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HomeMy WebLinkAbout11/01/1988, 7 - PROPOSED BALLOT MEASURE ON POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION INCREASES Original report from 11/88 meeting II MEETING DATE: ►����iii11illl IIVI,I City Of San tins OBISPO Oct. 11, 19sa COUNCIL AGENDA REPORT ITEM NUS FROM: .John Dunn Chief Administrative 0 firer SUBJECT: Proposed Ballot Measure on Police and Fire Ueparimenl Employee Compensation Increases CAO RECOMMENDATION: Adopt Resolution placing on the ballot a measure to require voter approval of increases in compensation for certain public safety positions . BACKGROUND: The Police Officers and Firefighters Associations ( "POA & FFA" ) have announced that the group they formed. "Citizens for Public Safety, " will continue to gather signatures for the proposed Charter amendment on binding and compulsory arbitration. This decision is made in spite of the fact that the POA and the City sc.ccessfully reached a five-year agreement resulting, in significant compensation increases (42.20 over the life of t_he agreement) . The FFA' is in the second year of a three year agreement. We have not had any noteworthy history of labor problems with that unit. The City of San Luis Obispo police and fire employees are among the best- trained and highest paid public safety employees in the County. For e::ampie. the recent agreement with the POA will result in total compensation for some officers of almost $62 ,000 in 1993 (.see Exhibit "A" ) . Council has continuously worked to ensure that the public safety equipment. facilities and work environ- ment are among the best. Binding and compulsory arbitration will negatively affect operational aspects of the two departments as well (see Exhibits "B" and "C") . Should this amend- ment be adopted, the end result will be a loss of control and account ability over one of the most important and expensive elements of the City services . public safety (see Exhibit "D" ) . the goal of the POA & FFA is to convince the people of San Luis Obispo that the ultimate responsibility for decision making in this area should not rear w.i'� h their duly elected representatives . the Council . I submit that a panel of outside arbitrators is not the one to make these decisions . If the Council is to be removed from this al.l-important and essential fuuc:tion then the obvious choice to make these difficult decisions is the Peonle of the City. After all . it is the taxpaying public who ultimately bear the costs of these extremely difficult and complicated decisions . If the Counr,il is removed frim this role. then this role should be preserved for our citizens . The attached resolution (see Exhibit "E" ) would place on the ballot a Charter amendment to give the People of the City tiie power to approve or deny any and all compensation increases to nou-management public safety positions . �iiii�li illlllll ��� ��� �DII VIII city of sAn tuis oBispo 990 Palm Street/Post Office Box 8100 • San Luis Obispo, CA 93403-8100 October 4, 1988 MEMORANDUM TO: John Dunn, City Administrative Officer. FROM: Wendy George, Acting Personnel Director 'u( SUBJECT: Police Association Salary Increases The most common salary range and step for police officers as of July, 1988 was 702(E), the top step. This designation is for an officer with education or special assignment pay. Total comp for such an officer as of June 30, 1988 was: Total Comp 6/30/88 = $43,716.00 per year (prior to new contract) At the end of this new contract there will no longer be education or special assignment pay. Instead there will be two Master Police Officer designations. Possible total comp will be as follows: Total Comp 1/1/93 = $56,280.00 per year (Police Officer, top step) _ $59,016.00 per year (Master Police Officer I) _ $61,884.00 per year (Master Police Officer II) Because the PERS retirement rate changes each year, I have assumed the current rate for the 1993 calculation. Total comp includes salary, insurance and retirement. It does not include uniform allowance which is paid annually. EXHIBIT "A" a cl-ty ue-RN San h"'lls c3ispo POLICE DEPARTMENT ` Post Office Box 1328 — San Luis Obispo. CA 93406-1328 — 805/549.7310 TO: John Dunn, City Administrative Officer FROM: James M. Gardiner, Chief of Police DATE: October 53 1988 SUBJECT: Binding Arbitration Mike's report on the Fire Department's experiences with Binding Arbitration clearly delineates the form and substance of the process. My additional comments will address more subjective observations. The picture is no better on the Police side. The four Police agencies (Vallejo - 1969, Oakland - 1972, Palo Alto - 1976, San Jose - 1982) have experienced similar cost increases. More significant has been the detrimental impacts on management flexibility and the amount of time spent on arbitration issues. All the facts listed in Mike's report are paralleled in respect to operation and management issues. One area not listed but in effect in Palo Alto and Oakland i the applicability of arbitration to discipline. This is one area, however , in which a professional arbitrator may be more effective than a civilian personnel board. While the tenor of management/labor relationships varies in each organization, every Department stated that there has been a decrease in the ability to make effective and timely decisions. Each change or act which could be subject of arbitration has to be weighed against the costs of entering into the process. in Palo Alto. the Chief on occasion must go through the City Manager to get Council approval on an internal policy change because of the potential costa. This directly involves the Council in the day to day operation of the Department. ^in my opinion, the result in these four agencies has been a fundamental shift from a focus of meeting the needs of the community to managing (as much as possible) the resources and organization ,dictated by an arbitrator. The focus is inward not outward . Ultimately, with more outside control and limitations on management , there will be the need to prioritize what services will be provided. I can foresee tough decisions and cutbacks in the ability to be a "full service" Police Department. H EXHIBIT "B" 2 i � J MEMORANDUM TO: John Dunn, CAO FROM Michael Dolder, Fire Chief DATE: October 5, 1988 SUBJECT: Operational Impacts of Binding Arbitration State law, Labor Code 1962, already prohibits Firefighters from striking and Government Code 3504, defines what is subject to meet and confer negotiations and what are management rights and responsibilities. The proposed San Luis Obispo Public Safety Binding Arbitration initiative includes the same items covered under existing State law, except that it adds a binding arbitration requirement to the negotiations process. The specific issues covered in the binding arbitration initiative are as follows: "._ obligation to negotiate subject to arbitration on all matters relating to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment Existing State law, known as the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, requires a city to meet and confer on issues impacting an employee unit, however, the law does not require negotiations on merit, necessity and organization. The addition of binding arbitration to the negotiation requirement subjects all city actions involving the Police and Fire Departments to binding arbitration review. Specifically, City management rights and abilities to regulate City operations, presently excluded,form negotiations, would now be subjected to binding arbitration. Based on court rulings involving the City of Vallejo, binding arbitration has already been applied to the following operational and/or management areas: Promotional testing methods Assignment of personnel Administration and assignment of overtime Uniforms Time off policies Changes to City and department rules and regulations Changes to general operations and equipment Injury reports Medical exams Safety gear/equipment Safety tests of equipment Retirement No. of persons responding on fire engines Educational incentive City codes which impact firefighting procedures Minimum manning Vacation procedures Sick leave procedures Seniority Reduction in work force Acting pay Reporting pay V 24C-(4) �. EXHIBIT "C-111 r l Work hours Holidays Authorized leave Association business leave Background on Cities Onerating Under Bindine Arbitration Of the 450 cities in the State of California only six northern California Cities have passed some form of binding arbitration. These Cities include Hayward, Oakland, Palo Alto, Redwood City, San Jose and Vallejo. In four cities both Police and Fire are covered by binding arbitration and the remaining two cities, arbitration in others only applies to the Fire Department. The City of Vallejo, in early 1970, was the first California city to enact binding arbitration legislation. Vallejo's binding arbitration applies to all city departments, however, the Fire Department has used the procedure most often. Binding arbitration has impacted city operations in Vallejo. The specific areas impacted are listed above. "Arbitration also has fiscal and staff time impacts. As examples, last year's cost for arbitrating issues in the Vallejo Fire Department was in excess of $50,000. In addition. city staff time has also been severely impacted; for example, the Vallejo Fire Chief conservatively has spent two hours per day on arbitration related issues. As a result of binding arbitration, the salaries of the Vallejo Fire Department are 15% higher than any of their comparable cities which include: Hayward, San Leandro, Fremont, Alameda, Palo Alto, Mountain View, Santa Clara, San Mateo, Daly City, Santa Rosa, Stockton, Berkeley and Richmond. Redwood City is the most recent city to pass binding arbitration only applies to the Fire Department. To date, Redwood City has not gone to binding arbitration on any specific issue. However, Redwood City has also taken a short term position that they will not make any immediate policy and procedure changes and thus will eliminate the binding arbitration review or consideration in management areas. The remaining cities of Palo Alto, Hayward, Oakland and San Jose have used binding I rbitration to various degrees. However, the impacts of binding arbitration in all six communities has been an erosion of local control. Local control that the citizens gave to the City Council. V24C-(4) EXHIBIT IT-211 f► r MEETI DA E: j �� city of San LUIS OBispo ' 8 COUNCIL AGENDA REPORT ITEM N FROM: John Dunn, City Administrative Officer Roger Picquet, City Attorney SUBJECT: Compulsory and Binding Arbitration CAO RECOMMENDATION: By motion continue formal opposition to the concept of compulsory and binding arbitration in public employer-employee relations. BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION: The issue of compulsory and binding arbitration has arisen recently in connec- tion with two separate matters. One was the request from the League of Cali- fornia Cities for all cities to join in opposition to AS 3341 (Floyd) which would have mandated a statewide system for compulsory and binding arbitration on local governments for resolution of police and fire collective bargaining issues. In response to this request, the City authorized letters to be sent to state legislators setting forth our points in opposition. The other matter is the recent announcement by the local police and fire fighter associations of an intent to circulate an initiative petition to amend the Charter to include a compulsory and binding arbitration procedure to resolve disputes over wages. hours and other terms and conditions of employment. AS 3341 was just defeated in the Senate Appropriations Committee after a concerted and combined effort by city, county and other officials throughout the state. Surprisingly, even a few public safety employee associations joined in opposition arguing that compulsory and binding arbitration would destroy the existing and highly successful collective bargaining process. AB 3341 was similar to previous measures introduced in past years by police and fire organizations. Despite its latest defeat, this concept surely will be back in future legislative sessions (indeed, the proposed Charter amendment is strikingly similar to the defeated AB 3341) . The more that citizens of this community understand the basic issues and the components of compulsory and binding arbitration, the quicker this concept can be put to rest. The League encourages all cities to become very familiar with the primary reasons why compulsory and binding arbitration is a serious threat to effective municipal management. 1. In cities, compulsory and binding arbitration would remove an estimated 50% of the budget from the control of. elected officials and give authority to an outside, non-elected arbitrator with no understanding of a city's public services needs or finances to determine this major portion of the budget. } 2. Compulsory and binding arbitration is the antithesis of the collective bargaining process. Rather than negotiating in good faith, making compromises and solving problems. the parties' posture in the bargaining process to place themselves in the best possible position for arbitration. H EXHIBIT "D-1" ��' ►�►►Wnlllll�p�'�u'���IU city of san LUis osIspo A COUNCIL AGENDA REPORT September 1 , 1988 Page 2 3. Compulsory and binding arbitration (as expressed in AB 3341) is a clear, state-mandated local cost. The Legislative Counsel has ruled that notonly the cost of the arbitration process but the amount of the award above the employers' last best offer is a state-mandated local cost. The difficulty in getting the state to fully and fairly shoulder the financial burdens it imposes on local jurisdictions is well-known and and has been a source of frustration to local government. 4. Compulsory and binding arbitration is often sold as a means to prevent strikes. In Michigan, and in other places where it has been adopted, the establishment of binding and compulsory arbitration has actually caused an Increase in the number of strikes because employee groups have been dissatisfied with the arbitrator's determination. The first two reasons merit further discussion. The state constitution proyides that cities may choose to be governed under a "freeholder's charter. " This authority grants the City a great deal of flexi- bility when addressing municipal affairs. Under our Charter, the Council is "vested with all powers of legislation adequate to a complete system of local government" (section 202) . The Charter directs the Council to organize a city government (section 204) , consider and adopt an annual budget (section 802, et seg. ) . and perform other essential functions, including establishment of a personnel system. The Mayor and Councilmembers are elected at large and directly by the elec- torate to carry out the mandates of the Charter and other relevant federal and state laws. Although they are ably assisted by the appointed city officials and other city employees, it is the Council alone .which is directly responsible and accountable to the voters. Accordingly, all council members strive to be responsive to the legitimate wants, needs and desires of the community. This obligation means setting priorities and, often times, making difficult choices between competing interests and alternatives. Compulsory and binding arbitra- tion strips the Council of its necessary and inherent ability to control the level of municipal services (and related funding or costs) in a given area or function, such as public safety. and delivers the prerogative over to an arbitrator who bears no legal or official accountability or responsibility to the community or electorate. Regardless of the arbitrator's intent or motivation, his or her decision may not accurately reflect the community's choices or priorities to address community needs. By definition this form of arbitration is binding, meaning further administrative review would be impossible and judicial review extremely unlikely. EXHIBIT "D-2'• (�� � �1111611P �'dlll city or San LUIS OBISPO COUNCIL AGENDA REPORT September 1, 1988 Page 3 Government Code section 3500 et sec . is known as the "Meyers-M.ilis-Brown Act" or MMB. It regulates the current legal framework of public employer-employer relations. The heart and soul of MMB is the requirement that the governing body of a government meet and confer in good faith regarding wages. hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with the employee organizations. The governing body (Council ) must fully consider the positions and presentations of the employee organization prior to arriving at a determination of policy or particular course of action (Govt. Code section 3505) . The duty to "meet and confer in good faith" is a mutual obligation to meet personally and promptly in order to exchange freely information, opinions and proposals and to try to reach agreement on matters within dispute. The meet and confer sessions do not impinge on the legislative power vested by law in the Council . but, rather. they provide a useful channel by which employees may provide suggestiops as to how the Council's discretion in salary matters should be exercised and help promote open communication between employer and employees (Civil Service Assoc. v. S.F. (1977) 141 Cal . Rptr. 922) . This is what is referred to as "collective bargaining. " Over the years that MMB has been in effect it has operated very successfully and contributed significantly to an overall positive environment for public sector employer-employee relationships. However, although the statutory framework encourages binding agreements resulting from collective bargaining, the Council retains the ultimate power to refuse an agreement and to make its own decision (Seal Beach P.O.A. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 205 Cal . Rptr. 794) . This authority reflects the basic premise that the Council alone is held to answer to the electorate for the policy directions and fiscal soundness of the City. If arbitration is made compulsory, the incentive to bargain in good faith and to fully consider the merits of the other side is greatly reduced. Under the scheme envisioned by the current proposed Charter amendment, as with the recently deceased AB 3341 , the role of the Council , the elected representatives of the people, is reduced, in effect, to a mere advisory role to an arbitrator. Reduced to its essentials compulsory and binding arbitration is a "power grab" which removes necessary discretion from a Council to determine the direction and policy of a city in the critically important area of internal employee relations. There are many other related issues which could be addressed at great length. These include (at a minimum) the following: 1. Political divisiveness and costs involved with compulsory and binding arbitration; I 2. Experience of other jurisdictions (e.g. , Michigan and other California cities) which has shown that public employee strikes and work actions increase, not decrease with compulsory and binding arbitration; EXHIBIT "D-3" - dIIIP,�pCA�I�III city of San .aIS OBISpo MOGS COUNCIL AGENDA REPORT September 1 , 1988 Page 4 3. Negative morale among other employees when public safety employees are treated differently: 4 . Inability of departments to be efficiently managed without interference of outside arbitrator: and 5. Binding and compulsory arbitration also effect's "other terms and conditions of employment, " meaning that certain management prerogatives allowed by MMB and court decisions could be removed from us, decreasing the ability of the Police Chief and the Fire Chief' to effectively run their own departments . 6. Litigation and related costs. ~ SUMMARY: Compulsory and binding arbitration is a concept which is inherently incom- patible with the purposes and functions of a municipal government. The ability of an elected body to make appropriate and balanced policy decisions in the area of wages, hours and other terms of employment for public employees would be effectively lost. More significantly, the ability and obligation of the Council to be responsive and accountable to the voters is eliminated. This concept is really an attempt to alter the fundamental relationship and roles of the Council and employee associations. There is no corresponding benefit to be obtained by the City. Staff recommends this Council continue to support the League on this matter and express its opposition to compulsory and binding arbitration whenever and wherever appropriate. x E MiIBIT "D-4" RESOLUTION NO. (1988 Series) A RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO CALLING A GENERAL MUNICIPAL ELECTION TO BE HELD IN SAID CITY ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1989, FOR THE PURPOSE OF VOTING TO ADOPT SECTION 1106 OF THE CITY CHARTER ENTITLED "EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION" WHEREAS, a concern has been expressed that the Council may not be the appropriate body to decide compensation issues for certain public safety positions; and WHEREAS, it is highly desirable to provide a means by which such compensation issues can be resolved and determined in a manner which is democratic, fair, efficient and reasonable. , NOW, THEREFORE, 'BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of San Luis Obispo as follows: 1. There is hereby called and ordered in the City of San Luis Obispo, County of San Luis Obispo, State of California, on Tuesday, November 7, 1989, a General Municipal Election of the qualified electors of the City, to vote upon a measure to adopt City Charter Section 1106; 2. . If a special municipal election is called and ordered for any other purpose prior to November 7, 1989, the City Clerk is hereby directed to place this measure on the same ballot. 3. That Section 1106 of the City Charter of the City of San Luis Obispo shall be added to read as follows: "SECTION 1106. Employee Compensation. Any proposed increase in compensation for any employee in the position of Police officers, Fire- . 7 fighter, Fire Engineer and Fire Captain shall not be approved by Council until it has received a majority JtECE1VED OCT, 7 195 CITYCLEW SAN WiSo®SFO CA �,�1 C //.moo ��„r Exhibit E Resolution No. (1988 Series) Page 2 vote of the electorate at a regular or special municipal election." I 4. The proposition to be voted on at said General Municipal Election shall be set forth substantially as follows: CITY MEASURE "A" EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION. Shall the City YES Charter be amended to allow the electorate to approve or disapprove proposed increases NO in compensation for certain Police and Fire Department positions? 4. The proposition shall pass only if a majority of the votes cast by voters for the Charter amendment are "YES" votes. On motion of seconded by and on the following roll call vote: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: The foregoing Resolution was passed and adopted this day of 1988. MAYOR RON DUNIN ATTEST: s CITY CLERK PAMELA VOGES ' 1 Resolution No. (1988 Series) : Page 3 c APPROVED: City Ad inlstrative Officer City A torney