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HomeMy WebLinkAbout01/07/2003, AGENDA council agenba CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO CITY HALL, 990 PALM STREET Tuesday, January 7, 2003 Action Update 3:00 P.M. REGULAR MEETING Council Chamber 990 Palm Street Present: Council Members John Ewan, Ken Schwartz, Allen K. Settle, Vice Mayor Christine Mulholland, Mayor Dave Romero 3:00 P.M. PRESENTATION CAO Hampian introduced formally and officially Police Chief Deborah Linden. Cit r Clerk Price administered the Oath of Office to Chief Linden. Retired Santa Barbara County Sheriff Jim Thomas pinned on the Chief's badge. PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD FOR ITEMS NOT ON THE AGENDA(not to exceed 15 minutes total) The Council welcomes your input. You may address the Council by completing a speaker slip and giving it to the City Clerk prior to the meeting. At this time, you may address the Council on items that are not on the agenda or items on the Consent Agenda. Time limit is three minutes. State law does not allow the Council to discuss or take action on issues not on the agenda,except that members of the Council or staff may briefly respond to statements made or questions posed by persons exercising their public testimony rights(Gov.Code Sec.54954.2). Staff may be asked to follow up on such items. Staff reports and other written documentation relating to each item referred to on this agenda are on file in the City Clerk's Office in Room 1 of City Hall. Deborah Holley, Downtown Association Administrator, spoke in support of Item C6, and provided an update on the public relations campaign associated with the "Once every Hundred Years, the Century Project". Council Agenda Tuesday, January 7, 2003 Action Update CONSENT AGENDA The Consent Agenda is approved on one motion. Council Members may pull consent items to be considered after Business items. C1. MINUTES OF TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2002 AND TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 2002. (PRICE) RECOMMENDATION: Waive oral reading and approve as presented. ACTION. Approved. (5:0) C2. RESOLUTION OF SUPPORT FOR-ALLOCATION OF PROPOSITION 50 FUNDS FOR SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY. (GEORGE/HAVLIK) RECOMMENDATION: 1) Adopt a resolution supporting the allocation of between $15 and $18 million to San Luis Obispo County from Proposition 50 bond proceeds; and 2) authorize staff to forward this resolution to the offices of Assemblyman Maldonado and Senator McPherson. ACTION. 1) Resolution No. 9403(2003 Series)adopted. 2)Approved (3:2) (Mulholland and Schwartz opposed). C3. WATER REUSE PROJECT—AMEND DESIGN SERVICES CONTRACT. (MOSS/PIERCE) RECOMMENDATION: 1) Approve an addendum in the amount of $45,113 to the agreement with Brown and Caldwell for design of the Water Reuse Project. 2) Appropriate $45,000 from the Water Fund unreserved working capital to the Water Reuse Project CIP Design account. ACTION. 12)Approved. (5:0) C4. LAGUNA LIFT STATION AND FORCE MAIN UPGRADE CHANGE ORDER, SPECIFICATION NO..90006. (MOSS/HIX) RECOMMENDATION: 1) Approve the change order for $61,200 for changes to the Laguna Lift Station and Force Main Upgrade. 2) Authorize the City Administrative Officer to execute the change order. ACTION. i 2)Approved. (5:0) 2 i Council Agenda Tuesday, January 7, 2003 Action Update C5. FINANCING FOR THE ENERGY CONSERVATION PROJECT. (MOSS/MUNDS) RECOMMENDATION: Adopt a resolution preserving the City's ability to enter into a Lease Purchase Agreement for approximately $3,000,000 to design and construct the approved Energy Conservation Project. ACTION. Resolution No. 9404(2003 Series) adopted. (5:0) C6. DOWNTOWN UTILITY PIPELINE IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS SPECIFICATION NO.'S 90240 & 90261. (MCCLUSKEY/LYNCH/CORNEJO) RECOMMENDATION: 1) Approve the award to and execute a contract with Tierra Contracting, Inc. in the amount of $937,000 for"Water, Sewer and Stormdrain Improvement Project, Specification No. 90240" and authorize the Mayor to execute the contract. 2) Approve the transfer of $10,100 from the Prefumo Arm and Marsh Street Silt Removal Projects to the 90240 project account. 3) Approve the award to and execute a contract with Arthur's Construction in the amount of $628,938 for"Water and Sewer Improvement Project, Specification No. 90261" and authorize the Mayor to execute the contract. 4) Approve the transfer of $20,000 from the Railroad Square Lot Seal Project to the 90261 project account. ACTION. 1-4)Approved. (5.0) - APPOINTMENT Al. NOMINATIONS TO THE HOUSING ELEMENT UPDATE TASK FORCE. (MANDEVILLE/HOOK—20 MINUTES) RECOMMENDATION: Appoint members to serve on the Housing Element Update Task Force by: 1) Accepting the nominations for twelve organization representatives, and 2) appointing individuals to fill the four at-large categories, either from the applications received or from names put forward by Council Members. ACTION. 1)Approved. 2)Appointed Andrew Carter, Anita Robinson, Gabe Garcia and Kent MacDonald as at-large members. (5:0) 3 Council Agenda - Tuesday, January 7, 2003 Action Update BUSINESS ITEM 1. REVISED REGIONAL HOUSING NEEDS ALLOCATIONS. (MANDEVILLE/HOOK—30 MINUTES) RECOMMENDATION: 1) With respect to the January 8, 2003 SLOCOG meeting to consider revised housing need allocations, provide Council Member Schwartz with the following direction: a) endorse the 333 unit reduction in the City's housing need allocation based on revised jobs data as a percentage of total County employment, lowering the City's allocation from 5,450 to 5,117 dwellings; and b) endorse a proposed shift of 2,000 above moderate income housing units from the cities to the unincorporated County, further reducing the City's allocation from 5,117 to 4,383 dwellings, with the understanding that this shift will respect the general plans of the County and the cities and that most of the added dwellings will be developed on. existing "lots of record"; and c) endorse the proposal by SLOCOG staff to count Cal Poly University housing toward meeting the City's housing needs based on the inclusion of Cal Poly employment in the City's job share, and on the impact the University has on the City's overall housing supply and demand. 2) Continue to work cooperatively with all SLOCOG agencies to effect statewide legislative reform in the regional housing needs determination process and in state growth policies. 3) Direct staff to work with the Housing Element Update Task Force and the Planning Commission to prepare a housing element that can hopefully achieve state certification based on the reduced housing need allocation and on respect for City General Plan goals. ACTION. 1 a) Endorsed the 333 unit reduction in the City's housing need allocation based on revised jobs data as a percentage of total County employment; b) endorsed a proposed shift of 2,000 above moderate income housing units from the cities to the unincorporated County, with the understanding that this shift will respect the general plans of the County,and c) endorse the proposal by SLOCOG staff to count Cal Poly University housing toward meeting the City's housing needs based on the inclusion of Cal Poly employment in the City's job share, and on the impact the University has on the City's overall housing supply and demand. 2)Agreed to continue to work cooperatively with all SLOCOG agencies to effect statewide legislative reform in the regional housing needs determination process and in state growth policies. 3) Directed staff to work with the Housing Element Update Task Force and the Planning Commission to prepare a housing element that can hopefully achieve state certification consistent with City General Plan goals. (5.0) ACTION. Directed the City's representative, Council Member Schwartz, to reluctantly and under protest accept the amended SLOCOG Regional Housing Needs Plan, as adjusted. (5:0). 4 Council Agenda Tuesday, January 7, 2003 Action Update ACTION: Directed staff to draft for the.Mayor's signature a letter of protest to the Housing and Community Development Department(similar to the one sent by the City of Arroyo Grande). (5:0) PUBLIC HEARINGS 2. TEXT AMENDMENT TO THE ZONING REGULATIONS CREATING STANDARDS FOR BED AND BREAKFAST ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE R-3, R-4, AND AG ZONE DISTRICTS AND ASSOCIATED ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW (NEGATIVE DECLARATION) (TA/ER 41-02); CITY-WIDE; CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO, APPLICANT. (MANDEVILLE/AZEVEDO-45 MINUTES) RECOMMENDATION: As recommended by the Planning Commission, introduce an ordinance 1) approving a negative declaration and 2) adopting development standards for bed and breakfast establishments in the R-3, R-4, and AG zone districts, based on findings. ACTION: 1) Ordinance No. 1429(2003 Series)introduced. (5:0);2)Approved(5:0). 3. A REQUEST FOR A DENSITY BONUS OF 58% TO ALLOW AN AFFORDABLE, SENIOR HOUSING PROJECT WITH 401-BEDROOM APARTMENTS: 2005 JOHNSON AVENUE, ARC 1.47-02. (MANDEVILLE/CODRON - 1 HOUR) RECOMMENDATION: Approve the request for a density bonus, subject to Architectural Review Commission review and approval of the project. ACTION: 1)Adopted Resolution No. 9405(2003 Series)..2) Directed staff and the ARC to look at the parking lot placement, the intersection of Ella/Johnson and roof design as part of the development review process. (5:0) 7:00 P.M. PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD FOR ITEMS NOT ON THE AGENDA(not to exceed 15 minutes total) The Council welcomes your input. You may address the Council by completing a speaker slip and giving it to the City Clerk prior to the meeting. At this time,you may address the Council on items that are not on the agenda or items on the Consent Agenda. Time limit is three minutes. State law does not allow the Council to discuss or take action on issues not on the agenda, except that members of the Council or staff may briefly respond to statements made or questions posed by persons exercising their public testimony rights(Gov.Code Sec.54954.2). Staff may be asked to follow up on such items. Staff reports and other written documentation relating to each item referred to on this agenda are on file in the City Clerk's Office in Room 1 of City Hall. Kelvin B.Harrison. SLO, reiterated claims of discrimination and harrassment, 5 Council Agenda Tuesday, January 7, 2003 Action Update Klaus Schumann,26 Hillcrest Drive in Paso Robles(on behalf of SLO Green Party), submitted an informative packet about the dangers of High Level Radioactive Waste Storage at Diablo Canyon. PRESENTATION Mayor Romero presented the "Water Awareness Year"proclamation to Utilities Director Moss and Administrative Analyst Baesch. PUBLIC HEARINGS, CONTINUED 4. SAN LUIS GARBAGE COMPANY INTERIM YEAR SOLID WASTE RATE ADJUSTMENT APPLICATION. (MOSS/MUNDS —20 MINUTES) RECOMMENDATION: Adopt a resolution increasing solid waste rates by 2% for interim year 2003 to become effective on February 7, 2003. ACT10N: Resolution.No. 9406(2003 Series)adopted. (5:0) BUSINESS ITEMS, CONTINUED 5. COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF A RESOLUTION OPPOSING UNILATERAL PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ BY THE UNITED STATES (HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION) RECOMMENDATION: As recommended by the Human Relations Commission (HRC), adopt a resolution opposing unilateral preemptive military action against Iraq by the United States and direct staff to forward the resolution to federal officials. ACTION: Adopted Resolution No. 9407 (2003 Series). (4:1) (Schwartz opposed) COUNCIL LIAISON REPORTS (not to exceed 15 minutes) Council Members report on conferences or other City activities. Time limit-3 minutes. None. 6 Council Agenda Tuesday, January 7, 2003 Action Update COMMUNICATIONS (not to exceed 15 minutes) At this time, any Council Member or the City Administrative Officer may ask a question for clarification, make an announcement, or report briefly on his or her activities. In addition, subject to Council Policies and Procedures, they may provide a reference to staff or other resources for factual information, request staff to report back to the Council at a subsequent meeting concerning any matter, or take action to direct staff to place a matter of business on a future agenda(Gov. Code Sec. 54954.2). None. A. ADJOURN. 7 1 council agenba An CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO CITY HALL, 9 9 0 PALM STREET Tuesday, January 7, 2003 3:00 P.M. REGULAR MEETING Council Chamber 990 Palm Street NOTE EARLY START TIME CALL TO ORDER: Mayor Dave Romero PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE ROLL CALL: Council Members John Ewan, Ken Schwartz, Allen K. Settle, Vice Mayor Christine Mulholland, Mayor Dave Romero 3:00 P.M. PRESENTATION POLICE CHIEF OATH OF OFFICE. (PRICE/HAMPIAN — 15 MINUTES) CONSENT AGENDA The Consent Agenda is approved on one motion. Council Members may pull consent items to be considered after Business items. C-1. MINUTES OF TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2002 AND TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 2002. (PRICE) RECOMMENDATION: Waive oral reading and approve as presented. ® City Council regular meetings are broadcast live on KCPR, 91.3 FM and Charter Channel 20. The City of San Luis Obispo is committed to include the disabled.in all of its services,programs,and activities. Telecommunications Device for the Deaf (805)781-7410. Please speak to the City Clerk.prior to the meeting if you require a hearing amplification device. For more agenda information,call 781-7103. Council Agenda Tuesudy, January 7, 2003 C2. RESOLUTION OF SUPPORT FOR ALLOCATION OF PROPOSITION 50 FUNDS FOR SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY. (GEORGE/HAVLIK) RECOMMENDATION: 1) Adopt a resolution supporting the allocation of between $15 and $18 million to San Luis Obispo County from Proposition 50 bond proceeds; and 2) authorize staff to forward this resolution to the offices of Assemblyman Maldonado and Senator McPherson. C3. WATER REUSE PROJECT-AMEND DESIGN SERVICES CONTRACT. (MOSS/PIERCE) RECOMMENDATION: 1) Approve an addendum in the amount of $45,113 to the agreement with Brown and Caldwell for design of the Water Reuse Project. 2) Appropriate $45,000 from the Water Fund unreserved working capital to the Water Reuse Project CIP Design account. C4. LAGUNA LIFT STATION AND FORCE MAIN UPGRADE CHANGE ORDER, SPECIFICATION NO. 90006. (MOSS/HIX) RECOMMENDATION: 1) Approve the change order for $61,200 for changes to the Laguna Lift Station and Force Main Upgrade. 2) Authorize the City Administrative Officer to execute the change order.. C5. FINANCING FOR THE ENERGY CONSERVATION PROJECT. (MOSS/MUNDS) RECOMMENDATION: Adopt a resolution preserving the City's ability to enter into a Lease Purchase Agreement for approximately $3,000,000 to design and construct the approved Energy Conservation Project. C6. DOWNTOWN UTILITY PIPELINE IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS, SPECIFICATION NO.'S 90240 & 90261. (MCCLUSKEY/LYNCH/CORNEJO) RECOMMENDATION: 1) Approve the award to and execute a contract with Tierra Contracting, Inc. in the amount of $937,000 for"Water, Sewer and Stormdrain Improvement Project, Specification No. 90240" and authorize the Mayor to execute the contract. 2) Approve the transfer of $10,100 from the Prefumo Arm and Marsh Street Silt Removal Projects to the 90240 project account. 3) Approve the award to and execute a contract with Arthur's Construction in the amount of $628,938 for"Water and Sewer Improvement Project, Specification No. 90261" and authorize the Mayor to execute the contract. 4) Approve the transfer of $20,000 from the Railroad Square Lot Seal Project to the 90261 project account. 3 I I Council Agenda Tuesaay, January 7, 2003 APPOINTMENT Al. NOMINATIONS TO THE HOUSING ELEMENT UPDATE TASK FORCE. (MAN DEVILLE/HOOK—20 MINUTES) RECOMMENDATION: Appoint members to serve on the Housing Element Update Task Force by: 1) Accepting the nominations for twelve organization representatives, and 2) appointing individuals to fill the four at-large categories, either from the applications received or from names put forward by Council Members. BUSINESS ITEM 1. REVISED REGIONAL HOUSING NEEDS ALLOCATIONS. (MAN DEVI LLE/HOOK—30 MINUTES) RECOMMENDATION: 1) With respect to the January 8, 2003 SLOCOG meeting to consider revised housing need allocations, provide Council Member Schwartz with the following direction: a) endorse the 333 unit reduction in the City's housing need allocation based on revised jobs data as a percentage of total County employment, lowering the City's allocation from 5,450 to 5,117 dwellings; and b) endorse a proposed shift of 2,000 above moderate income housing units from the cities to the unincorporated County, further reducing the City's allocation from 5,117 to 4,383 dwellings, with the understanding that this shift will respect the general plans of the County and the cities and that most of the added dwellings will be developed on existing "lots of record"; and c) endorse the proposal by SLOCOG staff to count Cal Poly University housing toward meeting the City's housing needs based on the inclusion of Cal Poly employment in the City's job share, and on the impact the University has on the City's overall housing supply and demand. 2) Continue to work cooperatively with all SLOCOG agencies to effect statewide legislative reform in the regional housing needs determination process and in state growth policies. 3) Direct staff to work with the Housing Element Update Task Force and the Planning Commission to prepare a housing element that can hopefully achieve state certification based on the reduced housing need allocation and on respect for City General Plan goals. 4 Council Agenda Tuesaay, January 7, 2003 PUBLIC HEARINGS 2. TEXT AMENDMENT TO THE ZONING REGULATIONS CREATING STANDARDS FOR BED AND BREAKFAST ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE R-3,. R-4. AND AG ZONE DISTRICTS AND ASSOCIATED ENVIRONMENTAL_ REVIEW (NEGATIVE DECLARATION) (TA/ER 41-02); CITY-WIDE, CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO, APPLICANT. (MANDEVILLE/AZEVEDO —45 MINUTES) RECOMMENDATION: As recommended by the Planning Commission, introduce an ordinance 1) approving a negative declaration and 2) adopting development standards for bed and breakfast establishments in the R-3, R-4; and AG zone districts, based on findings. 3. A REQUEST FOR A DENSITY BONUS OF 58% TO ALLOW AN AFFORDABLE, SENIOR HOUSING PROJECT WITH 401-BEDROOM APARTMENTS; 2005 JOHNSON AVENUE, ARC 147-02. (MANDEVILLE/CODRON — 1 HOUR) RECOMMENDATION: Approve the request for a density bonus, subject to Architectural Review Commission review and approval of the project. 7:00 P.M. PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD FOR ITEMS NOT ON THE AGENDA(not to exceed 15 minutes total) The Council welcomes your input. You may address the Council by completing a speaker slip and giving it to the City Clerk prior to the meeting. At this time,you may address the Council on items that are not on the agenda or items on the Consent Agenda. Time limit is three minutes. State law does not allow the Council to discuss or take action on issues not on the agenda, except that members of the Council or staff may briefly respond to statements made or questions posed by persons exercising their public testimony rights(Gov.Code Sec.54954.2). Staff may be asked to follow up on such items. Staff reports and other written documentation relating to each item referred to on this agenda are on file in the City Clerk's Office in Room 1 of City Hall. PRESENTATION PROCLAMATION: WATER AWARENESS YEAR. (MOSS/BAASCH —3 MINUTES) 5 Council Agenda Tuesaay, January 7, 2003 PUBLIC HEARINGS, CONTINUED 4. SAN LUIS GARBAGE COMPANY INTERIM YEAR SOLID WASTE RATE ADJUSTMENT APPLICATION. (MOSS/MUNDS —20 MINUTES) RECOMMENDATION: Adopt a resolution increasing solid waste rates by 2% for interim year 2003 to become effective on February 7, 2003. BUSINESS ITEMS, CONTINUED 5. COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF A RESOLUTION OPPOSING UNILATERAL PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ BY THE UNITED STATES. (HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION) RECOMMENDATION: As recommended by the Human Relations Commission (HRC), adopt a resolution opposing unilateral preemptive military action against Iraq by the United States and direct staff to forward the resolution to federal officials. COUNCIL LIAISON REPORTS (not to exceed 15 minutes) Council Members report on conferences or other City activities. Time limit-3 minutes. COMMUNICATIONS (not to exceed 15 minutes) At this time, any Council Member or the City Administrative Officer may ask a question for clarification, make an announcement, or report briefly on his or her activities. In addition, subject to Council Policies and Procedures, they may provide a reference to staff or other resources for factual information, request staff to report back to the Council at a subsequent meeting concerning any matter, or take action to direct staff to place a matter of business on a future agenda (Gov. Code Sec. 54954.2). A. ADJOURN. 6 A CC ' C�uf1C'a,t� Statement on behalf of the SLO GREEN Party Public comment in front of the SLO City Council, January 7, 2003 by Klaus Schumann, 26 Hillcrest Drive, Paso Robles, Ca. 93446, (805) 238-4454.jayklaus@msn.com Active member of the SLO GREENS and chair of the SLO GREEN Party Committee on Nuclear Wastes at Diablo. Member of the SLO County Nuclear Waste Management Committee since 1996. The SLO GREEN Party submits an info packet about the dangers of High Level Radioactive Waste Storage at Diablo Canyon to the City of San Luis Obispo. We urge the Council to get involved in the PG&E license application process with the County and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. PG&E now plans to store 9times as much highly radioactive waste at Diablo Canyon than the plant was originally licensed for. Short of nuclear war, there simply is no greater conceivable man-made threat to this City and far beyond than this accumulation of.huge amounts of deadly.toxins at Diablo. The time has come, especially in light of 9/11 and the fact that the plant sits near an active earthquake fault, to carefully reconsider PG&E's plans at Diablo Canyon. Allow me to quote from an news article dealing with the ramification of potential fires or meltdowns in the waste pools, which are located with little protection outside the containment domes. Quote: " A catastrophic meltdown in the spent fuel pool of a nuclear power plant could cause fatal, radiation-induced cancer in thousands of people as far as 500 miles from the site, according to a US Nuclear Regulatory Commission study. The analysis of spent fuel pool meltdowns also states that millions of people within such a 500 mile zone might have to be evacuated for periods ranging from 30 days to one year AND that people living within 10 miles of a nuclear plant............................ might never be able to return to their homes." Unquote. [REPEAT] Most of the City of San Luis Obispo lies within 10 miles of Diablo, doesn't it? I continue the quote: " The extent of possible radiation damage described in the NRC documents is far more severe than anything that federal ........ ....... County or [utility] ......officials have disclosed in public forums or written statements mailed to thousands of residents........... ." The Associated Press reports in its New Year's poll that 2/3 of respondents in the US are worried that an attach on Iraq will bring an attack on the soil of the US. We now know that nuclear plants are on the list of primary targets of Al Queda. The SLO GREEN Party believes that your involvement is essential for the sake of public health and safety in the City of San Luis Obispo. [ distributed by SLO GREEN Party; wN w.slo.greens.org ] "NRC study warns of 500-mile radiation spread" By ROGER XN/=RSPOON THE JOURNAL NEWS (Original publication: November 10, 2002) A catastrophic meltdown in the spent fuel pool of a nuclear power plant could cause fatal, radiation- induced cancer in thousands of people as far as 500 miles from the site, according to a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission study. The analysis of spent fuel pool meltdowns also states that millions of people within such a 500-mile zone might have to be evacuated for periods ranging from 30 days to one year and that people living within 10 miles of a nuclear plant, such as Indian Point in Buchanan, might never be able to return to their homes. It also cites the potential for "prompt fatalities" from radiation poisoning that would occur in areas close to a plant site, where many radioactive particles would be expected to fall. The extent of possible radiation damage described in the NRC documents is far more severe than anything that federal, Westchester County or Indian Point officials have disclosed in public forums or written statements mailed to thousands of residents in Westchester, Rock-land, Putnam and Orange counties. The agency's assessments are contained in a special report prepared by experts within the NRC and the Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, N.M.,in October 2000 that was designated as an official NRC planning regulation in February 2001. A copy of the report was obtained by The Journal News. The study has been criticized by nuclear industry representatives who say it reflects a worst-case scenario based on unrealistic assumptions and ignores the effectiveness of plant safety systems. Michael Slobodien, director of emergency programs at the site for Entergy Nuclear Northeast, which owns Indian Point 2 and 3, said even if an accident did occur at Indian Point's spent fuel pool. the facility had the ability to control the situation and prevent the release of radiation into the atmosphere. "This is a generic report and is not applicable to Indian Point," Slobodien said. "It neglects the Indian Point design features, and I cannot accept the premise of a meltdown and fire in the spent fuel pool when it comes to Indian Point. Vou cannot set up a case where it can happen at Indian Point." Sandia laboratories maintain a computer simulation system that enables the NRC to predict the possible spread of radiation from any of the nation's 103 nuclear plants based on their location, geography and area population densities and the prevailing or seasonal weather patterns within hundreds of miles of the sites. Damage assessments - including the number of prompt fatalities, long-term cancers, affected population centers and durations of evacuations for specific areas - can then be estimated for any region of the country. Within 500 miles of Indian Point, there are nearly 82 million people living in the United States and 11 million in Canada. The report provides the basis for any future NRC regulations on evacuation needs, safety requirements and insurance and compares the possible damage caused by a .spent fuel pool meltdown with that of a meltdown in a fully operational nuclear reactor. It was developed to show the NRC what types of problems could occur in spent fuel pools when nuclear plants are shut down, at which point no new fuel rods would be placed in the pools, and how long they might pose a danger from a meltdown and fire. The potential spread of contamination cited in the report far exceeds the 10-mile zone the nation's nuclear plants currently utilize in developing emergency evacuation plans. NRC and Indian Point officials said the evacuation plans are intended to deal only with short-term radiation poisoning, which is not likely to occur outside the 10-mile zone. The report[V:"ns nulled from the NRC's public database following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks because, agency spokesman Neil Sheehan said, "if a terrorist decided to attack any plant in the U.S., not lust Indian Point, that is information about what fatalities it could cause, and the exact knowledge of that could be very advantageous to them." The information was returned to the database in April, however, because it is an official regulation governing spent fuel pool operations and must be accessible to plant operators. The report states that analysts did not base their findings on "events due to sabotage. No established method exists for estimating the likelihood of a sabotage event. Nor is there a method for analyzing the effect of security provisions on that likelihood." Instead, analysts examined various accident scenarios, ranging from worker mishaps to plane crashes into a .-,pent fuel pool building. The report.concluded that while the probabft, of such accidents is extremely low, the impact of a meltdown would be enormous. The protection and disposition of spent fuel is.a national problem. Every two years, plants such as Indian Point replace a third of the nearly 100 tons of fuel used in their reactors with new fuel. The spent fuel at Tndian Point 7 and 3 is stored in pools of water 40 feet deep, and both are nearing their storage limit. The federal government is develoning a netrnanent renository for spent fuel under Zucca Mountain in Nevada. which is expected to open around 2010. The uranium fuel used in reactors has a zirconium coating that nermitg nuclear reactiong to occur but helps prevent the fhei from literally bu ink atn and being disner'sed into the atmosphere. The coolinu water in the reactor and the spent fuel pools keen the temperature low enough that there is no danger of fire. The internal heat of the nuclear fuel drops over time; and.after about five vears spent fuel rods can be removed from the pools and stored in dry casks that are air cooled. Tt had been thought by plant oneramrg that there was little c_.hance of a 7irconitim fire in fitel that w2S ont of a reactor for at least five years. As a result, nuclear plant operators were not required to have emeraenev evacuation nlans for events involving snent fuel nools. even though the pools hold hundreds of tons of radioactive material. far more than is used in the reactors. The NRC was considering industry requests to reduce insurance requirements for pools containing only older fuel. But the report states that a zirconium fire still can occur 30 years after fuel rods are removed from a reactor. as significant an accident as a worst-case reactor-core meltdown and that the danger of cancer- causing radioactive contamination would not significantly decrease at least for that long. The report assesses the effects of a fuel fire that would be triggered if water were completely or partially drained from spent fuel pools. Cesium-137; which is among the radioactive particles that could be released into the atmosphere; is the primary cause of longi term cancers, according to the NRC study. In that regard, cesium-137 is more significant than radioactive iodine. Westchester, Rockland, Putnam and Orange county officials have distributed pills to residents living within 10 miles of Indian Point as a possible protection against thyroid cancer induced by the radioactive iodine. Current evacuation plans approved by the NRC for Indian Point are based on the premise that it would take several hours or days to reach the stage where a fuel fire would release radiation into the atmosphere. The agency's 2000 report states that a zirconium fire could erupt and begin releasing radiation within two to four hours after coater was completely or partially drained from a spent fuel pool. Charles Tinkler, a senior adviser in the NRC's office of research and co-author of the report's section on meltdown consequences, said the NRC studied the effects of contamination at Chernobyl in Ukraine, which suffered a catastrophic meltdown in 1986. There is a permanent exclusion zone extending about 35 miles around the site of the former reactor. A permanent exclusion zone also would be needed following such an accident at Indian Paint, Tinikler said. "I am not sure it would be comparable to the same radius as Chernobyl," Tinl ler said in an interview. "We would predict that persons would be excluded from that property for the duration if they live within the 10-mile, emergency-planning zone." Tom Hinton, a radiation ecologist at the University of Georgia's Savannah River Ecology Lab, said the extent of contamination from a meltdown depends on how high the contaminants are pushed into the atmosphere, local weather conditions and the type of radioactive isotopes involved. "At ChernobyL" he said, "there was contamination spread around the world, though the majority of it was within 300 kilometers or so. Contamination depends on local weather conditions,specifically rain. If a (radiation) cloud passes over you and it is not raining, you will not get as much contamination as if it were raining. Rain scavenges contaminants out of the air and deposits them locally. That is the reason for many hotspots that occurred around Europe after the Chernobyl accident." Some radiological isotopes, such as plutonium, swill stay where they land, Hinton said, while others travel through the environment contaminating plants and'waterways. Officials in the four counties around Indian Point conducted a mock evacuation drill of the 10-mile zone on Sept. 24 under the auspices of the NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency, which certifies emergency evacuation plans. Officials at the time said radiation leaking from the reactor would dissipate after about five miles and the evacuation plans would protect the public from any harmful radiation. Though the drill did not entail the scope of accident studied by the NRC and Sandia, Westchester County Executive :Mdrew, Spano last June hosted a briefing for about 80 municipal and school officials, where they were assured there was little danger of contamination if a meltdown occurred in the reactor. Herschel Specter, a consultant for Enterw, said that 90 percent of county residents were "not at radiological risk. They may be terrifie& but there is no clanger." Specter said a massive release of radiation would be of short duration and do little damage. Slobodien acknowledged last week that the emergency planning zone %vas designed to protect the public from acute health effects, but that "the latent effects of cancer can occur far beyond that." Concurring in that assessment was James Lee Witt, former director of FEMA under President Clinton. During his tenure, Witt approved the effectiveness of emergency plans for residents living near each of the nation's nuclear power plants. In an interview last week:, Witt said none of the plans deals with protecting residents from long-term radiation effects from a reactor or spent fuel pool accident. "If you are dealing with a meltdown at that level," Witt said, "you potentially have a threat to deal with that could reach beyond the 10 miles. I was aware of it. But our task:has been to look at the emergency preparedness in a 10-mile radius, and that is what we were looking at." Witt. now a private emergency management consultant, was given an 5800;000 contract by Gov. George Pataka to examine the effectiveness of the emergency plans for the 10 miles around Indian Point. His report is due in December. David Lochbaum, a nuclear safety anahst for the Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington, D.C., said that the argument that radiation couldn't go more than five miles or so "was never accurate." "If they put the correct information out there and involved the American public and got a majority of people to agree that only those 10 miles need to be protected, that would be one thing," he said. "But for a small group of people to make a decision behind closed doors is what the Kremlin used to do, isn t it?" Tinkier, who worked on the NRC report, said the study's estimates of possible fatal cancers was based on the conservative premise that a spent fuel pool fire would release up to nine times as much cesium-137 as the meltdown at Chernobyl, and that any dose of radiation above the normal background level for a region could induce cancer at some point. "It means our figures ... represent the upper bounce," Tinlder said. "But it is not beyond the physical limits of the material involved. It provides us an outside limit for planning." A decision on how many millions of people might have to be evacuated following a real spent fuel pool fire, he said, would depend on the cost of evacuation, and what is perceived to be an acceptable death rate. "The decision would depend on what level of radiation the government decided people could receive without a significant health effect," Tinkler said. "That means some acceptable increase in the risk of cancer." NOTE: Diablo Canyon has two spent fuel pools, which by 2006 will contain 2,648 spent fuel assemblies. Both pools have high density raclang and, under current PG&E plans, will stay at full capacity for as long as the plant operates, i.e..2025 or 2052 with re-licensing. [ distributed by SLO GREEN Party; www.slo.oreens.org J [ distributed by SLO GREEN Party; www.slo.greens.o b I ROBUST STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL: by Dr. Gordon Thompson, Senior Scientist at the INSTITUTE FOR RESOURCE AND SECURITY STUDIES, 27 Ellsworth Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, USA Phone: 617-491-5177 Fax: 617491-6904 Email: "mailto:irss(c-�,iac.ora", November 2002. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The 103 nuclear power plants operating in the USA contain massive amounts of radioactive material in their reactor cores. In addition, the reactors have discharged more than 43,000 tonnes of irradiated fuel, containing an amount of long-lived radioactive material that substantially exceeds the amount in the reactor cores. This irradiated fuel is commonly described as "spent fuel", because it is no longer suitable for generating fission power. Cumulative national production of spent fuel is likely to exceed 80,000 tonnes over the currently-licensed lifetimes of existing nuclear power plants. Most of the nation's spent fuel is now stored in high-density spent-fuel pools adjacent to the reactors, and the plant owners intend to continue using these pools at high density. As the pools become full, plant owners are building independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs)to accommodate the growing inventory of spent fuel. Present and proposed ISFSIs are generally at reactor sites, but away-from-reactor ISFSIs may be -established at Skull Valley, Utah, and elsewhere. In the USA, ISFSIs store spent fuel under dry conditions inside storage modules that are arrayed on concrete pads in the open air. This situation poses a very high risk to people and the environment, because the loss of water from a high-density pool will cause spent fuel in the pool to heat up, self-ignite,burn and release a huge amount of long-lived radioactive material — including tens of millions of Curies of the isotope cesium- 137—to the atmosphere. Water could be lost from a pool by evaporation, displacement, siphoning, pumping, a breach in the pool floor or wall, or overturning of the pool. These mechanisms could be exploited in various ways by knowledgeable and determined attackers, who could thereby create a pool fire that contaminates large areas of US territory with radioactive material. Nuclear reactors are also vulnerable to attack. A successful attack on an operating reactor would release large amounts of short- and long-lived radioactive material to the atmosphere. Knowledgeable and determined attackers could achieve this result in a variety of ways. The safe operation of a reactor or a spent-fuel pool depends upon the continuing availability of cooling water, electrical power and operator attention. By contrast, ISFSI modules are passively safe, because they are cooled by natural circulation of air. Nevertheless, these modules are not designed to resist a determined attack. Moreover; ISFSI modules are comparatively easy to attack,because they are stored in the open air in a closely-spaced array. Thus, nuclear power plants and their spent fuel can be regarded as predeployed radiological weapons that await activation by an enemy. The US government acts as if it were unaware of this threat. Responsibility for overseeing the security of civilian nuclear facilities has been delegated to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC). This agency has a longstanding policy of not requiring its licensees to protect their facilities against enemy attack, and has continued this policy with little change since the terrorist attacks of September?001. As a result, US nuclear facilities are lightly defended and are not robust against attack. This situation is symptomatic of an unbalanced US strategy for national security, in which offensive capabilities are assigned a higher priority than homeland defense. The lack of balance is a potentially destabilizing factor in the current international environment, because it could promote an escalating spiral of violence. Moreover, a weak defense of the homeland exposes US citizens to a variety of threats. In the case of nuclear facilities,the lack of defense exposes US citizens to the risk that an enemy will create widespread radioactive contamination. This report otTers a way forward in an important area of national defense. Specifically, the report articulates a strategy for providing robust storage of US spent fuel, where the word "robust" means that a facility for storing spent fuel is designed so as to be resistant to attack. Implementation of robust storage will be needed whether or not a repository is opened at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The proposed robust- storage strategy should be implemented as a major element of a four-component strategy for the security of each US civilian nuclear facility. The four components are: site security; facility robustness; damage control; and offsite emergency response. Together,these components would provide a defense in depth for each nuclear facility, within the context of national-security strategy that provides solid protection of our homeland. Figure 1 shows how robust storage of spent fuel would contribute to the national security of the USA. A strategy for nuclear-facility security will have as its objective the reduction of the risk of a release of radioactive material. In the case of a reactor, the risk can be almost completely eliminated by shutting down the reactor and removing its fuel. In the case of spent fuel, the risk can be reduced but can never be eliminated. A strategy for robust storage of spent fuel must be judged by the extent to which it - reduces risk. The strategy should assign the highest priority to reducing the highest risk The highest priority of a robust-storage strategy would be to re-equip spent fuel pools with low-density, open-frame racks, as was the case when the present generation of nuclear plants began operating. This step would prevent fuel from igniting and burning if water were lost from a pool. Fuel that can no longer be accommodated in the pools would be stored in ISFSIs. Each pool would centtn'»e*r^open»te at lo;:,density :�'b le its associated reactor remained operational,to provide storage space for fiiel discharged from the reactor. After storage in the pool for several years; to allow its level of radioactive-decay heat to decline,fuel would be transferred to an ISFSI. As a further measure of risk reduction,ISFSIs should be designed to incorporate hardening and dispersal. "Hardening" means that each fuel storage module would be shielded from attack by layers of concrete, steel, gravel or other materials. "Dispersal" means that fuel-storage modules would not be concentrated at one location,but would be spread more uniformly across a site. Hardening and dispersal of ISFSIs should not be conducted in a manner that encourages society to extend the life of an ISFSI until it becomes,by default,a repository. Therefore, a hardened ISFSI should not, unless absolutely necessary, be built underground. Also,the cost of implementing hardening and dispersal should be minimized, consistent with meeting performance objectives, and.the timeframe for implementation should be similarly minimized. These considerations argue for the use, if passible;of dry-storage modules that are already approved by the NRC and are in common use. The design of a hardened,dispersed ISFSI would be governed by a design basis threat(DBT). This report articulates a two-tiered DBT. The first tier requires high confidence that no more than a small release of radioactive material would occur in the event of a direct attack on the ISFSI by a TOW (anti-tank) missile, a manually-placed charge, a vehicle bomb, an explosive laden general-aviation aircraft or a fuel-laden commercial aircraft. The second tier requires reasonable confidence that no more than a specified release of radioactive material would occur in the event of a ground burst of a 10- kilotonne nuclear weapon at the ISFSI. An ISFSI design approach that offers a prospect of meeting this DBT involves an array of vertical-axis dry-storage modules at a center-to-center spacing of perhaps 25 meters. Each module would be on a concrete pad slightly above ground level, and would be surrounded by a concentric tube surmounted by a cap,both being made of steel and concrete. This tube would be backed up by a conical mound made of earth, gravel and rocks. Channels for air cooling would be inclined, to prevent pooling of jet fuel,and would be configured to preclude line-of-sight access to the dry-storage module. Figure 2 provides a schematic view of the proposed design. An alternative design approach might be used at a few reactor sites where space is insufficient to allow wide dispersal. In this approach,a number of dry-storage modules would be co-located in an underground, reinforced concrete bunker. Similar bunkers would be dispersed across the site to the extent allowed by the site's geography. At especially-constricted sites, it could be necessary to ship some spent fuel from the site to an ISFSI at another location. Any ISFSI, whether at a reactor site or an away-from-reactor site, should employ hardened, dispersed, dry storage. The design of an away-from-reactor ISFSI could, because the facility is entirely new, provide a degree of dispersal and a level of site security that may be difficult to achieve at some reactor sites. However,there are factors that argue against developing away-from reactor ISFSI: (i)overall transport risk would be increased,because fuel would be shipped twice before arriving at a repository; (ii)the massive amount of radioactive material concentrated at this ISFSI could provide an attractive target for an enemy; (iii)this ISFSI would not eliminate the need for at reactor ISFSIs; (iv)this ISFSI could become,by default, an unsafe repository; and (v)storage in this ISFSI could be more expensive than storage at reactor sites. Three major requirements must be met if a robust-storage strategy for spent fuel is to be implemented nationwide. First, full-scale experiments are needed to determine the ability of various dry-storage design approaches to accommodate various DBTs. Second, performance-based specifications for dry storage, addressing both short-and long-term risks, must be developed with stakeholder input. Third, robust storage of spent fuel must be seen as an important component of national security, to ensure that sufficient funding is available and robust storage is implemented quickly. NOTE: Diablo Canyon has two spent fuel pools, which by 2006 will contain 2,648 spent fuel assemblies.Both pools have high density racking and, under current PG&E plans,will stay at full capacity for as long as the plant operates, i.e. 2025 or 2052 with re-licensing. [ distributed by SLO GREEN Party; www.slo.greens.org ] I T'_.a .'L__a.._1 L_. CT C% 0""1+11%T T-__ - t ,__�.. i l 1JISMUULel1 U)' JLV l> MnJr.1\ Bills'; W W w.S110.gi eeus.ui'g l WnAI AtSUU 1 NMI r UEta' D IT MijoZiL l AL V't%AJG1 T) L..-a A1_...-._� ...._....1 .. A .]_.:_ aL_- Ti T\.:_,...a_...__a ,.rn___..._. � :_ Robe L.ruvarez served as a Senior�OI1Cy r►uvt�er III UIV US Department u1 1Sjier arld is C1 LT�1__i;._ - aal_<T:.,.«a a-, C__ til_1:',_. C•��...j_ now, a Jeillor aellola1 at U1C ll1JL1LULC_lul Policy Studies �LIISL pUD115RCU In I3UTLLl✓11 llV OFF 1 I1L AT V1Vlll JL1L1V 1 ISTI J, JA1V'.%I LISI(..22002 lJIILil receLIILiy,cCnl%,W IM awiiL a Latw"vii cOrrlmereiai nuclear power plaits 1vCuseu 11141Iuy VII uIL, vLilllL,tavulLy VL IL,a%,Lvj %,OrltaIIIIJA ,11L utululIaSa. BUL r111\,1L,at YVwk llcarpowcr p1GUItJ LILay Liav%. a 4vCYaw i inik-5pC11t 1UCI POIIUS. r C2WWI'S ULU LMIUC SLCCI VCS5Cl5 SULIOU11UCU Uy I1CdVy 5UUULWCS dllU CU[1La1111I1Cllt ULU1LLillgs, Says GoLdoil 1110illpso Y, se111U1 Scientist at We Institute fiA ACSULL(CC aiiu Security Studies. "Spent iiici pools, colittailiing SOinLe ofiiie l largest concentrations Of, radiOa C,vity On the plancL, earl catf li ilio and are in much,more vulnerable Ouildiriss."r uuuC CA..,:rl.. 1_r.- TL..W e_ ccTl__ a .a t--..,.al Ti... A L....a officials Stale 1 uolljpsorl S CUIICCIII. 1 111 not SV w0jiied aUVUL Lue core; 1 111 wOliled about tulle a r.._1 ---I " /+,;�. TT.L..--J _ rt 7 .1«.:1.7 aL- wir_.. 7 f---1\ Sper1L IUCI PUUI. %1Vv. ILVwalu Dean V1 veli110M LUIU U1c lvcw Yoflk Titles�iLvvclTlvcl Z_). "i ieie's vaRCaiiy IIV FIVLCCHOvlt Lu2r2." The pdIIds,ty:YiCaIIy;CC'LgUISLLlar Or LrShapeu Uasins aVOULL tV L\rVL uCCp,aTC 11164\ V1 r%ir vrCCu CUIICCCLC Walls four t^• live 1CCL ihick and S1d1UICSS SLCCI IIRCi'S. Basins WILILUUL SLCCI 11HIC1'S A1C '1 , ...,__ .. 1 �. .ra- _ r 1 -... ] 1.._.1. ,.: 11101C SUSUept1U1C LU UIUUILS dl1U cofkUs1ULY. 1V1USt Uf U1C SpC11t fuel Pollas ill OU111Ug WQLCI Icaut is are ilUUSCLL 1I1 realLor Uuiiuifigs several SLUtIeS ai)ove grUUUd. rOOiS al pieSSUrIZCU Water 1Gd.ULUIS- « .L• .a r n .1 ... ..:.a• Tl_. _ r 1T L AA..A . L - A representing about two-u iiuds of all punas-arc dial Lially yr linty erllbeuucu lit Hie grOtifiu, SvtileLirliCb 4UUve iiuuleiS Or l nderg1Ourld iuvriiS. r ire ana water Over►11e past 25 years, T hompson, a physicist and engineer, has Worked or,'Acilall Ui citizer, groups and State and'local governments tO Corivince nuclear regulatOrS III u1c UIULed JLatC3 WILL Europe,'--,SpeILL LUC pOvia pose Severe rIJAJ. TY1c IIlVSL Se11lJI1J 1l�&, i2 Says, LS iUSS 01 ale pvGi water ulat COViS auu biueius u1c LustuJ iauiva a"vc sperlL 1u21 asselmvlics. rr atcr ivss C,vuiu \,AvvaJ JpL.11t 1LL%,Il 1L,awiiS LV a QaLa UVFILIL, III%U wlul CviwCyuLilCCs pVLL.lula ly wvwL, Luau a 1. - • • TT r. - . . .... ... r -1 1. 1. 1: '1 Tr.i- r -1 1 Caciui 1UClulUWI1. LVIUSL U. J. ICiil:LU15 SLUIC SPCIIL 1UCL UI 111811 UCIISI Ly POOLS. 11 LIM IUCI WC►'C C1Cl1USCLL LU illl a[1LL steam,U1CZiIL'n1iil LLLYI C18UU111� WUtlld 1CGCL 197LUU1C11111C2U1y, l:altallllg lll8 al 1__:_a l nnn j_._____ n 1_'__ r._/ 1 1.]• 1_1 1_ l 1. ] al c_ . auuut l,ovv ucglcca %,elslus. A fuel pond building would probably but sw-vive, arlu Ule life WOuld likely spread t0 nearby pools. T ie INUUIeW neguiatory LviiI iSSiOU WILCUUCS Llial SUCII a lire carlilOt be e\Ui1rLiishe u, iL Cou1u rage for days. a c._/ _- a_ L 113t a T 1 r._. a - a «:. .i._ _ _: -• vu average:, Spew LUC, PVILUJ 11O1u Live LO jO times more tong-jived jadioactivily Blau a 1CM%oLOi coIC. I aliiCUlariy wVIIIS u1C is Uiv. iarse a111VLUIL 01 ceslu l i3', tri luVi pVi1LALS, w111V1i COnta-in .L....., �... �n«., cn :rl:.... «L a,...�„�,,..,. «,..... T7.« L-trl:r cin arty wuL iL "Vill 4v LV Jv I11IUIUI1"Ull%,J Of ulla L1QuScjvua isvLvilc. tiT I�a 11CL11-I11L,V1 aV Y%.aA3, cesium 137 gives off highly penetrating radiation and is absorbed in the food chain as if it were potassium. According to the NRC, as much as 100 percent of a pool's cesium 137 would be released into the environment in a fire. In comparison,the 1986 Chernobyl accident released about 40 percent of the reactor core's 6 million curies of cesium 137 into the atmosphere, resulting in massive off-site radiation exposures. A single spent fuel pond holds more cesium 137 than was deposited by all atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in the Northern Hemisphere combined. If a fire were to break out at the Millstone Reactor Unit 3 spent fuel pond in Connecticut,it would result in a threefold increase in background exposures. This level triggers the NRC's evacuation requirement, and could render about.29,000 square miles of land uninhabitable, .according to Thompson. Connecticut covers only about.5,000 square miles; an accident at Millstone could severely affect Long Island and even blew York City. A 1997 report for the NRC by Brookhaven National Laboratory also found that a severe pool fire could render about 188 square miles uninhabitable, cause as many as 28,000 cancer fatalities, and cost.$59 billion in damage. (The Brookhaven study relied on a different standard of uninhabitability than Thompson.) While estimates vary, "the use of a little imagination," says Thompson, "shows that a pool fire would be a regional and national disaster of historic proportions." Several events could cause a loss of pool water, including leakage, evaporation, siphoning, pumping, aircraft impact, earthquake,accidental or deliberate drop of a fuel transport cask, reactor failure, or an explosion inside or outside the pool building. Industry officials maintain that personnel would have sufficient time to provide an alternative cooling system before the spent fuel caught fire. But if the water level dropped to just a few feet above the spent fuel,the radiation doses in the pool building would be lethal. The procedures fuel handlers need to follow to recognize problems, repair heavily damaged equipment; and command off-site resources have yet to be formalized, much less tested. But if routine operations are any indication, not all reactors would pass muster. By the NRC's own admission, significant temperature rises in fuel ponds have gone undetected for days. Old policy, older problems Over the years, Thompson's persistence has paid off,and the NRC has grudgingly made important concessions. For 20 years,the NRC assumed that aged spe—t.ft4 which has had several years for radioactive isotopes to decay, was at little risk of catching fire. But in an October 2000 study of spent fuel risks at sites where reactors were being decommissioned,the NRC conceded that "the possibility' of a zirconium fire cannot be dismissed even many years after a final reactor shutdown". Equipment installed to make high-density ponds safe actually exacerbates the fire danger, particularly with aged spent fuel. In high-density pools at pressurized water reactors, fuel assemblies are packed about nine to 10.5 inches apart-slightly more than the spacing inside a reactor_ To compensate for the increased risk of criticality, pools have been retrofitted with enhanced water chemistry controls and neutron-absorbing panels between assemblies. The extra equipment restricts water and air circulation, creating vulnerability to systemic failures. If the equipment collapses or fails, as might occur during a terrorist attack, for example, air and water flow to exposed fuel assem'biies would be obstructed, causing a fire, according to the NRC's report. Heat would turn the remaining water into steam, which would interact with the zirconium, malting t.",c problem worse by yielding flammablc and cxplosivc hydrogcn. .A.s a result, the NRC concludes that"it is not feasible, without numerous constraints,to define a generic decay heat level (and therefore decay time) beyond which a zirconium fire is not physically possible." Perhaps the most important concession was made in June 2001, when the NRC staff reported that terrorist threats against.spent fuel ponds are credible and cannot be ruled out. "Until recently, the staff believed that the [design basis threat) of radiological sabotage could not cause a zirconium fire. However; (NRC''S safety policy for spent fuei storage] does not support the assertion of lesser hazard to the pubiie heaith and safety, given the possibie consequences of sabotage.- Despite a6mowiedging spent fuei pond dangers,the NXU's ability to adapt to a much more dangerous world remains to be seen. It took 1 U days after the September 11 attacks before the NKL. admitted that-nuclear power piants were not designed to withstand Ljet airimerl crashes.r Although this statement was widely covered by the media, the NRFC was just restating the results ofold policy. In 19V2, the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ruled that reactor owners`°are not required to design against such things as.kamikaze dives by large airplanes. Reactors could not be effectively protected against such attacks without turning them into virtually impregnable. fortresses at much higher cost."This view is buttressed by NRC's equally long-standing policy blocking consideration of terrorist acts in licensing proceedings. Because acts of terrorism are unpredictable, the NRC reasons, they are not germane to safety requirements. Incredibly,a day after the September t I attacks,the NRC ruled that concerns about terrorists raised by Georgians Against Nuclear Energy(GAME)regarding the mixing of plutonium in nuclear fuel at the Energy Department's Savannah River Site were not valid because"GAME does not establish that terrorist acts.. fall within the realm of`reasonably foreseeable' events." Running out of room The NRC is now reviewing from"top to bottom" its safety and security policies, "working around the clock to ensure protection of nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel facilities,"NRC spokesman Victor Dricks told the Washington Post on November 1. "Everything's on the table. I'd like to tell you that everything's going to be okay,but I can't do that. Will more gates, guards, and guns be enough? About 40,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel are stored in pools at 110 operating and closed reactor sites across the United States, with over 2 billion curies of long-lived radioactivity. Over the next several years, the Energy Department estimates that storage space for an additional 11,000 tons of spent fuel will be needed. Plant owners are already lobbying for more space. For example, Connecticut's Millstone plant has 585 fuel assemblies in its reactor Unit 3 pond. But Millstone's owner, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut Inc., wants permission from the NRC to expand the pool's capacity to hold 1,860 assemblies. Spent fuel ponds were designed to be temporary-and to store only a small fraction of what they currently hold. "Neither the ABC [now the Energy Department] nor utilities anticipated the need to store large amounts of spent fuel at operating sites," said Millstone's owner last October. "Large-scale commercial reprocessing never materialized in the United States. As a result,operating nuclear sites were required to cope with ever-increasing amounts of irradiated fuel... This has become a fact of life for nuclear power stations." The underlying assuription of NRC's policy allowing for expanded pool storage is that some day the government will permanently dispose of it all,as required under the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act. But the Energy Department will not accept custody of spent fuel until 2010 at the earliest-if at all. Even if Energy anis ttizi3usii aurniltiStiaiivn aic auic to vvcii:vlau iue tuiuiivauic G sitioit iv o hitt tl-le proposed repositut at i'iicca ivlo-artin IN evada, there could be Niw �----� p--pr,-- N y �. 'J_.._I_l, _:,t. L a_.___—_s:.. /.,,_-__ J C_t_: a� C1 1 �.. J'..:-4' a. cOrijiu�laut� pian ut uau5PUtuu�ututuands vi Shl: iciiu vi ilisiliy rauivautlYc w8�tc:. Storage JVIuliublIS In light of the NRC's admissions about spent fuel vulnerabilities, it seems it would be easier to cause an accident.at a spent fuel pond than to breach and release the radioactive contents of multiple hardened concrete and steel dry storage casks. Casks and other storage alternatives would greatly reduce,or even eliminate,the risk of a pond fire. A handful of reactor owners have put only about 4 percent of the nation's spent fuel into dry storage. Today,the pressure felt by reactor owners from electricity deregulation works against nuclear safety. According.to a report on utility deregulation and nuclear power by the Nukein Corporation,"In an era of deregulation there will be no pool of captive customers to shoulder uneconomic operating costs or massive capital additions"Because of deregulation,the owners of many reactors are limited liability companies with little or no cash reserves. There is no financial incentive to move wastes to safer dry storage_ Other nations are taking spent fuel vulnerabilities very seriously. Germany is seeking ways to harden its dry-stored spent fuel in even more robust containers. France has installed anti-aircraft missiles around its spent fuel ponds at the La Hague reprocessing facility, where some 100 million curies of cesium 137 are stored. What the United States will do to protect the public from this serious nuclear vulnerability remains to be seen. The permanent disposal of spent fuel from commercial reactors now-seems a greater abstraction than does a terrorist strike against a nuclear power plant.. Safely securing the spent fuel in crowded pools should be a public safety priority of the highest degree. If the events of September 1 I have t tight ,us anything, it is that the war against terrorism will be anunpredictable struggle. The coast of fixing Am.erca's nuclear:^alnerabilities may be high, but the price of doing too little is incalculable. NOTE: At Diablo Canyom there are currently about 1 700 assemblies stored in 2 pools By 2006 PG&E Flans to store a total of 2,648 assemblies in Diablo's two pools for as lona as the pla a oprMtes i.e. 2025 or 2052, if re-'.icensed. [ Distributed by SLO GREEN Party; www.slo:greens.org 1 , I Green Rart ­. of California SLD Green Parry•PO Boot 13244•San lie Obi,CA 93406 HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WAS= 8TORAGE AT DIABLO CANYON The Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant was originally designed, licensed and built to store 506 highly radioactive waste units, misleadingly ceiIIed 'spent' fuel assemblies, for about five years NOW, PG&E wants to store nearly 10 times as much at the Diablo site, which sits right on the coastline,just 10 aides away from the city of San Luis Obispo and only 3 miles from an active earthquake fault! . Worse, storage would last at least 30 more years or even indefinitely, depending upon construction of-'a national permanent repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada,which at this time, remains to be Conbwendal and in question. High-level radioactive waste ("spene fuel) is an extremely hazardous substance that would kt71 an unprotected person standing next to it in mere seconds. With every day of continued operation, Diablo produces more of this deadly waste that will remain toric for at be a quarter of a million years or 12,000 human generational According to studies by the US Dept. of Energy (DOE) and.Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), a catastrophic release of radioactivity into our air, water and sod could happen through big earthquakes, accidental dropping of storage/loading casks and sabotage/terrorists attacks. At worse, radioactive contamination of an area half the size. of Pennsylvania with countless human deaths and illness through radiation exposure is possible. Clean-up costs in such a case are estimated by the NRC to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars with years of evacuation of the afflicted areas. No other man-made calamity can even remotely match this ]kind of catastrophic disaster potential in our conuty. Under the new PG&E proposal 4;416 "spent" fuel assemblies would be stored at Diablo in dry casks and in already existing water filled pools. Each assembly contains the equivalent in long- lived radioactivity of 10 times the amount released by the Hiroshima Bomblr Total radioactivity would reach the staggering equivalent of 449160 Hiroshima Rombsl By 2006, when the pools are full, they will contain roughly 40 times the amount of Cesium-137 than was released in the Chernobyl accident and caused most of the off-site Contamination there? The pools have no containment protection and are vulnerable to terrorist attacks or sabotage. In October 2000, the NRC found that, in a worst-case scenario, as much as 100°X0 of the cesium-137 could be released into the environment Transporting these deadly wastes somewhere else is no solution. This would only contaminate new sites and spread the dangers of catastrophic radiation release to thousands of communities along the transportation routes throughout the United States. There is only one solation: Stop producing radioactive waste!l If it is done correctly, monitored dry cask storage at Diablo Canyon may be the least of evils- However, on-site storage must only be considered for the already accumulated high- level radioactive waste AND only if all SLO GREEN Party demands are met (see reverse)l We are also concerned that PG&E's bankruptcy could lead to a slackening of safety and environmental standards. .Hiroshima Bombs-are hough estimates developed by Dr. Marvin Pxmulwff of Radioactive Waste Management Associates and are used for comparison Purposes wily. Nuclear explosions cannot occur. Despite numerous requests, pG&E has not released exact statistics. Z Chernobyl comparison by Robert Alvarez,former senior policy advisor in the US Department of l�mergy For more info or to get involved contact Klaus @ 805/238-4454 or jayklam@msmLcom To contact the SLO GREEN Party: 805/545 38 or visit www.dozmms.org Green -:Party of C ` Afornia - SLO Green Party•PO Boa 13244•San Ems Obispo,CA 934o6 HIGH-LEVEL RADYOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE AT DIABLO CANYON In light of the terrorist attacks-of 9/11/01; AND given the fact that far too many lethal wastes have already accumulated in vulnerable storage pools; '= AND in consideration of dangers to populations along transportation routes; AND in acknowledgement of the rights_of people near potential dump sites; AND in light of recent studies of increased seismic dangers at the San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant near San Diego; the SLO GREEN PARTY demands: ➢ IMMEDIATE HALT TO ANY FURTHER PRODUCTION OF HIGH- LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE ➢ MAIQMUM MEASURES IN PLACE TO ASSURE PLANT SAFETY AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS ➢ IMMEDIATE HALT TO DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT CONSTRUCTION OF IMPENETRABLE CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES OVER THE EXISTING STORAGE POOLS AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF COOLING COMPONENTS ➢ EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF PROPOSED STORAGE CASKS AGAINST TERRORISM, SABOTAGE, EARTHQUAKE, OR ANY OTHER RISK ➢ NEW RISK ASSESSMENTS THAT INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR AND TERRORISM/SABOTAGE ➢ AN UPDATED, COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF SEISMIC DANGERS AT DIABLO FULL SCALE TESTING OF THE ACTUAL STORAGE CASKS ➢ FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ALL DIABLO RADIOACTIVITY DATA ➢ DISTRIBUTION OF POTASSIUM IODIDE TO SLO COUNTY RESIDENTS For more info or to get involved contact Klaus @ 805/238-4454 or jayklaus@msn.00m To contact the SLO GREEN Party: 8WMS-9838 or visit www.slo gmens org . � . o « 2 * � M $ ■ « . o � �Tk � ~ 7 , u ? § ■ 7 K c o 99rim \ \ � « § 2 2 . 0 Poo 2 w .2 « ') S 3 § CA 7-4 2 § 2 2 « u / o § 2 $ t © - Cl k % a , ® . > . ool ƒ < § '.4 in 2 G 2 $ I \ L7L e 0 '7 Cep, i�cL 0 �`I e G�4Lt�LIG1 L P-e- eci4 e� i 0 Oip PuLz 200E Li c-eptje. f 70') ZCcce Za 04,40,1-f b fir. hatili'4