HomeMy WebLinkAbout20140611_Civil-Minutes_Holland-RoeCase 2:14-cv-01520-RGK-MRW Document 25 Filed 06/11/14 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #:98
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 14-01520-RGK (MRWx) Date June 11, 2014
Title JANE ROE et al. v. CJTY OF SAN L UIS OBISPO et al.
Present: The R. GARY KLAUSNER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Honorable
Sharon L. Williams (Not Present) Not Reported N/A
Deputy Clerk
Court Reporter / Recorder
Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
Not Present Not Present
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) Order re: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (DE 13)
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Jane Roe and Kip Holland ("Plaintiffs") filed a Complaint on February 28, 2014. The
Complaint names as defendants the City of San Luis Obispo ("City"), the County of San Luis Obispo
("County"), and Cory Pierce ("Pierce"). The action arises out of Plaintiffs' interactions with Pierce, a
former peace officer of the San Luis Obispo Sheriff s Office. Plaintiffs allege that Pierce repeatedly
extorted them by threatening them with arrest if they did not obtain heroin and other narcotics for him.
Plaintiffs further allege that Pierece sexually assaulted Plaintiff Roe on multiple occasions. Plaintiffs'
Complaint lists five causes of action: (1) by Plaintiff Jane Roe for Violation of Civil Rights against
Pierce (Section 1983); (2) by Plaintiff Holland for Violation of Civil Rights against Pierce (Section
1983); (3) by Plaintiffs for Violation of Civil Rights against City and County (Monell Claims); (4) by
Plaintiffs for Extortion against Pierce and City; and (5) by Plaintiffs for Negligence against Pierce and
City.
Defendants City and County filed this Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on April 25,
2014. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This factual background is based on the allegations of the Complaint.
Plaintiffs first encountered Pierce in March of 2011.Officers from the Grover Beach Police
Department arrested Plaintiff Holland for possession of heroin during a traffic stop. The officers called
Pierce, who transported Plaintiff Holland to the San Luis Obispo Police Department. Plaintiff Holland
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was subsequently booked into jail.
After he was released, Plaintiff Holland noticed that his wallet was not among the items of
property returned to him. He left a message for Pierce, who returned his call and instructed him to pick
up the wallet at the San Luis Obispo Police Department. Plaintiffs drove to the Police Department.
Plaintiff Roe entered and Pierce returned the wallet. Pierce requested Plaintiff Roe's telephone number
and she gave it to him.
Pierce later called Plaintiff Roe and asked her to obtain prescription painkillers for him. Plaintiff
Roe declined, but Pierce persisted, calling her repeatedly until she agreed to obtain them. Pierce led
Plaintiff Roe to believe that Pierce would help Plaintiff Holland with his criminal charges if Plaintiff
Roe did what Pierce told her. Pierce directed Plaintiff Roe not to tell Plaintiff Holland, but Plaintiff
Holland found out. Pierce later demanded that Plaintiff Holland also obtain drugs for him.
In April of 2011, Plaintiff Holland entered a plea in his drug possession case. He was sentenced
to 20 days in jail as a condition of probation and ordered to probation upon release. However, Pierce
picked Plaintiff Holland up from jail early and told Plaintiff Holland not to report to probation. As a
result, Plaintiff Holland had almost no contact with his assigned probation officer and did not participate
in drug testing or treatment.
Pierce's demands increased as time passed. In addition to painkillers, Pierce demanded that
Plaintiffs obtain money and heroin for him. Pierce gave Plaintiffs information regarding police
investigations so that they would not be apprehended. Pierce also provided Plaintiff Roe with
methamphetamine.
In March of 2012, Pierce gave Plaintiff Roe placebo oxycodone pills and directed her to trade
the pills to drug dealers for painkillers.
Beginning in April of 2012, Plaintiff Roe spent approximately six weeks in a drug rehabilitation
program in Santa Barbara County. She got rid of her phone so that Pierce would be unable to contact
her. When she left the program and returned to San Luis Obispo, Pierce contacted her again and
demanded that she supply him with drugs. This caused Plaintiff Roe to relapse.
On numerous occasions, Pierce directed Plaintiff Roe to go to emergency rooms and falsely
describe symptoms in order to obtain painkillers. Pierce followed Plaintiff Roe from the emergency
rooms to pharmacies to insure that she complied with his directions.
Pierce threatened Plaintiffs with imprisonment if they did not comply with his demands. He
followed through on his threat by having Plaintiff Holland arrested for an alleged probation violation. A
judge ordered Plaintiff Holland to report to probation, but Pierce again told him that he would take care
of it. Pierce also made threats of violence, including telling Plaintiff Roe that he could make Plaintiffs
disappear.
Pierce used his position as a police detective and threats of arrest to force Plaintiff Roe into
engaging in sexual acts with him on two occasions.
In November of 2012, Plaintiff Roe was arrested for entering a commercial dwelling, burglary,
and grand theft. She was placed in custody at the San Luis Obispo County Jail.
In January of 2013, Plaintiffs reported Pierce's conduct to the FBI and began cooperating with a
federal investigation. Plaintiff Holland agreed to record his conversations with Pierce. The recordings
documented Pierce demanding that Plaintiff Holland buy and sell drugs for Pierce.
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On February 5, 2013, the FBI arrested Pierce. On March 1, 2013, Pierce was indicted in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California for bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B)
and extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. On July 8, 2013, Pierce pled guilty to extortion. On
December 9, 2013, Pierce was sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment. He began serving his sentence
on January 27, 2014.
III. JUDICIAL STANDARD
The federal pleading standard states in relevant part that "a claim for relief must contain ... a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court
must assume allegations in the challenged complaint are true, and construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.
1996). However, a court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences, unwarranted deductions of
fact, or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. See W. Mining Council v.
Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, a pleading must contain sufficient factual matter
that, if accepted as true, states a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). A claim is facially plausible when there are sufficient factual allegations to draw a reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants ask that the following claims be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6): (1) Plaintiffs' Third
Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Rights (Monell claim); (2) Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action for
Extortion against the City; and (3) Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for Negligence against he City. For
the reasons that follow, the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate.
A. Plaintiffs' Monell Claim
Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action alleges that Defendants City and County are liable under
Section 1983. Plaintiffs allege three bases of liability: (1) that Defendants "implicitly or explicitly
adopted and implemented careless and reckless policies, customs, or practices"; (2) that Defendants
"failed to provide sufficient training for Defendant PIERCE"; and (3) that Defendants failed to supervise
Pierce and other narcotics officers. (PIS' Compl. at IT 41-51.) The Court considers whether Plaintiffs
have stated a claim under any of these three theories below.
Plaintiffs Have Not Identified Any Policy, Practice, Or Custom
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' Complaint contains "no factual allegation of a practice or
policy at issue that was the moving force behind the alleged violations." (Defs' Mtn to Dismiss at 5-6.)
The Court agrees.
"[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by
its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Plaintiffs' Complaint does not specify any policy or custom of the City or County that deprived
Plaintiffs of constitutional rights. The Complaint only contains the general and conclusory allegation
that "Defendants CITY and COUNTY implicitly or explicitly adopted and implemented careless and
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reckless policies, customs, or practices." (Compl. at ¶43.) This general allegation is inadequate under
Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard. "A pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' [... ] Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
`naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement."' Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). By failing to specify
any policy or practice of the City or County, Plaintiffs have failed to discharge their obligation to
include sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim.
2. Plainti[fs' Naked Assertion That Defendants Failed To Train Does Not State A
Plausible Claim
"[T]here are limited circumstances in which an allegation of `a failure to train' can be the basis
for liability under § 1983." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). "[T]he inadequacy
of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." Id.
Plaintiffs' Complaint does not specify how Pierce's training was deficient. Instead, the
Complaint contains the naked assertion that Defendants "failed to provide sufficient training for
Defendant PIERCE." This allegation is inadequate to state a claim without further "factual
enhancement" regarding the content of Pierce's training.
Moreover, even if the Complaint contained additional factual allegations about deficiencies in
Pierce's training, it is implausible that Pierce's training was the "moving force" behind the
constitutional violations alleged. Most if not all of these violations were the result of alleged crimes
committed by Pierce, presumably for his own benefit. It is difficult to imagine a causal nexus between
the training Pierce received and the kinds of crimes he is alleged to have committed. See Lee v. City of
Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2001)(holding that "plaintiff must show that his or her
constitutional injury would have been avoided had the governmental entity properly trained its
employees.") (quotations omitted).
Finally, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts tending to show that Defendants' failure to train
amounted to deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' rights. By failing to allege any specific deficiencies in
Pierce's training, Plaintiffs have also failed to plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference" that Defendants' training evidenced deliberate indifference. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678; Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007) ("evidence of the failure to train
a single officer is insufficient to establish a municipality's deliberate policy.")
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have not alleged a claim under a failure to train theory of municipal
liability.
Plainti s Have Not Adeguately Pled Failure To Su ervise Or Rati tcation
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to supervise peace officers and "ratified and approved"
acts of "felonious dishonesty and crimes." (Compl. ¶ 44.) The Court finds that this theory of municipal
liability is not adequately alleged.
Plaintiffs' Complaint contains no factual allegations that would permit the plausible inference
that Pierce's supervisors knew of his conduct, let alone ratified it. Nor is there any allegation of similar
violations by other officers that would permit the inference that there was a systemic failure to supervise
that amounted to deliberate indifference.
For the above reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under Section
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1983 against the City or the County.
B. Plaintiffs' Neglieence Claim Against The City
Plaintiffs assert that the City may be held vicariously liable for Pierce's negligence. The sole
allegation in the Complaint directly pertaining to negligence states that "Defendant PIERCE owed a
duty of care to Plaintiffs and breached that duty by negligently and unreasonably extorting Plaintiffs
without legal justification." (Compl. at ¶ 59.) The Court finds that this allegation does not state a
cognizable claim because "negligent extortion" is not a tort.
Under the California Penal Code, "[e]xtortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear,
or under color of official right." Cal. Penal Code § 518. To be criminally liable for extortion, a
defendant must have the specific intent to commit the crime. See, e.g., People v. Franquelin, 109 Cal.
App. 2d 777 (1952). It is not clear whether California recognizes a tort of "extortion." California has,
however, "recognized a civil cause of action for the recovery of money obtained by the wrongful threat
of criminal or civil prosecution." Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1136 (C.D. Cal.
2009) (citing Fuhrman v. Cal. Satellite Sys., Inc., 179 Cal. App. 3d 408, 426 (1986)). However
Plaintiffs' claim is denominated, either as the tort of duress, wrongful threats, or extortion, it is clear that
it is an intentional tort. As such, Pierce could not have committed the tort negligently.
Moreover, none of the allegations in the Complaint state a claim for negligence by Pierce. The
Complaint appears to allege only intentional conduct by Pierce. The Complaint explicitly asserts that
"Defendants, and each of them, did the acts and omissions hereinafter alleged in bad faith and with
knowledge that their conduct violated well established and settled law." (Compl. ¶ 10.)
Because the Complaint does not state a claim for negligence, dismissal of the Fifth Cause of
Action against the City is appropriate.
C. Plaintiffs' Extortion Claim Against the Ci
Plaintiffs asserts a cause of action for extortion against the City based on a theory of respondeat
superior. Defendants contend that they are immune from suit because California has not waived
immunity for these torts. The Court agrees.
California Government Code § 815 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute: (a)
A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the
public entity or a public employee or any other person." Plaintiffs, citing Government Code § 815.2,
assert that the City can be held vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat superior. The Court
disagrees.
Section 815.2(a) of the Government Code provides that "[a] public entity is liable for injury
proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his
employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action
against that employee or his personal representative." (Emphasis added). To adequately state a basis for
liability under Section 815.2, Plaintiffs must allege facts showing that Pierce's torts were within the
scope of his employment. Plaintiffs have failed to do so.
Under California law, "an employer will not be held vicariously liable for an employee's
malicious or tortious conduct if the employee substantially deviates from the employment duties for
personal purposes." Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992, 1004-05, (1995). "[I]f
an employee's tort is personal in nature, mere presence at the place of employment and attendance to
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occupational duties prior or subsequent to the offense will not give rise to a cause of action against the
employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior." Id. at 1005 (quoting Alma W. v. Oakland Unified
School Dist., 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 139 (1981). "In such cases, the losses do not foreseeably result from
the conduct of the employer's enterprise and so are not fairly attributable to the employer as a cost of
doing business." Id.
Plaintiffs allege that Pierce made express and implied threats with the intent to extort money and
drugs from Plaintiffs. The allegations in the Complaint make it clear that Pierce did not obtain the
money or drugs to further the objectives of the police department. Pierce's extortion of Plaintiffs
represented a "substantial deviation" from his duties. As such, the Court believes that the City cannot be
held vicariously liable for Pierce's extortion.
V. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion. The Court dismisses Plaintiffs'
Third and Fifth Causes of Action. The Court dismisses Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action against the
City.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Initials of Preparer
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