalf Mr. Dunn went to Sacramento recently to plead for state funds for the center: on behalf of the city, a major financial partner in the center, or on behalf of the Mozart Festival, a major beneficiary of the city's largess? Certainly, such a trip could be seen without much difficulty as a case of Mr. Dunn using his city position to benefit his civic position -- and, in cases of conflicts, appearances are as much a problem as blatantly unethical behavior. But we'll give him the . benefit of the doubt and ask some questions. Who paid for his trip -- that might provide a clue about to whom he was responsible on his junket? If his expenses were shared, that explicitly underlines the nature of his conflict. If either party paid exclusively, how could the other party's interests be divorced from his conduct in Sacramento? Clearly, even if he were a saint, the conflicting interests could not be untangled. Is it surprising, in light of the poor ethical example set by Mr. Dunn, that Mr. Jonas, one of Mr. Dunn's chosen underlings, finds nothing out of order with I'affaire Mandeville? (I find it amazing that five elected officials sit by silently when Mr. Jonas writes such a patently silly response to a citizen complaint about potential conflict of interest on his staff as the one contained in his letter to me, copied to you. Apparently, you too buy into his silly arguments that, at least, is what one concludes from your complicit silence.) Indifference to conflict of interest seems to be a way of life in the Dunn regime. It's time the Council did something about it. 3. While we're discussing city/Cal Poly Dunn Deals, thecampus newspaper recently carried a fascinating article about financing the new $9 million worth of "intramural" athletic fields to be located out in the boonies on ag land north of the core campus and necessitated by building the -Rec Center and the performing arts center parking garage atop existing centrally-located athletic fields. The article stated that the city is going to help finance a major portion of this =, and quoted Paul LeSa eq at length about how the city is fully behind the joint financing Ip an. I was stunned, for this was the first I'd heard of such a thing. I asked a member of the Parks and Rec Commission if I'd missed something, and the response was: "I was as surprised as you when I saw that article. I know nothing about it. It's never been discussed." So, I ask, what is this all about? Is this yet another Dunn manipulation of political "process" so that political skids are greased and political decisions made by administrative staff without involvement of commissions whose jurisdiction would normally include the item, or without going through the normal public " olitical" rop cess? don't expect to ever hear any replies to any of this, for silence seems to be the way the present regime deals with questions about what it is doing. Nonetheless, I shall continue to raise questions, in this forum, and if silence and inaction continue, in others as well. Yours, ichard Schmidt Pierce'Capitai, Inc. 219 Albert Drive • San Luis Obispo. CA 93405 • (805) 544-3476 Fax 544-3597 June 4, 1996 eCOUNCIL . .- '-?tAO ❑ FIN D! t Memorandum �A�PI�EY ❑ FIRE CHIEF , I WIo ��John Dunn, City ManagerMG� 9 ❑ CE CHF` � Bill Statler, Director of Finance ❑ REC DIA. ?❑ C READ FILE ❑ UTIL D'R k: City of San Luis Obispo ❑ PERS 0M Re Lease Financing for the Performing Arts Center Thank you for your enabling our quickly exploring opportunities for offering an alternative to Heritage Oaks Bank's $1,000,000 offer. First, we commend Heritage Oaks Bank's offer. The 5.5% pricing and 10 year term beginning with interest only payments then graduating upward over the duration of the term is quite aggressive. In the few hours which we have had available to invest in developing alternatives, we have confirmed that we can present a competing offer covering the $1,300,000 actual funding requirement. We are immediately able to offer a 10 year term, with level payments of$175,800 payable annually in arrears throughout the term, with the interest rate 5.9%. Our feeling is that, with the exception of covering the $300,000 shortfall in funding associated with Heritage Oaks Banks' offer, our immediate alternative would be less advantageous in view of the 4/10' of one percent higher interest rate, and additionally, the lack of an interest only period, then followed by stepped payments. In view of these shortcomings, our inclination is not to present this proposal unless you-request otherwise (it could be detrimental to Pierce Capital, Inc. to present a non-competitive offer). Had we more time to invest we might be successful in generating a superior offer to cover the full $1,300,000 funding need, or simply an offer to cover the $300,000 shortfall associated with the Heritage Oaks Bank offer. You may be aware that 10 year Treasury rates rose significantly last week (see attached statistical report showing prevailing rates). If Heritage Oaks Bank's rate is indexed to Treasury rates until takedown, rather than absolutely fixed at 5.5%, our 5.9% alternative might actually be directly in line. RF 0 oft"IVE!D JUN 4 19Q4 CITY CLERK SAN LUIS OBISPO.CA The 10 year term beginning with interest only then stepping upward impacts the pricing. A shorter term and level payments would ease the challenge of developing an attractive alternative. There remains a possibility, although reasonably unlikely, that before this day passes our explorations may permit a distinctly attractive alternative proposal. Regards, Douglas R. Pierce President Enclosure �' yb 0: 2l (ET ) JULIA PIERCE PAGE i or 1 JUI.1 03. . _ .._ _- ___ ....... -.._......__..c TU k]•4G371��tlLS51`Jti`J:1:5%�t-�t1 P.4J1 1,3:52, FkOt•t F'ULiL l i.t=tT!ON;, �EkU �. .:, FEDERAL RESERVE statistical release l�hj Th*evaseasM d Khe to IS announced an(202)452.32Da. wats •n�R•tt rest•• Thetwe telco wed cert.Nbnday. H.16(619) For Immediate release SELECTED INTEREST RATES June 3. 1996 Yields in percent per annum Week Ending 1996 1998 7996 1996 1988 1996 Me May May May May May May May Instrumerlls 27 28 29 30 31 31 24 Federal funds(odactive) 1 23 6.14 6.33 5.24 5.34 5.31 6.10 622 6.24 Commercial paper 345 6.37 6.37 6.38 6.40 6.38 6.36 5.38 t-month6.37 6.37 6.39 5.40 6.38 6.37 6.38 3 R1On� 6.39 6.38 6.43 6.44 6.41 6.40 6.42 6-month Fktance paper plaoad directly 3 a 6 5.27 6.26 6.27 6.27 6.27 528 6.29 1-month 6.28 628 5.28 529 6.28 5.27 5.29 3-month 6.24 624 6.24 624 6.24 _523 6.23 6-month Bankers acceptancss(top rated)9 4 7 6.28 6.20 6.31 6.32 6.30 627 6.29 3-month 6.29 632 5.34 6.38 6.33 829 6.31 &rrmonth CDC(secondary Q1"ket)3 e 5.30 630 6.32 6.32 6.31 5.31 532 1-1ronth 6.34 6.34 5.37 5.37 5.36 6.36 6.36 3-nlonm 6.44 6.44 6.48 6.51 6.47 6.415 5.47 6-month Eu6.29 6.28 rododar deposits&Andon)3° 6.31 631 5.30 62e 6.30 1•TOn� 6.31 6.34 6.38 638 6.36 634 6.38 3-month 6.47 6.47 6.44 5.60 6.47 6.47 6.47 6-mrn+th 6.26 8.25 Vaan 2310 826 8.26 9.26 8.26 826 &26 Renk Prime 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 DlscOunt window t'iorr0e`4V 211 6.00 6.00 6.00 U.&government socuddos Treasury Dib Auabn avara9a 3412 6,03 6.03 6.02 3.rtwnih 5 6.14 .14 6.11 6.12 6-rnonlh 6.14 6 &31 1-yew Secondary marked 3-month 5.12 5.04 6.04 .046.12 6.12 6-month 6.12 6.16 5.14 6.16 6.14 627 6.39 6,33 630 6.15 6.46 639 1-year Tremury congWd rnatur)tles h3 6.17 6.18 6.18 6.18 8.18 6.18 633 3-month 5.34 638 6.35 6.36 6.35 633 6-month 6.63 6.70 6.71 6.77 6.70 6.59 6.94 1-Year 6.06 6.18 6.19 627 6.17 6.03 6.10 2 Yeer 6.23 833 6.38 6.44 8.34 6.20 8.27 3-year 8 44 8.68 6.65 6.64 6.66 6.41 6.48 6-year 8.89 8.67 8.68 Y 6.68 B.BD 6.70 6.78 8 66 6.74 7-pact 9.67 6.77 6.78 6 86 e•T7 7.11 10-year 7.02 7.10 7.08 7.17 7.09 7.02 7.00 &03 99l 9.03 20•ya+v e.es e.94 9.92 30-y ear 7.08 C mposh1 a " 7.00 7.08 7.06 7.16 7.07 BAD over 10 yews(lora-term) Corporate bond 7.62 Moody'a seasoned 7.66 7.61 7.61 7.67 7.61 7.63 Aaa8.33 8.27 920 8.30 Bas 8.21 8.27 6'� 8.08 8.08 7.00 8.02 A•u llity 1 S 6.94 6.94 6.87 6.98 State 8 local bonds 16 8.03 8.03 8.01 8.07 COnventkxhd m0r>Qe9ae 17 See ovviasf for footnotes • Markets closed TOTAL P.01 DRAFT �- �- DRAFT N cc Performing Arts Center - 1996-97.General Operating Budget nn 5/23/96 — —_` -. ..—.. 13 �Nti Expenses _ A Y-A ft EM. Salaries/benefits $ 349,965 Hiring expenses $ 3,500 Facility insurance $ 49,000 Office supplies $ 4,500 Printing/copies $ _ 1,000 Telephone _ $ 10,000 Postage _ $ 1,500 Tax prep and audit _ $ 2,000 TravelftraininQ _ $ 10,800 Hosting $ 1,500 Memberships/subc. $ 1,500 Network maim. $ _ 5,000 Shuttles/parkin $ 11,000 Miscellaneous $ 3,780 Marketing $ 45,000 Cap, equip,hease/depreciation/W $ 12,500 Administrative Expenses $ 512,545 Ticketing Services $ 197,458 Technical Services(net exp.) $ 4,000 .... ........ _ —_... . Maintenance&Utilities $ 377,000 (in-kind) Fiscal fees $ 39,980 Total Admin. & Maint./Util $ 1,130,983 '� C� COUNCIL ❑ COD UIR AN FIVE- 9 '" CAO ❑ FIN DIR JUN 1996 . 4'ACAO ❑ FIRE CHIEF 1 .ATTORNEY ❑ PW DIR CLERK/ORIG ❑ POLICE CHF j CITY CLERK ❑ MGMT TEAM ❑ REC DIR SAN LUIS OBISPO,CAIt ❑ FILE ❑ U71L DIR f J Q PERS DiR , Page 1 DRAFT - DRAFT Revenue - - Cal Poly Malnt. & Mi. $ 377,000. (in-kind) _____-•_ .,-.,. Cal Poly Pre-Paid rent $ 245,353 FPAC $ 100,000 -- S�eciat Events Grants _ .. ... ....-—. Caterir -r,oncessions commission Sales net (commemorative Items) $ 7,500 Parking $ - Advertising —._ $ 30,000 . ...... YOPAC net $ 17,413 Ticketing Seivices $ 47haye Revenue subtotal Re $ 1,029,7—_nt. .n-e.eded to balance bud9et � � $ 101,2current commitments est.to be$57,OOD Total revenue $ 1,130,983 ..........--------- Net revenue(expense) $ a Page 2