Loading...
02-16-2021 Advance Item - After Action Review Council Agenda Report Department Name: Police Cost Center: 8001 For Agenda of: February 16, 2021 Placement: Business Estimated Time: 120 Minutes FROM: Jeff Smith, Interim Chief of Police Prepared By: Fred Mickel, Acting Captain SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REVIEW OF THE JUNE 1, 2020 PROTEST RECOMMENDATION Receive and file the After-Action Review of the June 1, 2020 Protest. DISCUSSION On June 16, 2020, Chief Cantrell gave a special presentation to the City Council regarding the community’s request for information regarding the events on June 1, 2020. In response to questions, the City Manager directed the Police Department staff to prepare an After-Action Review (AAR) (Attachment A). The focus of this AAR was the events of the June 1, 2020 protest, including protestors marching on Highway 101 and law enforcement using Chloroacetophenone (CN) gas, commonly referred to as “tear gas”. The AAR thoroughly reviewed the event and considers what happened, why it happened, what can be done in the future to possibly avoid similar outcomes and “lessons learned” to improve overall safety in supporting free speech events. The mechanism most widely utilized by the police for understanding critical incidents or events are “After Action Reviews” (AAR’s) or “Critical Incident Reviews” (CIR’s). They are fundamental to the development of a healthy, accountable, and community-engaged police department. Honest and self-critical reviews of the various critical incidents or events that the police are charged with resolving or managing is essential to maintaining the public’s trust and confidence in the local governmental entity paid to protect it. The San Luis Obispo Police Department (SLOPD) routinely conduct CIRs and as such it was determined they would conduct the AAR of the June 1, 2020 protest. This AAR was guided and reviewed by Chief James Bueermann, who is nationally recognized for his extensive work with AAR’s. Additionally, an independent consultant, Kari Mansager, was utilized to conduct the community review portion of the AAR. Mr. Bueermann supervised numerous critical incident reviews and police reform efforts involving some of the most noteworthy policing incidents in America. A few of these incidents include: the civil unrest in Ferguson, MO; the “Christopher Dorner Incident”; the Stockton, CA bank robbery in which a hostage was inadvertently killed by police; the Pulse Nightclub mass shooting in Orlando, FL; and the husband-wife terrorist mass shooting in San Bernardino, CA. Bueermann also founded Future Policing Strategies, a California-based consultancy that helps Packet Page 1 practitioners, policymakers, and community members envision and advance policing for the future. Kari Mansager, Director of Diversity, Inclusion, and Outreach at Cal Poly San Luis Obispo and independent consultant was selected by Chief Bueermann, to conduct the community review portion of the June 1, 2020 protest AAR. Mansager’s report (Attachment A) serves as a stand- alone addition to the San Luis Obispo Police Department’s AAR. Conducting this AAR is indicative of SLOPD’s commitment to develop as a “learning organization” that is continually focused on improving it policies, procedures and practices and anchoring on-going learning to its organizational culture. Background The first step of this AAR was to gather background information and consider the precipitating events that led up to the outcome on June 1, 2020. Next was the exploration of the information gathering which led to the Police Departments' pre-event planning and preparation. Through this information, the Police Department developed an operations plan in preparation for the protest planned for June 1. This was largely based on past major events in the City of San Luis Obispo. As part of this process, the department collected as many documents, videos, media reports, and police reports that were publicly available to begin to initiate the review for the AAR. With this information, an event summary was created to outline the protest from when it began at approximately noon to the conclusion at 9:42 pm. Kari Mansager, conducted the community review portion of the AAR, conducting eleven (11) interviews with June 1st protestors to obtain their unfiltered views, perspectives, and recommendations. The AAR team shared honest perceptions and researched and considered best practices. Additionally, they discovered areas that could be improved on and considered community input through the work of Ms. Mansager. The team identified action steps to ensure peaceful protests in the future; and to lessen the likelihood that future protests would result in the use of chemical agents, and less lethal munitions as a means of dispersal. The final part of the AAR is the identification of issues where the San Luis Obispo Police Department could improve. There are ten (10) action items identified in this area, many of which align with the input and recommendations made during Ms. Mansager’s interviews and have already been implemented. Examples include a lack of proper equipment to make a loud enough announcement during the protest which has been resolved with the purchase of a Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD). Another identified issue was the body worn camera batteries only having a 7-8 hour run capacity on intermittent use, constant use is 3 hours max. New body worn cameras were just approved for purchase by the City Council that have replaceable batteries and run capacity issues should be mitigated. Prior to finalizing the AAR, Chief Bueermann reviewed the pertinent media reports, Ms. Mansager’s report, spoke with the Interim Police Chief and the SLOPD staff member responsible for conducting the review, and determined that the AAR meets the generally accepted criteria. Packet Page 2 Lastly, while the City conducted its own AAR, on September 28, 2020, an advisory board convened by Governor Newsom released a study titled “Protecting and Facilitating the Right to Engage in Peaceful Protests and Demonstrations" (Attachment 4 within Attachment A) and SLOPD is actively reviewing and evaluating this study and its recommendations. Many of the preliminary recommendations in this study are already being followed and/or implemented by the San Luis Obispo Police Department. Other recommendations which require subsequent action by the state legislature, or the Police Officers Standard Testing (POST) will be monitored and integrated as appropriate once adopted. Previous Council or Advisory Body Action On June 16, 2020, Chief Cantrell gave a special presentation to the City Council regarding the community’s request for information regarding the events on June 1, 2020. The City Manager directed the Police Department staff to prepare an After-Action Review (AAR) (Attachment A). Policy Context The City does not currently have any policies that govern After Action Review. Public Engagement For the After-Action Review (AAR), an independent consultant Kari Mansager conducted anonymous interviews with community members to create a safe space for protest participants and community members to provide reactions, perspectives and recommendations based on their experiences. In addition to her consulting role, Mansager is director of Diversity, Inclusion and Outreach at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. Prior to the City Council’s February 16th meeting, the Police Department will review the report with representatives from numerous community organizations through its “Police and Community Together” (PACT) program and SLOPD Roundtable. PACT organizations include Transitions Mental Health, St. Stephen's Episcopal, Tranz Central Coast, Diversity Coalition of SLO County, Central Coast Commission for Inclusive Schools, JCC Federation of SLO County, Women's March SLO, People of Faith for Justice, Elevate Christian Church, GALA, and the Anti-Defamation League. The Roundtable includes representatives from a broad array of community interests, from business to healthcare to industry. Additionally, on February 4, the City is releasing the After-Action Review report by the San Luis Obispo Police Department to the community. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW The California Environmental Quality Act does not apply to the recommended action in this report, because the action does not constitute a “Project” under CEQA Guidelines Sec. 15378. FISCAL IMPACT Budgeted: N/A Budget Year: Funding Identified: N/A Packet Page 3 Funding Sources Total Budget Available Current Funding Request Remaining Balance Annual Ongoing Cost General Fund $ State Federal Fees Other: Total $ It is estimated that Police Department personnel committed approximately 300 hours to prepare the After-Action Review. James Bueermann was paid $7500.00 for his services consulting on the After-Action Review. There is no fiscal impact on the City’s General Fund associated with receiving and filing the AAR. Any cost resulting from implementing recommendations included in this After-Action Review can or have been absorbed in the Police Department’s budget. ALTERNATIVES Council may direct staff to conduct further analysis or collect other information to incorporate into the After-Action Review. Attachments: a - Response to the June 1 2020 Protest AAR Packet Page 4 CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO RESPONSE TO THE JUNE 1, 2020 PROTEST AFTER ACTION REVIEW Community Interviews Conducted by Kari Mansager San Luis Obispo Police Department Packet Page 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 Executive Summary Page 2 After Action Review Report Page 4 Appendix A - Definitions Page 23 Appendix B - KCOY Interview with Chief Cantrell Page 23 Appendix C - Summary of Calls Received by Dispatch Page 24 Appendix D - Tactical Deployment Page 26 Appendix E - Event Information Page 27 Appendix F - Safety Order Advisement Page 28 Appendix G - Unlawful Assembly Advisement Page 28 Appendix H - Videos of Protest From Media Sources Page 29 Appendix I - Video Review Page 30 Appendix J - Protest Route and Timeline Page 35 Community Interviews Attachment 1 Methodology Attachment 2 State Task Force Recommendations Attachment 3 Bueermann Review of AAR Attachment 4 Packet Page 6 The San Luis Obispo Police Department believes that After Action Reviews (AAR) are critical to organizational learning and to strengthen responses in an evolving and increasingly complex operating environment. By honestly reflecting on past experiences, our organization can anticipate emerging challenges, incorporate promising practices, and work collaboratively to evolve and prepare for future events. We also believe that instilling a culture that encourages continuous learning through the assessment and identification of best practices and lessons learned is vital to ensuring first responder and community safety and building effective responses to major events in our City. The focus of this AAR is to discover and review the events of June 1, 2020 that led to the crowds taking the freeway and the necessity for law enforcement to use Chloroachetophenone (CN) gas (tear gas), why it happened and how to sustain strengths and improve on weaknesses. (Appendix A) This AAR involves all team members sharing honest and open perceptions and best practices and lessons learned and creating action steps to ensure peaceful protests in the future; and to lessen the likelihood that future protests would result in the use of chemical agents, and less lethal munitions as a means of dispersal. To produce an AAR that adheres to the highest industry standards, an independent expert was brought in to review and make recommendations for this report. In August 2020, James Bueermann was hired. Bueermann is nationally recognized for his extensive work with AAR’s. He has supervised numerous critical incident reviews and police reform efforts involving some of the most noteworthy policing incidents in America. A few of these incidents include: the civil unrest in Ferguson, MO; the “Christopher Dorner Incident”; the Stockton, CA bank robbery in which a hostage was inadvertently killed by police; the Pulse Nightclub mass shooting in Orlando, FL; and the husband-wife terrorist mass shooting in San Bernardino, CA. Bueermann also founded Future Policing Strategies, a California-based consultancy that helps practitioners, policymakers, and community members envision and advance policing for the future. In mid-August 2020, Kari Mansager, an independent consultant, was asked by Bueermann to conduct the community review portion of the June 1st, 2020 protest After Action Review. Mansager’s report (Attachment 1) serves as a stand-alone addition to the San Luis Obispo Police Department’s After Action Review. The purpose of the interviews was to obtain the views, perspectives, and recommendations from the community. Mansager’s report is based on interviews with eleven (11) community members who have been given alias names and for some, no identifiable demographic information, to protect their privacy and safety. She identified individuals to be interviewed based on print and social media accounts of the protest. Manasager also conducted additional interviews with those referred by the original individuals interviewed. This report was also reviewed by James Bueermann. The first step of this AAR was to gather background information and look into what were the precipitating events that lead up to the outcome on June 1, 2020. The main precipitation event was a protest that occurred on May 31, 2020, that turned into a march that was not planned by the original event organizers. Next was the exploration of the intelligence gathering which lead to the Police Departments' pre-event planning and preparation. The intelligence gathered through social media, public tips, and various other sources indicated that this was not going to be a peaceful protest. Through this intelligence, the Police Department developed an operations plan in preparation for the protest planned for the next day. This was largely based on past major events the City of San Luis Obispo had experienced. 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Packet Page 7 The protesters only had one way to disperse which was to turn around and go back, this is difficult for crowds. No city personnel had a relationship with the group protesting and thus no way to communicate with them. Lack of proper equipment to make a loud enough announcement. Received feedback during independent interviews about early appearance of officers in riot gear during a peaceful protest. Lieutenants needed in the field overseeing the tactical operation. There was insufficient sworn staffing to prevent protesters from entering the freeway. There was insufficient civilian support staff to assist with traffic control during events. Mutual Aid agencies assisting self-deployed and lacked sufficient direction from Command Post. Lacked drone pilots and batteries for equipment to staff lengthy event. Body-worn camera batteries have a 7-8 hour run capacity on internment use, constant use 3 hours max. Cameras must be docked to recharge. As part of this process, the department collected as many documents, videos, media, and reports that were available to us through the investigation. With this information, an event summary was created to outline the protest from when it began at approximately noon to the conclusion at 9:42 pm. The protest started at Mission Plaza and almost immediately it became a march that occupied the streets of the City of San Luis Obispo. The protest evolved and protesters entered Highway 101 and blocked traffic. The Police Department in working with the California Highway Patrol, organized a line of officers who eventually guided the protesters off the freeway. The protest once again occupied the Downtown area of the City for several more hours. Information was gathered during this time that the protesters were going to make another attempt for the freeway. At approximately 6:11 pm a line of officers halted them at Santa Rosa and Walnut, to deny access to the freeway. Because of the dangers of entering the freeway again and the protestor's refusal to turn around and not continue toward the freeway, numerous safety dispersal orders were given which deemed the protest an illegal assembly. When the protestors would not disperse as directed, a plan was developed to move the protesters south on Santa Rosa away from the freeway. This was done by instructing the line of officers to move forward to cause the protesters to disperse south on Santa Rosa. This action was met with resistance and several of the protesters began throwing water bottles, rocks, and fireworks at the officers. Several protesters were arrested for failing to disperse and officers used less lethal options in an attempt to stop the projectiles and to disperse the protesters. When this failed to disperse the crowd, resistance increased and there was great concern for the safety of the officers; two canisters of teargas were then deployed in front of the protesters and the line of officers were ordered to move forward. Shortly thereafter, the line of officers moved to Santa Rosa and Peach at which time the majority of the protesters had dispersed and left the area. The final and most important part of this document is the identification of issues where the San Luis Obispo Police Department could improve. There are ten (10) action items identified in this area. These action items were developed through this AAR and through public interviews that were conducted independently by Kari Mansager. These items are listed and outlined as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Since identifying these areas, many of the issues have been addressed and changes implemented.. For details on the recommendation and implantation of these areas of improvement see pages 23-24. 4Packet Page 8 The San Luis Obispo Police Department is also intimately aware and has educated itself regarding Governor Newsom’s advisory board on “Protecting and Facilitating the Right to Engage in Peaceful Protests and Demonstrations" provided on September 28, 2020 (Attachment 3). SLOPD is actively monitoring this study and its recommendations. It is worth noting that many of the preliminary recommendations in this study are already being followed and/or implemented by the San Luis Obispo Police Department. 5 BACKGROUND Some of the most significant changes to law enforcement and public safety responses to incidents are the result of thoughtful and post-incident critical reviews. After Action Reviews (AAR) have contributed to important national-level discussions about law enforcement strategies and tactics during these events. Nationwide, law enforcement agencies and their public safety partners are increasingly challenged by complex crisis events. It is incumbent upon first responder agencies to use every available opportunity to identify best practices and lessons learned to continue to enhance their ability to respond. AARs do increase the department's transparency and accountability. Developing the habit of conducting AARs and reviewing incident response as regular practice as part of organizational culture helps us better prepare for future incidents. This document was written using the methodology recommended by the in the National Police Foundation "How to Conduct an After Action Review" report (Attachment 2). The Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests in 2020 were an ongoing series of protests and civil unrest that began in Minneapolis on May 26, 2020. The protests began in response to the death of George Floyd, a 46-year-old black man who was killed during an arrest when Derek Chauvin, a Minneapolis Police Department officer, knelt on Floyd’s neck for over eight minutes as other officers looked on. Chauvin and the other officers involved in the arrest which led to Floyd’s death were later arrested. This killing was a breaking point for many community members about the injustices perpetuated on people of color by law enforcement. The civil unrest began with local protests in the Minneapolis, Saint Paul metropolitan area of Minnesota, then quickly spread nationwide in over 2,000 cities and towns and over 60 countries internationally in support of the Black Lives Matter movement. While most of the protests have been peaceful, demonstrations in some cities escalated into riots, looting, and clashes with law enforcement. San Luis Obispo is a community that has been and continues to be actively involved in local, state, and national matters, and the advance information received regarding this protest was not unexpected, nor alarming. The Police Department has been involved with numerous large events including parades, peaceful protest, rallies, large marches and other community events. The City and the Police Department have worked over the past five years to develop and maintain an open and consistent relationship with the community, special interest groups, and marginalized communities. They also work with various organizations to ensure their ability to exercise their constitutional rights in the city peacefully and safely. With these relationships in mind and the information about the local upcoming protest on May 31, San Luis Obispo Police Chief Deanna Cantrell interviewed with a local news station (KCOY) on May 29. In this interview, which is referenced in the appendix (Appendix B), Chief Cantrell wanted to reassure the community that the Police Department was working hard locally to ensure the safety of protesters and all community members while facilitating the peaceful exercise of free speech rights. Packet Page 9 6 On May 29, 2020, the Police Department learned there was a protest scheduled for Sunday, May 31 consistent with sentiments being expressed across the country. The group that organized this protest was RACE Matters SLO, which is a private citizen group that was working together with local organizations such as Woman’s March SLO to coordinate this event. This was a non-permitted event, that was scheduled from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm at Mitchell Park. The protest was anticipated as a rally to be contained in the perimeter of Mitchell Park. The following was the intent of the rally which was posted on the RACE Matters social media page, “We stand together against anti-Black terror and pledge action against ongoing violence and injustice against Black and Brown people in America. Rally 1-2 pm, ending with 8 minutes and 46 seconds of silence. Masks and 6 ft distancing requested. Bring masks and signs. Peaceful Rally." PRECIPITATING EVENTS Packet Page 10 The San Luis Obispo Police Department’s Command Staff was tasked with developing the Tactical Deployment schedule for this protest. Planning for this upcoming event was conducted similarly to past events. The goal of the San Luis Obispo Police Department was to maximize the safety and Constitutional rights of the citizens, event participants, and employees on duty. The plan consisted of adding additional officers from Patrol, Motors, Plainclothes, Bikes, and Emergency Response/ Mobile Field Force Teams dedicated to the event. In anticipation of potentially large crowd size in excess of 500 people, based on the protest the day before, resources from the Pismo Beach, Morro Bay, Grover Beach, Santa Maria, and Atascadero Police Departments, the San Luis Obispo County Sheriff’s Office (SLOSO), and the Department of Corrections were also utilized.The San Luis Obispo Police Department has used mutual aid from allied Law Enforcement agencies for prior large-scale events including the SLO Women’s March, Mardi Gras and Cal Poly Open House. On May 31, 2020, at approximately 1:00 pm a peaceful rally began in Mitchell Park, with approximately 1,000 in attendance. Over the next hour, there were several guest speakers, and the rally was peaceful and stayed contained within the park. The rally ended at approximately 2:00 pm and the crowd began to disperse. As the crowd was dispersing a secondary group began marching through the crowd soliciting those in attendance of the rally to now march through the city streets of San Luis Obispo. This group eventually swelled to approximately 500 people and they began marching in the streets throughout downtown. Even though the protesters marched in the roadway, ignoring traffic laws and impeding vehicular traffic through much of the downtown, they were mostly peaceful and generally followed the directional orders of the Officers on-scene. Additionally, Chief Cantrell marched with the protesters for many blocks and was able to contact and open up communications with individuals who appeared to have leadership roles in the group. She was able to negotiate with them to stay off Santa Rosa Street due to the disruption to city services, public safety, and emergency vehicular traffic. The protestors pushed past officers at Higuera and Nipomo, but through negotiations with Chief Cantrell, did not get on Highway 101, and turned to Marsh on Carmel Street. This protest concluded without any further issues. 7 INTELLIGENCE On that day, the San Luis Obispo Police Department began receiving information that another protest was being planned for the following day, June 1, 2020. However, unlike the protest on May 31, 2020, this event was not organized by RACE Matters SLO and the information being circulated on social media regarding the event was warning people that this protest was going to potentially lead to criminal activity. This information came from various sources. SLOPD was urgently trying to identify the organizer of the protest, however, had difficulty because no one person or group was claiming leadership of the event. Some of the initial information was received by the SLOPD's School Resource Officer. This officer was contacted by the San Luis Obispo High School administration who informed SLOPD they had information regarding the upcoming protest. The information provided related to a concerning Facebook post by a student which stated that the protest on June 1st had the potential for criminal activity. The San Luis Obispo Police Department was also gathering intelligence via several social media posts indicating this protest was not going to be peaceful. Below are some of the examples found on social media on May 31, 2020. One of the social media posts was promoting looting, while the other warned “real protesters” to stay home because people are coming to incite a riot. Packet Page 11 8 Along with the intelligence being gathered by the police department, the San Luis Obispo Dispatch Center was receiving calls regarding information citizens were reporting about potential civil unrest at the upcoming protest on June 1, 2020. A summary of calls dispatch received leading up to the June 1, 2020, protest was prepared for this report (Appendix D). PRE-EVENT PLANNING AND PREPARATION On May 31, 2020, recognizing the importance of planning and preparation in advance of a major event, the San Luis Obispo Police Department transitioned to a tactical deployment schedule, which results in officers working alternating 12 hour shifts (Appendix E). This decision was made based on credible threats of violence, looting, and rioting received. For the protest on June 1, 2020, Police Department Command Staff was tasked with developing the operations plan. Due to the success of the May 31st event, the planning for this event was similar in personnel deployment with the same mindset to maximize the safety of the citizens, event participants, and employees on duty. Given the last-minute nature of this event being created this operation mainly consisted of personnel from SLOPD and the Department of Corrections. Packet Page 12 There were 46 personnel assigned to the event. Other than the Department of Corrections, there was no request made for additional resources from any other law enforcement agency. A county-wide advisement regarding the pending protest set for June 1, 2020, was made so that allied agencies would know that the event was taking place.The plan was to deploy Patrol Officers, Motor Officers, Plainclothes Officers, Bicycle officers, and a dedicated Emergency Response/ Mobile Field Force Teams to the event. Additionally, the San Luis Obispo Sheriff’s Office (SLOSO) and the California Highway Patrol (CHP) advised SLOPD that they had teams standing by if extra personnel were needed (Appendix E). On June 1, 2020, an unpermitted protest occurred which quickly became volatile, confrontational, and unorganized Protestors marched on to Highway 101 and blocked traffic. The protest was halted by a line of officers at Santa Rosa and Walnut, to deny pedestrian/protest access to Hwy 101 for a second time. Protesters ignored up to four Safety Dispersal Orders and four Unlawful Assembly Orders, in violation of PC 409 (Appendix A). Seven suspects were arrested, and several others were removed from the area with the use of minimal force options. On June 1, 2020, at approximately noon, the San Luis Obispo Police Department and California Men’s Colony (CMC) personnel, along with representatives from SLOSO and California Highway Patrol (CHP), attended a briefing at City Hall for the above described “unpermitted” protest scheduled to begin at 2:00 pm. The Command Post for this event was set up at City Hall. Incident command and decision making was the responsibility of Chief Cantrell, with tactical advice provided by Captain Amoroso and Captain Smith. The following personnel were assigned to the Incident Command Post SLOPD Police Chief Cantrell. 1.Chief Cantrell - Chief of Police 2.Captain Amoroso - Event Incident Commander 3.Captain Smith –Public Information Officer (PIO)/Field Incident Command 4.Lieutenant Mickel - Field Event Commander/Intelligence/ Mobile Field Force 5.Lieutenant Villanti – Undercover Command Mobile Field Force 6.Lieutenant Cudworth – Event Field Supervisor 7.Derek Johnson – City Manager 8.Chief Aggson – SLO City Fire Chief 9.Christine Steeb – Communication Manager 10. Mark Anselmi – Communication Supervisor 11. Christine Dietrick – SLO City Attorney After the briefing officers were assigned to teams for further instructions from the designated supervisor. There were extensive discussions before the start of the event to prepare for various contingencies. Uniformed officers monitored the designated event location on foot. These officers provided scene security and safety for the citizens. If officers witnessed criminal activity they would evaluate and take appropriate action, while balancing the severity of the crime with safety concerns as to not provoke an adverse crowd response. EVENT SUMMARY 9Packet Page 13 If the rally turned into a march, Bike and Motor Officers would attempt to assist crowds with safety and legal paths of travel (staying on the sidewalks and obeying all traffic control devices). However, if larger groups move into the roadway, at the direction of Command, Field Supervisors would determine the need to block motorized traffic to provide safe walking access for the demonstrators. The protest was expected to start at Mission Plaza at approximately 2:00 pm. A large group formed and by 2:07 pm began marching. The protestors immediately began marching in the roadway blocking traffic on Monterey at Chorro. The number of protesters was larger than expected, around 250, and field units immediately began asking for assistance to help control traffic. The protesters marched around the downtown area of the city in the roadway and appeared to have no real direction. About 20 minutes into the march, an officer who was helping keep traffic away from the protesters, heard some statements from the protesters that they wanted to go to the police department. He radioed this information to the command post along with his observations that there was a significant increase in hostility towards the police in comparison to the march the day prior. With this information, Sergeant Schafer’s Mobile Field Force Team deployed to the intersection of Walnut/ Santa Rosa and Walnut/ Osos. The purpose of this deployment was to keep the entry and exit gate of the police department open so police vehicles could respond to emergencies outside of the protest. Additionally, there was a concern for the safety of the protesters, if they marched north on Osos to the police department, they would be in danger from the traffic exiting 101 at Osos and Walnut. Captain Amoroso notified CHP who subsequently closed the off-ramp. At approximately 2:31 pm, the protest was marching again on Monterey, but this time they started to confront and surround Sheriff Deputies who were along the sidewalk. These Deputies were assigned to the security of the courthouse. A SLOPD officer radioed to the command post stating “you might want to start a secondary unit’s response team for the Sheriff’s Department, they’re (Deputies) starting to get surrounded.” Seeing that this was becoming an unsafe situation (being surrounded by upset protesters) and in an attempt to de-escalate the situation, the Deputies moved away from the street closer to the front of the courthouse.However, this did not de-escalate what the protesters were doing, instead, the protesters became more hostile toward Deputies by yelling and pursuing them to where the Deputies were retreating. Officers were able to identify one of the primary agitators who was trying to incite people to challenge the Police to fight. Much of the group splintered off and continued toward Mission Plaza while a group stayed and continued to confront and yell at the Deputies. This group moved on after a few minutes. The protest continued to march randomly around downtown and at approximately 2:42 pm a female, from the previous day's protest, seemed to take control of the demonstration. She had a bullhorn and began leading the group in a more organized fashion through downtown and toward the police department. While the group wound through downtown it continued to grow as people joined the march. The march grew to approximately 350 protesters by the time it left downtown. 10Packet Page 14 As the protesters left the downtown area, they began traveling northbound on Santa Rosa. The protesters blocked traffic for the entire north and south lanes of traffic on Santa Rosa as they marched in the direction of the police department. Command was becoming increasingly concerned about safety due to the size and behavior of the crowd which was becoming more agitated as they marched. Several of the people marching were yelling at cars that were attempting to legally drive in the roadway. In addition, they were yelling "fuck the police" at the officers who were providing traffic safety for the protesters an vehicle traffic. Due to this increased concern for safety, the Mobile Field Force team, located at the Police Department, asked for and received permission from the Command post leadership to put on their helmets and to deploy shields. At approximately 2:48 pm, the protesters stopped in front of the Police Department, occupying the entire intersection of Santa Rosa and Walnut. Initially, the crowd focused on the fact that the Officers were wearing “riot gear” and this seemed to agitate them. Due to the size of the crowd, a second Mobile Field Force team was deployed to the station. At approximately 3:03 pm the group called for an eight-minute and 30-second moment of silence. Most of the protesters sat silently in the intersection. During this period of silence, the protesters began demanding that Officers should kneel to show respect for the killing of George Floyd. 11 Photos of female leading protest sent to Command at 3:19pm and 3:27pm Packet Page 15 This information was relayed to Command by the on scene sergeant and Command left the decision to kneel or not up to the Officers on the scene. Each Officer was consulted and most of them agreed to take a knee to show respect for the protestors’ cause and to de-escalate the crowd. Initially, the crowd applauded this action by the Officers; however, after the moment of silence they stood up and started marching northbound on Santa Rosa. Many of the protesters began yelling and screaming "fuck you!" while flipping off the police who just knelt with them. At this time, a large group of peaceful protesters split off from the more hostile protestors and dispersed. It is unknown why these individuals left at this point. The on scene Sergeant was contacted by several of these protesters who said they shook his hand and told him, they appreciated the police department's acknowledgment and support. 12 Photo above: intersection of Walnut and Santa Rosa Photo left: Mobile Field Force officers kneeling at the crosswalk Walnut Street Packet Page 16 While the protesters were at the Police Department our Drone Pilot reported that he saw a protester jump the fence to the rear secured parking lot of the Police Department. By the time officers responded they were unable to locate the individual. It is unknown what the intentions of this individual were or where they went while on the police department property. The entire parking lot and Police Department were searched but no one was located. As the protesters continued northbound in the traffic lanes of Santa Rosa, CHP’s Airplane “Air 73” advised that approximately 60 additional protesters were working their way northbound on Santa Rosa to join the other larger group. Because of the unpredictable nature of this protest, and where the protest was now marching, SLOPD resources were being stretched thin. This coupled with our efforts to keep the public, traffic, and protesters safe, Chief Cantrell began making phone calls to other law enforcement agencies in our county for assistance. A short time later, officers from other agencies began responding to our city. At approximately 3:35 pm the main group of protesters reached Santa Rosa and Foothill. As they began to occupy the intersection, it appeared that many of the protestors who were marching in the street were not concerned for their safety or the safety of others. This was demonstrated when a SLOPD officer reported a “near traffic collision” where a vehicle narrowly missed a protester who was walking in the roadway. The protest then occupied the entire intersection completely shutting down traffic in all directions. The group sat in the intersection and had another 8 minutes and 46 seconds of silence for George Floyd. While the protesters were still occupying the intersection, one Undercover in the crowd, started hearing the crowd become focused on the police again starting to chant “fuck the police” seemingly unrelated to any particular police actions. At approximately 3:41 pm the protesters started to march south on Santa Rosa in the direction of the 101 freeway. As the crowd was marching, two undercover officers reported they both heard the crowd start chanting “freeway.” 13 Protesters occupying the intersection of Santa Rosa Street and Foothill Blvd. Packet Page 17 With the information that the march was potentially headed toward the freeway, Command directed a Mobile Field Force Team, along with CHP to respond and trail the protesters in case they truly intended to enter the freeway. As the group was approaching Santa Rosa and Olive, a female’s voice, on a megaphone was leading the crowd in a chant, “fuck the police.” She then announced on the megaphone she wanted the protesters to “take the intersection” at Santa Rosa and Olive. At 3:52 pm the march stopped and occupied the intersection of Santa Rosa and Olive blocking all lanes of traffic in all directions. While occupying the intersection, a SLOPD Officer advised Command that one of the protesters appeared to have assaulted a civilian motorcyclist, however, the motorcyclist was able to get away by turning onto Olive. The officer said that he saw the motorcyclist attempting to navigate his way by the crowd and a female protester jumped out and grabbed his motorcycle handlebars to make him stop. Anticipating that the protest was possibly going to try to enter onto the 101 freeway southbound, a large contingent of SLOPD Officers and CHP officers were staged at the 101 southbound on-ramp on Olive west of Santa Rosa. At approximately 4:00 pm the protesters began marching again and instead of turning west on Olive, they turned east on Olive toward 101 southbound onramp at Lemon street. There was only one CHP officer with his marked black and white police vehicle at this location. He attempted to stop and redirect the crowd by parking his marked patrol vehicle across the traffic lane and verbally instructed them not to enter the freeway, but he was overwhelmed by the number of protesters as they ignored these orders and marched past him onto the freeway. The protesters were now being led in a chant by a female who was on the megaphone chanting, “we will not be stopped” as they marched by the CHP Officer and onto the freeway. 14 Screenshot from Officer’s body camera when the protesters first entered the freeway at 4:03 pm. Packet Page 18 As the protesters continued marching south on the 101 and continued to bypass the off-ramps, Command along with the CHP began working on a plan on how to move the crowd off the freeway. During this time, it was related to the Command Post that CHP resources were being stretched thin and were struggling to stop and divert traffic off the freeway north and south of the protest. At the request of Chief Cantrell, a large number of assisting Police and Sheriff personnel responded to our city to assist with the protest. At approximately 4:20 pm, a total of four Mobile Field Force teams were assembled and being deployed to move the protest off the freeway. These teams, along with CHP, blocked the protesters on the southbound 101 freeway at Marsh. The plan was to have the protesters exit the freeway and direct them back towards downtown where it was easier to provide for the safety of everyone involved. At approximately 4:41 pm, at the direction of a SLOPD Sergeant, the CHP made dispersal announcements over the public address system from one of their patrol vehicles. Over the next 10 minutes, there were several dispersal orders given. At approximately 4:50 pm the protesters exited the freeway and headed east on Marsh towards downtown. Shortly after entering the southbound side of the 101 freeway, protesters began jumping the center rail onto the northbound side of the freeway. This was taking place on a Monday, at the end of the workday, and there was a significant amount of vehicle traffic traveling at freeway speeds This was extremely dangerous for the protesters, those driving on the freeway, and the Officers who were attempting to protect all parties. Once the protesters occupied both north and southbound lanes of the freeway, they began marching south. 15 Photo from Drone when the protesters first entered the 101-freeway occupying north and southbound lanes at 4:04 pm. Packet Page 19 To keep the protesters from re-entering the freeway a Mobile Field Force team was assigned to trail the protesters. As the protest was heading back toward downtown, it was reported that confrontations between a frustrated public and the protesters were starting to occur. At approximately 5:41 pm, a Deputy who was undercover in the crowd, reported to Command that he saw “Tianna the organizer challenge a female to a fight, but it was broken up.” Ms Arata was challenging a counter protester who was on the sidewalk as the protest passed them by. Between 4:50 pm and 5:56 pm, the protesters continued marching in the streets and blocking vehicle traffic throughout downtown. The Bike, Motor, and Undercover teams continued to monitor the protesters.At 4:56 pm, Command was notified that the protesters were talking about “taking over the freeway” again. Additionally, it was reported that the crowd became very confrontational with an Officer who was undercover in the crowd. They suspected he was a Police Officer and a group started to put their hands on him like they were “patting him” down. The Officer tried to walk away but the crowd followed him. Because of being searched and now being followed, he felt this was becoming a dangerous situation for him and he had to run from the crowd.At approximately 5:09 pm, it was reported to Command that a team of Deputies was being surrounded by protesters at Marsh and Morro. A Mobile Field Force team was sent to assist at that location. In addition to the Police, some of the organizers were “trying to push the hostile group away from the Deputies.” At this point, it looked like the organizers had lost control of some of the protesters. 16 Mobile Field Force blocking the entrance to Southbound 101 onramp at Marsh Street. Packet Page 20 It was reported again at approximately 5:55 pm, by Officers trailing the protest, the protesters were talking about making another attempt to occupy the freeway. With the information that the protesters were planning on taking the freeway again, Command developed a plan to prevent them from accessing Highway 101. This decision was based on the fact it is illegal, dangerous for both the protesters and motorists on the highway, the growing hostility within the crowd, and the fact it would soon be getting dark, increasing risks of pedestrians on an unregulated freeway. As the march worked its way north on Santa Rosa toward the freeway, Command moved Officers and the Mobile Field Force teams to the intersections of Santa Rosa/ Walnut and Osos/ Walnut. The plan was to place lines of officers on Walnut, at Santa Rosa, to deny the protesters access to northbound Santa Rosa, eastbound Walnut, and westbound Walnut. This placement prevented the protesters from accessing the four freeway on-ramps in the immediate area. Additionally, Osos at Walnut was shut down to prevent westbound traffic on Walnut and northbound traffic on Osos (HWY 101 NB on-ramp and NB off-ramp). At approximately 6:11 pm, a group of approximately 30 to 40 protesters linked arms and stood mid-block, with several hundred protesters behind them, on Santa Rosa between Peach and Walnut. They began marching toward the line of officers that had been formed at Santa Rosa and Walnut. Command was concerned the protesters were doing this to break through the line of officers to gain access to the freeway. Command ordered the teams at the intersection to put on their gas masks in the event the decision was made to deploy tear gas. The plan was to use tear gas if the protesters attempted to break through the line of officers to get to the freeway again. 17 Screenshot from Drone when the protesters linked arms and marched toward the line of officers at 6:11 pm. Packet Page 21 When the protesters were face to face with the line of Officers, the on-scene supervisor attempted to reach out to who he believed were the leaders of the protest. The supervisor told the protesters that they could continue to exercise their 1st amendment right but had to turn around and head southbound on Santa Rosa to continue marching. He explained that the police were not going to allow them access to the 101 freeway. Some of the people the supervisor spoke to attempted to communicate with the protesters this information, however, this seemed to have little effect on what the protestors did. Many of the protestors continued their hostilities toward the Officers by challenging the officers who were assigned to the line to fights and threatening to break through the line of Officers. At approximately 6:22 pm, one of the protesters experienced a medical emergency. The Officers on the scene had to clear the area around the person having an emergency to provide help. Many of the protesters refused to move for the Police to help. The Mobile Field Force team had to form a rescue circle around the subject to provide medical care. The officers on the scene radioed for an ambulance and the subject was transported to a local hospital. 18 Officers providing care to a protester having a medical emergency (indicated by the circle in the photo) during the time other protesters were refusing to leave the area. Packet Page 22 At approximately 6:23 pm, Captain Smith arrived at Santa Rosa and Walnut and assumed command as the on-scene Incident Commander.He started a dialogue with some of the apparent protest leaders in an attempt to gain compliance and convey the message that they could not continue northbound Santa Rosa, eastbound Walnut, or westbound Walnut toward the freeway. They were instructed to turn around and continue southbound on Santa Rosa, but again they refused. Captain Smith continued to reach out to those appearing as leaders of the protest to have them disperse. One of the leaders explained to Captain Smith that he had attempted to get the group of protesters to turn around and continue their march, but they were not listening to him. The leader asked Captain Smith if all the Officers could remove their helmets, gas masks, and shield and place all less-lethal weapons on the ground. Once this was done, he wanted Officers to take a knee to show support for the group and Black Lives Matter. Captain Smith explained this was not an option based on officer safety concerns and the hostility of some of the protesters. At approximately 6:53 pm, a female stood up on a retaining wall located on the southeast corner of Santa Rosa and Walnut with a megaphone and announced to the crowd that the protest is over and requested everyone to leave peacefully. She warned the crowd that the police will not allow them to continue north on Santa Rosa and if they do not disperse, the Police would deploy tear gas. A Sergeant who was on scene said after her announcement he heard several of the protesters say to her, “we are ready”. At this point the crowd was not organized and was not following directions of the identified leadership. This created a difficult and potentially dangerous situation. It is difficult to communicate or provide safety for a large group that does not have leadership. This along with the above-described behavior and the growing concern that the crowd wanted to enter the freeway again, confirmed that this crowd needed to be dispersed. Additionally, it was now after 7:00 pm and there was an additional concern that it was going to get dark, which greatly increased the dangers of having people in the street without the benefit of pre- planned traffic controls. A SLOPD Sergeant was instructed to make safety and dispersal announcements on the loudspeaker of his car. At approximately 7:17 pm, announcements began for the Formal Safety Dispersal Order for Potential Safety Issue (Appendix F). The announcement was made three times over the loudspeaker of patrol unit 2002, which took approximately 5 to 10 minutes. It was reported by a SLOPD Sergeant that the crowd quieted during the second announcement and appeared to be listening to the announcement. He also said the dispersal order appeared to upset the protesters and they began yelling, “who is the organizer” and appeared frustrated the protest was concluding. At about 7:40 pm, several legally required Unlawful Assembly announcements (Appendix G) were made on the same loudspeaker of marked patrol unit 2002. There were three announcements made over the loudspeaker (appx 20’ away from frontline protesters) for about 10 minutes. As part of the announcement, the protesters were told they could continue exercising their 1st amendment right while walking on the sidewalk. After the first announcement, it was discovered by SLOPD personnel at the front of the line of officers that the announcements were not loud enough for the entire crowd to properly hear. The vehicle making the announcements was moved closer (approximately 5-8’) towards the crowd. Additionally, CHP had their fixed-wing airplane and helicopter leave the area to reduce the ambient noise and allow protesters to hear the announcements. Following the next announcements, they appeared to have been heard because many in the crowd responded and left the area or moved to the sidewalk. 19Packet Page 23 However, numerous others stayed in the street and several sat down in defiance of the order. At approximately 7:50 pm, a SLOPD Sergeant identified two main attendees who were encouraging the crowd not follow the dispersal order and instructed a SLOSO arrest team to arrest these two protesters who were now sitting in the street near the southeast corner of Santa Rosa and Walnut. The two protesters were taken into custody without incident. After approximately 10 minutes, allowing ample time for the crowd to disperse, many of the protesters remained. Realizing that this group was not going to leave the area as instructed and were not following the lawful orders given, Command developed a plan to move the protesters south on Santa Rosa away from the freeway. A command for the line of Officers to move forward was given which pushed the crowd south on Santa Rosa. In the event they were met with resistance, officers armed with pepper balls would disperse pepper balls (Appendix A) at the feet of protesters to further persuade them to leave the area. If the crowd continued to not heed lawful orders to disperse and become confrontational with Officers, tear gas would be used to further disperse the crowd without the need for hands on crowd interventions. Protesters who refused to move were going to be taken into custody by designated arrest teams. At approximately 8:03 pm, the line of Officers was ordered forward and began pushing the protestors backward. In the first push by the line of Officers, several protesters who refused to move were taken into custody for failing to disperse. During one of the arrests, an unknown protester attempted to free an individual who had just been arrested. Within about 20-30 seconds of the line of officers moving forward, it was reported that various unidentified protesters began throwing water bottles at Officers. 20 Screen shot from Drone following the Safety Order and Unlawful Assembly announcements showing the protesters who were refusing to comply with the legal order at 8:02 pm. Packet Page 24 It was also reported that Officers saw a subject in a black sweatshirt with the number 23 written with green paint on the back was throwing rocks at Officers. Additionally, the protesters started throwing fireworks at the Police and into other protesters. The use of fireworks suggests preplanning and premeditation of several of the protesters in preparing and planning to create chaos and/or incite conflict. This behavior is also seen in many of the videos from Mustang News, San Luis Obispo Tribune, and Instagram Live videos that were posted (Appendix H). With the protesters’ refusal to disperse from the vehicle travel lanes, along with the bottles and rocks being thrown, pepper balls were deployed at the ground in front of the protesters. The use of the pepper balls was an effort to use the lowest level of force to disperse the unruly protesters while keeping Officers safe and avoiding the need to use hands on force. Additionally, deploying pepper balls on the ground reduced the chance of injury to the protesters while still releasing the irritant contained in the pepper balls making it uncomfortable to stay in the area. The line of Officers was ordered to stop approximately 20’ south of Walnut so the situation could be re-assessed, and a further course of action could be determined. The protesters continued to throw water bottles, fireworks, and other various items towards Officers. Numerous unruly protesters started to reform in a group and close the distance on Officers. This group remained standing in the middle of the street and challenged Officers. The protesters were approximately 40’ in front of the line of Officers at this point. Command reevaluated the situation at this point to see if the hostile protesters were being appropriately dispersed with the initial push of the line of Officers. It was determined the protestors were still throwing objects and fireworks thus endangering bystanders and Officers. At approximately 8:14 pm, Command authorized Chloroachetophenone (CN) gas (tear gas) canisters be deployed in front of the hostile protesters to encourage them to disperse. Two canisters of CN gas were thrown in front of the protesters. Once the CN gas was thrown, the line of Officers continued to move southbound on Santa Rosa as several hostile protesters threw rocks and fireworks at officers. To stop being battered by the projectiles being thrown at them, officers utilized pepper balls, foam 40mm impact rounds, marking 40mm impact rounds, bean bag shotgun impact rounds, and Oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray) (Appendix A). 21 CN gas deployment as seen by a protester looking north on Santa Rosa toward the line of officers. Shown are the protesters who are not willing to disperse from the street even with the deployment of teargas at 8:14pm. Packet Page 25 At approximately 8:36 pm, Mobile Field Force teams took control of Santa Rosa Street, from Walnut to the intersection of Peach. Most of the crowd had dispersed from the area except for approximately 30-40 protesters who were still challenging officers in the street on Santa Rosa, between Peach and Mill. The line of Officers continued to move forward which caused many of the unruly protesters to disperse, however, many continued to stay in the street out of reach of the arrest teams located at the line of officers. An Arrest Team was formed by SLOPD personnel and approached the remaining protesters from a parking lot to the west. The protesters were unaware of the approach of the arrest team and one of the was taken into custody. As this was happening, the line of Officers moved to the intersection of Santa Rosa and Mill. This action caused most of the remaining protesters to disperse and leave the area. At approximately 9:00 pm, seeing that the hostile protesters had left the area and there was no more danger to the public or police, all personnel cleared the streets and returned to the Police Department. Security of the Police Department was turned over to the SLOPD night watch officers. At approximately 9:42 pm, the Command Post was shutdown. Since this event, as of October 27, 2020, we have had 72 demonstrations. Through the lessons learned, by both demonstrators and law enforcement, the additional protests have largely been peaceful, and we have not had the same issues as we had on this day. 22Packet Page 26 Issues Recommendations Implemented Identified by Community Recommendation Identified by Internal Review 1.The protesters only had one way to disperse which was to turn around and go back, this is difficult for crowds. Have a route or alternative routes for protesters to use to leave (left or right). Added to Event Plan for future events X 2.No city personnel had a relationship with the group protesting and thus no way to communicate with them. Build relationship prior to event with protester leaders and talk face to face if safe. On-going X X 3.Lack of proper equipment to make a loud enough announcement. Purchase Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) loudspeaker Make multiple announcements and make announcements from different locations if possible to reach more of the crowd LRAD purchased X X 4.Received feedback during independent interviews about early appearance of officers in riot gear during a peaceful protest. Evaluate safety equipment donned based on assessed safety risk. Limit the number of officers in the nearby area of a peaceful protest to lessen the appearance of a police stance. Added to Event Plan for future events X 5.Lieutenants needed in the field overseeing the tactical operation. Deploy lieutenants to the field during tactical operations. Added to Event Plan for future events X 23 Issues and Recommendations Packet Page 27 Issues Recommendations Implemented Identified by Community Recommendation Identified by Internal Review 6.There was insufficient sworn staffing to prevent protesters from entering the freeway. Work with allied agencies but staffing has to be balanced with fiscal sustainability. Mutual Aid implement X 7.There was insufficient civilian support staff to assist with traffic control during events. Use City Street personnel to deploy barricades and support. Now using City Street personnel to deploy barricades X 8. Mutual Aid agencies assisting self- deployed and lacked sufficient direction from Command Post. When allied agencies arrive to assist, ensure they check in with the Command Post and the team sergeant they are assigned to is aware. Assign Dispatch to make a spreadsheet to track where Mutual Aid agencies are assigned. Now having mutual aid check in with the CP and Dispatch is completing the spreadsheet X 9. Lacked drone pilots and batteries for equipment to staff lengthy event. Purchase additional batteries and train additional pilots. Batteries purchased, pilots in training X 10. Body worn camera batteries have a 7-8 hour run capacity on internment use, constant use 3 hours max. Cameras must be docked to recharge. Purchase body worn cameras that have replaceable batteries. Currently testing cameras with replaceable batteries X 24Packet Page 28 APPENDIX 25Packet Page 29 Pepper ball - A pepper-spray projectile, also called a pepper-spray ball, pepper-ball, pepper bomb, or pepper-spray pellet is a frangible projectile containing a powdered chemical that irritates the eyes and nose in a manner similar to pepper spray. These projectiles are fired from specially designed forced compliance weapons or modified paintball guns. Pepper spray – A temporarily disabling aerosol that is composed partly of capsicum oleoresin and causes irritation and blinding of he eyes and inflammation of the nose, throat, and skin. CN Gas – A gas that makes the eyes fill with tears but does not damage them, commonly referred to as “tear gas;” used in dispersing crowds. As a result of the UN’s Chemical Weapons Convention, riot control agents were banned in war and took effect in 1997. The overall ban was put into place because of the inability to differentiate lethal gas from non-lethal gas such as CS or CN. However, there is an exception to the convention that CS or CN gas can continue to be used to prevent rioting of prisoners of war or situations where civilian casualties can be avoided. 40mm Impact round – Lightweight, high-speed projectile consisting of a plastic body and sponge nose as a less-lethal alternative, that is shot from a 40mm launcher. Mobile Field Force – A Mobile Field Force Team is comprised of officers who are trained in crowd control tactics. A Mobile Field Force Team is capable of responding to a variety of behaviors and have the ability to provide rapid, organized and disciplined response to civil disorder, and control or disburse unruly crowds. Penal Cod 406. Whenever two or more person, assembled and acting together, make any attempt or advance toward the commission of an act which would be a riot if acutally committed, such assembly is a rout. APPENDIX A - DEFINITIONS APPENDIX B - KCOY INTERVIEW WITH CHIEF CANTRELL 26Packet Page 30 APPENDIX C - SUMMARY OF CALLS RECEIVED BY DISPATCH SAW SOCIAL MEDIA POST - LOOTING WILL START IN SLO AT 2000HRS 2ND Reporting Party (RP) SAYS DAUGHTER SAW A SECONDHAND SNAP CHAT THAT THERE WAS GOING TO BE LOOTING IN SLO TONIGHT. No Further Detail ADDITIONAL Reporting Party (RP) HEARD SECOND HAND ON SOCIAL MEDIA THAT THERE WILL BE DESTRUCTION Downtown SLO AT 2000HRS REPORTING PARTY DAUGHTER SHOWED HER A SOCIAL MEDIA POST REGARDING SUBJS COMING INTO TOWN TO LOOT/ RIOT. 2ND REPORTING PARTY ADVISED HER DAUGHTER SHOWED HER SNAP CHAT POSTS OF SUBJS SAYING THEY WERE COMING TO SLO AND THAT PEOPLE SHOULD LOCK THEIR DOORS AND GET READY FOR THE VIOLENCE/LOOTING/ RIOTING ONLINE POST CIRCULATING ABOUT GROUPS ENRT TO SLO FROM VALLEY TO 211 (rob) STUDENT HOUSING AND BUSINESSES IN SLO. REPORTING PARTY HAS SCREENSHOTS TO PROVIDE TO OFFICERS INFO FROM REPORTING PARTY COWORKERS FRIEND TO COWORKER - SUBJ IN PROTEST ARE STASHING BRICKS IN DT AREA TO THROW THROUGH WINDOWS ADDTL REPORT OF POSS LOOTING OVERHEARD WHILE AT LAGUNA LAKE FOR BEST BUY - NO DESCR OF SUBJ AND WAS 40 AGO FACEBOOK POSTS PLANNED LOOTING AT TARGET TONIGHT, NO SPECIFIC TIME LISTED POST FROM FRIEND OF EMP May 31, 2020 SLOPD Case # 200531047 The below narrative are the notes from the Officer Actions who handled the call regarding the social media post. The mother of a Social Media poster was contacted, and she was appropriately notified of SLOPD's response if any looting occurred in SLO tonight. She said she understood the gravity of the social media post and she would have her son take down the post and would speak to him about the seriousness. June 01, 2020 SLOPD Case # 200601117 SLOPD Case # 200601116 SLOPD Case # 200601102 SLOPD Case # 200601089 SLOPD Case # 200601084 27Packet Page 31 REPORTING PARTY SEEING SNAPCHAT POSTS ABOUT LOOTING AT 2000 HOURS "START LOOKING AT DOWNTOWN SLO, GO GET YOUR MOB READY" REPORTING PARTY WAS ACCIDENTALLY INCLUDED IN GROUP TEXT THAT TALKED ABOUT LOOTING THE APPLE STORE TODAY. June 1, 2020 continued SLOPD Case # 200601062 SLOPD Case # 200601007 The group text appears to reference a conversation between Apple store managers and Administration regarding 3rd hand info obtained online. The information references a looting spree at Apple stores starting in SLO. There are no dates, details, or other detailed info in the texts. RP has no association with Apple, or the numbers listed in the text. I was unable to determine the validity of the information. No other reports of suggested or confirmed looting at the store have been reported to SLOPD. The sergeant informed of the information. 28Packet Page 32 29 APPENDIX D - TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT PATROL In response to national protests and increased frequency of local short notice protests, the Department will be transitioning to a Tactical Deployment status for all sworn officers. The below schedule will be implemented effective Monday morning 6/1/2020 at 0700 hours. We will be placing all personnel in two squads, working 12-hour shifts, seven days a week until the deployment ends. All officers currently assigned to Team 1, 2, Motors, and Day Metro will work 0700-1900 hours. Team 3, 4, 5, and Night Metro will work 1900-0700 hours. INVESTIGATIONS Detectives will be working 0700-1900 seven days a week. You will remain working in your current assignment, but you will need to have all your tactical gear ready to deploy if called upon. Daywatch 0700-1900 Lieutenant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Nightwatch 1900-0700 Lieutenant Sergeant Sergeant Sergeant Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer Investigations Lieutenant Sergeant Sergeant Detective Detective Detective Detective Detective Detective Detective Detective Detective Detective Packet Page 33 APPENDIX E - EVENT INFORMATION 30 Event Name: Black Lives Matter Protest Case #: Event Start Date: June 1, 2020 Event End Date: June 1, 2020 Event Briefing Time: 12:00 pm Event Start Time: 2:00 pm Event End Time: 9:06 pm Demobilization Time: 9:42 pm Staffing Details # of officers Chief 1 Captains 2 Lieutenants 3 Sergeants 4 Officers 34 Field Service Tech. 2 Dispatchers 3 Other 1 Total 50 Agency # of officers California Men's Colony 10 San Luis Obispo Sheriff's Office 60 Paso Robles Police Department 7 Grover Beach Police Department 5 Pismo Beach Police Department 5 Arroyo Grande Police Department 4 Morro Bay Police Department 5 Cal Poly Police Department 2 California Highway Patrol 30 Total 128 Packet Page 34 APPENDIX F - SAFETY ORDER ADVISEMENT BY SGT. SHALHOOB 31 "Attention, this is Sgt. Shalhoob of the San Luis Obispo Police Department. We have received information that there is a potential safety threat to this event. We have spoken to the event organizers and they have asked us to help disperse this assembly immediately until the validity of this threat can be determined. We are asking all of you to disperse immediately in an orderly fashion to avoid any possible threats to your safety." APPENDIX G - UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY ADVISEMENT BY SGT. SHALHOOB "I am Sgt. Shalhoob with the San Luis Obispo Police Department. I hereby declare this to be an unlawful assembly, and in the name of the People of the State of California command all those assembled at the intersection of Santa Rosa and Walnut St.'s in the City of San Luis Obispo to immediately disperse, which means to break up this assembly. If you do not do so, you will be subject to police action, including arrest. Police action could include the use of necessary and reasonable force which could result in injury. Section 409 of the California Penal Code prohibits remaining in the area just described, regardless of your purpose, you will be in violation of section 409. The following routes of dispersal are available. Southbound Santa Rosa from Walnut St. You have 5 minutes to disperse." Packet Page 35 APPENDIX H - VIDEOS OF PROTEST FROM MEDIA SOURCES 32 Video from San Luis Obispo Tribune Video from Cal Poly Mustang News Video from Tianna Arata's Instagram account Packet Page 36 APPENDIX I - VIDEO REVIEW The following is a copy of Lieutenant Cudworth's report on the body camera and in-car videos he reviewed of the event. There were over 80 videos captured by officers during the protest. Lieutenant Cudworth reviewed all the body-worn camera (BWC) footage between the hours of 6:00 pm and 9:00 pm. Several of the videos are similar as many of the officer’s views overlapped each other. There are some subtle differences in what angle was captured but they provide an accurate representation of what the officers faced once the dispersal order was given and the protesters failed to leave the area as directed. The following BWC videos were reviewed: Officer Etherton: 3 videos 1 – (202006011811) 22m:13s Santa Rosa and Walnut at Skirmish line as the crowd formed. Officer Etherton[ contacts leaders of the group asking for assistance with a medical emergency. He directs them to march back downtown. He gives directions away from the freeway. He gives group options but emphasizes the PD wants them to be safe. He is asked, “Why are you geared up?” and he replies that “You ran at us.” Captain Smith confirms the intersection of Santa Rosa and Walnut is a firm line in the sand. 2- (202006011917) 10m:04s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Protestor yelling “You don’t give a fuck about us.” The tone of the protestor’s yelling is becoming angry. Instructions are given on how and what will be deployed to move protestors back. Smoke, pepper balls, and then CN gas. Give instructions to the protestors. At 9m:29s a linebacker approaches Etherton and states something to the effect that people are starting to fade out and that the officers on the line should be rotated. 3- (202006011943) 46m:26s Santa Rosa and Walnut. The dispersal order is given along with the route for dispersal. Sgt. Shalhoob reminds protestors they have a 1st amendment right to walk on the sidewalk and continue their protest. Captain Smith gives clear instructions first smoke, then pepper ball, and finally CN gas. The line of officer scan be seen moving up. Deployment of crowd control measures begins. 29m:00s CN gas is deployed. The crowd is in the street. CN gas canisters being kicked back at officers. Officer Bravo: 2 videos 1-(20200611808) 1h:00m:12s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Protestors can be seen at the top of the hill. He moves up to support the line of officers. Protestors state this is a peaceful protest, and they will not be stopped. Protestor states “You want to hurt us.” Protestor “We want to go that way” pointing towards Walnut in front of he PD and “We do not want to fight.” Unknown protestor “Big pigs in the back, small pigs in the front.” An unknown female asks for “white people in the front.” Protestor “You are escalating this, then when shit starts you blame it on us.” Etherton steps in and asks for help getting to a female experiencing a medical emergency. 45m:00s unknown female on megaphone announcing people can leave or stay and if they stay, they may be arrested. 33Packet Page 37 2-(202006011944) 59m:34s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Can hear dispersal order. Go to the sidewalk and you can legally protest. Protestors begin to move. Can hear the 2nd order. Can see protestors disperse, then others beginning to move back into the street. Line of officers moves, smoke, and pepper balls are used. Protestors do not leave and form a line at Santa Rosa and Peach. Officer Perlette’s gas mask fails, and he is exposed to the CN gas and had to leave the line. 30m:00s unknown object thrown at officers. Officer Jeff Koznek: 4 videos 1- (2006011942) 4m:19s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Can hear dispersal order and five-minute warning to disperse. Can hear Sgt Shalhoob provide a direction of travel. He also tells them per the 1st Amendment they can continue to protest while on the sidewalk. A second and third dispersal order can be heard. 2- (202006011949) 49m:01s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Begins with the arrest of protestors in the intersection. Captain Smith gives instructions regarding the deployment of crowd control measures. Can see the initial push of officers and deployment of crowd control measures. Follows officers up Santa Rosa to Mill like other videos. 3- (202006012039) 1m:25s Nothing significant noted in the video. 4- (202006012041) 8m:48s Nothing significant noted in the video. Officer Parsons: 1 video 1- (202006012000) 22m:18s Line of officers on the east side of Santa Rosa at Walnut. Video is after the dispersal order. 8m:45s objects are throng at officers. 8m:55s fireworks are seen going off. Officers are deploying pepper balls. A protestor shouts, “What the fuck is wrong you, you work for us.” Officer Benson: 3 videos 1- (202006011830) 29m:25s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Shows a similar video as captured by several other officers. No new info was obtained; nothing significant was noted in the video. 2- (202006011948) 15m:08s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Behind line of officers. Shows a similar video as captured by several other officers. No new info was obtained; nothing significant was noted in the video. 3- (202006012012) 28m:07s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Behind the line of officers after the initial push. Protestor using a leaf blower to push gas back at officers. Flashbangs, fireworks, can be seen along with CN gas deployment. Water bottles being thrown by protestors. Finishes up with officers moving up Santa Rosa to Mill. 34Packet Page 38 Officer Villanueva: 2 videos 1- (202006011807) 1h:00m:18s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Protestor “We are just a bunch of kids.” Officers respond to a medical emergency of an unknown female. Can see organizers interact with each other. The protestor seen in Detective Stradley’s video is yelling the same insults as seen in Villanueva’s video. Officer Etherton interacts with organizers. Can hear an unknown female telling protestors that the officers will not let them through. 2- (202006011946) 57m:35s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Can hear 1st and 2nd dispersal order. Can see first push of line of officers southbound on Santa Rosa. Officer “bottles incoming.” Can see fireworks as the group backs up. Bottles being thrown at officers as gas is deployed. The remaining video shows officers’ movements southbound from Santa Rosa to Mill like other videos. Officer Magana: 3 videos 1- (202006011814) 44m:52s Santa Rosa and Walnut. He is behind the line of officers and the view is like other officer’s videos. Can see the group begin to disperse and move southbound on Santa Rosa towards Peach. Can see protestors regroup on Santa Rosa near Peach. 2- (202006011914) 7m:31s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Can hear dispersal order. Can hear female on megaphone stating event organizers are asking for help from officers to disperse the crowd. Officers have deemed the event to be a safety risk. 3- (202006012009) 39m:05s Santa Rosa and Walnut. It begins to push protestors southbound on Santa Rosa. Can see pepper ball deployment. Protestors reorganize and CN gas is deployed. CN gas canisters kicked back at officers. Officers move southbound on Santa Rosa through to Mill. Protestors still yelling at officers. Officer Hurni: 2 videos 1- (202006011957) 6m:28s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Begins with the arrest of protestors in the intersection. Dispersal order can be heard. Nothing significant was noted in the video. 2- (202006012042) 1m:36s Nothing significant noted in the video. Officer Cox: 2 videos 1-(202006011957) 5m:10s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Begins with moving in to arrest protestors. Takes possession of the arrestee then returns to the line. Nothing significant was noted in the video. 2-(20200612031) 11m:53s Santa Rosa and Mill. Arrest near the intersection for failing to disperse. Nothing significant was noted in the video. 35Packet Page 39 Officer Bracy: 2 videos 1- (202006011946) 53m:36s Santa Rosa and Walnut. A dispersal order is given. Video same vantage point as Officer Pelletier. Shows the arrest of Michael Gates. You can see protestors moving to the northeast corner of the intersection beginning to flank officers. After arrest, he gets back into the line of officers. 2-(202006012042) 1m:40s Nothing significant noted in the video. Officer Peck: 1 video 1- (202006011958) 10m:47s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Begins with the arrest of two females. The crowd is chanting and yelling during arrests. Nothing significant seen on video. Officer Stradley: 2 videos 1- (202006011811) 1h:00m:18s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Protestor “Big pigs in the back, small pigs in the front.” Can see officers helping female who suffered a medical emergency. 15m:45s male protestor approaches the line of officers, “you guys are all fucking bitches, scared aren’t you” “Fuck all of you guys” “Scared as Fuck” “You are a fucking punk.” Protestor “You gonna stop me? I wanna go that way.” 25m:00s “Let us walk.” 47m:14s lady in pink trying to debate how many the officers can take.” 51m:21s protestor asking, “Where is the Chief who lost her gun?” Protestor “They cannot legally stop us.” Protestor debating with Captain Smith. 2- (202006012050) 1m:45s Nothing significant noted in the video. Officer Pelletier: 2 videos 1-(202006011946) 43m:37s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Starts with the dispersal order. While standing on the northeast corner of the intersection he is part of the line of officers. This is when the group began to flank our officers. He is directed to pull out his baton and bring it to “port-arms.” Jalen laughs and replies “I got yours.” A protestor, “I’m sensing some shit” and “I am not scared.” Protestor replies to dispersal order, “Stand on your words, just don’t talk about it.” Implying he heard the order and was refusing to disperse. A protestor, “You guys are causing the problem.” 2-(20206012033) 10m:36s Mill and Santa Rosa. Cover an arrest of a protestor failing to disperse. Nothing significant was noted on video. Officer Amaya: 1 video 1- (202006012032) 18m:29s Mill and Santa Rosa. An unknown protestor is yelling at officers as they are making an arrest. Protestors still yelling at offices even after the deployment of gas and PD efforts to move the crowd out of the area. Nothing significant seen on video. 36Packet Page 40 Officer Benedetti: 1 video 1- (202006011944) 55m:49s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Captures dispersal order and the initial arrests at Santa Rosa and Walnut. The crowd yells at officers to “Let her go” and “Fucking pigs.” Captain Smith gives clear instructions on the use of smoke, pepper balls, and CN gas. Items are thrown at officers. 32m:00s fireworks thrown at officers. Captures deployment of crowd control measures. Officer Jessen: 2 videos 1-(202006011919) 10m:19s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Stationed behind line of officers. Nothing significant was noted in the video. 2-(202006011955) 57m:42s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Unknown female announcing to the crowd. Protestor replies, “Fuck you.” Protestors begin to leave and get onto the sidewalk then return to the street as the line of officers moves forward. 13m:45s Fireworks thrown at officers. The crowd does not disperse and gathers in the street Santa Rosa and Peach. A protestor is standing in the street with a bicycle raised overhead. As the crowd grows, CN gas is deployed. Protestors kick CN gas canister back at officers. Fireworks continue to be thrown at officers. 21m:50s unknown officer advises, “rocks coming in.” Protestors still yelling at officers and not dispersing. Officer Orozco: 2 videos 1-(202006011828) 56m:37s Santa Rosa and Walnut. Shows protestors yelling at officers. “Let us walk.” 26m:45s an unknown female can be heard on a megaphone, “They will not let us pass” and “you could be arrested.” A protestor, “Fucking white cops.” This is when the group began to flank the officers. The group’s chanting begins to get louder. Captain Smith can be seen speaking with organizers. Captures deployment of crowd control measures. 2-(202006012025) 10m:49s Santa Rosa and Peach. Group of protestors continuing to yell at protestors. The squad moves up the street to Santa Rosa and Mill. Nothing significant was noted in the video. Additionally, there were 20 video segments filmed by our drone. The drone flew over the protestors as they moved throughout the city, onto the freeway, and failed to disperse. The videos which best captures the behavior of the crowd were: DJI_0178: Shows protestors on the Freeway DJI_0226: Shows arrests at line of officers DJI_0228: Show the deployment of crowd control measures DJI_0230: Shows protestor throwing rocks at officers There are an additional seven YouTube videos of the protestors' behavior which was documented by Mustang News. All these videos are digitally preserved at our Police department and are available for review. 37Packet Page 41 38 APPENDIX J - PROTEST ROUTE & TIMELINE Packet Page 42 39Packet Page 43 40Packet Page 44 MEMORANDUM TO: CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO, SAN LUIS OBISPO POLICE DEPARTMENT FROM: KARI MANSAGER, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT SUBJECT: COMMUNITY PORTION OF 6/1/20 PROTEST AFTER ACTION REPORT DATE: 11/5/20 In mid-August 2020, I was asked and agreed to conduct the community portion of the June 1st, 2020 protest “After Action Report.” The San Luis Obispo Police Department had started an internal review and this portion serves as a stand-alone addition to the After Action Report appendix. The narratives are based on interviews with 11 community members who have been given alias names and for some, no identifiable demographic information, to protect their privacy and safety. I initially identified folks to interview based on print and social media accounts of the protest and then asked each person I interviewed for names of people they recommend I include. About a dozen people did not respond to my request for an interview. I asked a standard set of questions and have weaved their narratives together and pulled out common themes from what was shared. My role in this report was to share their experiences. My role was not to fact-check or provide recommendations. I’m honored that those I interviewed trust me with their narratives. They have my deepest thanks. Alias names and demographic information interviewees chose to share: Alberto is a Hispanic male in his 20’s. Anne is a white woman in her 40’s. Anthony is a “white guy” in his 20’s and is Jewish. Christopher is a Caucasian male in his 20’s. Jackie is an African American woman in her 40’s. Jo is a Mexicano man in his 20’s. Justice will be referred to using “they” gender pronouns to best protect their identity. Nora is a Mexican American woman in her 20’s. Penny is a Caucasian female in her 30’s. Rosie is a Latina female in her 20’s. Rosie was an arrestee. Sam will be referred to using “they” gender pronouns to best protect their identity. Sam was an arrestee. All interviewees were SLO county residents at the time of the protest. Interviewees were a mix of active participants who came to the event to protest and participants who served as observers/helpers who came to document the event or to support protesters. Motivation to Join the June 1st Protest: Concern and Care Anthony: The protest on Sunday [the day before June 1st] was great. We marched and it was overall a really positive experience but the presence of the cops at that protest was very Attachment 1 Packet Page 45 2 threatening. I could feel tensions were high which is what motivated me to come out on June 1st and serve as a peacekeeper again. Jackie: I honestly joined on June 1st because I was a little concerned and wanted to bear witness and be there and see what was happening. I had concern that there were kids there. Nora: One of the reasons I was motivated to go to the June 1st protest was because I attended the May 31st Black Lives Matter rally the day prior. From the beginning of [the May 31st] march there was a large police presence. I was there as an observer. I wanted to be between the youth and the police officers. [On May 31st] I saw a SLO police officer on a bike hit a student with their bike. Later on, the police officers were at corners in their SWAT gear. It was very intimidating, and I had never seen something like that in SLO. One of my motivators to show up to the June 1st march was because of the police aggression I witnessed the day before. I was concerned about what could happen based on what I had seen on May 31st. Experiences at the June 1st Protest A Sense of Community Anthony: I wasn’t there to protest. Instead, I saw my community waking up in a way I hadn’t seen before. I just wanted to support people, which is why I served as a peacekeeper with water and snacks. I felt I was there to protect my community, or to witness my community, or support it. I walked alongside the protesters. I was on the edges of the crowd. For most of the protest it felt fine. It felt good. It felt like we were doing what we were supposed to do – express our anger. Express our sadness. And it didn’t feel unsafe for a while. Nora: The police don’t talk to protesters. They don’t talk to the community. I felt safe with protesters. There were medics. At the very beginning, I helped someone who twisted their ankle and waited with her for her friend to pick her up. That was the kind of atmosphere it was- people helping each other out. Sam: One of the big things that these protests have sparked within me is a connection to the SLO community that I didn’t have before that. During these protests I really felt like I was marching with a group of people who were of the same mindset and wanted change in the community. This movement was really eye opening for me and just really powerful to hear people’s voices echoing downtown. That one solid voice- it really made me sad that I hadn’t been connected earlier. For the next 6 hours- before we got on the freeway, before we hit the police blockade- it was 6-hours of our voices, marching, moments where we took breaks and talked. To hear these voices that I hadn’t heard before... I didn’t know that many Black community members... I heard them that day and to hear their voices and to hear that they face an incredible amount of prejudice just because of the demographics of SLO- to hear them was really eye opening and makes you want to change. Undercover Officers and Unease about Rumors of Antifa and Looting Alberto: As we marched, I saw some businesses with boarded up windows. My first thought was, “who the fuck in SLO is going to riot and loot these stores downtown?” It seemed Packet Page 46 3 very racist. They associate this movement that is trying to get Black people not to get killed with violence. I don’t know why people thought riots would take place in SLO. Anthony: They won. May 31st, the police showed up with shields and armor and big assault rifles. Why? Why? Why? I don’t understand. Why they called in every cop from the county in full gear and menacing people with weapons, assault rifles. They said later that they were scared seeing what was going on around the country. This tells me that our law enforcement doesn’t know what community they live in. They acted like occupiers of the town just because kids were mad. Anyone who’s from here knows that we don’t have Antifa or any organized far left movement that’s going to burn down the courthouse. I don’t see what they were worried about. Penny: I remember an instance when there were people who seemed they didn’t belong. There had been rumors of Antifa and people being bussed into the protest from Santa Maria and Los Angeles. There were businesses boarded up. Nobody knew if it was real. There was no indication of people being bussed in, but there were some people looking out of place. They may have been undercover, and people started calling them out. There were random men alone in the crowd and I did see people start saying “does anyone know this guy?” and someone would ask “why did you join today?” - friendly, but inquiring. There was a lot of misinformation and rumor. City officials had shared some of these rumors and people in the protest were concerned about this. Rumors were shared on “Take back SLO” and other social media, which likely fueled businesses boarding up. Some of the businesses boarded up, others didn’t, and it made for a unique landscape of every other business boarded up and the others with employees outside supporting us. The discrepancy felt odd and sad. Adding undercover police did not help. Police never felt like a security at the protest. They felt like a threat. They could have made sure cars didn’t blast through. Instead, this felt like we were under threat rather than protection. Feeling under threat from police and knowing there were undercover people in the crowd listening to us didn't feel supportive. Entering the Highway Alberto: I got on the freeway for like 2 minutes, but it was in between my classes. I heard the protest from my apartment and ran out there to see what was going on. There was one police officer with one car. They got around it really easily. Everyone looked carefully to the left to be safe from oncoming traffic. When they had a clear amount of time they spread out and made themselves big with signs and made sure they stopped traffic. They knew what was going to happen if they didn’t. They started marching southbound then I got off on the other side. The whole idea of stopping traffic is to disrupt people and basically the whole idea is to make people aware that Black people are being brutalized and murdered. That’s a regular thing and having your Thursday afternoon drive disrupted is like the only way to get people to relate who don’t understand being killed, beaten, choked, and shot. I like doing breaking news stuff. It was an adrenaline rush. I was glad to be a part of it and attempt to document it. Packet Page 47 4 Jackie: I felt safe entering the freeway because there were so many of us. It’s a weird thing. When we got on, there were no cars. It’s not like you get on and cars are going 80. It is dangerous, but we walked on from the sides and there were just no cars on our side. The other cars were already stopped in traffic. We walked through those cars. It felt invigorating and at that time it had never been done in SLO before. It felt like “wow this is a new day here”. It felt empowering that we had the strength in numbers. Obviously, you can’t do that with a small crowd. You have to be bold; you can’t be wishy washy. It gets more attention -more media attention. It makes more of a statement that you’re stopping business as usual to address this issue. Because it’s dangerous you’re taking more of a risk, including legal repercussions. It’s a level up. A freeway takeover signifies that “we’re going big”. Sam: That whole day was powerful. The freeway moment was the force of the community- the young, angry, fed up students and youth of SLO coming together to show that we are here, and we can stop traffic. We can make a difference. Making a literal physical impact. Its’ something that draws a lot of news. That moment was really powerful for us in terms of getting our voices heard. Getting on the freeway was a little unplanned and scary at first, but we had the right amount of people, no one got hurt and it was ok. The drivers who get stuck on the freeway because of protesting- they experience this moment of discomfort and feel stuck. That’s kind of the feeling that BIPOC people in America face every day- that they’re trapped, unsafe, and have nowhere to go. Most white Americans will never feel that or don’t understand that. Getting on the freeway also shuts down commerce a little. As soon as you affect the economy, people start to listen. These kinds of protest work. They get the message out and people listen. It’s not violent. A Leaderless March Anne: When you’re looking at a collective movement, how can you identify who the leader is? Some people had megaphones, but even that phrase “leaders” is not how it works. Jo: I like to think of these things as community organized. I know when we were on the corner of Marsh and Santa Rosa there were a lot of high school students that spoke. I didn't think there was one person leading this. I felt it was a community engagement effort. Just because you have a megaphone doesn't mean you’re leading because the people who have the megaphones pass it around freely. Justice: There was no one leading the march, really. It was a bunch of high school students in solidarity with Black lives. There were different speakers at different moments, but it was a bunch of students marching in solidarity. It was leaderless. It was a movement of youth. Sam: The police kneeled with the crowd the first time we passed the police station. I remember it was weird because we didn’t have one unified voice. We didn’t have people leading; we were just listening to anyone who had the loudest voice or with a megaphone. Some people yelled for police to kneel and after a while they did. It didn’t really mean much- four hours later they Packet Page 48 5 were spraying at us, shooting at us, and arresting us. Their kneeling showed its hypocrisy in four hours' time. The Police Line at Santa Rosa and Walnut Shock Anne: Making space for BIPOC people to share their stories and just listening to them throughout the protest as a white person was profound and frankly not something I get to do often in this community. To have the police act as if this was going to be a totally destructive event was just shocking. The character of the response did not match the character of the protest. Christopher: When we got to the top of the hill at Santa Rosa, we saw all these armored officers. I was shocked when I came over the hill- I didn’t expect to see these guys fully equipped with all the riot helmets. Police said later that people came running at them, but the protesters had held arms together and skipped down the hill. Nobody was running at them. Once we got there the crowd started chanting “why are you in riot gear we don’t see a riot here”. The police didn’t allow them to walk through Santa Rosa at all. They skipped down holding hands to meet the police line. Police responded with batons and tear gas. Justice: Our breath was taken away when we saw this line up of police in riot gear. We saw a paddy wagon, large bundles of zip ties, and large staging areas, like the Sheriff setting up at Santa Rosa and Palm. We didn’t see any ambulances or medics there. Fatigue Jackie: There was no directive from within our group to advance. That wasn’t a goal. It was getting dark. I heard another reason given for the police stopping us when they did and how they did was that the officers themselves were tired. I don’t think it was necessary. They could have not stopped us there and let us disperse. We were getting tired and it was going to end soon. Penny: I remember as soon as I joined the protest, those who had been speakers on the megaphones were tired. They had been out there marching for hours already and there was not a plan. There was still joy and energy in the crowd but the people who had been out there speaking were tired. I thought we were going to the police station to protest out front and end there. It was not announced that way from a megaphone, but I remember thinking we were about to wrap up. And then we were met with the riot gear line. Rosie: While we were in the van on the way to county jail, I heard some officers saying, “Oh yeah, we only did this because we want to get home and we’re tired. We escalated this because everyone’s tired and want to get home.” Following Black Leadership, and Protecting Bodies of Color Anthony: People were respecting the young Black participants in the protest- they weren’t the organizers or directors of movement. They weren’t in control of the situation. But they were Packet Page 49 6 the march leaders in the moment by way of having the mic and having the courage in that moment. Penny: I remember the crowd was calling white people to the front. A lot of white people were at the front then yelling at the police. Agitation was happening from some of the young white “allies” who were instigating. This made me more nervous because agitation could put people of color at risk. Nobody in the protest had threatened violence. We know that people of color are targeted in any setting more that white people so, especially in a protest or in a time of heightened situation, a strategy or a way of protecting the people you’re there to support is to surround black and brown bodies with white bodies. Often in protest folks of color will ask for that. White allies, after attending these kinds of events, have learned that this is something they should be doing, expected to do. The hope is putting white people between officers and brown people helps protect people of color. Not Wanting to Turn Around, Feeling Trapped Anthony: You could feel the battle happening between what the protest was going to become- call it quits and go back to Mitchell park and relax or keep pushing because we were so angry. Jackie: Turning around felt like a defeat. Unless it’s planned, turning around feels like a defeat. Having no option but to turn around was a hard one without any leadership. People didn’t want to have a protest for hours and then just turn around when meeting a police line. Justice: There was no clear intention or directive to get on the freeway again. There was no intention to do anything, but we were just stuck there and turning around felt like defeat. We were trapped. Nora: It felt inevitable that the police were not going to let them through, and the protesters weren’t going to turn away. I had a big sense that this isn’t going to end well because the police already showed up this way and it’s their way or nothing. At some point, I talked to a Cal Poly police officer and asked, “are you really going to tear gas me and these students?” he shrugged and said, “I don’t know what’s going to happen.” I’d be walking back and forth behind the protest line to check in on protesters to see how they were doing. At one point some of the protesters started to turn back. There was an attempt to turn back and turn in a different direction. Then they decided that that was splintering and came back. Penny: Blocking all of Santa Rosa and not giving anyone a forward moving option is not viable for creating consensus. Protesters just kept saying they wanted to move forward. There was nowhere to turn except to turn around. Someone had to backdown and it was either going to be police or protesters. It didn’t feel like it was the role of protesters to back down from the people (police) who had been intimidating them all day. Protesters never tried to get through the barricades. If there had been an option to turn left, we would have done that. The police line blocked all of Santa Rosa. Protesters on the bullhorn were trying to say we're not trying to get on the interstate that they wanted to protest in front Packet Page 50 7 of the police station. Police weren’t really interacting. We couldn’t see anyone’s face except for the San Luis Obispo Police Captain. Everyone else had full mask and riot gear. There were lots of different agencies present, a large police presence, lots of cars. What stood out to me was the protest had no clear leadership on the protester side or the police side. I also remember people noting that the police Chief wasn't even there. People and leaders were questioning why the Chief wasn't the one present when she was who people had a relationship with. Police Concerns of Protesters Reentering the Highway Anthony: I needed to know as a peacekeeper what to be ready for. I didn’t hear at any point anybody say, “we’re going back on the highway”. I don’t know if people were aware that by virtue of going north on Santa Rosa that we were getting close to the highway. I didn’t hear that. That was not the goal. Christopher: One of the speakers got on a bullhorn and said that the police thought they were going on the highway again but that they’re not going on the highway again. The speaker said that a number of times. People wanted to walk down Santa Rosa. Protesters had ruled getting back on the highway out. They were just trying to walk down Santa Rosa. Jackie: There was no clear intention or directive to get on the freeway again. There was no intention to do anything, but we were just stuck there and turning around felt like defeat. We were trapped. Getting on the freeway a second time would have been really anti-climactic. We were tired. This had been going on for 6 hours and we had walked miles and miles. Re-entering the freeway wasn’t in the cards. Communication: The Police Dispersal Order and Announcements Amongst the Crowd Alberto: There was a helicopter circling and there was a single propeller plane flying overhead. They were taking turns constantly hovering over the protesters. I think that contributed to the chaos. It was hard to hear, with the flying and circling overhead. That, and there were a ton of people who were conversing. Some announcements were made from police. I was right up on the line and I couldn’t hear them. There were 2-3 announcements in that intersection while I was there. I could hear the bullhorn, but I couldn’t make out what was said at all. No one really wanted to leave. People wanted to stay there and stand their ground and be there at the protest. At that point one of the speakers got up on the megaphone on a bullhorn and said that the police were saying this is an unlawful protest. The speaker had to repeat what was being said because there were a lot of people and a lot of aircraft. I could see but I couldn’t hear what they were saying. It was basically “hey guys, were not doing anything wrong standing here. But they want us to leave. We don’t want you to feel unsafe so you can stay but we want you to avoid anything uncomfortable. We’re not keeping you here, please go home.” All I could tell is that the police were trying to say something. The officer making the announcement was way at the back behind police lines. I couldn’t hear words just that someone was trying to say something over a loudspeaker. I couldn’t hear it over the din of the Packet Page 51 8 crowd and sounds of the helicopter. It didn’t seem like the police tried very hard to let everyone know. If you want people to hear, you bring the bullhorn forward not in the back where no one can hear it. The front-line officers were having conversations with everyone. If they had told those protesters at the front that there was a dispersal order it would have spread very quickly. The police didn’t take into account the noise levels and what would make it loud enough or they didn’t try very hard. Anthony: One of the speakers had left the protest. They had been exhausted, tired, and had left. They returned later and announced something akin to, “guys it’s not worth it to stand here and provoke the cops. This is a marathon not a race. Let’s head back to the park.” If I were a protester, I would have followed them, but as a peacekeeper I stayed with the cordon, the pods up against the cops. About a third of the protesters left with the dispersing group. Enough protesters stayed and more were coming, and then word got out that when sundown happens, we were going to get dispersed. We were seeing tear gas canisters, bean bag guns. We were watching them get ready to menace us. Christopher: The protesters’ bullhorn was more effective than the police’s. I couldn’t hear what the police were saying. It was far back, and nobody knew what the police were saying. The police had a bullhorn too, but it was weak. People who got arrested didn’t know they were going to get arrested. The speaker in the protest was trying to communicate this but no communication came from the police. All the people who were arrested later told me that they didn’t know what was going on. It felt arbitrary to see who got arrested. Jackie: A speaker in the group got up and said something like, “ok guys, we’re going to get teargassed. If you’re down for that cool. Stay. I’m going to go.” Some left. Another speaker got on the megaphone and said, “I’m tired.”. A man on the front line said, “We got you baby girl. You go home and we’ll stay here.” That’s when “team standoff” won. Nobody knew what to do. Jo: There was an elderly Black man at the front of the line who tried to leave. He rose his hands in the air and said, “I’m too old for this shit” and tried to cross the line of officers to go. One of the officers who was a Cal Poly police officer actually shoved a baton into the elderly man’s abdomen and told him to stay back on the protester side because nobody was supposed to cross the line. I thought it was interesting because an acquaintance who had joined just a bit earlier had crossed the line from behind the officers. They had been coming from behind and essentially was like “pardon me”, the officers stepped aside and let him join the protest. The premise from the police was “don’t cross the line” when my acquaintance had just crossed the line. They police were just stopping us from continuing this peaceful protest. If the goal was to stop us from getting on the highway, they would have set up a barricade on the highway, not on Santa Rosa. The police were pretty straightforward and simple with their dispersal order. They got on a megaphone- which is an interesting way to get hundreds of people to listen. You’re outside in open space and sound travels in different directions. It’s going to get lost if you only have one. I saw one officer go to a handheld megaphone and say, “Here’s our dispersal order. This Packet Page 52 9 gathering is now determined an unlawful gathering. You have 15 minutest to disperse or face legal consequences” or some form of that. I was right at the police line so that’s why I heard it. Nora: I was trying to get answers because the police weren’t saying anything to the general crowd. I couldn't tell who was in charge with the police line. I couldn't tell if there was some kind of negotiation that could have happened. I was trying to get some information and see if there was a way to negotiate out of this, essentially. By negotiate I mean if the police could stand down and allow us to proceed, it wouldn’t have resulted in a violent confrontation. Rosie: I joined after the blockade had already happened. I wasn’t part of the march, so when I joined the protest was already at a standstill. We were in the street and there was a helicopter and a huge police line and people with megaphones behind the police lines. I couldn't hear what police were saying- instead information was disseminated by protesters. We tried to talk to police at the line asking what we’re supposed to do, and they were stone faced silent. We had the end goal of marching to Foothill, so we were going to stay until they moved. As we asked around “what did they say?” protesters would share “we have to move back on the sidewalk” but minimal information got through. I know there were some people face to face with officers, but any information shared up there couldn’t be heard by the crowd and the officers on the megaphone were 20-30 feet behind the line- we couldn't hear anything especially with the helicopter and the crowd. Police Advance Alberto: I was taking videos on my phone documenting everything. Everyone was sitting down. The police were plugging as many holes as possible with officers to get their line as thick as possible. Then they took a choreographed aggressive step forward. Everyone freaked out and started running away. One woman was sitting on the ground and an officer hit her with his shield and used it as a battering weapon against her. I think she got arrested too. It came out of nowhere. Nobody was up and yelling in their faces. Everyone was seated and the police provoked this action. Everyone started to run up Santa Rosa to get away. Once they got enough space- about 10 feet- is when the police started opening fire at the protesters. People had their backs to them. I think they were foam bullets. I do know they were using mace. One guy was trying to pull his backpack to his face and the police officer was shaking a can and spraying it in the guy’s face. At the same time, you could see the pepper bullets popping on the ground. We ran away and then I came back to see what was going on. There were angry protesters about 40-50 feet away still yelling at police. It was getting darker, approaching nightfall, and I did notice someone hiding out behind the building who threw a firework at the police. I don’t know where it landed, it was kind of chaotic. Anthony: Police started pushing protesters back- I think that some protesters were pushed down and then helped back up. Flash bangs were used. The pepper balls started getting shot out. Foam rounds started being shot out. We were dispersed. There were pops of flash bangs. People were screaming, yelling, and running back. There was teargas in the air. I started bolting. I remember hearing foam rounds hitting people- people were screaming and I heard Packet Page 53 10 foam rounds bouncing off their backpacks. I heard them bouncing off the ground. Ominous white balls were emitting smoke. Some people turned back and wanted to yell at the cops. It was scary. The sun had gone down, streetlights were turning on, and it looked like a war zone. People were getting pelted with stuff. I took the role of getting tear gas out of people’s eyes. This was a thing I had expected so I got water bottles out. People were coming up crying and screaming. I was pouring water on them to try to get it out of their eyes. I didn’t see any blood, but lots of people with burning eyes. I made sure the people who were so amped up that they wanted to go back to the cops didn't- I wanted to make sure they were ushered away. The cops had arrested at least 8 people that night. They got their people. They got their arrests. Jackie: I was stuck- me and some others- were stuck by the fountain and that’s when the police started pushing. It was really scary- they push, and then you’re afraid to get trampled in the crowd. We were stuck. My friend asked a woman cop who shouted “move!” where we could go because we were wedged against a wall. The cop told her to climb the wall. People were climbing over the fountain. We were honestly stuck and asked, “where do we go?” we were scared. It was really scary. It was intense. It felt like war. It was scary. The coughing, the tear gas in the lungs was very irritating. It was scary. Scary and running as fast as I could not knowing where my friends were. I was totally in shock. I knew intellectually that it was coming, but I didn’t know exactly what that was going to look like- pepper balls, rubber bullets, tear gas. I stayed because I felt like I needed to. To bear witness and if other people are there- especially young Black people- it felt like an obligation to stay. Even though I knew it was coming, it was scary when it actually happened. Justice: I heard flash bang sounds like fireworks and then police started shooting tear gas. Everyone started screaming and running. I saw two protesters who had been pepper sprayed in the face at close contact. I tried to give first aid. Very few people were left in that immediate area, and then the police went even harder with pepper spray and rubber bullets- bright pink- not even rubber, just hard pellets. I started screaming. I was so upset because I was giving first aid and this violence was coming at us. These were young unarmed people protesting. I got hit by one of the metal canisters on my foot. I now have a heat scar that burned through my pant leg. I’m going to remember this moment for the rest of my life when I look at this scar. I want an accounting of all the weapons that were shot. What was it? What hit me on the leg and scarred me? Nora: A few minutes after they put on gas masks, I started to back up because I didn’t want to be tear gassed. Then basically the protesters were shouting “show me what democracy looks like” and decided to sit. It was really powerful imagery. Tear gas canisters were coming at them and then there was a flash bang thrown from the police into the protesters. Penny: At that point I was across from the police station. We had crossed the street to try to leave. We didn’t want to get teargassed. Police were pointing canisters up the hill. We were stopped there because they were losing control of the group, and the police flanked us back in, through the bushes, back to the group and then they deployed the tear gas. They made us walk Packet Page 54 11 right into it. They had cut off Walnut and put us back in the group that was just teargassed. We had to leave and run up the hill through the teargas. That’s when I heard a loud bang. We were ducking, like we were being shot. I put my arm around my friend. There was so much happening I don’t know what happened first. I never saw anyone throw anything. Then people were trying to jump on a wall and through bushes. They didn’t want to go into the teargas. I was at the top of the hill watching. The street was full of teargas. I remember hearing and seeing what looked like a flash/firecracker and big bangs. That was the most disorienting. After two rounds of teargas, people started to really leave. Rosie: I was behind the police line and I saw a flash bang shoot over the line from the police side into the protesters. I saw a black thing fly overhead- I thought it was a drone- and then felt the ground shake and saw the flash of light and smoke. The only thing I saw coming back from the protester side was a water bottle. Sam: I was at Walnut and lots of protesters moved to the sidewalk, which left me and 3 other people sitting in the street. We were sitting on the ground, hands on our heads when we were arrested. Then all hell broke loose- they started shooting. Even people who were on the sidewalk were shot at. It was terrifying. I am a very small person. I don’t need four cops to come and arrest me when I’m doing nothing. We started moving off Walnut because the cops were pushing people on the sidewalk. Tensions were rising and we tried to deescalate by sitting and chanting “hands up don’t shoot”. We were clearly unarmed people sitting on the ground. Police were about to use force against a lot of children with their hands up. Arrests Rosie: All of a sudden, all the police officers got in a straight line and started pushing against us on the sidewalks with shields and batons up. They started all together pushing into us as if to knock the crowd back. I was next to one of my friends and a Correctional Officer was pushing against me. I stood my ground not pushing back but not letting myself be knocked over. He grabbed my wrist and yanked me and said, “you’re under arrest” and pulled me behind police lines. He dragged me behind the line. He then patted himself and said, “I don’t have any cuffs”. We then were walking around and he’s asking other officers for cuffs. He found an officer that gave him flexicuffs. They bound me so tight that I had bruises for days. I was walked over to the officers who were with the detainment van and there was someone who had been arrested just before me. We were walking 3-4 feet apart to the detainment van. They’re obviously white and I’m obviously Latina. I had a little sweater on, with the cuffs on, and the officer stuck her hand in all my pockets, checked my hood, checked my sweater pockets, stuck her hand in my waistband, my underwear, pulled my bra away from my body. She took my shoes and grabbed around my socks and then I was put in the back of the van by myself into one section. They bagged all my property, took my name and info. In the van we protesters were talking with each other- how are you doing? Are you ok? And I said, “my shoes are annoying me after the search” and they said “What do you mean? Why were your shoes off? We didn’t get Packet Page 55 12 searched”. They were both white. I said, “You didn't get searched?” and they said “No- they just put us in the van.” We were in the detainment van from about 8PM to about 10 and then the van drove us to the county jail, and we were all processed. I was processed last. They put us into a holding cell and then took us back out to take our picture and get fingerprints. When they did that to me the officers in the room were asking “what are you going to do after this? You going to loot? You want a new tv?” After being in there a while we talked to each other and we agreed we’d all look away when someone used the toilet. I gave someone my thin blanket. It was really cold. Later on, when I got my arrest records, they had the wrong officer’s name. While we were in the van, they asked for my information again to write out the report because the person who arrested me hadn’t done the report. Someone else filled it out who wasn’t the arresting officer. They filled out my paperwork after the fact. We were given a couple minutes to look through our phones and write down phone numbers, but officers were impatient. I wrote down my mom and dad’s numbers but they didn’t answer because it was midnight, and they were asleep. That should have been my first instinct to call a friend who could pick me up. We knew that if we couldn’t get someone to pick us up that night, then we were going to have to wait until morning to get released. Sam: I wasn’t read rights. I don’t think any of us arrestees were. Police pulled us back behind the police line. It seemed disorganized. They zip tied us with our arms behind our backs, walked me to the police station, didn’t know where to put me, and made me walk backwards to a van. We were split up by gender in 2 different vans. We were put in the back of a van. They asked questions- got our information. All they said to me was that I was under arrest. The cop who filled out the arrest report wasn’t the guy who arrested us. They took us to jail and they took us out and processed us, logging everything we had. First thing they took off our bodies were our masks. They took off the zip ties at that point, processed us, put us in a waiting cell. They didn’t interact with us for a while. They didn't tell us what we were in jail for. It was about another 40 minutes before another cop came and one at a time read us our charges. Said we might be able to leave that night. Another 30 minutes pass before another cop comes and says, “do you even know why you’re still waiting in these cells?" We said, “I don’t know” and then the cop said “oh yeah, you’re actually waiting for someone to pick you up. You have to call them.” I’m now spending the next three hours hoping someone will get me. They wouldn’t give us access to our cell phones to look up our contacts. Now I know you’re supposed to write phone numbers on your arm because you don’t have access to contact information when you’re arrested. They said they needed a warrant for me to be able to access my phone. We were in that cell for about 30 minutes before we got a mask. We asked a few times asking them for one. While I was being read my charges, the cops were cracking jokes about how I was some kind of cult leader. When I asked them where the other van might be (it hadn’t arrived yet), one of the cops said, “I don’t know they’re probably getting gassed or something”. It was ridiculous. Packet Page 56 13 One cop defended using rubber bullets because someone had thrown a water bottle, while the cops were fully decked out in riot gear and shields. At 10 PM, people had come to pick me up, but there was an additional 2 hours for them to complete the paperwork. Police didn’t tell me during that time that anyone was coming to pick me up. They didn’t tell me there were people already there and just waiting for paperwork to be processed. I was really losing my shit in there. I got out around midnight. While I was there, I wasn’t talking very much but I have crazy anxiety as is. This was horrifying and nerve-wracking. It was radio doom and gloom in my head for four hours. What Still Resonates, Remaining Questions Alberto: I was pretty weary of police before, now I’ve galvanized against them. I think that with seeing all the acts of violence against protesters in the past months in combination with it happening to me- I don’t like police at all now. The police were the aggressors and they really tried to cover their ass. How are you going to show up to a protest that at its very core is about police violence against their own citizens and then go on and commit violence against your own citizens? You show up and shoot and gas people. I would suggest to police to not be a stereotype- out there hurting people. It’s your community that you live in and you know these people. Treat them as your neighbors not your enemies. Anne: I really think everyone was trying to do their best in a complicated situation. But unfortunately, the best the police were trained to do was inherently violent, over-reactionary, and escalating and that’s why this went down the way it did. Anthony: Something changed in SLO that day. As someone thinking about having kids here- this is my community. I live downtown. We now know that the SLO PD is willing to use what could be lethal force- to break up a bunch of kids that were justifiably angry. They can’t undo or deny the fact that they teargassed us. The way in which people in this community will bend over backwards to justify anything the cops do is scary. I’m Jewish and that informs why I'm committed to social justice- what I’m seeing in the community is a bunch of people who, were they regular normal people living in 30’s or 40’s Germany would have enabled a lot of awful behavior. They would have stood by and looked the other way. I’m not going to compare college students getting tear gassed to the Holocaust, but I saw that undercurrent in SLO community members responding to the tear gas. That scared me more than the actual protest. People were primed to blame the protesters and look for excuses for the behavior of the police department. It’s the “lone wolf’ people that I think are emboldened by police using force that scares me the most. I don’t want to change the culture of policing; I want police defunded- to take the weapons out of their hands and for that money to go to help people and the community. I don’t want empty promises and shit that we know won’t work- like police accountability commissions. I want actual change that stops cops from harming people. There is still outstanding confusion- we still don’t know who to be angry at. The Chief? The Captains? City council? The city manager? Our civic muscle as Americans and Californians is so Packet Page 57 14 atrophied that we don’t know how power is actually built and consolidated and wielded. Everyone is passing the buck, and I still don’t think people know what happened and who's call this was. Christopher: This was a very heavy-handed approach that didn’t make sense. The Chief later went on to say a lot of things that weren’t true. The police weren’t good at communicating. If I were managing, I would tell them to block highway entrances/exits, use multiple megaphones, tell officers at front that they’d communicate with people who would be arrested. I wonder why the Chief wasn’t there. I want to know why the Chief wasn’t there. Why did they think that this was such a serious event that they would call 110 officers from all over the county- why did they think that was necessary? They were heavily deployed, and I want to know why they invested in that in the first place. SLO is a safe space so I don’t know the need for those supplies. I‘d like to know the cost and why they got those supplies in the first place. I want to know why two of the arrestees were picked when they were just sitting there not really doing anything. Why did they single them out? They chose to charge five people for a supposed crime that 300 protesters committed at the same time. Jo: To this day I will always be more wary of police officers. I don’t trust any officers. I thought SLO was going to be a place where these things wouldn’t happen. The police in this instance were not protecting and serving. They took the interest of public and private property to be more important than the lives of folk. I’ve since spoken to police officers and they get very technical with what chemicals and weapons were used. They get caught up on the technical language. The technicality of things is a way to get around what they did to disperse the crowd for controlling purposes. Justice: The emotion of the violence is still resonating with me. To see peaceful young people- those high school students with their craft signs and seeing the sounds and smell and the violence from the police was awful- the violence from a police force that’s supposed to be neutral and helping people. And it’s San Luis Obispo. Who authorized the plan to bring extra law enforcement in tactical riot gear? What Governing Authority gave the authorization of law enforcement in riot gear? (City Council? Police chief? City Administrator? Emergency Service director?) What was the approval process and who was involved in the decision making? What were the law enforcement agents directed to do? What was the expense for these measures and what agency paid for this? City? County? Did the funds come from a city budget? Were the funds allocated from another community service? Which law enforcement agencies were present and how many officers from each agency? (SLOPD? Cal Poly UPD? Sheriff? State Prison?) What was the purpose of the use of drones and what agencies are they from? Who authorized the FAA license to fly the drones in a public downtown core? What was the cost of this? What will the footage be used for? I want an accounting of all the weapons that were shot at unarmed protesters. What was it? What hit me on the leg and scarred me? Nora: What happened on June 1st was a judgement call made by SLO PD that makes me question their judgment. Makes me question the role of SLO PD and campus police in keeping Packet Page 58 15 people safe. Because they did not keep people safe that day. If they think they did, I wonder who they think they were keeping safe because it was not the youth at the protest. I don’t trust their judgment. It also made me aware that we have a very militarized police for a small town with little crime. I wonder what the point of that is. I want people to think about the militarization of police locally. Sam: There was a huge community support afterwards. People donated to bail funds we didn’t even need. Legal representation was provided pro bono. I talked to people in the news and with my professors. Professors called me. There was an almost overwhelming amount of support. It was beautiful and unexpected. You usually hear the opposite about SLO. What stuck with me was this blind belief in the police narrative. We’re only getting that one side- I don’t know how that doesn’t clue people in or have them think about why they’re only getting a one-sided story. I don’t understand why people are so willing to jump to the defense of the police but not people in the community. Packet Page 59 Process Chart for the After Action Review of the June 1, 2020 Protest March Implement Recommendations: All Recommendations Have Been Implemented or Are In The Process of  Implementation at Time of AAR Publishing  Communicate Findings: Provide AAR Presentation to Council on February 16, 2021 Develope Findings and Recommendations Conduct Analysis Identify and Engage Key Stakeholders: Mansager Conducted Independent Interviews with Community  Memebers Involved in the Protest Conduct Research on the Incident, Compile Relevant Materials, Review Information Select a Team or Lead to Conduct AAR: Command Staff with Consultants Bueerman & Mansager Determine the Type of AAR to Conduct June 16, 2020 Council Direction to Staff to Coduct After Action Review June 1, 2020 Protest March Attachment 2 Packet Page 60 Memorandum Date: January 6, 2021 To: Derek Johnson City Manager, City of San Luis Obispo Capt. Jeff Smith, Interim Chief of Police San Luis Obispo Police Department From: Chief Jim Bueermann (Ret.) jbueermann@futurepolicing.org 909.557.6563 Subject: Review of San Luis Obispo PD’s After Action Report Summary I have reviewed the San Luis Obispo Police Department’s (SLOPD) After Action Report which focused on the actions the department and supporting allied agencies took during a community protest in San Luis Obispo (SLO) on 6-1-20. It is my opinion that it meets generally accepted criteria for a “after action review” of the type desired by Chief Cantrell when she engaged my services. It answers the fundamental questions of what happened, why it happened and what can be done in the future to avoid similar outcomes. Discussion In August 2020 I entered into an agreement with then Chief Cantrell to conduct a review of the SLOPD June 1, 2020 After Action draft report. I was not engaged to conduct the review itself nor interview department or community members. I have reviewed the pertinent media reports, the community consultant’s report and have spoken with the SLOPD interim chief and the SLOPD staff member responsible for conducting the review. In doing so, I have discussed the process of conducting reviews such as this, the complicated nature of policing or participating in public protests and best practices for reviewing critical incidents. In addition, we have discussed the value of SLOPD becoming a learning organization. I have found Interim Chief Smith’s interest in furthering the development of the police department in this regard to be impressive and quite encouraging. I have also worked with the community consultant to facilitate her understanding of policing practices and protest dynamics. I found her to be appropriately objective and very focused on capturing the observations and perceptions of several community members who participated in the 6-1-20 protest. Policing in America today is a complicated matter. The police are called upon to handle some of the most complicated situations our society faces. Many of these situations have Attachment 3 Packet Page 61 2 of 6 less than optimal outcomes. In those instances, it is imperative that the police learn what happened, why it happened and how to improve outcomes in future similar situations. Failure to learn from previous events frequently produces similar poor outcomes. To quote noted philosopher George Santayana, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” In a policing context, this represents the importance of truly learning from an incident or event and applying that new understanding to similar future endeavors in the hopes of achieving better results. The mechanism most widely utilized by the police for understanding critical incidents or events are “After Action Reviews” (AAR’s) or “Critical Incident Reviews” (CIR’s). They are fundamental to the development of a healthy, accountable and community-engaged police department. Honest and self-critical reviews of the various critical incidents or events that the police are charged with resolving or managing is essential to maintaining the public’s trust and confidence in the local governmental entity paid to protect it. This is especially true today as police “reform” is still front-of-mind for so many community members and policy makers. The best model for less rigorous AAR/CIR’s is one that is initiated by the police (as opposed to an outside entity compelling the review), is framed around a non-blaming approach, is apolitical and answers the basic questions related to what happened, why it happened and what was learned and contains community input and observations. All of these elements are present in the SLOPD effort I reviewed. AAR’s/CIR’s are developed under a variety of circumstances and their format and effort reflect those variables. They also reflect the organization’s commitment to on-going learning and improvement. For instance, police response to an in-progress burglary, a public protest, and an active-shooter incident are all examples of incidents that call for varying levels of departmental review. When the police respond to an in-progress burglary, for example, the review of the department’s actions would appropriately take place at the squad or team level and may be rather informal. Police actions in a protest with less-than-optimal outcomes would dictate a more formal review with community observations included. A police representative can also appropriately conduct this type of review. And finally, an active- shooter incident would dictate a holistic, all-encompassing review of police practices and policies, the role of other involved organizations, leadership component, a focus on training and organizational culture, communications, policies and practices, a comprehensive review of the perpetrator’s background, etc. These should be conducted by an independent third- party. These reviews are the most comprehensive types of reviews – but they are also the most arduous, time consuming and expensive. Chief Cantrell and I discussed the type of review we thought would be appropriate to learn from the 6-1-20 protest given fiscal and resource constraints. She was leaning toward one conducted by a SLOPD staff member and I agreed with that decision. Findings It is my opinion that the SLOPD AAR pertaining to the 6-1-20 protest meets the generally accepted criteria for a “after action review” of the type desired by Chief Cantrell when she Packet Page 62 3 of 6 engaged my services. It answers the fundamental questions of what happened, why it happened and what can be done in the future to avoid similar outcomes. More importantly, it appears to be the impetus to a more rigorous effort on the part of the department’s current leadership to develop the SLOPD into a “learning organization” that is continually focused on improving it policies, procedures and practices and anchoring on-going learning to its organizational culture. It is evident to me that the leadership of the SLOPD did not wait for the review to be completed before enacting some necessary changes to the tactics, equipment or resources they might use in managing future protests. My understanding is that there have been several protests in San Luis Obispo since the one on 6-1-20, all of which had much better outcomes. This is an indication, that, in part, the lessons learned by the SLOPD from the 6-1-20 protest more than likely contributed to improved outcomes. In addition, the behavior and actions of protest participants since 6-1-20 may have also changed to facilitate a more peaceful expression of their 1st Amendment rights. Recommendations Based on my review of the SLOPD after action report of the 6-1-20 protest, and my discussions with SLOPD staff and the community consultant, I make the following general recommendations for advancing democratic policing in San Luis Obispo: 1.Anchor the notion of a learning organization to the culture of the SLOPD through training and the use of informal and formal AAR’s/CIR’s, establishing a strategy to collect the “lessons learned,” requiring a variety of staff members to conduct the reviews, etc.; 2.Continue to review advances in crowd and protest management as determined by the most prominent national policing and research organizations; 3.Conduct tabletop simulations of potential protests to identify optimal tactics and plans for managing future protests; 4.Persist with the initiative to engage the community, especially those segments interested in public protests; and, 5.Consider collaborating with local or regional mediation organizations that can be helpful in facilitating open and productive dialogue between the police and protest community (such as is advocated by the Trust Network – https://mediatorsbeyondborders.org/trust/) Resources The following are resources the SLOPD can use to further its development as a learning organization and conduct future after action/critical incident reviews. It is not a comprehensive collection but does provide the department with sufficient resources to begin advancing its organizational learning philosophy. Packet Page 63 4 of 6 How to Conduct an After Action Review by the National Police Foundation (www.policefoundation.org), a USDOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing publication. Critical Incident Review Library, National Police Foundation (https://www.policefoundation.org/critical-incident-review-library/ Debriefings and after action reviews by Sid Heal, a Summer 2009 Tactical Edge article Policing Protests – Lessons Learned from the Occupy Movement, Ferguson & Beyond: A Guide for Police by Edward R. Maguire and Megan Oakley (a Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation publication) Protecting and Facilitating the Right to Engage in Peaceful Protests and Demonstrations, a report to Governor Gavin Newsom by Ron Davis and Lateefah Simmon Report on the 2020 Protests and Civil Unrest, a publication of the Major Cities Chiefs Association Knowledge Management in Policing by T. David Chavez, Michael Pendleton and Jim Bueermann, a USDOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing publication. Becoming a Learning Organization: What is a learning organization and why should the criminal justice community care? by Joe Binns at www.police1.com Bueermann Biography Chief Jim Bueermann (Ret.) has spent more than 40 years in policing. From 1978 to 2011 he was a member of the Redlands (CA) Police Department, where he served in every unit within the department. In his last 13 years with the department, he was the Chief of Police and Director of Housing, Recreation and Senior Services. He directed the implementation and strategic development of community policing in Redlands which included directing the consolidation of Housing, Recreation and Senior Services into the police department as a risk and preventative factor strategy for reducing crime and adolescent problem behavior. In 2000, this effort was recognized by the Innovations in American Government Award program (Harvard’s Kennedy School) as one of the 25 most innovative governmental programs in America. After his retirement in 2011 he worked for a year for the USDOJ, National Institute of Justice as an Executive Fellow. In 2012 he was appointed the president of the National Police Foundation (NPF) - America's oldest non-partisan, non-profit police research organization. During his tenure at the NPF he supervised numerous critical incident reviews and police reform efforts involving some of the most noteworthy policing incidents in America. These included: the civil unrest in Ferguson, MO after the Michael Brown shooting by police; the “Christopher Dorner Incident” in which a former Los Angeles police officer began hunting LAPD executives and their families (resulting in several murders of civilians and police officers); the Stockton, CA bank robbery in which a hostage was inadvertently killed by the police; the Pulse Nightclub mass shooting in Packet Page 64 5 of 6 Orlando, FL; the Uber driver serial killer in Kalamazoo, MI; the county response to the tragic mass shooting at Stoneman Douglas High School in Broward County, FL; the husband-wife terrorist mass shooting in San Bernardino, CA; the January 2017 response by the Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Department to the Presidential Inauguration protest demonstration; and, a controversial murder investigation in Arcata, CA. He retired from the Foundation in late 2018. He was one of the first police chiefs to be inducted as an honorary fellow into the Academy of Experimental Criminology and into the halls of fame at George Mason University’s Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy (VA) and the School of Behavioral Science at California State University, San Bernardino (CA). In 2018 he was awarded the Distinguished Achievement Award in Evidence-Based Crime Policy by George Mason University’s Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy. Chief Bueermann sits on advisory boards at Cambridge University’s Institute of Criminology, Executive Development Program, George Mason University’s Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy, Axon’s (market leader in police body cameras) AI and Police Technology Ethics Board and Lexipol’s (nation-wide public safety policy/risk management firm) Law Enforcement Advisory Council. He currently serves as the policing advisor to the national Trust Network, a consortium of local mediation centers, founded by Mediators without Borders, International, focused on reducing pre/post election-related violence in America. He is also the policing advisor to Police2Peace a non-profit organization aiming to anchor the framework of “peace officers” to the American policing culture. He also serves as the Strategic Site Liaison to the Anchorage Police Department (AK) for the US Department of Justice’s National Public Safety Partnership initiative focusing on violence reduction in key jurisdictions throughout the U.S. Until his retirement from the NPF he sat on the FBI Academy National Academy Advisory Board and served as the research advisor to the California Police Chiefs Association. Appointed by Attorney General Eric Holder, he served on the US Department of Justice’s Science Advisory Board from 2015 until the end of 2018. In addition, he was appointed to the National Academies of Sciences Working Group on Crime Trends and its Panel on Proactive Policing. Chief Bueermann has worked extensively on advanced technology projects in policing that include mobile devices, crime mapping, community analysis, social networks, surveillance cameras, drones, sentiment analysis, data mining, geospatial tracking, virtual reality and artificial intelligence. He has also worked extensively in the field of evidence-based policing and prisoner reentry. He is a charter member of the Police Futurists International and is a founding member of the American Society of Evidence Based Policing. He has done extensive lecturing on a wide breadth of policing issues across the U.S. and internationally. He has worked extensively with local and national community and advocacy groups, bureaucrats and politicians on police reform issues. In addition, he has conducted national and international interviews with a wide breadth of media sources such as USA Today, Packet Page 65 6 of 6 the New York Times, the LA Times, CNN, NBC, CBS, Fox News, KNX News Radio, the BBC and numerous other international publications. He holds a bachelor’s degree from California State University at San Bernardino and a master’s degree from the University of Redlands. In addition, he is a graduate of the FBI’s National Academy in Quantico, Virginia and the California Command College. In January 2019, Chief Bueermann founded Future Policing Strategies, a California- based consultancy that helps practitioners, policymakers and community members envision and advance policing for the future. Packet Page 66 Memorandum Date: January 6, 2021 To: Derek Johnson City Manager, City of San Luis Obispo Capt. Jeff Smith, Interim Chief of Police San Luis Obispo Police Department From: Chief Jim Bueermann (Ret.) jbueermann@futurepolicing.org 909.557.6563 Subject: Review of San Luis Obispo PD’s After Action Report Summary I have reviewed the San Luis Obispo Police Department’s (SLOPD) After Action Report which focused on the actions the department and supporting allied agencies took during a community protest in San Luis Obispo (SLO) on 6-1-20. It is my opinion that it meets generally accepted criteria for a “after action review” of the type desired by Chief Cantrell when she engaged my services. It answers the fundamental questions of what happened, why it happened and what can be done in the future to avoid similar outcomes. Discussion In August 2020 I entered into an agreement with then Chief Cantrell to conduct a review of the SLOPD June 1, 2020 After Action draft report. I was not engaged to conduct the review itself nor interview department or community members. I have reviewed the pertinent media reports, the community consultant’s report and have spoken with the SLOPD interim chief and the SLOPD staff member responsible for conducting the review. In doing so, I have discussed the process of conducting reviews such as this, the complicated nature of policing or participating in public protests and best practices for reviewing critical incidents. In addition, we have discussed the value of SLOPD becoming a learning organization. I have found Interim Chief Smith’s interest in furthering the development of the police department in this regard to be impressive and quite encouraging. I have also worked with the community consultant to facilitate her understanding of policing practices and protest dynamics. I found her to be appropriately objective and very focused on capturing the observations and perceptions of several community members who participated in the 6-1-20 protest. Policing in America today is a complicated matter. The police are called upon to handle some of the most complicated situations our society faces. Many of these situations have Attachment 4 Packet Page 67 2 of 6 less than optimal outcomes. In those instances, it is imperative that the police learn what happened, why it happened and how to improve outcomes in future similar situations. Failure to learn from previous events frequently produces similar poor outcomes. To quote noted philosopher George Santayana, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” In a policing context, this represents the importance of truly learning from an incident or event and applying that new understanding to similar future endeavors in the hopes of achieving better results. The mechanism most widely utilized by the police for understanding critical incidents or events are “After Action Reviews” (AAR’s) or “Critical Incident Reviews” (CIR’s). They are fundamental to the development of a healthy, accountable and community-engaged police department. Honest and self-critical reviews of the various critical incidents or events that the police are charged with resolving or managing is essential to maintaining the public’s trust and confidence in the local governmental entity paid to protect it. This is especially true today as police “reform” is still front-of-mind for so many community members and policy makers. The best model for less rigorous AAR/CIR’s is one that is initiated by the police (as opposed to an outside entity compelling the review), is framed around a non-blaming approach, is apolitical and answers the basic questions related to what happened, why it happened and what was learned and contains community input and observations. All of these elements are present in the SLOPD effort I reviewed. AAR’s/CIR’s are developed under a variety of circumstances and their format and effort reflect those variables. They also reflect the organization’s commitment to on-going learning and improvement. For instance, police response to an in-progress burglary, a public protest, and an active-shooter incident are all examples of incidents that call for varying levels of departmental review. When the police respond to an in-progress burglary, for example, the review of the department’s actions would appropriately take place at the squad or team level and may be rather informal. Police actions in a protest with less-than-optimal outcomes would dictate a more formal review with community observations included. A police representative can also appropriately conduct this type of review. And finally, an active- shooter incident would dictate a holistic, all-encompassing review of police practices and policies, the role of other involved organizations, leadership component, a focus on training and organizational culture, communications, policies and practices, a comprehensive review of the perpetrator’s background, etc. These should be conducted by an independent third- party. These reviews are the most comprehensive types of reviews – but they are also the most arduous, time consuming and expensive. Chief Cantrell and I discussed the type of review we thought would be appropriate to learn from the 6-1-20 protest given fiscal and resource constraints. She was leaning toward one conducted by a SLOPD staff member and I agreed with that decision. Findings It is my opinion that the SLOPD AAR pertaining to the 6-1-20 protest meets the generally accepted criteria for a “after action review” of the type desired by Chief Cantrell when she Advance Item Packet Page 68Packet Page 68 3 of 6 engaged my services. It answers the fundamental questions of what happened, why it happened and what can be done in the future to avoid similar outcomes. More importantly, it appears to be the impetus to a more rigorous effort on the part of the department’s current leadership to develop the SLOPD into a “learning organization” that is continually focused on improving it policies, procedures and practices and anchoring on-going learning to its organizational culture. It is evident to me that the leadership of the SLOPD did not wait for the review to be completed before enacting some necessary changes to the tactics, equipment or resources they might use in managing future protests. My understanding is that there have been several protests in San Luis Obispo since the one on 6-1-20, all of which had much better outcomes. This is an indication, that, in part, the lessons learned by the SLOPD from the 6-1-20 protest more than likely contributed to improved outcomes. In addition, the behavior and actions of protest participants since 6-1-20 may have also changed to facilitate a more peaceful expression of their 1st Amendment rights. Recommendations Based on my review of the SLOPD after action report of the 6-1-20 protest, and my discussions with SLOPD staff and the community consultant, I make the following general recommendations for advancing democratic policing in San Luis Obispo: 1.Anchor the notion of a learning organization to the culture of the SLOPD through training and the use of informal and formal AAR’s/CIR’s, establishing a strategy to collect the “lessons learned,” requiring a variety of staff members to conduct the reviews, etc.; 2.Continue to review advances in crowd and protest management as determined by the most prominent national policing and research organizations; 3.Conduct tabletop simulations of potential protests to identify optimal tactics and plans for managing future protests; 4.Persist with the initiative to engage the community, especially those segments interested in public protests; and, 5.Consider collaborating with local or regional mediation organizations that can be helpful in facilitating open and productive dialogue between the police and protest community (such as is advocated by the Trust Network – https://mediatorsbeyondborders.org/trust/) Resources The following are resources the SLOPD can use to further its development as a learning organization and conduct future after action/critical incident reviews. It is not a comprehensive collection but does provide the department with sufficient resources to begin advancing its organizational learning philosophy. Packet Page 69 4 of 6 How to Conduct an After Action Review by the National Police Foundation (www.policefoundation.org), a USDOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing publication. Critical Incident Review Library, National Police Foundation (https://www.policefoundation.org/critical-incident-review-library/ Debriefings and after action reviews by Sid Heal, a Summer 2009 Tactical Edge article Policing Protests – Lessons Learned from the Occupy Movement, Ferguson & Beyond: A Guide for Police by Edward R. Maguire and Megan Oakley (a Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation publication) Protecting and Facilitating the Right to Engage in Peaceful Protests and Demonstrations, a report to Governor Gavin Newsom by Ron Davis and Lateefah Simmon Report on the 2020 Protests and Civil Unrest, a publication of the Major Cities Chiefs Association Knowledge Management in Policing by T. David Chavez, Michael Pendleton and Jim Bueermann, a USDOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing publication. Becoming a Learning Organization: What is a learning organization and why should the criminal justice community care? by Joe Binns at www.police1.com Bueermann Biography Chief Jim Bueermann (Ret.) has spent more than 40 years in policing. From 1978 to 2011 he was a member of the Redlands (CA) Police Department, where he served in every unit within the department. In his last 13 years with the department, he was the Chief of Police and Director of Housing, Recreation and Senior Services. He directed the implementation and strategic development of community policing in Redlands which included directing the consolidation of Housing, Recreation and Senior Services into the police department as a risk and preventative factor strategy for reducing crime and adolescent problem behavior. In 2000, this effort was recognized by the Innovations in American Government Award program (Harvard’s Kennedy School) as one of the 25 most innovative governmental programs in America. After his retirement in 2011 he worked for a year for the USDOJ, National Institute of Justice as an Executive Fellow. In 2012 he was appointed the president of the National Police Foundation (NPF) - America's oldest non-partisan, non-profit police research organization. During his tenure at the NPF he supervised numerous critical incident reviews and police reform efforts involving some of the most noteworthy policing incidents in America. These included: the civil unrest in Ferguson, MO after the Michael Brown shooting by police; the “Christopher Dorner Incident” in which a former Los Angeles police officer began hunting LAPD executives and their families (resulting in several murders of civilians and police officers); the Stockton, CA bank robbery in which a hostage was inadvertently killed by the police; the Pulse Nightclub mass shooting in Advance Item Packet Page 70Packet Page 70 5 of 6 Orlando, FL; the Uber driver serial killer in Kalamazoo, MI; the county response to the tragic mass shooting at Stoneman Douglas High School in Broward County, FL; the husband-wife terrorist mass shooting in San Bernardino, CA; the January 2017 response by the Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Department to the Presidential Inauguration protest demonstration; and, a controversial murder investigation in Arcata, CA. He retired from the Foundation in late 2018. He was one of the first police chiefs to be inducted as an honorary fellow into the Academy of Experimental Criminology and into the halls of fame at George Mason University’s Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy (VA) and the School of Behavioral Science at California State University, San Bernardino (CA). In 2018 he was awarded the Distinguished Achievement Award in Evidence-Based Crime Policy by George Mason University’s Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy. Chief Bueermann sits on advisory boards at Cambridge University’s Institute of Criminology, Executive Development Program, George Mason University’s Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy, Axon’s (market leader in police body cameras) AI and Police Technology Ethics Board and Lexipol’s (nation-wide public safety policy/risk management firm) Law Enforcement Advisory Council. He currently serves as the policing advisor to the national Trust Network, a consortium of local mediation centers, founded by Mediators without Borders, International, focused on reducing pre/post election-related violence in America. He is also the policing advisor to Police2Peace a non-profit organization aiming to anchor the framework of “peace officers” to the American policing culture. He also serves as the Strategic Site Liaison to the Anchorage Police Department (AK) for the US Department of Justice’s National Public Safety Partnership initiative focusing on violence reduction in key jurisdictions throughout the U.S. Until his retirement from the NPF he sat on the FBI Academy National Academy Advisory Board and served as the research advisor to the California Police Chiefs Association. Appointed by Attorney General Eric Holder, he served on the US Department of Justice’s Science Advisory Board from 2015 until the end of 2018. In addition, he was appointed to the National Academies of Sciences Working Group on Crime Trends and its Panel on Proactive Policing. Chief Bueermann has worked extensively on advanced technology projects in policing that include mobile devices, crime mapping, community analysis, social networks, surveillance cameras, drones, sentiment analysis, data mining, geospatial tracking, virtual reality and artificial intelligence. He has also worked extensively in the field of evidence-based policing and prisoner reentry. He is a charter member of the Police Futurists International and is a founding member of the American Society of Evidence Based Policing. He has done extensive lecturing on a wide breadth of policing issues across the U.S. and internationally. He has worked extensively with local and national community and advocacy groups, bureaucrats and politicians on police reform issues. In addition, he has conducted national and international interviews with a wide breadth of media sources such as USA Today, Advance Item Packet Page 71Packet Page 71 6 of 6 the New York Times, the LA Times, CNN, NBC, CBS, Fox News, KNX News Radio, the BBC and numerous other international publications. He holds a bachelor’s degree from California State University at San Bernardino and a master’s degree from the University of Redlands. In addition, he is a graduate of the FBI’s National Academy in Quantico, Virginia and the California Command College. In January 2019, Chief Bueermann founded Future Policing Strategies, a California- based consultancy that helps practitioners, policymakers and community members envision and advance policing for the future. Advance Item Packet Page 72Packet Page 72 The Honorable Gavin Newsom September 28, 2020 1 September 28, 2020 The Honorable Gavin Newsom Governor of California State Capitol, Suite 1114 Sacramento, CA 95814 Dear Governor Newsom: When you asked us to serve as advisors to you on policing issues, you requested we provide you recommendations in two key police practices areas: 1) improving police response to demonstrations and protests in order to protect and facilitate peaceful free speech and expression; and 2) ensuring that California’s landmark new use of force laws (AB 392 and SB 230) are implemented appropriately across the state to foster a culture of de-escalation in which officers use force only when necessary. The initial phase of our work has focused on policing and demonstrations. We write today to provide you our recommendations on this topic. We also have started engaging stakeholders about implementation, training and oversight issues related to AB 392 and SB 230 and look forward to providing you those recommendations soon. As you no doubt are aware, changes to police practices are necessary but far from sufficient to address the many ways in which structural racism plays out in connection with policing and the criminal justice system. In addition to sharing their thoughts and recommendations on protests and use of force policies, stakeholders have shared with us a range of important broader policy recommendations related to policing, criminal justice, and racial justice. These conversations made clear that reimagining the role of law enforcement is a top priority for many community members and other stakeholders. Time and again, we heard stakeholders express a strong interest in shifting some funding away from traditional law enforcement responses to investments in communities and other types of first responders such as mental health providers and trained conflict resolution experts. Law enforcement stakeholders agree that police should not be first responders for handling mental health and socioeconomic issues. As your advisors, we wholeheartedly agree and endorse the views of community members and law enforcement in this area. Attachment 4 Packet Page 73 The Honorable Gavin Newsom September 28, 2020 2 Our recommendations today focus on improving police response to demonstrations and protests. We recommend that after we complete our use of force recommendations, you commission an additional phase of this project. For the new phase, we recommend engagement of stakeholders and academic partners to develop a roadmap for local law enforcement and communities to help guide their discussions around reimagining community safety. Below, we submit our recommendations for improving police response to demonstrations and protests. This is a critical issue because the First Amendment right to protest is fundamental to our democracy. As the New York Times Editorial Board recently recognized: “When George Floyd died under the knee of a Minneapolis police officer, the scourge of police violence, festering for generations, became a rallying point for Americans yearning for the fulfillment of this country’s founding aspiration to promote life, liberty and happiness.”1 Across California, the country, and globally, the murder of Mr. Floyd has amplified a much-needed conversation on race, police abuse, and social injustice. Hundreds of thousands of people have taken to the streets, many for the first time in their lives, to protest racism. While there are numerous examples of law enforcement professionalism, restraint, and even solidarity in some instances, there also have been disturbing and well-documented instances of unnecessary and counterproductive aggression, instigation, and over-reaction by some police officers and agencies in response to the demonstrations. Over the past several weeks, we have participated in dozens of small and large listening sessions with a wide range of stakeholders and experts from across the state to hear their concerns and recommendations. We had conversations with a wide range of community-based organizations and advocacy groups including racial justice, civil rights and civil liberties advocates, youth and youth advocacy organizations, and faith-based groups. We also met with statewide and local law enforcement organizations from small, medium and large cities across the state. Additionally, we spoke with prosecutors and defense attorneys and met with Legislators, local officials, and journalists. Based on our conversations with these stakeholders, there’s a broad consensus that we can and must do better to protect and facilitate the right to engage in peaceful protests and demonstrations in California. We also repeatedly heard 1 NYT Editorial Board. “In America, Protest is Patriotic.” New York Times, 2 June 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/opinion/george-floyd-protests-first-amendment.html Advance Item Packet Page 74Packet Page 74 The Honorable Gavin Newsom September 28, 2020 3 about challenges in mutual aid response related to differing standards, training, and expectations among participating agencies. Our recommendations for improving police response to protests and demonstrations include the following:  a recommended set of core values;  a summary of key themes that emerged from our listening sessions;  possible executive actions;  possible legislative action; and  a set of general recommendations for law enforcement agencies. As part of this project, Goldman School of Public Policy Professor Jack Glaser and his research assistant May Lim conducted a review of available research and analysis related to policing and demonstrations. They conducted this review with the goal of understanding what are the most effective practices to support First Amendment rights while minimizing harms, particularly violence and property damage. A copy of this review is attached and, where relevant, promising practices identified from the research have been incorporated into the recommendations below. According to the research, policing practices for crowd control have varied over time, place, and agency. Since the 1960’s the dominant (but not universal) paradigm in the U.S. has shifted from “escalated force” to “negotiated management.” The research is consistent with what we have observed in recent protests and demonstrations in California. First, the overwhelming majority of protests remain peaceful. Second, violent elements among protest groups tend to be small and not inevitably violent or destructive. Third, violence often results from interactions in the dynamics between police and protesters. Finally, unnecessary injuries occur and violence escalates when tactical weapons are used inappropriately by law enforcement. The research also is consistent with the recommendations we make below, including reinforcing the importance of the following key concepts as essential strategies for more effective law enforcement response to protests and demonstrations:  Coordination and Communication: Police should communicate clearly with assembled civilians, ideally before demonstrations have started, but also during, in the service of maintaining safety. Law enforcement agencies should work to establish and keep open Advance Item Packet Page 75Packet Page 75 The Honorable Gavin Newsom September 28, 2020 4 lines of communication with protest organizers when possible. They should also reinforce expectations and values with partnering agencies in mutual aid relationships to promote consistent practices.  Avoiding unnecessary enforcement: During protests and demonstrations, enforcement of low-level offenses or imposing unnecessary constraints on movement can spark avoidable conflict. Enforcement should target those who are causing harm in order to avoid disrupting the First Amendment rights of other participants.  Minimizing militarization: Militaristic presence (e.g., with armored vehicles, combat-style helmets or weapons) can be counterproductive and threatening to peaceful protestors and may incite or escalate conflict.  Minimizing use of weapons: Deploying weapons, including kinetic impact projectiles and chemical irritants, can, in addition to causing injuries and even death, rapidly escalate conflict, and they should be used as a last resort to protect life and repel assaults when other means have been exhausted. We trust that with your leadership and the leadership and partnership of the Legislature, communities, and law enforcement, it is possible to keep communities safe while better protecting and facilitating the First Amendment rights of Californians to engage in peaceful protests and demonstrations. Sincerely, Ron Davis Lateefah Simon Advance Item Packet Page 76Packet Page 76 The Honorable Gavin Newsom September 28, 2020 5 Protecting and Facilitating the Right to Engage in Peaceful Protests and Demonstrations Recommended Core Values for Protests 1. Sanctity of Life and protection from physical injury 2. Facilitation of peaceful protests and free expression 3. Protection of property Key Themes • Recognition that people have a constitutional right to demonstrate • Recognition that law enforcement’s role is to facilitate peaceful protests and demonstrations and protect life above all (property secondarily) • Recognition that the vast majority of demonstrators are peaceful • Recognition that there is a better way and there is a need for more consistency and statewide standards Proposed Actions - 3 Categories 1. Executive 2. Legislative 3. General Recommendations Executive  Instruct the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) to modernize its 2012 Guidelines on Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control to focus on protection and facilitation of First Amendment rights rather than on “management” and “control.” o Recommend that POST convene stakeholders including law enforcement, community members, and subject matter experts to ensure updated guidelines reflect promising practices and best evidence.  Instruct POST to update, expand, or add the following topics to the Basic Academy curriculum and 2012 POST Guidelines on Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control: Advance Item Packet Page 77Packet Page 77 The Honorable Gavin Newsom September 28, 2020 6 o First Amendment o Legal updates (unlawful assembly, curfew, etc.) o Professional, ethical, and moral responsibilities o Crowd psychology (including that crowds are not inherently irrational or prone to violence and that aggressive or unjustified police actions can antagonize and galvanize otherwise peaceful crowds) o De-escalation o Community relations and advance planning o Use of force proportionality, including emphasis on restraint and accountability, de-escalation, and AB 392 necessity requirement o Distinguishing civil disobedience from violence or riots o Other areas (see general recommendations below).  Instruct POST, in coordination with the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, to develop a train the trainer course for mutual aid coordinators.  Instruct POST to develop best practices and training guides for law enforcement to identify, monitor, and strategically detain individuals suspected of violence and/or destruction of property during protests and demonstrations.  Form a working group to evaluate and update conditions of mutual aid, including the standardization of command and control, use of force, communications, and operational plans. Legislative  Prohibit the use of dogs and water cannons for crowd control or to disperse crowds.  Restrict the use of less-lethal projectiles and chemical agents to defensive actions to protect life, repel serious assaults, and, when other means have been exhausted or are not feasible, to disrupt the significant destruction of property.  Require all California law enforcement officers to receive regular training regarding the First Amendment and responding to demonstrations and protests.  Clarify the definition of unlawful assembly and the process by which it can be declared (which is a necessary condition for crowd dispersal). Advance Item Packet Page 78Packet Page 78 The Honorable Gavin Newsom September 28, 2020 7  Require officers to intervene to prevent or stop other officers from engaging in excessive force, false arrest, or other inappropriate conduct.  Require officers to report the misconduct of other officers. General Recommendations  Sheriffs and other local mutual aid coordinators should convene local stakeholders, including community members, law enforcement, and local government representatives to update or establish county operations and response plans (including tabletop exercises) for demonstrations, protests, and other mass events.  Establish communication and coordination channels between government actors in advance of known demonstrations or protests so that decisions can be quickly made and/or communicated.  Establish early and open lines of communication with organizers as a key strategy for planning, facilitating, and de-escalating issues if needed. o Establish relationships before crises to build trust. o Train community ambassadors or other responders to assist with communication, de-escalation/intervention, and other functions.  Designate a point of contact for media inquiries.  Establish clear and visible leadership with prescribed protocols for relaying of commands; especially important with mutual aid.  Provide clear communication to public in advance of known protests and demonstrations re: commitment to protecting rights and intolerance for violence.  Line up resources before they are needed and, when possible, stage away from demonstrators.  Establish and reinforce with all participating officers, including mutual aid officers, clear goals (e.g., protecting 1st A rights, protecting critical infrastructure), and plans for how to accomplish. Advance Item Packet Page 79Packet Page 79 The Honorable Gavin Newsom September 28, 2020 8  Establish and reinforce common standards, training, and rules for mutual aid including regarding enforcement priorities, use of force standards, warnings, and equipment.  Recognize that police presence can have an escalating effect and be prepared to dial up or dial down visibility (e.g., do not start with visible armored vehicles and riot gear).  If equipped, require all officers in direct contact with demonstrators to wear and activate their body cameras during protests and demonstrations.  Use dispersal orders strategically (as they may have an escalating effect); when given, ensure dispersal orders are clear, loud, in multiple languages where appropriate, and that individuals are given sufficient time to disperse with clear, visible, and ample means of egress.  Ensure protection for journalists and legal observers exercising their right to record and observe police activities during protests and demonstrations. o Provide officers training on the role and rights of journalists and how to facilitate their ability to report on protests and demonstrations. o Establish a media center and/or point of contact for journalists who are covering the event.  Importance of quick, targeted intervention to stop violence and/or incitement; need to isolate antagonizers and not disrupt peaceful demonstrators (“identify, target, isolate, remove”). o Identify and address the role of hate groups, including white supremacists, in disrupting protests and committing and instigating violence and looting. o Partner with protest organizers, legal observers, demonstration marshals, and public safety liaisons to help identify and address potential problems before they escalate. o Prohibit the undercover infiltration of constitutionally protected demonstrations and protests unless there is a criminal predicate to support such activity. Advance Item Packet Page 80Packet Page 80 The Honorable Gavin Newsom September 28, 2020 9  Limit amount of time officers can be on the line and establish ability to tap out or be pulled out based upon risk factors observed by the officer, other officers, or a supervisor. Risk factors should include signs such as fatigue, unmanageable stress, or other factors which may impact an officer’s ability to safely and appropriately perform their assignment.  Conduct daily briefings with mutual aid agencies to reinforce policies, priorities, and command structure.  Conduct after-action reviews to identify what went well and what can be improved.  Involve prosecutors’ offices in front-end discussions regarding the possibility of curfews or other enforcement strategies and priorities and to provide training on relevant laws (e.g., distinguishing burglary from looting charges).  Include prosecutors and/or other legal advisors on-site at emergency operations centers to provide legal advice and guidance.  Oversight and accountability: tailor oversight to local jurisdiction; consider role to include monitoring event, accepting and investigating complaints (including mutual aid), compliance with policies, procedures, and training. o Local mutual aid coordinators and/or lead law enforcement agencies should coordinate centralized civilian complaint processes to ensure all complaints associated with demonstrations and protests are received and investigated. Advance Item Packet Page 81Packet Page 81 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Prepared by Jack Glaser & May Lim Goldman School of Public Policy University of California, Berkeley July 28, 2020 I. Executive Summary This report on research on policing demonstrations reflects a review of scholarly books and chapters, scientific journal articles, NGO guidance documents, and other “grey literature” to identify major themes and promising practices to reduce conflict and violence. Summaries of guidance documents from California’s Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST), the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and others reveal that such guidances, while clear and comprehensive, tend to emphasize operational considerations but fail to reflect current understandings of “crowd psychology” and unnecessarily discourage communication between police and demonstrators. The main findings from systematic research on demonstrations and policing start with an acknowledgment that policing practices for crowd control vary over time and place (and agency). Since the 1960’s the dominant (but not universal) paradigm in the U.S. has shifted from “escalated force” to “negotiated management.” There is considerable consensus among researchers on five essential points: • Contrary to theories of crowd behavior originating in the 18th Century, crowds of people are not inherently irrational, de-individuated, or prone to emotional contagion. • The overwhelming majority of protests remain peaceful. • Violent elements among protest groups tend to be small and not even inevitably violent. • Violence tends to result from interactions in the dynamics between police and protesters. • Unnecessary injuries and even deaths occur and violence escalates when tactical weapons are used inappropriately. The research supports a focus in policing reform on key issues: • Communication: Police do well to communicate clearly with assembled civilians, ideally before demonstrations have started, but also during, in the service of maintaining civility. Law enforcement agencies should work to establish and keep open lines of communication with partnering agencies in mutual aid relationships, to promote consistent practices. Advance Item Packet Page 82Packet Page 82 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 2 of 18 • Respecting spatial boundaries: Violence is more likely to erupt if protestors or police violate each others’ territories. Making expectations about territories (e.g., protest zones) explicit, so long as they are respected, can reduce upheaval. • Avoiding unnecessary enforcement: As with territorial incursions, enforcement of low level offenses or unnecessary requirements of movement can spark mass conflict. • Minimizing militarization: Militaristic presence (e.g., with armored vehicles, combat-style helmets) can be threatening to peaceful protestors and incite conflict. • Minimize use of weapons: Deploying weapons (e.g., batons, kinetic impact projectiles, chemical irritants) can, in addition to causing injuries and even death, rapidly escalate conflict, and they should be used as a last resort, defensively or to disperse a crowd that has been declared unlawfully assembled. Additional smart practices implied by research and supported by discussions with stakeholders and experts include ensuring demonstrators have a clear and visible means of egress, targeting only destructive individuals for arrest, and pursuing unambiguous coordination among multiple responding agencies. Three significant thematic challenges emerged: 1) How to balance officer safety gained by armor, weapons, and offensive configurations against the escalation they tend to engender; 2) How to target destructive individuals without being viewed as violating territory and triggering broader disruption; and 3) What are the most promising methods for de-escalation given that research to date has not shown benefits? II. Introduction The purpose of this report is to transmit a review of available research and analysis on policing demonstrations conducted with an eye to understanding what are the most effective government practices, particularly policing, to support First Amendment rights while minimizing harms, particularly violence and property damage. The review surveys a variety of research types, seeking empirically grounded psychological and sociological insights into crowd behavior and how it responds to various crowd control approaches. Promising and problematic practices will be identified and discussed. The types of research sources reviewed included scientific journal articles, books, book chapters in edited volumes, government reports, training documents, and other “grey” literature, such as advocacy group recommendations. Much of the research involves qualitative review through case studies of actual protests (often single cases, but in some studies many), but some of the research involves rigorous quantitative analysis of protester surveys or archival data. Advance Item Packet Page 83Packet Page 83 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 3 of 18 As den Heyer (2020) notes, perhaps too dismissively, in his very recent, extensive book on Police Response to Riots, Extensive literature that examines the approach taken by the police to crowd management during protests and that identifies various options for the police to consider if they wish to improve their management of such events is available. However, no research has been conducted that would inform the police as to how they could improve their response to a riot, nor has any literature identified methods for managing protests that contain violent individuals or groups (den Heyer, 2020, p. 50). In fact, although there is no known research that has conducted randomized controlled trials to test policing strategies on crowd management outcomes, there are research-based inferences that can be made about what is likely to work and not work well. We will highlight Nassauer’s work in particular, which represents a very rigorous comparative analysis of 30 protest events, including those with violent and peaceful results. It is worth noting as well that many, if not most, public protests do not elicit a police presence (Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003), although, not surprisingly, Earle et al. find that the larger the event, and the more radical the goals, the more likely there will be a police presence. III. Recent guidances and current practices Before considering social scientific research, we review some of the substantial materials developed by large law enforcement organizations to provide policy and practice guidelines for individual agencies. We will review here some of the most influential and recent. All have a highly operational flavor, appropriately providing guidance to agencies on the mechanics of crowd management. There is some reference to prioritizing free expression, coordination with organizers, limiting use of force, and de-escalation. But there is little evidence of research influence. California’s Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) (2012). POST’s Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control document states clearly that it represents guidelines, rather than policy or standards. It provides a comprehensive description of various dimensions of considerations that have to be made in preparation (long and short term) for policing demonstrations. POST’s description of law enforcement’s role, to distinguish between lawful and unlawful behavior in demonstrations (p. 3) is perhaps too simplistic, with many agencies strategically overlooking some unlawful behavior such as roadway blocking. But the report goes on to more subtly distinguish among “lawful, isolated unlawful, unlawful, and riotous” crowd behaviors. Furthermore, the guidelines later offer some flexibility in responding to criminal acts: “Crowds and criminal acts committed by participants within the crowd require a flexible response. Strategies include containment, control, communication, tactical information, coordination Advance Item Packet Page 84Packet Page 84 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 4 of 18 and response” (p. 31) and acknowledge that crowds are heterogeneously composed. In line with common best practice, POST encourages coordination with event leaders, to the extent possible. The language on dispersal is very clear and prescriptive, but could be interpreted as providing legal guidance more than strategic guidance: The decision to declare a crowd unlawful must be based upon reasonable and articulable facts. The definition of an unlawful assembly has been set forth in Penal Code section 407 and interpreted in court decisions. The terms ‘boisterous’ and ‘tumultuous’ as written in Penal Code section 407 have been interpreted as conduct that poses a clear and present danger of imminent violence [In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal. 3d 612, 623.].” (POST, 2012, p. 33). More in the way of strategic guidance, POST makes a clear statement of the importance of making dispersal announcements heard, and recording, for accountability purposes, when all the announcements were made and who made them. However, the dispersal order template provided in the POST document is very direct, bordering on officious. A more cordial approach could reduce the likelihood of physical resistance. POST’s use of force guidance is generic, and permissive: Peace officers need not use the least intrusive force option, but only that force which is objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances; Scott v. Henrich, 39 F. 3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994), and Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F. 3d 804 (9th Cir. 1994). When feasible, prior to the use of a particular force option, officers should consider the availability of less-intrusive measures; Young, 655 F.3d at 1166; Bryan v. McPherson, 630 F. 3d 805, 831 (9th Cir. 2010)” (p. 39). Regarding chemical agents, the guidance is loose: “Each agency should consider when, where, and how nonlethal chemical agents may be deployed, and consider potential collateral effects (POST 2012, p. 41). Overall, the POST guidelines cover a lot of topics and consider many variables, but tend to be descriptive and emphasize common legal standards as opposed to evidence-based approaches for promoting optimal outcomes. A more recent set of guidances is offered through a training manual published by Ohio Peace Officer Basic Training (July 2019). Encouragingly, there is repeated emphasis on “legal, moral, professional and ethical responsibilities.” (e.g., p. 7). On the other hand, based on the stated student objectives, the course seems very command and control oriented: “At the end of this topic, the student will be able to: Advance Item Packet Page 85Packet Page 85 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 5 of 18 1. Explain the balance between First Amendment rights and the need to protect public safety and property. 2. Describe mob behavior. 3. Describe the basic concepts of perimeter crowd control. 4. State the common uses for a mobile field force. 5. Demonstrate a column formation. 6. Demonstrate a line formation. 7. Demonstrate a wedge formation. 8. Identify the color codes and each associated chemical agent that may be used by law enforcement agencies. 9. State the steps for administering first aid to an individual who has been exposed to the chemical agents OC or CS.” (p. 9) Like the POST guidelines, the emphasis in the Ohio training recommendations is on distinguishing between lawful and unlawful conduct. There is a significant section on de-escalation, including building rapport with protestors, and an acknowledgment that most demonstrators are resistant to committing acts of violence. “It is very difficult for those not bent on unlawful behavior to fight with the police when officers have been professional and respectful to those encountered” (p. 13) An admonition to “not engage demonstrators in any conversation without supervisory direction except the giving of verbal commands” (p. 14) offered in the section on de-escalation, not in the context of violence already occurring, seems at odds with emerging best practices, and likely to promote tension. A similar admonition in the IACP Model Policy from April 2019 (discussed below) provides a stronger signal that such a prohibition applies to conversations about topics related to the demonstration, perhaps to prevent arguments from erupting between demonstrators, counter-demonstrators, and police. Nevertheless, such approaches could cast a chill on officer-demonstrator relations. The Ohio document seems to reflect an old-fashioned crowd psychology, indicating “anonymity,” “universality,” and “irrationality” of crowds. This will be discussed later – contemporary social scientific evidence supports a very different characterization. The Ohio document recognizes the problems associated with a large policing presence, recommending that additional officers be “posted nearby but out of sight.” (p. 18). However, they recommend plain clothes officers in the crowd: “When safe to do so, use plain clothes officers to monitor the crowd from within the group to identify potential instigators” (p. 25). However, there is a danger that such postings, if discovered, can serve to violate protestors’ territory and sense of control and consequently incite violence. One section indicates a clear preference for diplomacy over force: “Crowd control of an unlawful disturbance or riot a. Dispersal, not mass arrest, is key when trying to stop a riotous crowd b. Diplomacy is preferred over a show of force, if possible Advance Item Packet Page 86Packet Page 86 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 6 of 18 c. It is important for officers not to overreact, but they must be prepared to act quickly in order to disperse the crowd as soon as possible d. When forming a dispersal squad, do so out of sight of the crowd, yet close enough to respond quickly if needed e. When attempting to break up a crowd, continue to spread them out so they do not regroup somewhere else” (p. 25). It may be worth noting that the Ohio document lists only the advantages (not disadvantages) of using chemical agents (p. 50). Given the clear and broadly recognized risk associated with using these tactical weapons, this may raise concern. Furthermore, the instructions for chemical agent deployment are not clear that canisters should not be aimed at people (pp. 57-58). In a set of three related documents on “Crowd Management” the International Association of Chiefs of Police (April 2019) provides a “model policy” on crowd management. The IACP recommends that officers monitoring crowds should have identification clearly visible at all times, and that Fire and EMS should be present before dispersal orders are made. Like the earlier POST and more recent Ohio guidances, they distinguish only between “civil disturbance” (unlawful) and “demonstration” (lawful), losing some important strategically and operationally relevant nuance – that civilly disobedient demonstrators can be peaceful. In fact, in the Model Policy Document, IACP conflates “civil disobedience” with “riot,” again losing important nuance that could allow departments to handle civilly disobedient demonstrations, like road blockages, diplomatically. The IACP documents note that self-policing among protesters happens, in some instances even with handouts prepared in advance to guide protesters on conduct. But they also note that “out-of-town” elements sometimes participate, the implication being that outsiders are less likely to be of like mind with locals preparing for peaceful protest. The IACP documents offer mostly operational guidance, with little reference to de-escalation, except, “When lines of communication have been maintained between event organizers or leaders and a law enforcement liaison, it is sometimes possible to negotiate a resolution to the situation. Given such situations, many crowds tend to become self-enforcing to ensure that they can continue to assemble and convey their message” (p. 6 of Concepts Paper). IACP offers some specific use of force limitations: no canines; no horses used against passive protestors; no firehoses; CS gas generally shouldn’t be used; riot baton as defensive or prod only. Bicycles are recommended as a less threatening mode of transportation. IACP recommends that dispersal warnings be recorded whenever possible. The Model Policy document makes a clear effort to walk the line between coordination and engagement: • “Officers shall be positioned in such a manner as to minimize contact with the assembled crowds.” (p. 2) Advance Item Packet Page 87Packet Page 87 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 7 of 18 • “Individuals designated by the IC should establish and maintain communication with event organizers and relay information on crowd mood to the IC.” (p. 3) • “Mass arrests shall be avoided, unless necessary.” • “Unless exigent circumstances justify immediate action, officers shall not independently make arrests or employ force without command authorization.” (p.3) USDOJ COPS Office Ferguson After-Action Report. A different, but nevertheless instructive, type of government report on policing protests comes in the form of a thorough after-action investigation carried out and reported (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015) by the US DOJ’s Community Oriented Policing Services office on the protests that occurred in Ferguson, Missouri after the fatal officer-involved shooting of an unarmed, Black teenager, Michael Brown. Clear implications of that investigation included the following: 1. Police-community relationships: “Ferguson PD had virtually no established community relationships with the residents” of the complex where Michael Brown was killed. 2. Command and control: “The incident command structures throughout the evolution of the Ferguson demonstrations were uncoordinated and incomplete in the early days.” “Use of intelligence products was minimal.” “Law enforcement agencies initially offered limited public information and did not commit to proactive communications with the public.” Lack of coordination led to inconsistent and untracked deployment of less-lethal weapons. 3. Use of force: Inappropriate canine use. Instances of inappropriate deployment of tear gas. Military weapons and sniper deployment “was inappropriate, inflamed tensions, and created fear among demonstrators.” Elevated daytime response was not justified, and served to escalate. 4. Militarization: “Overwatch tactic” (snipers use rifle sites to monitor crowd) was inappropriate and fear-evoking. Visible staging of armored vehicles was threatening. 5. Need for preparation: It is too late to prepare once protest and violence has erupted. Officers need full preparation, including understanding of demonstrators’ rights, civil disobedience, and unlawful assembly. 6. Social media: Police were unprepared for the impact and rapid dissemination of information. 7. Protection of constitutional rights: “Keep moving” orders (and the inherent threat of arrest or force) risk violating First Amendment protections of free speech and assembly. Unified command in Ferguson “failed to establish a clearly marked First Amendment free speech zone.” 8. Accountability and transparency: Some officers removed their nameplates. A lack of confidence in the complaint process may have caused a deceptively low rate of complaints. Advance Item Packet Page 88Packet Page 88 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 8 of 18 9. Officer resilience: Officer shifts were long and often entailed verbal and physical abuse from protestors, particularly toward minority officers. “Transition from traditional nameplates to identity numbers on badges would preserve accountability and offer the individual officer some protection.” 10. The role and impact of protestors intent on exploiting the demonstrations: There were some, including self-described anarchists, who joined intent on causing problems. Community members noted big differences in the nature of activities during daytime (more peaceful) versus nighttime hours. The documents from POST, Ohio, the IACP, and USDOJ indicate an acknowledgment of many of the challenges of policing protests, nods to the notion that crowds are heterogeneous and not inherently prone to violence, and tend to provide clear operational guidance (or, in the case of Ferguson, cautionary tales). However, they generally fall short with respect to reflecting systematic research on crowd behavior in general and policing protests in particular. IV. Main Findings from Research There is considerable consensus in the research literature around several key issues relating to demonstrations. First, the overwhelming majority of protests remain peaceful. Second, violent elements among protest groups tend to be small and not even inevitably violent or destructive. Third, violence tends to result from interactions in the dynamics between police and protesters. Finally, unnecessary injuries and deaths occur and violence escalates when tactical weapons are used inappropriately. We will return to these findings after a general consideration of the relevant research. Protest policing strategies vary over time and place (Brown, 2015; Den Heyer, 2020; Logan, 2019; McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Vitale, 2005, 2007). Historically, in the U.S. modern policing of protests was characterized by a doctrine of “escalated force” in the 1960s and 1970s, in which police tended to be punitive and focused on crowd control. This was followed by a general trend toward “negotiated management” in which public safety officials coordinate with protest organizers in advance, to the extent possible, and establish clear expectations. This approach has persisted in many places, even as there was emergence of a “strategic incapacitation” trend following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2013). The focus in strategic incapacitation is on isolating and/or neutralizing disruptive individuals or groups, and reflected, “tactical innovations introduced by transgressive protesters during the Seattle cycle of protests [and] contributed to the end of a long, relatively stable period of détente between police and protesters in the United States” (Gillham & Noakes, 2007, p. 341). Strategic incapacitation accelerated in response to the Occupy Wall Street protests that Gillham and colleagues describe as “transgressive,” where protesters refused pre-negotiation with police. Advance Item Packet Page 89Packet Page 89 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 9 of 18 Protest policing appears to have generally returned to a negotiated management model, aggressive police tactics in recent Black Lives Matter protests notwithstanding. “The myth of the mob.” Perhaps the most influential social scientific influence on protest policing has been notion of the “deindividuated crowd” or “mob.” However, research in recent decades has emphatically rejected this notion that crowds are inherently irrational and emotionally contagious (Borch, 2013; den Heyer, 2020; McPhail, 1991; Reicher, 2011; Schweingruber, 2000). Illustrating a troubling implication of this misconception, Hoggett and Stott (2010; see also Reicher, Stott, Drury, Adang, Cronin, & Livingstone, 2007) show that police officers’ perceptions of crowds as inherently irrational have a self-fulfilling effect on crowd violence. The reality is less bleak. Research indicates that 92% to 98% of protests stay peaceful (Nassauer, 2019, citing others, p. 6). Stott (2011) argues that crowd control would benefit from police being educated about the cultural norms of crowds, specifically, dispelling the myth that crowds are inherently irrational. On the other hand, there is some evidence (Cocking, 2013) that aggressive or indiscriminate dispersal actions can galvanize a crowd and be counterproductive. In a more rigorous study, Snipes, Maquire, and D. Tyler (2019) found that protesters indicated greater willingness to engage in civil disobedience, even vandalism, when they perceived police actions as procedurally unjust. In sum, crowds are not inherently irrational and unruly, but aggressive and unjust police actions can antagonize and galvanize them. Current research in crowd behavior points to the idea that police presence at a protest also constitutes a “crowd,” meaning that crowd behavior theory can provide insights for police behavior as well. There is also evidence that points to individuals having an inhibition threshold, after which they can cross over into a stage of panic and loss of control, leading to violent behaviors (Nassauer, 2015). Police officers engaging in such behavior often act out as an individual, forgetting that they are part of a larger unit. Having moved past the outdated theory of the deindividuated mob, researchers who study policing of demonstrations exhibit considerable consensus with regard to a number of important factors, including communication with protesters, respecting territorial boundaries, avoiding unnecessary enforcement, and minimizing militarization. Communication. There is general consensus, even where pitfalls are pointed out (e.g., Baker, 2014), that pre-demonstration negotiations between public safety officials and demonstration organizers generally promote more peaceful outcomes. Nassauer (2019), discussed further below, identifies communication as a critical element of successful, peaceful crowd management. Holgersson and Knutsson (2011), after analyzing the failures of policing of the riots in Gothenberg, Sweden, in 2001, relay Swedish national “basic tactics” advising that officers policing riots be prepared for stress and have a communicative mindset. The Swedish national principles for Advance Item Packet Page 90Packet Page 90 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 10 of 18 policing protests are: Facilitation (of demonstrations); Dialogue; Counterpart perspective (perspective-taking to avoid escalation); Differentiation (police actions should not be the same for all protestors); Signal value (display readiness to use force); State (moods of crowds -- green, yellow, red). Davies and Dawson (2018), however, drawing on a review of the 2011 Stanley Cup Riot in Vancouver, caution that the “meet and greet” strategies that are so promising in policing relatively low- risk crowds may not work for higher risk situations. Although no research was found on the importance of communication within police organizations, discussions with police practitioners have revealed emphatic support for clear, bounded, and well structured communication within and between responding agencies. This has clear implications for the importance of developing procedures for real-time communication down the chain of command as well as cooperative and consistent mutual aid collaboration between agencies. Recognize and respect territorial boundaries. Nassauer (2019; see also 2015 & 2018), through in-depth, multimedia and multi-method analysis of 30 protests that occurred in Germany and the U.S. between 1960 and 2010, identified important dimensions of crowd and police behavior in protests. Nassauer studied events that turned violent as well as those that remained peaceful, noting that much research on protests has “selected on the dependent variable” of violence, thereby limiting inferences about things that cause – and obviate – violence. Surprising outcomes occur because of situational breakdowns -- moments of emotionally charged chaos and poor communication. In these situations, people are confused and overwhelmed because the interactional and organizational routines they usually rely on have collapsed… However, such instances do not unfold randomly but due to specific patterns and are therefore not beyond our control. (Nassauer, 2019, p. 7). Nassauer has observed that the occurrence of violence can be explained by interactions among five primary situational factors: spatial incursions; police mismanagement; escalation signs; property damage; and communication problems. Nassauer identifies three pathways along which these factors intersect to cause violence, but notable is the fact that “spatial incursions” is common to all three, suggesting that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for violence to erupt. Accordingly, one especially clear implication of Nassauer’s careful work is that spatial incursions, in either direction, should be avoided. Nassauer (2019), in making recommendations, also highlights the importance of good communication by police and protesters, to help reassure each other of good intentions. She also highlights the need for good police management, meaning clear oversight and coherent plans of action. In an interview (July 17, 2020) with Chief Davis and Professor Glaser, Nassauer explained that communication from police should be clear and positive, conveying that police are there to facilitate a successful demonstration. Nassauer Advance Item Packet Page 91Packet Page 91 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 11 of 18 also noted that the presence of plain-clothes or undercover officers among protesters, if discovered, would likely be seen as a territorial incursion, thereby increasing the likelihood of disorder and violence. In contrast, lightly armed or unarmed personnel wearing colored vests clearly marked with “Communication Team” can be seen as nonthreatening ambassadors who can be helpful while reducing tensions. Avoid unnecessary enforcement. Legal scholar El-Haj (2015) writes, “If we want to preserve the unique functions of outdoor assembly as a form of politics...we need to reconcile ourselves to the fact that we must increase our tolerance of the disorder and disruption associated with it” (pp. 984-985). Implementing a more robust right of assembly does not entail as radical a transformation as one might imagine. To be certain, the public would be asked to tolerate a lot more than it currently does. On the other hand, many cities, as a matter of discretion, already allow more spontaneous and disruptive crowds than they are strictly required to by contemporary constitutional doctrine. Essentially, the transformation would require enshrining these practices in law (El-Haj, 2015, p. 985). Aggressive pursuit of rule compliance can be counterproductive. Writing about the WTO riots in Seattle, Gillham and Marx (2000) note that, “After the curfew was declared… police chased groups of people through the streets with tear gas and pepper spray. As news of police behavior spread, many demonstrators felt an increased sense of solidarity and a need to stand up to police efforts at control, beyond the original goal of protesting against the WTO” (pp. 223-224). Adding to the challenge is the likelihood that aggressive rule enforcement can affect even those who are not the direct targets of enforcement. As Waddington (1987) put it, “The disorganised approach to public order policing leads not only to ineffectiveness and excessive force, but can also result in injustice being done to individuals in the crowd. The tendency to make arbitrary and essentially random arrests arises from the confusion that almost invariably accompanies scenes of disorder” (p. 41). Minimize militarization. Militarization, in terms of equipment (e.g., armored vehicles, combat-style helmets), clothing (e.g., camouflage, armor), weapons (e.g., grenade launchers), and tactics (e.g., officer formations) is a topic of concern regarding policing in general, exacerbated by the direct transfer of equipment from the military to state and local police departments. Given the psychological tensions associated with crowd control, a militarized presence, consistent with the earlier era of the “escalated force” approach to crowd control, is likely to increase anxiety and tensions, perhaps setting the stage for volatility. The need for safety, perhaps promoted by armoring, is an understandable one, but may promote a “warrior mindset” (Stoughton, 2014-15). In fact, Stott, Adang, Livingstone, and Schreiber (2008), Advance Item Packet Page 92Packet Page 92 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 12 of 18 studying policing of European football hooliganism, found that non-paramilitary style policing was associated with less disorder. In a study reflecting on both minimizing militarization and the value of positive communication, Masterson (2011) highlights the success of Vancouver police who “developed a meet-and- greet strategy. Instead of using riot police in menacing outfits, police officers in standard uniforms engaged the crowd. They shook hands, asked people how they were doing, and told them that officers were there to keep them safe. This created a psychological bond with the group that paid dividends. It becomes more difficult for people to fight the police after being friendly with individual officers.”1 Even the presence of police in riot gear could cause the crowd to engage in behaviors they would not have otherwise. It has been found that when police begin using traditional crowd control tactics (e.g. tear gas, rubber bullets, kettling), protestors in the crowd find increased solidarity and connection with one another and a sense of defiance in the face of perceived injustice, and they begin to shift their focus of protest to what they feel are unjust behaviors by the police, rather than the cause for which they first gathered (Gillham & Marx, 2000). Certain preemptive actions by the police, such as wearing riot gear to a protest or putting on gas masks, can signal a lack of trust to the protestors (Nassauer, 2015; Waddington, 1987). Other factors that can lead to possible escalation of violence include police behaviors that lead to their loss of legitimacy (Masterson, 2011; Stott, Hoggett, & Pearson, 2012). This is related to Procedural Justice Theory (PSJ), which theorizes that individuals will be less likely to comply with the law if they feel that officers are acting without justice and legitimacy. Minimize Weapon Use. As the US DOJ’s COPS Office after-action report (2015) on the Ferguson, Missouri 2014 protests noted, The use of force via less-lethal weapons should be a last resort to maintain order and should be used only in a manner consistent with law and agency policy, after alternatives have been reasonably exhausted, after multiple warnings have been given to demonstrators, and in situations when the threat to the safety of persons and protection of property are in imminent jeopardy. When the decision is made to use these weapons, the police should be tactically placed to ensure that demonstrators have clear avenues of escape from the demonstration area. The goal of these technologies is to disperse protesters, not capture them. In addition, the use of force must be documented (pg. 46-47). Dr. Rohini Haar, an emergency physician and adjunct professor at UC Berkeley’s School of Public Health, conducts research on crowd control weapons. She and her colleagues have found chemical irritant weapons to cause serious injury despite the general belief that they are safe: 1 “Meet-and-greet” strategies, as noted earlier in this report, may not work in high risk situations. Advance Item Packet Page 93Packet Page 93 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 13 of 18 The prevailing presumption about these chemical agents is that they cause minimal and transient irritation to the skin and eyes, but are generally safe for use on diverse populations. However, we found that, by design or by inappropriate use, chemical irritants can cause significant injuries as well as permanent disabilities. While deaths were rare, we identified one death directly caused by the blunt trauma from the projectile and another from high dose exposure to the chemical agent in a closed environment (Haar, Iacopino, Ranadive, Weiser, & Dandu, 2017, p. 10; see similar findings by Hu et al., 1989). Haar and colleagues point out that, in addition to being potentially injurious to their intended targets, “Chemical irritants, especially those deployed in aerosolized forms, are inherently indiscriminate and can affect not only the intended targets but also peaceful demonstrators, bystanders, nearby communities and residences, and law enforcement officers themselves” (p. 11). They recommend that, “CCWs should only be used in situations where particular individuals pose an imminent violent threat, or where a protest requires dispersal because of widespread violent acts that pose an imminent threat to public safety. In most situations where we found these weapons being used, neither of these conditions was documented” (p. 11). The same researchers found a much larger number of serious injuries as well as fatalities resulting from the use of kinetic impact projectile (KIP) weapons such as rubber bullets and wooden projectiles (Haar, Iacopino, Ranadive, Dandu, & Weiser, 2017). Additional promising practices implied by research and expressed by practitioners. Strongly implied by research and explicitly expressed by practitioners is the need to use weapons as a last resort. Aside from the direct implications of injuries and risk of mortality created by weapon use, the anxiety and indignation their use can evoke in the crowd may effect more harm than good. Similarly, it is clear in writing and discussions that police managing protests must ensure that the crowd has clear and accessible egress options. The older technique of “kettling” to section off and control crowds can lead to mass anxiety and violence. Identifying and singling out violent or destructive individuals for arrest is preferable to taking action against a collective (i.e., “mass arrest”) that is largely peaceful, if not law-abiding. The inherent challenge in this case is to effect these arrests without the larger group being set off by a territorial incursion (see Nassauer, 2019). Finally, it is imperative that when multiple agencies are responding (i.e., “mutual aid”) there is unambiguous coordination among them (den Heyer, 2020). This poses interagency challenges as different departments have different use of force policies and cultures. Advance Item Packet Page 94Packet Page 94 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 14 of 18 V. Significant themes and challenges The review of the research literature and interviews of experts and stakeholders has revealed some overarching themes that are worth considering in order to foster a better understanding of the challenges of policing demonstrations. The officer safety vs. escalation tradeoff. As Stoughton describes, there is an understandable urge to employ tools and tactics that ensure the safety of police officers. However, some of these tools and tactics, while promoting immediate and proximal safety (e.g., hardening against weapons) may have externalities that undermine safety in the broader sense. Most prominently, the armoring of officers with paramilitary equipment will reduce the harm of a hurled object, but it may also, by signaling aggression, increase the likelihood of the object being hurled. As Nassauer and others write, a single escalatory act can cause a cascade of violence, so the immediate gain from armoring may pose a large net loss in public safety and even officer safety. At one far end of this continuum are police who are so armored as to be invulnerable, but violence that is nearly inevitable, or a sense that free speech is utterly constrained. At the other end is the protest that is not policed at all (as, in fact, is the case for many), with a reduced likelihood of reactive violence, but no official response to property damage and interpersonal violence. This is a tradeoff that must be continually confronted. Targeting destructive individuals without triggering broader reaction. It is essentially accepted that police do well to isolate individuals who are destructive and/or violent rather than incapacitating the collective. In fact, often this is exactly what most demonstrators want them to do, because the violent instigators are working at cross-purposes with the movement’s goals. Nevertheless, there is a real risk that isolating and arresting such individuals will be perceived as an incursion into the demonstrators’ territory, something Nassauer has identified as a critical condition for instigating crowd violence. Policing professionals will do well to develop tactics for executing such arrests while signaling to the crowd the clear limits of their intentions and actions. De-escalation. An intuitively appealing concept in policing in general, de-escalation takes many forms. Regrettably, the evidence base for effective de-escalation tactics is lacking. A very recent empirical review (Engel, McManus, & Herold, 2020) of 64 de- escalation training programs found no evidence of improvements in outcomes. However, another finding of great importance was that the researchers were not able to identify any robust evaluations of de-escalation training in all of criminal justice. While there is reason for concern that the lack of evidence indicates that de- escalation programs as currently constituted may not reduce conflict and/or improve outcomes, there is also still ample reason for optimism that, in policing in particular, de-escalation tactics can reduce negative outcomes. Furthermore, in the Advance Item Packet Page 95Packet Page 95 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 15 of 18 specific domain of crowd management, with the potential for heated emotions, de- escalation seems a worthy objective, at the very least warranting further study. VI. Conclusion Many factors will need to be considered in making recommendations for reform of crowd control and use of force policies and practices. The research reviewed here clearly indicates that police should minimize militarization and use weapons only as a last resort. Communication and coordination with protest organizers appears to be effective, and the peace can be kept by care to avoid unnecessary territorial incursions. There are many technical and operational considerations and puzzles, but it is clear that policing protests is a fundamentally human, social endeavor that requires attention to feelings and motivations as well as respect for rights and privileges. It is worth considering the observation that the police presence is also a crowd, and the civilian crowd may respond accordingly. Communication and trust are paramount. References Cited Baker, D. (2014). Police and protester dialog: safeguarding the peace or ritualistic sham? International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 38(1), 83- 104. https://doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2013.819024 Borch, C. (2013). Crowd theory and the management of crowds: A controversial relationship. Current Sociology, 61(5–6), 584–601. California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. (2012). POST Guidelines – Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control. http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/police/documents/webcontent/oa k034615.pdf Cocking, C. (2013), Crowd Flight in Response to Police Dispersal Techniques: A Momentary Lapse of Reason? J. Investig. Psych. Offender Profil., 10, 219-236. https://doi.org/10.1002/jip.1389 Davies, G. & Dawson, S.E. (2018). Spoonful of sugar or strong medicine: ‘Meet and Greet’ as a strategy for policing large-scale public events, Policing and Society, 28:6, 697-711. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.1259317 den Heyer G. (2020) Police Response to Riots: Case Studies from France, London, Ferguson, and Baltimore. Cham: Springer. Advance Item Packet Page 96Packet Page 96 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 16 of 18 Earl, J., Soule, S.A. & McCarthy, J.D. (2003). Protest under Fire? Explaining the Policing of Protest. American Sociological Review, 68(4), 581-606. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1519740 El-Haj, T. (2015). Defining peaceably: Policing the line between constitutionally protected protest and unlawful assembly. Missouri Law Review, 80(4), 961-986. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/molr80&i=969 Engel, R.S., McManus, H.D., Herold, T.D. (2020). Does de-escalation training work? A systematic review and call for evidence in police use-of-force reform. Criminology & Public Policy, 1-39. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12467 Gillham, P. F., Edwards, B., & Noakes, J. A. (2013). Strategic incapacitation and the policing of Occupy Wall Street protests in New York City, 2011. Policing and Society, 23(1), 81-102. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2012.727607 Gillham, P., & Marx, G. (2000). Complexity and Irony in Policing And Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle. Social Justice, 27(2), 212-236. http://www.jstor.com/stable/29767215 Gillham, P., & Noakes, J. (2007). " More than a march in a circle": transgressive protests and the limits of negotiated management. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 12(4), 341-357. https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.12.4.j10822802t7n0t34 Gillham, P.F. (2011), Securitizing America: Strategic Incapacitation and the Policing of Protest Since the 11 September 2001 Terrorist Attacks. Sociology Compass, 5, 636-652. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00394.x Haar, R.J., Iacopino, V., Ranadive N., et al. (2017). Death, injury and disability from kinetic impact projectiles in crowd-control settings: a systematic review. BMJ Open 7:12. https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/bmjopen/7/12/e018154.full.pdf Haar, R.J., Iacopino, V., Ranadive, N. et al. (2017). Health impacts of chemical irritants used for crowd control: a systematic review of the injuries and deaths caused by tear gas and pepper spray. BMC Public Health 17, 831. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-017-4814-6 Hoggett, J. & Stott, C. (2010). The role of crowd theory in determining the use of force in public order policing, Policing and Society, 20(2), 223-236. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439461003668468 Holgersson, S., & Knutsson, J. (2011). Dialogue policing: A means for less crowd violence? In T.D. Madensen & J. Knutsson (Eds). Preventing Crowd Violence. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Advance Item Packet Page 97Packet Page 97 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 17 of 18 Hu, H., Fine, J., Epstein, P., Kelsey, K., Reynolds, P. & Walker, B. (1989). Tear gas-- harassing agent or toxic chemical weapon?. JAMA 262(5), 660-663. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/378206 IACP Law Enforcement Policy Center. (2019, April). Model Policy: Crowd Management. https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2019- 04/Crowd%20Management%20Policy%20-%202019.pdf Institute for Intergovernmental Research. (2015). After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri. COPS Office Critical Response Initiative. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Masterson, M. (2011). Crowd management: adopting a new paradigm. FBI L. Enforcement Bull., 81, 1. https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/crowd- management-adopting-a-new-paradigm McPhail, C., Schweingruber, D., & McCarthy, J. (1998). Policing protest in the United States: 1960-1995. In Della Porta, D. & Reiter, H. (Eds), Policing protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies, (pp. 49-69). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. McPhail, C. 1991. The Myth of the Madding Crowd. New York: Aldine. Nassauer, A. (2015). Effective crowd policing: empirical insights on avoiding protest violence. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 38(1), 3-23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-06-2014-0065 Nassauer, A. (2018). Situational Dynamics and the Emergence of Violence in Protests. Psychology of Violence 8(3), 293-304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/vio0000176 Nassauer, A. (2019). Situational Breakdowns: Understanding protest violence and other surprising outcomes. New York: Oxford. Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission: Education & Policy Section. (2019, July 1). Peace Officer Basic Training – Civil Disorders. https://www.scribd.com/document/465239354/Ohio-Peace-Officer-Basic- Training-Civil-Disorders Reicher, S. (2011). From crisis to opportunity: New crowd psychology and public order policing principles. In T.D. Madensen & J. Knutsson (Eds). Preventing Crowd Violence. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Advance Item Packet Page 98Packet Page 98 Review of Research on Policing Demonstrations Page 18 of 18 Reicher, S., Stott, C., Drury, J., Adang, O., Cronin, P. & Livingstone, A. (2007). Knowledge-Based Public Order Policing: Principles and Practice. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 1(4), 403–415. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pam067 Schweingruber, D. (2000), Mob Sociology And Escalated Force: Sociology's Contribution to Repressive Police Tactics. Sociological Quarterly, 41, 371-389. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.2000.tb00083.x Snipes, J.B., Maguire, E.R. & Tyler, D.H. (2019). The effects of procedural justice on civil disobedience: evidence from protesters in three cities, Journal of Crime and Justice, 42(1), 32-44. https://doi.org/10.1080/0735648X.2018.1559128 Stott, C. (2011). Crowd dynamics and public order policing. In T.D. Madensen & J. Knutsson (Eds). Preventing Crowd Violence. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Stott, C., Adang, O., Livingstone, A. & Schreiber, M. (2008) Tackling football hooliganism: A quantitative study of public order, policing and crowd psychology. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 14(2), 115-141. https://psycnet.apa.org/buy/2008-12904-001 Stoughton, S. (2014-2015). Law Enforcement's Warrior Problem. Harvard Law Review Forum, 128, 225-234. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/forharoc128&i=225 Vitale, A. (2007). The Command and Control and Miami Models at the 2004 Republican National Convention: New Forms of Policing Protests. Mobilization: An International Quarterly 12(4): 403–415. https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.12.4.97541013681695q5 Vitale, A.S. (2005). From negotiated management to command and control: how the New York Police Department polices protests. Policing and Society, 15(3), 283-304. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439460500168592 Waddington, P. (1987). Towards Paramilitarism? Dilemmas In Policing Civil Disorder. The British Journal of Criminology, 27(1), 37-46. http://www.jstor.com/stable/23637272 Advance Item Packet Page 99Packet Page 99